State v. Rhodes

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 129,524 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. RONALD L. RHODES, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. Issue preclusion, also called collateral estoppel, prevents a party from relitigating issues that were previously decided on the merits and necessary to the judgment. 2. Issue preclusion, like other preclusion doctrines, is prudential. Courts may exercise their discretion not to apply issue preclusion to avoid injustice. 3. Whether the requirements of issue preclusion are met is a legal question subject to unlimited review. But the decision to apply the doctrine is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; WILLIAM S. WOOLLEY , judge. Submitted without oral argument September 18, 2026. Opinion filed November 6, 2026. Affirmed. Sam Schirer, of Capital Appeals and Conflicts Office, was on the brief for appellant. 1  Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. The opinion of the court was delivered by WALL, J.: Ronald L. Rhodes is serving a life sentence for first-degree premeditated murder. In 2008, Rhodes petitioned the district court to conduct DNA testing on fingernail scrapings and a hair strand collected from the victim's body. The district court denied the petition after finding that the State no longer had the items. Rhodes tried again in 2010 with the same result. In 2025, Rhodes filed a third petition to test the same material. The district court again denied the petition. It found the State no longer had the items. But it also ruled that issue preclusion barred Rhodes' claim. Issue preclusion is a doctrine courts can apply to prevent parties from relitigating an issue that has already been decided on the merits. Rhodes appealed that ruling directly to our court. We hold that issue preclusion bars Rhodes' third DNA-testing petition. The issue has already been decided on the merits. The district court twice denied Rhodes' request to DNA test the fingernail scrapings and hair strand because the State no longer possessed them. And Rhodes failed to appeal either judgment. Rhodes argues that it would be unjust to apply issue preclusion here. He says there is no evidence that the district court told him that he could appeal the judgments denying his first and second DNA-testing petitions. But that question—whether the district court advised Rhodes of his appeal rights in prior proceedings—is a fact question that was not raised in district court. And the question pursues a remedy not contemplated under the DNA-testing statute. We thus affirm the district court's judgment. 2  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1981, police found Cleother Burrell stabbed to death in a Wichita apartment- complex hallway. They took fingernail scrapings from Burrell's body but did not collect anything visible. They also found a hair strand on one of Burrell's hands. The State charged Rhodes for Burrell's murder. The lone eyewitness, Bruce Elliott, testified that he saw Rhodes stab Burrell outside Elliott's apartment door. Rhodes claimed that Elliott was the real killer. Rhodes noted that Burrell's fingernails were broken, suggesting Burrell had struggled with his attacker. And Rhodes linked Burrell's broken fingernails to scratches visible on Elliott's neck the night Burrell was murdered. Rhodes also argued that the hair strand found on Burrell's hand matched Elliott's hair type but not Rhodes'. The jury convicted Rhodes of first-degree premeditated murder. The district court sentenced Rhodes to life imprisonment. And this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Rhodes, No. 53,467, unpublished opinion filed June 11, 1982 (Kan.). In 2008, Rhodes petitioned the district court under K.S.A. 21-2512 to DNA test the fingernail scrapings and hair strand collected from Burrell's body. In response, the State said it no longer had the items. It offered an affidavit from a Sedgwick County District Attorney's Office investigator. The investigator swore that neither the KBI nor the Wichita Police Department had any physical evidence from Rhodes' case. The district court denied Rhodes' petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. It found the requested material was not available for testing. Rhodes didn't appeal. 3  In 2010, Rhodes again petitioned to test the same material. The State again responded that it didn't have the material. The district court summarily denied the petition. It reasoned that "[t]here is no material in possession of [the] State that can be tested. This is [the] same motion that was denied in 2008." Rhodes didn't appeal. In 2025, Rhodes filed his third petition to test the fingernail scrapings and the hair strand. And for the third time, the district court summarily denied the petition. It found the State no longer possessed the items Rhodes sought to have tested. But it also ruled that issue preclusion barred Rhodes' petition. Rhodes directly appealed that decision to our court. We have jurisdiction. See K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(3) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction if maximum sentence is life) ; K.S.A. 22-3602 (defendant may appeal any unfavorable district-court judgment to the appellate court with jurisdiction). ANALYSIS Rhodes argues that the district court committed two errors in summarily denying his third petition for DNA testing. First, he claims that the district court erred by concluding that issue preclusion barred his claim. Second, Rhodes contends that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the State disputed the existence of the material he sought to have tested. We address each argument in turn after discussing the controlling legal framework for our analysis. Rhodes seeks postconviction DNA testing under K.S.A. 21-2512. That statute allows inmates convicted of first-degree murder or rape to petition the district court to test biological material that meets three conditions. First, the biological material must b e related to the underlying investigation or prosecution. K.S.A. 21 -2512(a)(1). Second, that material must be "in the actual or constructive possession of the state." K.S.A. 21 - 4 2512(a)(2). Third, it must not have been previously tested, or it must be reasonably likely that retesting with new DNA techniques will produce more accurate and probative results. K.S.A. 21-2512(a)(3). When a party appeals an order summarily denying a DNA-testing petition or challenges whether the requirements for issue preclusion are met, our review is unlimited because both challenges raise questions of law. State v. Holt, 321 Kan. 125, 128-29, 573 P.3d 665 (2025); State v. Edwards, 318 Kan. 567, 570, 544 P.3d 815 (2024). But issue preclusion is a prudential doctrine. See Herington v. City of Wichita, 314 Kan. 447, 457-59, 500 P.3d 1168 (2021). So even when the requirements are met, the district court still has discretion to decide whether to apply it. And we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Parry, 305 Kan. 1189, 1192, 390 P.3d 879 (2017) (recognizing preservation rules are prudential and reviewing Court of Appeals decision to review unpreserved issue for abuse of discretion); Matter of McWhorter, 887 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) (whether collateral estoppel is available is legal question reviewed de novo, but decision to apply the doctrine is reviewed for abuse of discretion). Let's turn to Rhodes' challenge to the district court's reliance on the issue- preclusion doctrine. Issue preclusion, also called collateral estoppel, prevents a party from relitigating issues previously decided on their merits and necessary to the judgment. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748-49, 121 S. Ct. 1808, 149 L. Ed. 2d 968 (2001); Herington, 314 Kan. at 457. The doctrine applies when three elements are met: (1) there is a prior judgment on the merits that determined the parties' rights and liabilities on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment ; (2) the same parties or parties in privity were involved in the prior and current litigation; and (3) the issue previously litigated was decided and necessary to support the judgment. Venters v. Sellers, 293 Kan. 87, 98, 261 P.3d 538 (2011). 5  Here, the district court correctly found that Rhodes' third DNA-testing petition met the issue-preclusion elements. In his three petitions, Rhodes brought the same claim—a request to DNA test the fingernail scrapings and hair strand collected from Burrell's body. Both Rhodes and the State were parties to the prior and current proceedings. While the district court summarily denied Rhodes' first two petitions, those summary denials were rulings on the merits. That is, the district court ruled that the motions, filings, and record conclusively showed Rhodes was not entitled to relief. See State v. Moncla, 317 Kan. 413, 416, 531 P.3d 528 (2023). That ruling supported the prior judgments. The district court found the State no longer possessed the fingernail scrapings and hair strand Rhodes wanted to test. That finding supported the district court's judgments denying Rhodes' first two petitions because the statute permits testing only if the State possesses the biological material. See K.S.A. 21-2512(a)(2). Rhodes acknowledges that issue preclusion could apply. But he notes that it's a prudential doctrine. And he argues the district court shouldn't have applied it because it doesn't serve the ends of justice. Rhodes claims he didn't have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue because the district court never held an evidentiary hearing. And there's no evidence that the court advised him that he could appeal the judgments denying his first two petitions. Rhodes is correct that issue preclusion is a prudential doctrine "rooted in the requirements of justice and sound public policy." Herington, 314 Kan. at 458. Courts must use a "flexible, common-sense" approach when applying any preclusion doctrine. 314 Kan. at 458. And they have discretion not to apply the issue-preclusion doctrine if doing so would result in injustice. See In re Estate of Reed, 236 Kan. 514, 519, 693 P.2d 1156 (1985) (doctrine of res judicata should not be "applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice"). 6  But Rhodes has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by applying the issue-preclusion doctrine. Rhodes claims that the district court erred by denying his first two petitions without holding an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Angelo, 316 Kan. 438, 455, 518 P.3d 27 (2022) (If the defendant and the State dispute the existence of the biological material the defendant seeks to have tested under K.S.A. 21 -2512, "they can present evidence to the district court for appropriate fact-finding."). But if Rhodes believed the district court erred, he could have appealed those earlier judgments. He did not do so. And he cannot now lay his failure to appeal at the district court's feet and claim it would be an injustice to preclude him from bringing the same claim a third time. See Aguras v. Lease Trucks, Inc., 193 Kan. 449, Syl. ¶ 3, 394 P.2d 85 (1964) ("A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, even though erroneous, when not corrected by appeal or supplementary proceedings, is res adjudicata."). Rhodes tries to avoid this fate by questioning whether the district court informed him that he could appeal those prior judgments. But there are procedural and substantive problems with his argument. Rhodes raises this argument for the first time on appeal without explaining why we should consider it on the merits. See Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36) (If an issue was not raised below, the appellant must explain why the issue is properly before the court.). Whether the district court notified Rhodes about his appeal rights in the first two proceedings is a fact question. But because Rhodes didn't raise the issue below, we have no district-court findings to review. And appellate courts don't make fact findings. State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 488, 243 P.3d 343 (2010). Moreover, Rhodes' appeal focuses on his third petition and his rights under K.S.A. 21-2512. That statute grants some defendants the right to postconviction DNA testing when qualifying conditions exist. If Rhodes' allegations about the court's advisements in prior proceedings are true, then other legal remedies may permit him to appeal the first 7 two judgments denying his DNA-testing petitions. See State v. Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733, Syl. ¶ 3, 640 P.2d 1255 (1982) (while timely notice of appeal is ordinarily jurisdictional, courts may make exceptions under certain circumstances including when defendants are not informed of their appeal rights). But K.S.A. 21-2512 does not contemplate collateral challenges to those judgments. In short, it's not the proper vehicle for deciding whether the court properly advised Rhodes that he could appeal the first and second judgments. We thus affirm the district court's ruling that Rhodes' third petition for DNA testing is barred by issue preclusion. And because we are affirming on these grounds, we need not address Rhodes' challenge to the district court's finding that the State no longer possessed the fingernail scrapings and hair strand. Affirmed. 8