Full Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 130,375 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS In the Matter of Z.A., Appellee, and J.G., Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; QUENTIN PITTMAN, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed November 6, 2026. Affirmed. J.G., appellant pro se. No appearance by appellee. Before COBLE, P.J., MALONE and BOLTON FLEMING, JJ. PER CURIAM: J.G. (Father) appeals the district court's order granting Z.A. (Mother) legal custody of their daughter, S.G., raising many challenges to the district court's rulings and its handling of the case. Based upon the record submitted for our review, we find no reversible error and affirm the district court's judgment. 1 FACTS In November 2025, Mother, who lives in Florida, filed a "Verified Petition to Domesticate and Enforce Out of State Custody Decree" in Sedgwick District Court. She also filed a motion setting forth the procedural history of the case and asking the district court to order that her daughter, S.G., be returned to her custody, along with a proposed permanent parenting plan and a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) affidavit. These documents were filed by Mother's legal counsel. In these filings, Mother explained that a 2023 order from an Alabama court granted Father sole legal and physical custody of S.G., and that Father and S.G. later moved to Sedgwick County, where they continued to reside for more than two years as of Mother's petition. According to Mother's filings, Father had recently been incarcerated in Kansas, and S.G. was now staying with her paternal grandmother (Grandmother). Mother alleged that Grandmother was withholding S.G. from her, "stating her reliance on the Alabama Court Order which gave Father primary residency." Mother initially had filed a petition for emergency custody in Alabama, but the Alabama court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding Kansas to be S.G.'s home state and noting that none of the parties lived in Alabama. Accordingly, Mother brought her action in Kansas. In response to Mother's filings, Father filed a pro se motion to terminate Mother's parental rights. He also filed a response to Mother's motion requesting custody of S.G., in which he alleged that Mother had not had any contact or provided any support to S.G., and that S.G. was doing well with Grandmother. He asked the district court to deny Mother's motion and permit S.G. to remain with Grandmother. Less than a month later, Father moved for default judgment on his motion to terminate Mother's parental rights, asserting that Mother had failed to respond to his motion in 21 days. 2 The district court held a hearing on all pending matters on February 17, 2026. Mother appeared by Zoom and through counsel; Father appeared by Zoom. The record contains no transcript of the hearing, but contains several orders filed the next day. First, the district court denied Father's motion to terminate Mother's parental rights, explaining that Father had failed to establish a prima facie case. Next, the district court adopted Mother's proposed permanent parenting plan and granted Mother sole legal custody of S.G. "due to Father's current incarceration rendering him unable to care for the child, coupled with his ongoing criminal history." The district court denied visitation to Father due to his incarceration and ordered Grandmother to turn S.G. over to Mother. Two days later, on February 20, Father filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, a "motion for change of judge" under K.S.A. 20-311d, and an "unsworn declaration of bias and prejudice pursuant to K.S.A. 20-311d and K.S.A. 53-601." Father argued the district judge needed to be removed because he presided over Father's preliminary hearing in his criminal case. The next week, Father filed a motion titled: "Emergency Motion for Administrative Stay and Return of Minor Child." On March 5, 2026, the district court filed an order denying Father's motion seeking a change of judge. The order noted that "an adverse ruling is not grounds to change judge" and that "a judge making a determination of probable cause in [Father's] criminal matter does not meet the extrajudicial source doctrine. . . . The request for a new judge is an attempt to relitigate an adverse ruling." In another order filed the same day, the district court denied Father's motion to alter or amend judgment. The district court explained: "[Father] is incarcerated in prison and unable to have access to the child. It is proper for the child to then go to her Mother's care. Given the obvious limitations and problems incarceration presents, it is in the child's best interests that the child is [with] the Mother." Finally, the district court denied Father's motion for an administrative stay. Father timely filed a notice of appeal. 3 ANALYSIS Father continues to represent himself on appeal. There has been no appearance by Mother. Father's pro se brief identifies five claims on appeal: (1) The district court committed reversible error by failing to consider mandatory sibling bonds under K.S.A. 23-3203(a)(6); (2) The district court lacked jurisdiction to enter substantive orders while a facially sufficient affidavit of bias was pending under K.S.A. 20-311d; (3) The district court violated Father's due process rights by terminating all parental contact without findings of unfitness; (4) The district court's judgment is not supported by substantial competent evidence due to the total absence of an evidentiary record; and (5) The district court erred by denying intervention by the child's primary caregiver and ignoring the child's established stability. Before addressing Father's claims, we observe that the record on appeal consists of one volume of case filings and no hearing transcripts. In considering an appeal, appellate courts are confined to the record on appeal that has been submitted for its consideration. The party challenging the district court's decision has the duty to designate the necessary transcripts and records to show reversible error. See Bicknell v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 315 Kan. 451, 462-63, 509 P.3d 1211 (2022). Moreover, "[a] pro se litigant is held to the same standard as other parties and is required to follow the same rules of procedure as a party represented by counsel." In re Marriage of Vargas, 20 Kan. App. 2d 480, 487, 891 P.2d 462 (1994). This includes suffering the consequences for failing to designate a necessary record on appeal. See Kline v. Bergstrom, No. 126,878, 2024 WL 4579310, at *7 (Kan. App. 2024) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 320 Kan. 862 (2025). 4 While Father's pro se brief appears to contain citations to the record, they do not correspond to the pages in the sole volume before this court. Father's brief repeatedly cites to "R. Index," but those citations do not correspond with the paginated contents of Volume 1 of the record on appeal. See Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36). We will endeavor to address the issues Father appears to be raising when possible. That said, Father's inadequate briefing and the omission (or nonexistence) of certain items in the record hinder meaningful review of several of Father's claims. Did the district court err by failing to consider S.G.'s bonds with her siblings under K.S.A. 23-3203(a)(6) when making the custody determination? Father argues the district court reversibly erred by failing to consider "'the interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests'" when it granted Mother custody of S.G. In short, he argues the district court abused its discretion when it granted Mother custody of S.G. because it committed an error of law. K.S.A. 23-3201 et seq. outlines and directs a district court's discretionary determination of a child's custody, residency, and parenting time according to the child's best interests. A district court's authority to modify an order of custody, residency, visitation, or parenting time is set forth in K.S.A. 23-3218. And K.S.A. 23-3218(a) allows the court to modify any prior order of custody, residency, visitation, or parenting time upon a showing of a "material change of circumstances." While Kansas law does not define that phrase, this court has explained that examining whether there has been a material change of circumstances "requires consideration of a variety of facts and circumstances . . . [and] must be of such a substantial and continuing nature as to make the terms of the initial decree unreasonable. [Citation omitted.]" In re Marriage of Nelson, 34 Kan. App. 2d 879, 887, 125 P.3d 1081 (2006). 5 The Kansas Supreme Court has explained: "'When the custody issue lies only between the parents, the paramount consideration of the court is the welfare and best interests of the child.'" Harrison v. Tauheed, 292 Kan. 663, 672, 256 P.3d 851 (2011). K.S.A. 23-3203 provides a nonexclusive list of factors for the district court to consider when determining the best interests of a child. Appellate courts recognize that a district court is in the best position to determine a child's best interests. Cheney v. Poore, 301 Kan. 120, 128, 339 P.3d 1220 (2014). As a result, this court will not reverse a district court's custody determination absent an abuse of discretion. State, ex rel. Secretary, DCF v. M.R.B., 313 Kan. 855, 861-62, 491 P.3d 652 (2021). Here, Father asserts that the district court abused its discretion by committing an error of law concerning S.G.'s bonds with her siblings. Father argues: "The District Court's orders . . . contain zero findings regarding these bonds. A custody order that fails to address the impact of sibling separation is legally deficient and must be reversed." He does not challenge any aspect of the district court's ruling beyond its alleged failure to consider S.G.'s familial bonds. And he provides no authority to support his claim that the district court's failure to consider K.S.A. 23-3203(a)(6) when considering the best interests of S.G. constitutes a reversible error of law. Though Mother bore the burden to show a material change of circumstances and that modification was in S.G.'s best interests before the district court, Father now bears the burden to show that the district court abused its discretion. M.R.B., 313 Kan. at 861; Bicknell, 315 Kan. at 466. While Father appears correct in asserting that the district court did not offer much analysis of the best interests of S.G. in its order, the district court did find that "it is in the best interest of the minor child for Mother to be granted Sole Legal Custody of the minor child due to Father's current incarceration rendering him unable to care for the child, coupled with his ongoing criminal history." And we do not know what additional analysis the district court may have offered to support its custody decision at the hearing because the hearing transcript is not included in the record on appeal. While 6 the district court did not explicitly refer to K.S.A. 23-3203(a)(6), or any of the other statutory factors in its order, its failure to do so in and of itself was not an error of law. Father does not argue that the modification of the custody order did not serve the best interests of S.G., he merely argues that the district court erred by not citing to K.S.A. 23-3203(a)(6) in its order. The record does not support that the district court committed an error of law by not citing to K.S.A. 23-3203(a)(6) in its order when it considered the best interests of S.G. and granted custody of her to Mother while Father is incarcerated. Did the district court lack jurisdiction because Father had filed an affidavit of bias under K.S.A. 20-311d, which was still pending? Next, Father asserts that the district court "lacked jurisdiction to enter substantive orders while a facially sufficient Affidavit of Bias was pending under K.S.A. 20-311d." It appears Father is arguing the district court could not rule on either his motion to terminate Mother's parental rights or Mother's motion to modify custody because he had initiated an attempt to change the judge presiding over the case. Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited. State v. Smith, 304 Kan. 916, 919, 377 P.3d 414 (2016). Father's argument has two fatal problems. First, the district court had already entered the orders that Father challenges on appeal by the time he filed his motion and affidavit of bias under K.S.A. 20-311d. Because he filed his motion and affidavit two days after the district court had already entered the custody order, even if he were correct that the district court lost jurisdiction, it would not affect the order Father is appealing because the district court had already entered the modification order. As the district court noted in its order denying Father's motion, it appears that Father's attempt to remove the district judge was merely an attempt to attack the court's modification order. 7 The second problem with Father's argument is that he did not comply with the procedural requirements of the sequential, two-step process for obtaining a change of judge. K.S.A. 20-311d allows a party to move for a change of judge based on the belief "that the judge to whom an action is assigned cannot afford that party a fair trial in the action." K.S.A. 20-311d(a). Under this provision, "a party must first file a motion for change of judge; if that motion is denied, then the party must immediately file a legally sufficient affidavit alleging grounds set forth in the statute." (Emphasis added.) State v. Sawyer, 297 Kan. 902, 908, 305 P.3d 608 (2013). "An affidavit is defined as being a written statement, under oath, sworn to or affirmed by the person making it before some person who has authority to administer an oath or affirmation." State v. Knight, 219 Kan. 863, 867, 549 P.2d 1397 (1976). Father filed the requisite motion for a change of judge, but the filing that he refers to as a "facially sufficient Affidavit of Bias," is not legally sufficient. A cursory examination of that filing shows that it was not sworn to or affirmed before some person who has authority to administer an oath or affirmation—in fact, the document is titled: "Unsworn Declaration of Bias and Prejudice." (Emphasis added.) Here, the "unsworn declaration" that Father filed with the district court was not even acknowledged by a notary—it is merely a document in which Father sets forth his grievances with the district court. Father's failure to follow the proper statutory procedure by not filing a sufficient affidavit of bias means his argument must fail. A district court does not have to assign a case to another judge if there was no legally sufficient affidavit filed. Because Father did not comply with the requirements of K.S.A. 20-311d, he is not entitled to the relief he seeks, and the district court did not lose jurisdiction over the case. 8 Did the district court violate Father's due process rights by terminating parental contact without making a finding of unfitness or harm? Father argues the district court violated his due process right "by terminating all parental contact without findings of unfitness or harm." He also references the district court's denial of his motion to terminate Mother's parental rights as constituting a separate denial of his due process rights. Father's claim asserting a denial of due process is inadequately briefed. Generally, inadequately briefed issues are deemed waived and abandoned. Russell v. May, 306 Kan. 1058, 1089, 400 P.3d 647 (2017). Father's brief fails to identify the controlling standard of review for this issue and contains no pinpoint citations to the record to support his claim for relief. A point raised incidentally in a brief but not argued is also deemed abandoned. State v. Lowery, 308 Kan. 1183, 1231, 427 P.3d 865 (2018). Failure to support a point with pertinent authority or show why it is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary authority, is akin to failing to brief the issue. State v. Meggerson, 312 Kan. 238, 246, 474 P.3d 761 (2020). As noted above, while Father's brief appears to include citations to the record, none of those citations correspond to the record that is before this court as required under Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4). As a result, this court may presume that these factual statements have no support in the record on appeal. Rule 6.02(a)(4). That said, it appears Father is referring to the portion of the district court's modification order in which it stated, after granting Mother sole legal custody, that "no visitation or other access to the child for Father is Ordered" and "[a]s a result of these Orders, [Father] has no legal rights to the minor child, S.G. . . . until further Order of the Court." Contrary to Father's categorization, the district court's order does not constitute "a summary termination of [his] parental rights." 9 Father's arguments that he has been denied due process—whether because the district court's modification order granted Mother sole legal custody of S.G. or because the court declined to terminate Mother's rights based on an alleged default—are conclusory and not presented in a manner in which this court can effectively address them. And it is not the role of this court to construct arguments for pro se litigants or search the record on their behalf; doing so would compromise this court's impartiality and give Father an unfair advantage. For these reasons, Father is entitled to no relief on his claim that the district court violated his due process rights. Is the district court's custody determination supported by substantial competent evidence? Father argues the district court's decision to grant Mother custody of S.G. is not supported by substantial competent evidence. A district court "commits an error of fact if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which the exercise of discretion is based." M.R.B., 313 Kan. at 862. The entirety of Father's argument consists of one paragraph, in which he states that the "record here is a vacuum" and that "[a] court cannot move a child across the country based solely on an attorney's unsworn statements and a judge's extrajudicial opinions." An appellant fails to meet their burden of establishing error on appeal by raising only conclusory contentions without any analysis or evidence to support their claims. See RAMA Operating Co. v. Barker, 47 Kan. App. 2d 1020, 1031, 286 P.3d 1138 (2012). "It follows that, by making conclusory contentions on appeal, appellants necessarily raise their arguments incidentally in their briefs, which results in abandonment of their arguments." Joritz v. University of Kansas, 61 Kan. App. 2d 482, 503, 505 P.3d 775 (2022) (citing RAMA Operating Co., 47 Kan. App. 2d 1020, Syl. ¶ 14). Because Father provides no analysis or evidence of why the district court erred beyond his conclusory assertion that its decision is not supported by substantial evidence, his claim fails. 10 Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Grandmother's motion to intervene? Finally, Father argues the district court abused its discretion "by denying the intervention of the child's primary caregiver and ignoring the child's established stability." Father asserts that the district court summarily denied Grandmother's attempts to intervene in the proceedings. But a thorough review of the record has not revealed any motion seeking to intervene filed on Grandmother's request. And there is no record of the district court ruling on such a motion. The only indication of Grandmother's potential involvement is a note in one of the district court's orders stating that Grandmother "is not a party to this case and has no legal right to the child." As the party challenging the district court's rulings, Father has the duty to designate a record sufficient to review his claims. Bicknell, 315 Kan. at 462-63. Because the record on appeal contains no motion to intervene, Father is entitled to no relief on his claim that the district court abused its discretion by denying such a motion. Affirmed. 11