Full Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 128,900 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. KORY GALE SUTTON, Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; SETH L. RUNDLE, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed October 23, 2026. Affirmed. Lindsay Kornegay, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Daniel Wells, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before SCHROEDER, P.J., PICKERING and BOLTON FLEMING, JJ. SCHROEDER, J.: Kory Gale Sutton timely appeals from the district court's order imposing $2,724 in Board of Indigent Defense Services (BIDS) attorney fees at sentencing. He argues the district court failed to properly consider his ability to pay the BIDS attorney fees, and the amount imposed was unreasonable in light of his long-term incarceration. After careful review, we find the district court properly considered Sutton's present and ongoing circumstances, and the amount imposed was reasonable based on Sutton's age and physical abilities, the length of his prison sentence, and the possibility of employment while serving his sentence. Accordingly, we affirm. 1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sutton pled guilty to two severity level 1 nondrug person felonies and two severity level 5 nondrug person felonies. The district court imposed a total controlling sentence of 351 months' imprisonment and further ordered Sutton to pay $2,724 in BIDS attorney fees for the cost of his court-appointed representation. In doing so, the district court noted Sutton had filed an affidavit requesting appointment of counsel at the outset of the case, wherein he attested to his financial situation. The district court asked Sutton if his circumstances had changed significantly since filing the affidavit, and Sutton responded they had not. Sutton's affidavit reflected he was unemployed, had no assets or other source of income, was single, and did not have any dependents. The district court noted there were a variety of employment opportunities for inmates in the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC), once Sutton was authorized to work. Sutton told the district court he had no physical disabilities that would prevent him from working while in KDOC custody. The district court then clarified Sutton had no current assets or sources of income; his only potential financial means would be from the possibility he could become eligible to work in the future at KDOC. DISCUSSION Sutton now claims the district court erred in imposing BIDS attorney fees because it did not properly consider his financial circumstances and the burden those fees would impose. He further asserts—without meaningful discussion—that the amount imposed was unreasonable given he would be imprisoned for nearly 30 years. Under K.S.A. 22-4513(a), the district court is required to assess BIDS expenses to the defendant upon conviction. In doing so, K.S.A. 22-4513(b) requires the district court 2 to "take account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of such sum will impose." If such payment "will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or the defendant's immediate family, the court may waive payment of all or part of the amount due or modify the method of payment." K.S.A. 22-4513(b). Whether a district court has complied with the statutory directives of K.S.A. 22-4513 presents a question of law subject to unlimited review. See State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 539, 132 P.3d 934 (2006). The amount of attorney fees assessed is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Buck-Schrag, 312 Kan. 540, 555, 477 P.3d 1013 (2020). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if it "is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; is based on an error of law; or is based on an error of fact." State v. Ingham, 308 Kan. 1466, 1469, 430 P.3d 931 (2018). As the party asserting the district court abused its discretion, Sutton bears the burden of showing such abuse of discretion. See State v. Crosby, 312 Kan. 630, 635, 479 P.3d 167 (2021). Sutton asserts the district court failed to comply with K.S.A. 22-4513(b) because it did not inquire about his previous employment or income, nor did it consider the burden imposed on Sutton's family. Sutton now claims he has minor children he is responsible for supporting, which the district court did not consider. Contrary to Sutton's argument, the district court did inquire about the circumstances set forth in Sutton's financial affidavit, which stated he had no dependents. Sutton maintained the information was still accurate. The district court did not inquire about Sutton's past employment; however, his financial affidavit was filed approximately 10 months before sentencing and stated he was currently unemployed. The record reflects Sutton remained in custody while his case was pending and through sentencing; thus, it is unclear what the district court may have gleaned from such an inquiry. What is clear, however, is Sutton was 30 years old at the time of sentencing and stated he was physically capable of working. The record further reflects Sutton had completed 12 years of schooling and earned a college degree. 3 Here, it was uncertain if or when Sutton may become eligible for employment in KDOC custody. However, he was subject to a lengthy prison sentence of nearly 30 years, which, even with a 15 percent reduction for good time credit, would still result in nearly 25 years' imprisonment. Sutton's education, age, and physical abilities made him capable of obtaining employment at some point while serving his sentence. Even using the reduced prison term, the $2,724 BIDS attorney fees imposed works out to less than $110 per year, which is less than $10 per month over the length of his sentence. The district court noted the compensation for different jobs can vary greatly, with some inmates being able to obtain relatively high-paying jobs if placed on work release. The district court felt it was appropriate to impose BIDS attorney fees based on Sutton's potential employability in KDOC custody. However, the district court noted the possibility such employment might not become available and advised Sutton he could file a motion to reduce or waive the fees if they ultimately imposed an undue burden. While the district court could have been somewhat more explicit in its discussion of the BIDS attorney fees, we are satisfied the district court gave an adequate explanation of the facts and circumstances it considered to enable meaningful appellate review. This is the core directive in Robinson. See 281 Kan. at 546. We also cannot find any abuse of discretion in the amount imposed, which equates to less than $10 per month over the course of Sutton's sentence. This was a proper exercise of the district court's discretion. Thus, we affirm the imposition of BIDS attorney fees. Affirmed. 4