Iseman v. Coffey County Board of Zoning Appeals
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket129117
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
No. 129,117
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
JIM and DIANA ISEMAN and
BILL and KARA REYNOLDS,
Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.
COFFEY COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, et al.,
Appellees,
v.
DANNY HAWKINS and LAURA HAWKINS,
Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1.
An indispensable party is a party who must be included in an action before it may
properly go forward.
2.
A necessary party must be included in an action either as plaintiffs or defendants
unless there is a valid excuse for their nonjoinder.
3.
Under intervention of right, a party must show (1) timely application, (2) a
substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and (3) inadequate
representation of the intervenor's interests by other parties.
1
4.
A motion for relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6) must be made within a reasonable
time.
5.
Cities and counties are vested with general zoning authority to protect public
health, safety, and welfare, but such authority does not extend to land used for
agricultural purposes.
Appeal from Coffey District Court; MICHAEL E. WARD, judge. Oral argument held September 8,
2026. Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed.
P. Bernard Irvine, of Irvine Law, LLC, of Manhattan, for appellants/cross-appellees Danny
Hawkins and Laura Hawkins.
Terence E. Leibold, of Petefish, Immel, Hird, Johnson & Leibold, L.L.P., of Lawrence, for
appellees/cross-appellants Jim and Diana Iseman and Bill and Kara Reynolds.
Before HILL, P.J., SCHROEDER and COBLE, JJ.
SCHROEDER, J.: In this timely appeal by Danny Hawkins and Laura Hawkins (the
Landowners), we are tasked with determining whether the use of their land qualifies as
agricultural use when its primary purpose is to hunt specially bred and managed
domesticated deer in a confined, fenced-in area. The adjacent neighbors have safety
concerns related to the operation of the hunting facility. The zoning administrator for
Coffey County (administrator) determined the Landowners needed a special use permit to
operate the hunting facility as the land no longer qualified as being used for agricultural
purposes. The Board of Zoning Appeals (the Board) disagreed. The district court found
the Board's decision was unreasonable and contrary to the law. Upon an extensive review
of the record, we find the land is currently being used as a recreational hunting preserve
2
as defined by the county zoning regulations, and the district court was correct to find the
Landowners need a special use permit. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Landowners own real property in Coffey County as joint tenants where they
operate about a 100-acre domesticated deer hunting facility. Their land is adjacent to land
owned by Jim and Diana Iseman and Bill and Kara Reynolds (the Neighbors).
On July 1, 2019, the administrator sent the Landowners a letter explaining the
Landowners needed to set up an administrative hearing to determine whether they were
violating zoning regulations by operating a privately owned deer hunting preserve. About
a week later, on July 9, 2019, the administrator sent the Landowners another letter
referring to a discussion she had with Laura that day. The letter stated it had two
enclosures—the A-1 agricultural district zoning regulations and a special use application,
which required a $150 fee. The letter did not explicitly state the Landowners were
violating any zoning regulations. The administrator explained that "the filing deadline for
the August Planning Board meeting is July 18, 2019 by 5:00 p.m."
On July 25, 2019, the administrator mailed another letter to the Landowners,
referring to a discussion she had with Laura on July 22, 2019. The letter explained the
administrator performed an investigation and concluded the Landowners were violating
Coffey County zoning regulations by operating a privately owned deer hunting preserve.
The letter acknowledged the administrator had received the Landowners' appeal
paperwork but not the associated fee. The administrator explained the Landowners had
30 days from the date of the letter to appeal to the Board. On August 19, 2019, the
Landowners filed an application for an appeal from a decision of the administrator,
specifically appealing the July 25, 2019 decision.
3
On August 28, 2019, a different interim administrator sent the Landowners a
letter, stating he had received the Landowners' application and fee, but the application
was incomplete because the legal description on the application was merely a property
description, not a proper legal description. The interim administrator explained the Board
would hear the Landowners' appeal at the next Board meeting if it received the missing
information by September 9, 2019. The Landowners completed their application on
August 30, 2019.
In October 2019, the Board held a hearing to review the administrator's decision.
The Board ultimately reversed the administrator's findings because "the land appears to
be a privately owned natural wildlife habitat and reserve which is considered an
agricultural use and these regulations do not require a special use [] zoning permit or
occupancy certificate for it."
The Neighbors filed a petition for review of the Board's determination in district
court case No. 19-CV-46, naming only the Board of County Commissioners of the
County of Coffey (Commissioners) and the Board as defendants (collectively the
County). The Landowners were not named as a party.
The Neighbors asserted the Landowners failed to timely appeal the administrator's
decision to the Board and the Board erred in allowing the appeal to proceed. The
Neighbors also asserted the Board's finding that the Landowners were using the land for
agricultural use, which was not subject to the County's zoning regulations, was arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, and contrary to the law. The Neighbors asked the district court
to find the Board's determination unlawful and reinstate the administrator's decision that
the Landowners violated the county's zoning regulations. The petition was later amended
to correct the name of one of the parties but substantively did not change. In response, the
County acknowledged the appeal was untimely but proceeded with the merits of the case
4
and denied the Landowners used the property as a privately owned for-profit hunting
preserve.
In November 2020, the parties—which excluded the Landowners—filed
competing motions for summary judgment. The district court found it had jurisdiction to
hear the appeal from the Board; the material facts were largely undisputed; and the court
ultimately granted the Neighbors' motion for summary judgment. The district court found
the Board's decision contrary to the law and, therefore, unreasonable. The district court
explained the Landowners were operating a recreational hunting preserve, which was not
an agricultural use of the land and required a special use permit.
About one month after the district court issued its order, the Landowners wrote a
letter to the district court stating the Neighbors appealed the Board's decision to the
district court without the Landowners' knowledge. The Landowners filed an entirely new
lawsuit in the district court, in case No. 21-CV-21, against the County and the Neighbors.
The Landowners claimed they informally learned of the Neighbors' appeal of the Board's
decision to the district court in May 2020 but were never formally notified of the appeal
or of any hearings. The Landowners petitioned for declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief, and inverse condemnation. Specifically, the Landowners claimed: (1) They were
indispensable parties to the appeal as the appeal related to their property, which caused
the district court to lack jurisdiction based on an absent, indispensable party ; (2) failure to
include them violated their due process rights and resulted in an uncompensated
confiscation of their property interest; and (3) in the alternative, the County's actions
resulted in a taking of the Landowners' property interest for public use. The Landowners
filed a motion for summary judgment largely elaborating on the points made in their
petition.
The district court denied the Landowners' motion for summary judgment,
interpreted the motion as a motion to intervene in 19-CV-46, and reopened the evidence
5
and the judgment issued in that case. The Neighbors filed a motion to alter or amend the
district court's order, arguing the Landowners' interests were adequately represented by
the other defendants, the motion to intervene was untimely, and the district court's
judgment could not be set aside. The district court denied the Neighbors' motion to alter
or amend. The Landowners then filed a response to the Neighbors' original motion for
summary judgment and joined in the County's motion for summary judgment.
The district court found the Landowners' appeal of the administrator's decision to
the Board was timely filed as the administrator's decision was confusing and inconsistent
and was timely as to the first time the decision was made in writing on July 25, 2019.
Substantively, the district court found it was not factually or legally correct for the Board
to classify the Landowners' hunting site as a "private natural wildlife habitat and reserve."
The administrator's classification of the land as a hunting preserve wa s consistent with
the actual use of the land, the zoning regulations, and Kansas law. The district court set
aside the Board's decision as unreasonable and contrary to the law.
The Neighbors timely cross-appealed. Additional facts are set forth as necessary.
ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction
Before addressing the merits, we must first determine if the Landowners' appeal
from the administrator's decision was timely filed.
Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to unlimited review and can
be raised at any time. Nicholson v. Mercer, 319 Kan. 712, 714, 559 P.3d 350 (2024).
6
Article 10, section 106 of the Coffey County Zoning Regulations addresses
appeals. The regulations state: "Appeals shall be made within 30 days after a decision has
been made by the Zoning Administrator by filing an application for appeal." Article 10,
section 106A. The party appealing the zoning administrator's decision shall file the
appeal with the recording secretary, state the grounds for the appeal, include the
property's legal description, provide an ownership list and a filing fee, and provide any
other necessary information. Article 10, section 106B.
Here, the record reflects that, on July 9, 2019, the administrator determined the
Landowners were using their real property as a hunting preserve, which required a special
use permit. The administrator's decision was not in writing. At the Board hearing on
October 16, 2019, the Landowners contended the meeting on July 9 was informal and
was not an administrative hearing.
The Landowners received a letter on July 25, 2019, which was the first time the
administrator put her decision in writing. The letter stated in part:
"As per my discussion with Mrs. Hawkins on July 22, 2019, you brou ght in the
appeal paperwork without the fee. The appeal application is not complete without the fee
as you were advised at our meeting and the appeal documentation will not be placed on
the Planning Board agenda for August 21, 2019.
"Your 80-acre tract . . . is in violation of the Zoning Regulations for operating a
privately-owned hunting preserve for deer as per my investigation and findings on May 2,
2019.
"You must stay the operation unless a Special Use application or an appeal to the
Board of Zoning Appeals is made within 30 days within the date of this letter. . . ."
7
At the Board hearing, the Landowners explained they had asked to fill out a
certificate of compliance when they met with the administrator and were told there were
no forms to fill out. With respect to the application fee, Laura told the Board at the
hearing: "I did not submit the application fee because I did not feel like I should have to
pay one because I should have been able to fill out the certificate of compliance which is
exempt from a fee to help [the administrator] determine."
Appeals to the Board must be made "within a reasonable time as provided by the
rules of the board." K.S.A. 12-759(d). Article 10, section 106 of the Coffey County
Zoning Regulations allows any aggrieved person to appeal the zoning administrator's
decision within 30 days of the administrator's decision. The administrator's decision was
not in writing until July 25, 2019. The Landowners then had until August 24, 2019, to file
an appeal to the Board.
The Landowners filed an application for appeal with the associated fee on August
19, 2019. The appeal was rejected as incomplete as "[t]he legal descriptions that was
copied from the Coffey County Real Estate Tax Settlement is only utilized as a 'Property
Description' not a legal description for the proper identification of the property in the
application." The application was completed according to the County's standards on
August 30, 2019. Based on the application rejection letter, it appears the Landowners did,
in fact, provide a legal description of the property, as noted in the appeal rejection letter,
from the property's real estate tax statement. While this was not the legal description the
County was looking for, it was sufficient to describe where the property at issue was
located.
The time to appeal started on July 25, 2019. The Landowners filed their appeal 25
days later, on August 19, 2019. The appeal to the Board was timely.
8
K.S.A. 12-759(f) states:
"Any person, official or governmental agency dissatisfied with any order or
determination of the board may bring an action in the district court of the county to
determine the reasonableness of any such order or determination. Such appeal shall be
filed within 30 days of the final decision of the board."
K.S.A. 12-760(a) provides: "Within 30 days of the final decision of the city or
county, any person aggrieved thereby may maintain an action in the district court of the
county to determine the reasonableness of such final decision." The statute broadly states
any dissatisfied party may appeal the decision of the Board to the district court but fails to
provide who the interested parties should be and who should receive notice of the appeal.
Here, the Landowners were not named as a party in the 2019 appeal to the district
court and received no notice of the pending action affecting their land. As explained
below, we do not see how a decision appealed to the district court without naming the
Landowners as parties to the appeal would provide the Landowners with due process as
the ultimate decision affects the use of their land. But we note our Supreme Court found
the inability to join a required party does not categorically deprive a district court of
jurisdiction. See McGinty v. Hoosier, 291 Kan. 224, 232, 239 P.3d 843 (2010). While the
Neighbors were an aggrieved party who could appeal the Board's decision, the
Landowners should have been joined as a party in the appeal. There was no showing in
the record that it would have been difficult to join the Landowners as parties.
The Landowners Are Indispensable and Necessary Parties
The Neighbors contend the district court abused its discretion by failing to
determine whether the Landowners' motion for summary judgment, which was construed
as a motion to intervene, was timely. The Neighbors argue the Landowners moved to
9
intervene 27 months after becoming aware of this case and contend the district court's
order allowing the Landowners to intervene should be set aside.
The Landowners assert they were an indispensable party to the 19-CV-46 case, the
district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case without the
Landowners as a party, and the district court's original judgment was void.
An indispensable party is a party "who must be included in an action before it may
properly go forward." Cities Service Oil Co. v. Kronewitter, 199 Kan. 228, 230, 428 P.2d
804 (1967). A necessary party "must be included in an action either as plaintiffs or
defendants unless there is a valid excuse for their nonjoinder." 199 Kan. at 230.
The district court's grant of a motion to join a party as a necessary party under
K.S.A. 60-219(a) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Landmark National Bank v.
Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 532-33, 216 P.3d 158 (2009). Likewise, the district court's grant of
a motion to intervene under K.S.A. 60-224 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A
district court abuses its discretion if its decision is based on an error of fact or law or is
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. Gannon v. State, 302 Kan. 739, 741, 357 P.3d 873
(2015).
The district court explained:
"Notwithstanding the Court's rulings [denying the Landowners' motion for summary
judgment], the [Landowners] could have been included as parties in 19-CV-46 because
the outcome of the case would impact the zoning use and use of the [Landowners']
property. Therefore, it would have been appropriate to include the [Landowners] as
parties in the 19-CV-46 case."
The district court did not state which joinder or intervention statute it relied on as
the basis of its finding. The Neighbors assert their argument under K.S.A. 60-
10
224(b)(1)(A)—intervention of right. While the Landowners also cite K.S.A. 60-224, their
argument claiming to be an indispensable party to the case stems from K.S.A. 60-
219(a)(1)(B)(i)—required joinder of parties.
K.S.A. 60-219(a)(1)(B)(i) states:
"(a) . . . (1) Required party. A person who is subject to service of process must be
joined as a party if:
....
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) As a practical matter, impair or impede the person's ability to protect the
interest."
K.S.A. 60-224(a) states:
"(a) Intervention of right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to
intervene who:
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by statute; or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of
the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter
substantially impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing
parties adequately represent that interest."
K.S.A. 60-224(a)(2) is nearly identical to K.S.A. 60-219(a)(1)(B)(i). The
Landowners claim a substantial interest regarding the action, and, as owners of the
property, the original action should not have proceeded without them. Disposing of the
action initially without the Landowners impeded their ability to protect their interest. See
K.S.A. 60-219(a)(1)(B)(i).
11
Under intervention of right, the Landowners must show: "(1) timely application,
(2) a substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and (3) inadequate
representation of the intervenor's interests by the parties." Gannon, 302 Kan. at 741-42.
Intervention of right "is to be liberally construed in favor of intervention." 302 Kan. at
742. The Neighbors concede the Landowners have a substantial interest in the subject
matter of the case. The Landowners are a required or indispensable party. See K.S.A. 60-
219(a)(1)(B)(i). Under the facts of this case, it does not matter whether the Landowners
are determined to be indispensable parties or necessary parties. They were both
indispensable and necessary given their ownership of the land at issue in this litigation.
Inadequate representation
The Neighbors contend the County would have ceased providing adequate
representation of the Landowners' interests, at the latest, when it decided not to appeal the
district court's February 17, 2021 decision. But the Landowners would then be unable to
appeal the district court's decision to our court without intervening because they were not
a party to that case. In other words, the Landowners had no way to seek relief of an
adverse decision directly affecting their real property.
The County's interests also did not entirely align with the Landowners', who could
be subject to penalties, including fines and imprisonment, for violating the district court's
decision and violating zoning requirements—a consequence with no effect on the
County. See K.S.A. 12-761(a) ("Any violation of any regulation adopted under the
authority of [the Planning, Zoning and Subdivision Regulations in Cities and Counties
Act] shall be a misdemeanor and shall be punishable by a fine of not to exceed $500 or
by imprisonment for not more than six months for each offense or by both such fine and
imprisonment. Each day's violation shall constitute a separate offense."). We find the
Landowners were an indispensable party to the 19-CV-46 case whose interests were
inadequately represented by the County.
12
Timeliness
A motion to intervene as a matter of right must be timely. Gannon, 302 Kan. at
741. Generally, timeliness must be judged according to the totality of the circumstances.
302 Kan. at 743. We must first determine when the Landowners had notice their interests
may not have been adequately represented, which is when the timeliness factor begins.
See 302 Kan. at 743.
Notably, the Landowners provided an affidavit signed in November 2020 in
support of the County's motion for summary judgment in 19-CV-46. These actions would
suggest the Landowners were aware of the lawsuit between the Neighbors and the
County but did not obtain counsel or move to intervene. The Landowners then filed a pro
se letter on March 15, 2021, claiming they were unaware of the appeal. The district
court's ruling was unfavorable to the Landowners, and the County elected not to appeal
the decision.
The Landowners then filed their petition in 21-CV-21 in October 2021—within
seven months of the district court's judgment in 19-CV-46—asking for a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief, followed by a motion for summary judgment in August
2022. The County responded, explaining it intended to enforce the zoning regulations
based on the district court's decision and, therefore, there was "a case or controversy for
which declaratory judgment is appropriate."
The record does not contain the full case record in 21-CV-21, and it is unclear
what took place between the filing of the petition and the filing of the motion for
summary judgment 10 months later. Even so, if the district court did not allow the
Landowners to intervene, they would not have had standing to appeal the district court's
decision despite the fact it directly affected their real property.
13
The Landowners may not have realized their interests were not adequately
represented until the County failed to appeal the district court's February 17, 2021
judgment. See Gannon, 302 Kan. at 743. The County had until March 19, 2021, to file an
appeal. See K.S.A. 60-2103(a). The Landowners filed their pro se letter to the district
court on March 15, 2021. Seven months later, the Landowners filed a petition in 21-CV-
21 for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and later moved for summary judgment.
In Gannon, our Supreme Court found a motion to intervene one year after a party
learned its interests may not be adequately represented was untimely . 302 Kan. at 744.
However, we observe such decisions are based on a case-by-case analysis. See 302 Kan.
at 743 ("Generally speaking, timeliness is a flexible standard that cannot be judged in a
vacuum but rather is to be determined from all the circumstances."). While the district
court here specifically interpreted the Landowners' motion for summary judgment—not
the petition—as a motion to intervene, it is clear the Landowners attempted to insert
themselves into the pending issues by filing the petition in 21-CV-21. We find the
Landowners' petition, filed seven months after realizing their interests were not
adequately represented in 19-CV-46, was reasonable and timely. Under the totality of the
circumstances, given the Landowners' property interests at stake, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the Landowners to intervene in this case.
The District Court Properly Granted the Landowners' Motion to Set Aside the Judgment
The Neighbors argue the Landowners' motion to set aside the judgment for the
purpose of presenting new evidence was untimely. More accurately stated, the Neighbors
contend the district court erred in setting aside its initial judgment and reopening the case
to allow the Landowners to intervene as an indispensable party. The Neighbors claim the
Landowners' motion for summary judgment—construed by the district court as a motion
to intervene and set aside judgment—was untimely under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6).
14
We review challenges from the relief or denial of a motion to set aside a judgment
for an abuse of discretion. Garcia v. Ball, 303 Kan. 560, 565-66, 363 P.3d 399 (2015).
Again, a district court abuses its discretion if its decision is based on an error of fact or
law or is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. Gannon, 302 Kan. at 741.
The district court "may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order or
proceeding" under one of six grounds. K.S.A. 60-260(b). The relevant grounds of relief
here are:
"(b)(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under subsection (b) of K.S.A. 60-259,
and amendments thereto;
....
(6) any other reason that justifies relief." K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2), (b)(6).
K.S.A. 60-260(c) explains a motion for relief from judgment must be filed within
one year of the entry of judgment if the grounds for relief fell under K.S.A. 60 -260(b)(1)-
(3); otherwise, the motion must be filed "within a reasonable time."
The Neighbors assert the subsections of K.S.A. 60-260 are mutually exclusive.
Because the district court interpreted the Landowners' motion for summary judgment—
filed in a different case—as a motion to intervene and set aside the judgment here, the
Landowners did not assert a theory under which they wanted the district court to set aside
its judgment. In finding the Landowners' motion was a motion to intervene and set aside
judgment, the district court explained: "Based upon arguments presented by the parties,
existing case law, and K.S.A. 60-260, the Court[] will permit the reopening of the
Judgment issued in 19-CV-46, all in the interests of justice." The district court also stated
it would reopen the evidence. In denying the Neighbors' motion to alter or amend, the
district court emphasized it allowed the Landowners to intervene and present evidence
15
"[i]n the 'interests of justice.'" The basis of the district court's decision was under K.S.A.
60-260(b)(6), not K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2), and was reasonable.
A motion under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6) "must be made within a reasonable time."
K.S.A. 60-260(c). "[T]he general catch-all provision of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-260(b)(6)
cannot be used to circumvent the 1-year limitations period provided in the first three
specific grounds of the statute." In re Marriage of Johnston, 54 Kan. App. 2d 516, 522,
402 P.3d 570 (2017).
The district court set aside its initial judgment in the interests of justice to allow
the Landowners the opportunity to defend their property interests. Without intervening in
the case, the Landowners would not have been able to appeal the district court's adverse
ruling against them. The Landowners were not attempting to circumvent the one-year
time limitation; rather, they were trying to defend their property interests. For the same
reasons explained above, the Landowners' motion for summary judgment—construed as
a motion to intervene and set aside judgment—was filed within a reasonable time under
the circumstances. The district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside its initial
judgment to allow the Landowners to defend their property interests.
The Land Was Improperly Zoned for Agricultural Use
The Landowners argue Kansas policy prevents Coffey County from regulating the
use of their property for agricultural purposes, including harvesting domesticated deer .
The Neighbors do not dispute domesticated deer qualify as livestock and the raising of
domesticated deer is an agricultural activity. Instead, the Neighbors argue the
Landowners' operation of a commercial hunting preserve of domesticated deer is not an
agricultural activity and the property in question is subject to Coffey County zoning
ordinances, which require a special use permit to operate a hunting preserve.
16
The interpretation of zoning statutes and regulations is subject to our de novo
review. American Warrior, Inc. v. Board of Finney County Comm'rs, 319 Kan. 78, 82,
552 P.3d 1219 (2024). Though dependent on the facts of the case, a finding as to whether
a landowner's use of property is agricultural is a question of law also subject to unlimited
review. Board of Seward County Comm'rs v. Navarro, 35 Kan. App. 2d 744, 748, 133
P.3d 1283 (2006).
Cities and counties are given general zoning authority to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare. K.S.A. 12-741(a). Such authority does not extend "to the use of land
for agricultural purposes." K.S.A. 12-758(b); K.S.A. 19-2908. Zoning regulations may
include provisions providing for the issuance of special use permits. K.S.A. 12-755(a)(5).
"It is a well-established principle that zoning ordinances must be liberally construed in
favor of the property owner." Corbet v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 14 Kan.
App. 2d 123, 127, 783 P.2d 1310 (1989).
Article 4 of the Coffey County Zoning Regulations governs agricultural districts .
The regulations allow, with a special use permit, "[p]rivately owned seasonal or
temporary or permanent parks and recreational areas such as . . . hunting preserves ."
Article 4, section 101B.14.
The parties do not dispute domesticated deer are considered livestock and raising
livestock is an "[a]gricultural activity." See K.S.A. 2-3203(a). If the Landowners are
simply raising domesticated deer on their property for agricultural u ndertakings, there is
no doubt the agricultural use exception applies. Our task is to determine whether the
domesticated deer on the subject property produced for commercial hunting qualifies as
agricultural pursuits. See Navarro, 35 Kan. App. 2d at 750.
In Corbet, the landowners planted certain crops to provide food for wildlife. The
panel found the landowners' use of property for a wildlife hunting preserve was
17
agricultural and did not require a special use permit for zoning purposes as it utilized "the
resources of the land for production of plants and animals useful to man." 14 Kan. App.
2d at 126-27. The findings were specific to the facts of that case. 14 Kan. App. 2d at 127.
Corbet is distinguishable as the landowners there cultivated land to attract wildlife
to the property for hunting. Here, the Landowners are using their land to hunt
domesticated deer, not wildlife. There is no question that, when the Landowners take
customers to hunt on their property, they will all be in the fenced-in area with the
domesticated deer.
Navarro provides more guidance. There, the landowners bred, raised, and trained
racehorses. The county claimed the operation of a horse training facility and racetrack
violated the county's zoning and planning regulations. The district court determined the
county had failed to show the horse training facility was not an agricultural use of the
land and a special use permit was not needed as the track was exempt from zoning
regulations.
On appeal, the Navarro panel acknowledged horses are generally considered
livestock but found "training horses to race does not fit within the 'traditional meaning of
agriculture' in Kansas." 35 Kan. App. 2d at 751. The panel explained the horse training
facility was not used for a traditional farming venture, and "[t]he activity tied to the
livestock has gone beyond the 'agricultural purpose' for which the exception was
designed to protect." 35 Kan. App. 2d at 751.
While hunting domesticated deer is different from running a horse racetrack, the
activity tied to the domesticated deer here goes beyond the agricultural purpose for which
the statutory exception was designed to protect. The Landowners contend there are no
laws in Kansas restricting the means to harvest agricultural products and list various
means of harvesting different agricultural products. However, the Landowners are doing
18
more than just raising and feeding livestock. They advertise transportation to and from
Kansas City International Airport to accommodate out-of-state hunters who want a
hunting experience. In fact, the name of the Landowners' business is OZsome Big Game
Hunts and is advertised as an experience, offering photography and video for its
customers. The individuals involved with the Landowners' hunting business are going
there for a recreational activity and paying for the privilege to hunt specially bred and
managed deer with a high-powered rifle or bow and arrow.
It was uncontroverted below the Kansas Department of Wildlife and Parks does
not have jurisdiction over the killing of domesticated deer. Rather, because the deer are
considered livestock, they are regulated by the Department of Agriculture. See K.S.A.
47-1804(b); K.S.A. 47-2101. And, again, because the deer are domesticated and
considered livestock, there is no designated hunting season. But K.S.A. 32 -919(a)
requires "a valid Kansas hunting license . . . to hunt in this state." The statute does not
distinguish between hunting wildlife or domesticated animals. K.S.A. 32-920(e) states:
"Completion of an approved hunter education course shall not be required to obtain a
special controlled shooting area hunting license valid only for licensed controlled
shooting areas." (Emphases added.) This is essentially the premise of the Neighbors'
argument—the Landowners are running a private hunting preserve that is not licensed or
properly regulated or controlled and poses a danger to neighboring properties only a few
hundred yards away. The Landowners advertise their customers can use "whatever
weapon you want," posing significant dangers to neighboring landowners, as bullets
know no boundary—such as a fence—once discharged close to residential tracts.
The Landowners are essentially trying to redefine the activity on their land as
"limited harvesting of deer through means of guns or bows by customers." In other
words, the Landowners are profiting from a privately owned hunting facility. Though the
hunter may or may not harvest the deer for meat, the deer are there for the sport of
hunting rather than the benefit the meat provides. This activity "does not fall under the
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legislature's purpose in granting the agricultural use exception to 'spare the [family]
farmer from governmental regulations and not to discourage the development of this
state's farm industry.'" 35 Kan. App. 2d at 751. Based on the facts of this case, the
Landowners' hunting site does not qualify as an agricultural use.
The Board's Decision Was Unreasonable and Contrary to the Law
The Landowners argue the district court erred in finding the Board's decision was
unreasonable and contrary to the law.
Zoning decisions may be appealed to the district court on a "reasonableness"
standard. K.S.A. 12-760(a). The district court is limited to determining the lawfulness of
the local zoning authority's action and the reasonableness of such action. M.S.W., Inc. v.
Marion County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 29 Kan. App. 2d 139, 143, 24 P.3d 175 (2001).
An appellate court makes the same review as the district court, may not substitute its
judgment for the zoning authority's judgment, and will not find the zoning authority's
"'action unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so by the evidence.'" 29 Kan. App.
2d at 144.
Reasonableness is determined based on the facts of the case presented to the
zoning authority. The zoning authority's action is unreasonable "'when it is so arbitrary
that it can be said it was taken without regard to the benefit or harm involved to the
community at large, including all interested parties, and was so wide of the mark that its
unreasonableness lies outside the realm of fair debate.'" 29 Kan. App. 2d at 144. "'A
district court reviewing a zoning decision of an administrative agency may take
additional evidence that is relevant to the limited issues of reasonableness and legality of
the order appealed.'" 29 Kan. App. 2d at 144. Relevant evidence, including records of
prior proceedings, are admissible subject to judicial discretion. 29 Kan. App. 2d at 145.
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The Board found: "[T]he land appears to be a privately owned natural wildlife
habitat and reserve which is considered agricultural use and these regulations do not
require a special use [] zoning permit or occupancy certificate for it." It seems likely the
Board meant the Landowners had a natural wildlife habitat and preserve, not a reserve. A
reserve is defined as "b: a tract (as of public land) set apart." Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary. A preserve is defined as "2: an area restricted for the protection and
preservation of natural resources (such as animals or plants)." Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary. The definition of preservation is "a: the activity or process of keeping
something valued alive, intact, or free from damage or decay." Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary.
While the motion minutes from the Board hearing are in th