Miller v. Harvey

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 129,044 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS TIFFANY MILLER, Appellee, v. AARON HARVEY, Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; CONSTANCE M. ALVEY, judge. Oral argument held August 18, 2026. Opinion filed October 23, 2026. Affirmed. Alan V. Johnson, of Sloan, Eisenbarth, Glassman, McEntire & Jarboe, L.L.C., of Topeka, for appellant. Rosie M. Quinn, of Rosie M. Quinn Attorney LLC, of Kansas City, for appellee. Before ARNOLD-BURGER, P.J., ISHERWOOD and HURST, JJ. PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from an oral agreement between cousins concerning the sale of a house and 5 acres of land. Tiffany Miller claims her cousin Aaron Harvey agreed to sell her his property if she cured the mortgage default, assumed the mortgage payments, and paid him the remaining equity. After Miller took possession, made the payments, and substantially improved the property, Harvey sought to sell it to someone else. The district court concluded that Miller's partial performance removed the agreement from the statute of frauds and ordered specific performance. Harvey appeals, arguing that Miller's failure to disclose the agreement in her bankruptcy proceedings 1 judicially estops her claim and that the statute of frauds bars enforcement of the oral contract. Neither argument warrants reversal. We affirm the district court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This appeal involves cousins, Harvey and Miller. The subject of this lawsuit consists of a house and about 5 acres in Kansas City. Harvey purchased the property in 2004, and the next year he borrowed $75,000 to make improvements to the property. These improvements included remodeling the house and constructing an arena for roping cattle. At the same time Miller's son, Demetre, kept his horses in the pasture on the property. Miller would routinely visit the property to feed those horses. While at the property, Miller had permission to check the mail and was instructed to notify Harvey if there was anything that may appear to be important. This is where the stories diverge as revealed during the trial in this case. A. Testimony of Miller In January 2020, Miller opened a letter addressed to Harvey stating that the property was on the verge of foreclosure and called Harvey to notify him. She testified that Harvey told her that he was "'done with it.'" Miller claimed that she offered to buy it from him. She stated that Harvey told her "$80,000 less than what was owed on the mortgage." Miller testified that she was solely interested in the land for her son and his rodeo activities but had never been inside the house. Miller explained that Harvey did not inform her of the mortgage balance, so she told him she would need to contact the 2 mortgage company. To do so, Miller needed Harvey's social security number and his driver's license. Miller testified that Harvey provided her with his social security number, date of birth, and texted a picture of his driver's license. Miller stated that when she contacted the mortgage company, she was able to confirm that the house was on the verge of foreclosure. During her testimony, Miller reviewed a letter from the mortgage company and stated that the amount listed in the letter—$9,055.68—reflected the amount she was told was needed to bring the mortgage current. Miller stated she and Harvey entered into an oral agreement for the sale of the land. Miller explained that the price was $80,000 minus what was owed on the mortgage, which, at that time, was about $61,000. She added that $9,000 was due by January 2025, and Harvey would deliver her a quitclaim deed. Miller also stated that the loan had to be reinstated. Miller explained that she would make the monthly mortgage payments and that the loan modification added the reinstatement amount to the balance of the mortgage rather than requiring immediate payment. The parties stipulated that Miller paid all the utility bills on the property as of January 2020, although they remained in Harvey's name until about March 2024. Miller testified that this was part of the sale agreement. In January 2020, Harvey delivered house keys to Miller's husband. Miller testified that her understanding was Harvey had delivered the keys because she purchased the house from him. Miller testified that after receiving the keys, she entered the house for the first time. Inside, she found furniture from previous tenants, plus mud, mold, and mildew on the basement walls. She also noticed a distinct sewer odor. Miller contacted Harvey to report these conditions, and according to Miller, Harvey responded, "That's your deal now." Miller understood Harvey's response to mean that because she had purchased the house, she was responsible for addressing the property's condition. 3  Miller testified that Harvey authorized her to apply for a loan modification using his personal information and to sign documents on his behalf. She explained that, to obtain the modification, she made the mortgage payments for three months under a trial payment plan. In May 2020, the lender approved the loan modification. Miller stated that she had paid all mortgage payments since January 2020. Miller explained that when Demetre attended college, he resided on campus and after his 2022 graduation he moved to the Kansas City property. At that point, Demetre began paying the mortgage, utilities, as well as contributing towards any repairs and improvements. Miller added that beginning in January 2020, Miller and her son made significant repairs and improvements to the property, including: "fixing the barn, the power washing, the fencing, the asphalt that Demetre put up, cutting down trees, grass cutting, weed control, the plumbing that had to be replaced, the French drain, the bobcat work, and the outdoor arena area, installing a new sink faucet. "And in the appliance room, Demetre put washer and dryer installed, broken step, a new security door, a new light fixture in the dining room, replaced vent covers, and installed a new thermostat. "In the kitchen, the refrigerator replacement, stove replacement, and installed new kitchen sink. "The basement labor, when we replaced the hot water tank, cleaned the mold and mildew out, the carpet tear out and replaced the sewer pipe." Miller detailed the work done to the basement of the house. Demetre also made repairs or improvements to the roping arena. Miller admitted that she never informed Harvey about any of the repairs or improvements which she had made to the property. Miller stated that, in March 2024, she first learned that Harvey was trying to sell the property when he put a sale sign in the yard. Miller added that a few days prior, Harvey indicated that he wanted her to put the property in her name. Miller, however, had 4 told him that she could not do so because she was in bankruptcy. Miller added that her grandfather had indicated that Harvey was attempting to sell the property. She said that Harvey had texted Demetre about selling the property. Around the same time, Harvey had the utilities disconnected. At this point, Miller sued. Miller admitted that she had filed for bankruptcy in 2022, at the same time she believed she was buying the property from Harvey. She also testified that she did not disclose in her bankruptcy petition her contract to purchase the property from Harvey or the mortgage payments she was making on the property. Miller stated that this omission was an "honest mistake," but stated she was now aware that omitting that information was unlawful. Miller added that she also failed to disclose the expenses from the property repairs and improvements. Miller testified that she eventually informed her bankruptcy attorney of the information regarding the property. During cross-examination, however, Miller reviewed her amended bankruptcy petition and confirmed that it did not include any information about her property contract or the mortgage payments. Finally, Miller confirmed that her bankruptcy proceedings would not be completed by January 1, 2025, which was the date that Harvey was to provide her with a quitclaim deed. B. Testimony of Harvey Harvey testified that he had not made an agreement with anyone to sell his Kansas City property. He recalled a phone call with Miller about his mail and confirmed that Miller told him that the home was in foreclosure. Harvey, however, insisted that the home was not in foreclosure, nor had it ever been in foreclosure. Harvey testified that the agreement was that if Miller paid the mortgage and utility bills, "that she could stay there that they could use the property." Harvey clarified that his understanding was that Miller 5 and her husband intended to use the property to store cars and continue keeping horses there and "they didn't need to stay in the house, because they already had houses." While testifying, Harvey reviewed the picture of the property, which he described as a "pasture." Harvey claimed that during his time living at the Kansas City property, he built an arena using a dozer. Harvey confirmed that Miller never informed him of any improvements she wanted to make to the property. Harvey testified that once he relocated from Tonganoxie to his current home, he was "done with the [Kansas City] property," and wanted the money out of it. Harvey explained that in 2024, he spoke with Miller about selling the property. Harvey testified that Miller told him she had just filed for bankruptcy and that she had paid for Demetre to attend college so he could purchase the property. According to Harvey, Miller said that Demetre would now have to "step up to the plate" and buy the property himself. Harvey added that he then contacted Demetre about buying the property, but Demetre was dismissive. Despite this, Harvey stated that he informed Demetre that he spoke with Miller about his plan to place a sale sign in the yard. After being aware of Miller's bankruptcy, Harvey testified that he authorized his attorney to communicate with any potential buyers about the asking price for his Kansas City property. Harvey stated that, in the spring of 2024, he received a $150,000 offer for the property, accompanied by a cashier's check for that amount. Harvey stated that at the time of trial, the mortgage on the property was around $49,000. In August 2024, the district court held a hearing to announce its findings of fact and conclusions of law. It ruled: "In this case, the plaintiff purchasers had made part payment for the land by obtaining the loan modification to secure the default by making the required three payments then 6  continuing to make the mortgage payment; had taken exclusive and notorious possession of the real estate when Plaintiffs received a key to the property. The plaintiff made improvements to the property by cleaning the mud out of the home, improving the driveway, and improving the arena and other improvements as were previously stated. All of the improvements having been made with the acquiescence of the defendant, when the defendant notified the plaintiff that the mud in the basement was now her problem because she was now the owner. "The Court finds that the plaintiff was no longer required to give the defendants permission or knowledge of any other improvements. The Court sustains the plaintiff's petition for specific performance finding that the plaintiff has proved that the oral contract is removed from the statute of frauds by the plaintiff following the oral agreement. And finds that, at a minimum, the plaintiff orchestrated the loan modification, continued to make the mortgage payments, and made the valuable improvements to the real estate, as was testified to." In its journal entry, the district court included the following conclusions of law and findings of fact: "Conclusions of Law a) To have a contract there must be an offer and an unconditional and positive acceptance, and a meeting of the minds of all essential elements. b) Pursuant to K.S.A. 33-10, a contract for land must be in writing (Statute of Frauds). This statute was enacted to prevent fraud and injustice. c) The Statute of Frauds cannot be used as a shield to protect fraud or enable one to take advantage of his own wrongdoing. d) An oral [agreement] can be removed from the Statute of Frauds when one party had relied upon the agreement to his/her detriment, and gross injustice would result if the oral agreement was not enforced. e) There must be a compelling, equitable considerations for the agreement to avoid the Statute of Frauds. f) Partial performance, done with the knowledge, consent or acquiescence of the party charged, has been accepted as justification to remove an oral contract from the operation of the Statute of Frauds. 7  g) The oral contract must be fully made and completed in every respect, except for the writing. The agreement must be clear, fair, reasonable and just. "Findings of Fact a) Mr. Harvey purchased the property in 2004 and borrowed $75,000.00 in 2005 to remodel the property. He resided at the property until 2011. b) Mr. Harvey rented the property after he moved from the property. As rent, the renters made the mortgage payments and paid the utilities, which remained in Harvey's name. c) In 2020, Plaintiff testified that she and Harvey verbally agreed for Plaintiff to purchase the property. At that time, the mortgage payments were in arrears. d) The agreement required the Plaintiff to bring the mortgage up to date, pay an additional $80,000.00 minus the mortgage balance of $69,000.00 for the property, with $19,000.00 to be paid to the Defendant by January 1, 2025. Plaintiff was required to pay the utilities, and a quitclaim deed would follow. e) Defendant denied there was an oral agreement to sell, that his agreement was for rental purposes only, which had been the history of the property. The difference between this rental agreement and previous rental agreements was that Plaintiff was required to bring the mortgage current. f) Plaintiff obtained a loan modification, which the Court finds the Defendant must have agreed to because he gave his personal information to the Plaintiff to gain access to his mortgage account. g) Plaintiff took possession of the property and made improvements to the driveway, arena, fencing, plumbing, and installed new appliances. h) No other tenants made repairs or improvements to the property. "Order of the Court "Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court sustains the Plaintiff's Petition for specific performance. The oral contract is removed from the Statute of Frauds." Harvey timely appealed. 8  ANALYSIS On appeal, Harvey makes three arguments: (1) judicial estoppel bars Miller's claim; (2) the statute of frauds bars Miller's claim; and (3) the district court erred when it ordered specific performance instead of restitution. Because, under Kansas law, the adequacy of monetary compensation is part of the analysis for determining whether partial performance removes an oral land contract from the statute of frauds, Harvey's stated issues 2 and 3 merge into a single issue. See Bank of Alton v. Tanaka, 247 Kan. 443, 453-54, 799 P.2d 1029 (1990) (listing the conditions required for partial performance to take an oral contract for the sale of real estate out of the statute of frauds). Each is addressed in turn. Harvey waived his newly minted claim of judicial estoppel by not raising it before the district court and not asserting an exception to this court's preservation rules. "Judicial estoppel precludes a party from taking one position in a case to induce the court to act in a certain way and then taking a contrary or conflicting position in a related proceeding involving the same opposing parties." Estate of Belden v. Brown County, 46 Kan. App. 2d 247, 262, 261 P.3d 943 (2011). Harvey argues that Miller's claim is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because (1) she failed to disclose her claim for the oral property contract in her bankruptcy pleadings; (2) she failed to disclose her payments made towards the mortgage; and (3) she failed to disclose the expenses she incurred for repair and improvement to the property. In other words, by failing to declare her interest in the property in the bankruptcy proceeding, she is estopped, or barred, from claiming an interest in the property in this proceeding. 9  Miller asserts that Harvey waived an estoppel defense by not including it as an affirmative defense in his pleadings and not arguing its application at trial. After a review of the record, we agree with Miller. In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including estoppel. K.S.A. 60-208(c)(1)(F). The statute does not distinguish between types of estoppel—equitable estoppel, collateral estoppel, or judicial estoppel—all fall within the general mandate to plead estoppel as an affirmative defense. While estoppel must be pled, the failure to use the precise word "'estoppel'" in the answer is not conclusive of waiver, so long as the defendant has pled the facts constituting the defense of estoppel. Turon State Bank v. Bozarth, 235 Kan. 786, 789, 684 P.2d 419 (1984). The purpose of the pleading requirement—fairness and notice—is satisfied when the facts underlying the defense are set forth, even if the label is omitted. 235 Kan. at 788-89. An affirmative defense not asserted in a responsive pleading is waived. 235 Kan. 786, Syl. ¶ 1. There is no dispute that Harvey did not plead estoppel as an affirmative defense in his answer, nor did he state any claims or facts in his answer that referred to estoppel under any other name. So the general rule is that he waived that defense. But as with most rules there are limited exceptions. The most significant practical exception is that if a party argues an unpled affirmative defense and the opposing party fails to object on the ground that the defense was not pled, the opposing party relinquishes that procedural challenge, and the district court may consider the defense. See Estate of Belden, 46 Kan. App. 2d 247, Syl. ¶ 6. Harvey claims that this exception applies. He asserts that Miller was examined during trial in regard to her failure to amend her bankruptcy petition to include her interest in the property and that Harvey also included the argument in his supplemental trial brief. The record does not support Harvey's claim. 10  It is correct that Harvey cross-examined Miller about her bankruptcy proceeding and a failure to disclose her claim to this property. But he never argued that this constituted judicial estoppel or asked the court to dismiss Miller's claim on that basis. The sum total of evidence that Harvey presents to this court to show that he properly preserved this issue is contained in his reply brief on appeal: "Mr. Harvey made the following argument in his supplemental trial brief: 'It is noteworthy that during much of the time Plaintiff contends she was improving the property, she was in bankruptcy. Payments not only for the mortgage but arguably also for improvements would be required to go through the bankruptcy trustee. Plaintiff admits, and her bankruptcy petition shows, no payments on the property.' ". . . Accordingly, Mr. Harvey pled the essential facts constituting the doctrine of judicial estoppel." Such an argument stretches credulity. Harvey never made the judicial estoppel argument to the district court. He did not take the next step to argue that Miller's claim should be dismissed due to judicial estoppel. His request for relief was never dismissal based on estoppel. His sole request consistently was for the court to apply the statute of frauds to bar Miller's claim. So it is no surprise that the district court order does not address judicial estoppel. He did not raise it as a legal defense at any time before the district court. And it follows that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised on appeal. See In re N.E., 316 Kan. 391, 407, 516 P.3d 586 (2022). This court exercises unlimited review over whether an issue is properly preserved for appellate review. State v. Daniel, 307 Kan. 428, 430, 410 P.3d 877 (2018). 11  During oral argument, Harvey's appellate counsel took the position that he did not have to raise the estoppel issue in the district court because he could raise this issue for the first time on appeal. It is true that, at the discretion of this court, a matter may be considered for the first time on appeal. But in order to do so, the appellant must explain why it was not raised before the district court and which of the three recognized exceptions to the general rule apply. Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36); In re N.E., 316 Kan. at 407-08. A party who ignores this requirement is considered to have waived and abandoned any exception to the preservation rule. In re N.E., 316 Kan. at 408. Harvey failed to comply with this preservation rule, which is fatal to his claim. Moreover, the party making a claim has the burden to designate facts in the record to support the claim; without a record, the claim of error fails. Friedman v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 296 Kan. 636, 644, 294 P.3d 287 (2013); Rule 6.02(a)(4), (a)(5). Here, even if we were to consider his judicial estoppel claim, the record does not include materials from Miller's bankruptcy proceedings. Because Harvey was not a party to those proceedings, he would not have any involvement in establishing the record in that case. As a result, due to an inadequate record, this court would not be in a position to determine what findings the bankruptcy court made, what evidence was presented, or what arguments were raised and resolved in that court. There was an oral contract for real property. The agreement between Harvey and Miller was not reduced to a writing. Accordingly, Miller bears the burden of proving the contract's existence by a preponderance of the evidence. U.S.D. No. 446 v. Sandoval, 295 Kan. 278, 282, 286 P.3d 542 (2012). 12  "[W]hether a binding contract has been formed depends on the intention of the parties and is a question of fact." Duling v. Mid American Credit Union, 63 Kan. App. 2d 428, 435, 530 P.3d 737 (2022) (citing Reimer v. Waldinger Corp., 265 Kan. 212, 214, 959 P.2d 914 [1998]). An appellate court reviews a district court's finding that a contract exists for substantial competent evidence. Price v. Grimes, 234 Kan. 898, 904, 677 P.2d 969 (1984); Duling, 63 Kan. App. 2d at 435. Substantial competent evidence is legal and relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as being adequate to support a conclusion. Granados v. Wilson, 317 Kan. 34, 41, 523 P.3d 501 (2023). So we must examine whether there was substantial competent evidence to support the district court's finding that the parties entered into a contract, albeit oral. "A binding contract typically entails an offer of terms, an acceptance of those terms, and consideration or a thing of value passing from each party to the other." Duling, 63 Kan. App. 2d at 436. The district court made the following finding: "The agreement required the Plaintiff to bring the mortgage up to date, pay an additional $80,000.00 minus the mortgage balance of $69,000.00 for the property, with $19,000.00 to be paid to the Defendant by January 1, 2025. Plaintiff was required to pay the utilities, and a quitclaim deed would follow." The district court's findings demonstrate that the alleged agreement contained sufficiently definite terms, including Miller's obligation to cure the mortgage default, pay the agreed purchase amount, and assume the utilities in exchange for Harvey's promise to transfer the property by quitclaim deed. 13  The parties must each accept the essential terms of the contract and outwardly communicate that acceptance in a way reasonably intended to be understood as such. 63 Kan. App. 2d at 436. Also, "'to form a binding contract there must be a meeting of the minds on all the essential terms thereof. To constitute a meeting of the minds there must be a fair understanding between the parties which normally accompanies mutual consent and the evidence must show with reasonable definiteness that the minds of the parties met upon the same matter and agreed upon the terms of the contract. [Citations omitted.]" Price, 234 Kan. at 904. The district court also made the following statement regarding the agreement: "The defendant denies there was an oral agreement to sell, that his agreement was for rent purposes only, which had been the history of the property. Except, in this case, the plaintiff was required to get the mortgage current, which she did through a loan modification, which must have been agreed to by the defendant since the defendant had to give the plaintiff personal information to gain access to his mortgage account in order to complete the modification." The district court's finding addressed mutual assent by determining that Harvey's conduct—specifically providing his personal information to allow Miller to complete the loan modification—demonstrated his agreement to the arrangement and was inconsistent with his claim that the parties had only a rental relationship. A reasonable person could accept the testimony as being adequate to support the conclusion that the parties had an agreement to convey the property from Harvey to Miller. The fact that Harvey provided his information to Miller supports the inference that he assented to the arrangement, qualifying as substantial competent evidence. In sum, there was substantial competent evidence to support the district court's finding that there was an oral contract for Miller's purchase of Harvey's property. But the next question we must address is whether that contract is enforceable. 14 Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding that the parties' oral contract is enforceable despite the operation of the statute of frauds. Under the Kansas statute of frauds, a contract for the sale of land is unenforceable unless it is in writing and signed by the party against whom an action is brought. K.S.A. 33-106. But the courts will generally not permit its use as a shield to protect fraud or enable one to take advantage of their own wrongdoing. As a result, oral contracts for the sale of land can be enforced for equitable reasons. Bank of Alton, 247 Kan. at 452-53. Because it is grossly unjust and inequitable for one party of the oral contract to rely on the contract and partially perform their obligations thereunder while the other takes advantage of the partial performance and repudiates the contract by invoking the statute of frauds, partial performance of an oral contract for the sale of real estate has generally been accepted as the kind of a compelling equitable consideration justifying the removal of the contract from the operation of the statute of frauds. 247 Kan. at 453. Certain conditions, however, must be met before partial performance will take an oral contract for the sale of real estate out of the statute of frauds. 1. The contract must be fully made and completed in every respect, except for the writing, and the parol agreement must be certain, clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal. 2. The oral contract must be fair, reasonable, and just. 3. The performing party cannot be compensated in money. 4. The asserted partial performance must have been performed with the knowledge, consent, or acquiescence of the party to be charged. The delivery and assumption of possession of land under, pursuant to, and in reliance on an oral contract is sufficient partial performance to take the case out of the statute of frauds. But the purchaser's possession must have been taken in good faith with the 15 knowledge, consent, or acquiescence of the seller. Consent will be inferred when the purchaser is permitted to continue in possession and make improvements, with the knowledge of the seller. 247 Kan. at 453-54. We review the district court's findings to determine if they are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether those findings support the court's conclusions of law. We do not reweigh evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact. St. Francis Mercantile Equity Exchange, Inc. v. Newton, 27 Kan. App. 2d 18, 24, 996 P.2d 365 (2000). We will review the evidence relied on by the district court to support its finding that this oral contract should be recognized outside the statute of frauds. 1. The contract was fair, reasonable, and just. First, Harvey contends that the agreement for the sale of land is fundamentally unfair to him. Harvey notes his trial testimony that the property had a fair market value of $150,000, with the mortgage on the property of about $49,000, resulting in $101,000 in equity. Miller obtained the property by paying only $19,000 to Harvey and making the mortgage payments, or so the argument goes. According to Harvey, based on these facts "the alleged oral agreement constitutes 'gross injustice'" to him, not Miller. Miller counters that, at the time of the agreement, about $61,000 remained on the mortgage, therefore, because the agreed price was $80,000, Harvey would have received $19,000 in equity. Miller adds that Harvey's 2024 valuation reflects the property's value after four years and more than $50,000 in improvements. At the time of the 2020 agreement, however, the property's disrepair, delinquent mortgage, and impending foreclosure justified the fair and reasonable price. 16  The district court found that Miller entered into an agreement to purchase rather than just an agreement to rent as evidenced by the fact that she paid to bring the mortgage current and get a loan modification. In addition, she made several improvements— basement work, driveway repair, arena upgrade, fencing, and extensive plumbing—to the property—something previous tenants did not do. Harvey characterizes the agreement as if Miller purchased the property for only $19,000. The evidence, however, was that the agreed purchase price was $80,000, consisting of a $19,000 payment to Harvey and Miller's assumption of the approximate $61,000 mortgage. Thus, the comparison between a $19,000 payment and the property's later value misstates the consideration Miller allegedly agreed to provide. Harvey's assertion of "'gross injustice'" depends on treating the property's increased value as though it resulted solely from market appreciation. The evidence, however, showed that Miller invested substantial labor and expense to restore and improve the property. For example, Miller discovered that mud, mold, and mildew had accumulated in the basement because the property lacked a French drain or retaining wall, allowing water and mud to flow into the home. To address the problem, Miller and three or four others spent approximately six hours manually digging the mud out of the basement, spraying the walls with bleach and removed some of the damaged sheetrock. After Miller had to clean out the basement again, she rented a skid-steer (bobcat) and installed a French drain to divert water away from the home. Other improvements included replacing plumbing and the sewer line, remediating mold and mildew, installing a French drain, and replacing the hot water tank. She also repaired the barn fencing and completed asphalt work. She removed trees, power washed, and graded the land with rented bobcats. Additional improvements included replacing appliances, installing a sink faucet and a new kitchen sink. She repaired a broken step, installed a new security door, installed a new thermostat, installed a new light fixture, and replaced vent covers. 17  Any increase in the property's value resulted from Miller's expenditures and efforts, not Harvey's. Allowing Harvey to retain the benefit of those improvements would be grossly unfair to Miller, who invested substantial time and money into the property. The district court's ruling was supported by substantial competent evidence. 2. Partial performance was obtained through the knowledge, consent, or acquiescence of Harvey. Harvey argues that Miller never informed him about any of the repairs or improvements that she had made to the property. According to Harvey, those repairs, or improvements, therefore, cannot constitute "'compelling equitable considerations.'" Harvey adds that the district court did not make a specific finding that Harvey had knowledge of the repairs or improvements made by Miller. The absence of that specific finding means that the alleged oral contract is barred by the statute of frauds and is unenforceable. Miller counters that the evidence is overwhelming. Harvey delivered the keys to her. He knew she was making mortgage payments. And she made improvements to the driveway, arena, fencing, plumbing, and appliances. Miller adds that when Harvey visited the property to place a sale sign in March 2024, the improvements would have been readily observable. Contrary to Harvey's assertion, the district court did make the necessary findings regarding Harvey's knowledge of the improvements. The district court stated the following from the bench: "In this case, the plaintiff purchasers had made part payment for the land by obtaining the loan modification to secure the default by making the required three payments then continuing to make the mortgage payment; had taken exclusive and notorious possession of the real estate when Plaintiffs received a key to the property. The plaintiff made 18  improvements to the property by cleaning the mud out of the home, improving the driveway, and improving the arena and other improvements as were previously stated. All of the improvements having been made with the acquiescence of the defendant, when the defendant notified the plaintiff that the mud in the basement was now her problem because she was now the owner. "The Court finds that the plaintiff was no longer required to give the defendants permission or knowledge of any other improvements." The district court based this finding on Harvey's response when Miller informed him of the basement's mud and mold problem. Harvey responded, "'It's your problem now.'" Because of this conversation, Miller never contacted Harvey again based on "his washing his hands of the property." Harvey, therefore, had knowledge about the condition of the basement and the need for corrective action. After being notified, Harvey did not object to Miller remaining in possession or undertaking the necessary repairs. Under these circumstances, Harvey's knowledge of the condition and failure to act supports an inference of consent in Miller's continued possession and improvements. Substantial competent evidence, therefore, supports the district court's finding that Miller's improvements were made with Harvey's knowledge or acquiescence. 3. The contract was fully made and completed in every respect and was certain, clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal. Miller maintains that the oral contract contained all essential terms as follows: "parties, property, price ($80,000 minus mortgage balance), payment terms (assume mortgage, pay $19,000 by January 1, 2025), and method of conveyance (quitclaim deed)." Harvey does not address this element. 19  The district court found that "plaintiff orchestrated the loan modification, continued to make the mortgage payments, and made the valuable improvements to the real estate, as was testified to." The court found that "[Miller] testified that she and Harvey verbally agreed for [Miller] to purchase the property." At that time, the mortgage payments were in arrears; therefore, Miller had to "bring the mortgage up to date, pay an additional $80,000 minus the mortgage balance of $69,000.00 for the property, with $19,000.00 to be paid to [Harvey] by January 1, 2025. [Miller] was required to pay the utilities, and a quitclaim deed would follow." The court noted, in its ruling from the bench, that Miller's son Demetre testified that he had overheard Harvey tell people that if they wanted to buy the property they would have to talk to Miller, because she owned it. The district court heard the live testimony of witnesses and clearly made determinations regarding credibility. There is substantial competent evidence to support the district court's finding the contract was fully completed and such completion was certain, clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal. We have no problem finding that a reasonable person could conclude that Miller orchestrated the loan modification and continued to make the mortgage payments as evidence of the contract to purchase. 4. There was no discussion by the district court of whether Miller could be adequately compensated with money, but Harvey did not ask for more specific findings. The district court did not discuss this element in its oral ruling or in its journal entry. Supreme Court Rule 165 (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R