Full Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 130,142 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of JIMMIE ARTHUR SEBEK. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; ROBB RUMSEY, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed. Jimmie A. Sebek, appellant pro se. Ryan J. Ott, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before BRUNS, P.J., ATCHESON, J., and RICHARD B. WALKER, Senior Judge. PER CURIAM: Jimmie Arthur Sebek has been involuntarily confined since 2012 in the treatment facility for sexually violent predators on the grounds of Larned State Hospital. In this appeal, Sebek challenges the Sedgwick County District Court's denial of his request for placement in the transitional release phase of the treatment program based on the 2025 annual report from the clinical staff. The report stated that his condition had not substantially changed and he was unsuited for transitional release. Representing himself on appeal, Sebek has filed a lengthy brief that fails to outline any material errors in the district court's ruling. We, therefore, affirm the district court. Sebek has raised multiple points on appeal. We address them sequentially after providing some background for context. The district court appointed Mark Sevart, who had previously represented Sebek, to handle Sebek's request for a change in his 1 placement following receipt of the 2025 report. The district court held a nonevidentiary hearing with Sevart and a lawyer for the State. Sebek was not present for that hearing. The district court exercised its discretionary authority under K.S.A. 59-29a08(c) and declined to appoint an independent expert to examine Sebek. At an annual review hearing, a district court makes an initial determination whether the movant, here Sebek, has shown probable cause to believe his condition has sufficiently changed that he may be appropriately placed in transitional release. K.S.A. 59-29a08(d). A district court has the discretion to appoint an independent expert for an indigent movant for that probable cause determination. If a petitioner establishes probable cause, the district court must then hold a full evidentiary hearing. The movant must be present at that hearing and is then entitled to an independent expert. K.S.A. 59-29a08(g). Here, the district court found that Sebek failed to establish probable cause for an evidentiary hearing. • Sebek filed a motion in the district court requesting a substitute lawyer for Sevart. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Sebek contends Sevart failed to adequately represent him. Sexually violent predators are entitled to competent legal representation in proceedings directly bearing on their continued confinement and treatment. In re Care & Treatment of Ontiberos, 295 Kan. 10, 25, 287 P.3d 855 (2012). In his brief, Sebek does not identify particular ways Sevart's representation in the district court fell short. The transcript of the district court hearing is not part of the record on appeal, compounding our difficulty in reviewing Sebek's claim. Typically, a sexually violent predator may pursue a claim of inadequate legal representation in a habeas corpus proceeding under K.S.A. 60-1501 rather than in an appeal from an annual review hearing. 295 Kan. 10, Syl. ¶ 4. At this stage, we have the option to remand to the district court for a hearing on the adequacy of Sevart's representation. See 295 Kan. at 27. But a remand for what is commonly known as a Van 2 Cleave hearing—to test the legal adequacy of an appointed lawyer's representation in a district court proceeding—entails an atypical procedural device reserved for circumstances raising demonstrable claims of incompetence. See State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117, 120-21, 716 P.2d 580 (1986) (recognizing authority of appellate court to remand in direct criminal case for district court hearing on sufficiency of defendant's legal representation upon investigation and showing of material grounds for relief); see also Bogguess v. State, 306 Kan. 574, 579, 395 P.3d 447 (2017) (characterizing Van Cleave remand as "unusual step"); State v. Jones, No. 124,699, 2023 WL 2723295, at *8 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion) (declining Van Cleave request for failure to show "an 'unusual' circumstance" warranting remand). Sebek's argument for ineffective legal assistance in the district court fails. He has not identified specific shortcomings warranting a Van Cleave hearing. • Sebek contends the district court was required to appoint an independent expert for him at the probable cause stage under K.S.A. 59-29a08. That contention is incorrect. The statute plainly gives the district court the discretion to appoint an expert for an indigent movant. K.S.A. 59-29a08(c); In re Care and Treatment of Twilleger, 46 Kan. App. 2d 302, Syl. ¶ 7, 263 P.3d 199 (2011). Sebek tries to read into the statute a requirement for mandatory appointment of an independent expert by pointing to language in K.S.A. 59-29a06(c) permitting the parties to call expert witnesses in "any proceeding conducted under the Kansas sexually violent predator act." Had Sebek retained an independent expert, he would have been permitted to have that expert present evidence at the probable cause hearing, as required by K.S.A. 59-29a06(c). But that is materially different from the district court's discretionary authority to appoint an expert in the first instance. A district court exceeds that broad authority if it rules in a way no reasonable judicial officer would under the circumstances, if it ignores controlling facts or relies on mistaken factual representations, or if it acts outside the legal framework appropriate to 3 the issue. See State v. Rayton, 321 Kan. 677, 686, 583 P.3d 898 (2026); Jennings v. Shauck, 318 Kan. 711, 714, 547 P.3d 524 (2024). Sebek bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion. Rayton, 321 Kan. at 686. He has failed to marshal a tenable argument that the district court abused its discretion. • Sebek contends K.S.A. 59-29a08 is unconstitutional because it does not allow him to seek full release from incarceration, treatment, and supervision. In an annual review hearing, the movant may seek placement in transitional release, a step that, in turn, may eventually lead to conditional release and then full discharge. Originally, the statute permitted a movant to request unconditional release at an annual review hearing. But the Legislature removed that language in 2017. L. 2017, ch. 83, § 1. Sebek contends he ought to be allowed to show that he is no longer dangerous and no longer suffers from a mental abnormality and, therefore, should be discharged from the treatment program. The Kansas Supreme Court has indicated that the annual review hearing process in K.S.A. 59-29a08 comports with substantive due process protections grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re Care and Treatment of Quillen, 312 Kan. 841, 858-59, 481 P.3d 791 (2021). Sebek mostly offers a diffuse argument that does not identify or analyze recognized constitutional protections. But he does submit that the amended version of K.S.A. 59-29a08, precluding him from seeking a full release or discharge, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution because he was committed five years before the amendment. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10. The Ex Post Facto Clause precludes the retroactive application of criminal statutes or other punitive measures. In considering the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq., the United States Supreme Court determined it to be a civil commitment process and not a criminal or punitive one, so ex post facto constraints do not apply. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 370-71 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1997). Sebek has not persuaded us of a constitutional defect in K.S.A. 59-29a08. 4 Moreover, as the State suggests, Sebek has not shown that he has ceased to be dangerous or may be free of a mental abnormality permitting commitment as a sexually violent predator. In that respect, his constitutional challenge to K.S.A. 59-29a08 is not ripe for consideration and presents us with a hypothetical legal question divorced from a fixed set of facts. Our answer would be an advisory opinion of the sort appellate courts refrain from offering. See State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 892, 179 P.3d 366 (2008) (issue not ripe for adjudication if it presents "abstract" or "hypothetical" dispute). • Sebek contends the 2025 annual evaluation prepared by the program clinicians was improperly filed with the district court and, in turn, was improperly considered in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. Sebek says there are no standards governing who is to prepare the annual examination, how it should be done, and what information the report should contain. According to Sebek, the problem (such as it may be) would be fixed if K.S.A. 60-235, applicable to independent mental or physical examinations in civil proceedings, were applied to the preparation of the evaluations and annual reports. Even assuming the premise of Sebek's position, K.S.A. 60-235(b)(2) simply requires that an expert report be in writing and "set out in detail the examiner's findings, including diagnoses, conclusions[,] and the results of any tests." Sebek has not shown how the 2025 annual report was something less than that. On its face, the report appears to conform to those requirements. Obviously, clinical evaluations have to be done in accordance with accepted professional standards for the expert's specialty. Sebek says that the 2025 report's discussion of his course of treatment was irrelevant and should not have been included. And he similarly says the report improperly discussed actuarial recidivist risk assessments of him. The Kansas Supreme Court has broadly found that district courts have the discretion to consider such assessments. In re Care and Treatment of Cone, 309 Kan. 321, Syl., 435 P.3d 45 (2019). 5 As a procedural matter, Sebek has not shown that his lawyer lodged an objection to the 2025 report on those grounds. Under K.S.A. 60-404, a party must make a specific, contemporaneous objection to evidence offered at a hearing or trial to preserve the issue for appellate review. The Kansas Supreme Court rigorously enforces the contemporaneous objection rule. See State v. Hardwick, 321 Kan. 519, 537, 582 P.3d 555 (2026); State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 349, 204 P.3d 585 (2009). So Sebek has failed to show that he (through his lawyer) lodged those objections to the report. We decline to consider them now. • Sebek alleges judicial misconduct on the part of the district court in the form of prejudice against him. He premises the allegation on the rulings the district court made in connection with the 2025 annual review, including the refusal to appoint a different lawyer for him, the refusal to authorize an independent expert, and the acceptance of the clinical report. A colorable showing of impermissible prejudice or bias on the part of a district court must be anchored in something more than adverse rulings in a given case or proceeding. See K.S.A. 20-311d(d); State v. Hurd, 298 Kan. 555, 570-71, 316 P.3d 696 (2013); Whittker v. State, No. 120,140, 2020 WL 1969436, at *3 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion). The point is without merit. Affirmed. 6