In re J.N.N.
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
Date FiledNovember 13, 2026
Docket128647
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 128,647
In the Interests of J.N.N. and J.P.N.,
Minor Children.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
The Supreme Court's discretionary review of a summary petition under Rule
8.03A (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 61) is only appropriate when controlling authority is
dispositive of the entire appeal or no substantial question is presented by the appeal.
When these requirements are not met, a summary petition will be denied.
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed February 6,
2026. Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; MICHAEL HOELSCHER, judge. Oral argument held
September 15, 2026. Opinion filed November 13, 2026. Summary petition for review dismissed as
improvidently granted.
Laura E. Poschen, of Poschen Law, LLC, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for
appellant natural mother.
Kristi D. Allen, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney,
was with her on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WALSH, J.: This appeal offers us the opportunity to clarify the very limited
application of the summary petition for review mechanism set out in Supreme Court Rule
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8.03A (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 61). We ultimately dismiss the petition as improvidently
granted because it fails to meet the limited circumstances that Rule 8.03A is designed for.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We need not recite the facts of the underlying case here; they are unchallenged and
are accurately set forth in the Court of Appeals' opinion below. Briefly, after the district
court terminated J.N.'s (Mother) parental rights as to her children J.N.N. and J.P.N.
(collectively, Children), a panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed. In re J.N.N.,
No. 128,647, 2026 WL 320185 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion). The panel
concluded that, based on the record, clear and convincing evidence supported the district
court's findings that (1) Mother was unfit under K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(7), (b)(8), (b)(9), and
(c)(3); (2) Mother's unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future; and (3)
termination was in the best interests of the children. 2026 WL 320185, at *8-11.
Taking issue with only the foreseeability determination, Mother sought review in
this court by way of a summary petition for review under Rule 8.03A, rather than a
standard petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision under Supreme Court Rule
8.03 (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 54). We granted the petition and have jurisdiction. K.S.A.
60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Court of
Appeals); K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (aggrieved party may petition the Supreme Court for review
of decisions of the Court of Appeals); K.S.A. 38-2273(a) (authorizing appeals from
terminations of parental rights under the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children).
ANALYSIS
Supreme Court Rule 8.03 sets out the general mechanism by which a party may
seek the Supreme Court's discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals. "In
lieu of" a petition for review under Rule 8.03, a party may petition the Supreme Court to
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"summarily consider" one or more issues raised before the Court of Appeals under
limited circumstances: "when controlling authority is dispositive of the entire appeal or
no substantial question is presented by the appeal." Rule 8.03A(a) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at
61). The petitions contemplated under Rules 8.03 and 8.03A are functionally distinct and
are not interchangeable. See, e.g., Rule 8.03(b)(5).
Review under Rule 8.03A is only appropriate "when controlling authority is
dispositive of the entire appeal or no substantial question is presented by the appeal."
When these requirements are not met, a summary petition will be denied.
Mother's summary petition invokes the words of the rule by claiming that
controlling Kansas authority is dispositive of the issues presented and that no substantial
question exists because the panel's decision "conflicts with settled law governing parental
unfitness and foreseeability." Mother further "asks the [Supreme] Court to apply settled
precedent governing evidentiary sufficiency of a foreseeability finding."
Specifically, the issue as framed by Mother is:
"Whether a finding that a parent's unfitness is unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future can stand as a matter of law given K.S.A. 38-2269(a) and In re M.S.,
56 Kan. App. 2d 1247 (2019), where the parent exercised sustained, unsupervised
parenting time without incident and no evidence demonstrated deterioration or danger
during that time."
Although Mother frames the issue as a legal question that has already been
answered in her favor by existing law, Mother's statutory and case citations do not
demonstrate that "controlling authority is dispositive," or that "no substantial question is
presented." See K.S.A. 38-2269(a) (setting out factors to be considered for termination of
parental rights, stating that, when a child has been adjudicated to be a child in need of
care, "the court may terminate parental rights or appoint a permanent custodian when the
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court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit by reason of conduct
or condition which renders the parent unable to care properly for a child and the conduct
or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future"); K.S.A. 38-2269(g)(1) (also
requiring court to consider whether termination is in the best interests of the child).
In re M.S., a Court of Appeals decision that is not binding on this court, stands for
the unremarkable (and unhelpful to Mother) proposition that "our courts may look to the
parent's past conduct as an indicator of future behavior." In re M.S., 56 Kan. App. 2d
1247, 1264, 447 P.3d 994 (2019) (affirming that children's young ages, lack of real
parental relationship between mother and one child, and Mother making little to no
progress during the 31 months between the CINC proceedings and the termination
hearing, together, constitute clear and convincing evidence that parental unfitness was
unlikely to change in foreseeable future). In re M.S. is not "dispositive of the entire
appeal."
Simply put, no Kansas authority holds that evidence of sustained, unsupervised,
and safe parenting time necessarily precludes a finding that a parent's unfitness is
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Because controlling authority does not
dictate a different outcome and because she does raise questions of substance, Mother's
argument does not meet the requirements for review of a Rule 8.03A summary petition.
Nor will we answer a question different than the one raised, including whether the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a rational factfinder could have found the
district court's foreseeability determination highly probable—i.e., supported by clear and
convincing evidence. See Rule 8.03A(b)(4)(C)(i) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 62) (the
Supreme Court "will not consider issues . . . not presented or fairly included in the
summary petition for review"); see also In re K.W.D., 321 Kan. 100, 110, 573 P.3d 221
(2025) (setting out standard of review of termination orders).
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Mother's efforts to distinguish the facts of In re M.S. from those here and her
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's foreseeability
findings betray the merits focus of her request for review.
We note that, following oral argument, the State filed a motion for additional
briefing, seeking to address "the sufficiency of the language of the district court for the
foreseeable future finding." Mother responded that additional briefing was unnecessary
because "Mother's requested disposition remains based on the sufficiency challenge
raised throughout this appeal." But these arguments are not properly presented—and
relief cannot be granted—through the Rule 8.03A summary petition mechanism, which is
not designed for fulsome review of evidentiary sufficiency arguments. We therefore deny
the State's motion for additional briefing and note Mother's response.
Because Mother's petition does not meet the limited circumstances for review
under the Rule 8.03A mechanism, we deem Mother's summary petition improvidently
granted. See In re Estate of Brenner, 306 Kan. 429, 430, 394 P.3d 857 (2017) (The
determination that a petition was improvidently granted "is identical in effect to a denial
of the petition for review in the first instance, and a 'denial of a petition for review
imports no opinion on the merits of the case.'"). We do not disturb the judgment of the
Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the district court.
Summary petition for review dismissed as improvidently granted.
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