State v. Bellamy

Nos. 128,897 129,898 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. DELILIAH DENISE BELLAMY, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, K.S.A. 22-4301 et seq., allows persons in the custody of the Secretary of Corrections to request final disposition of other criminal charges pending against them within the state. Its purpose is to prevent indefinite suspension of pending criminal charges while a prisoner is incarcerated on other charges and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by placing an obligation on the courts to hear cases within a reasonable amount of time. 2. An inmate who is released from custody by parole, probation, or otherwise, may no longer rely on the speedy trial provisions of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act. After release, that person's speedy trial rights are the same as that of any other person. 3. An ex post facto law is any law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime when committed. 1  Appeal from Riley District Court; JOHN BOSCH, judge. Oral argument held July 29, 2026. Opinion filed September 18, 2026. Affirmed. Kristen B. Patty, of Wichita, for appellant. David Lowden, deputy county attorney, Barry R. Wilkerson, county attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before BOLTON FLEMING, P.J., HILL and GARDNER, JJ. HILL, J.: In this probation revocation appeal, Deliliah Denise Bellamy raises two issues. First, she contends that, because the State failed to timely act within 180 days as required by the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, found in K.S.A. 22- 4301 et seq., the district court lost jurisdiction to revoke her probation. Second, Bellamy argues that her jail credit was improperly calculated because it did not comply with the ruling in State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, 566 P.3d 481 (2025), permitting duplicative jail credit. In support, she argues that K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d)(2)(B) retroactively denies duplicative jail credit to pending appeals such as this case and is an ex post facto law and is unconstitutional and unenforceable. Because this is not a direct criminal appeal of her sentence, Bellamy is not entitled to any duplicative jail credit. We turn to the Detainers Act question first. In September 2023, Bellamy began serving a felony sentence in the Topeka Correctional Facility after her probation was revoked in a Geary County conviction. When she entered prison, she received notice that Riley County had filed detainers against her for two felony cases where she had pending motions to revoke her probation. While she was in prison, Bellamy filled out a form to resolve those two detainers. But that notice was never sent out because Bellamy lacked enough money in her prison 2 account to pay the postage to notify Riley County. She was never told that her request for disposition of her detainers had not been filed in Riley County. After Bellamy was released from prison on parole on March 15, 2024, she was transported to Riley County and then taken to court on her probation revocation cases. In June 2024, Bellamy moved to dismiss the State's motions to revoke her probation in both Riley County cases, arguing that the failure to process her detainer request was a violation of her due process rights and, in doing so, the Department of Corrections committed malfeasance. She argued that, under K.A.R. 44-12-601, the Department of Corrections should have paid for the postage and then deducted the amount from Bellamy's account when funds became available. When it finally ruled on the matter, the district court assumed that the Department of Corrections had violated the regulation by failing to pay the postage in advance and then taking it out of her account later. But, despite that finding, the court found no harm was done because Bellamy had been brought back to Riley County in front of a judge on this matter within 180 days of Bellamy's initiation of her detainer disposition request. After that finding, the district court also found that Bellamy violated her probation by failing to report for an office visit. The court revoked her probation and ordered her to serve her original prison sentences in both cases. The parties take opposite positions on this issue. Bellamy contends that she had complied with all the requirements of the Detainers Act but was thwarted by the prison officials' failure to mail her documents. She was indigent. She was thus entitled to the protection of the Act. She argues the district court's reasoning was erroneous because the clock started on either October 17 or 18, 2023, and expired on April 15, 2024, which was before her first hearing date on April 22, 2024. 3  In opposition, the State contends the 180-day period never started because the Riley County District Court and the Riley County Attorney never received the necessary documentation from prison authorities. With no notice, the 180-day period to respond never started. The State also argues that the failure of the prison authorities to mail the documentation was harmless because the 180-day clock could not have expired as Bellamy was released on parole on March 15, 2024, well within 180 days. The law on detainers is clear. The Detainers Act allows prisoners in the custody of the Secretary of Corrections "to request final disposition of other criminal charges pending against them within the state." State v. Munoz, 319 Kan. 743, 743, 559 P.3d 347 (2024); K.S.A. 22-4301(a). Its purpose is "'to prevent indefinite suspension of pending criminal charges while a prisoner is incarcerated on other charges' and 'to prevent delays in the administration of justice by placing an obligation on the courts to hear cases within a reasonable amount of time.'" State v. Griffin, 312 Kan. 716, 721, 479 P.3d 937 (2021). The State has 180 days to begin the resolution of those charges. K.S.A. 22-4303(b)(1)(A), (1)(B). Bellamy was entitled to the protection of the Act despite the failure of the prison authorities to mail her detainer request. They had a hold on her account to deduct the postage cost when she earned it. They should have mailed the request or at least notified her that the documents were being held because she did not have sufficient funds so she could take some other action. Without such notification, Bellamy reasonably believed her request had been mailed, given the hold on her account. Bellamy did what the Act required of her, but a defect occurred because prison officials failed to do what the Act required of them. See Griffin, 312 Kan. at 723-24. Despite that, Bellamy lost protection of the Act when she was paroled on March 15, 2024. She was then no longer in the custody of the Secretary of Corrections. This was 4 only about 150 days after she delivered her request to the detainer clerk and signed the account withdrawal form. This release is significant. The rule is simple. An inmate who is released from custody by parole, probation, or otherwise, may no longer rely on the speedy trial provisions of the Act. After release, that person's speedy trial rights are the same as that of any other person. State v. Julian, 244 Kan. 101, Syl., 765 P.2d 1104 (1988). Julian was in custody when he initiated his disposition of detainer request but was placed on probation before the 180 days was up. The court held he no longer had the right to rely on the speedy trial provisions of the Act. 244 Kan. at 105. The Julian decision forecloses relief for Bellamy. We note that, while the statutory language of the Act has changed since Julian, it does not appear to have changed the reasoning of Julian. The Julian court focused on a purported purpose of the statute—to avoid adverse consequences to prisoners that a detainer may cause, such as being excluded from programs or eligibility for parole. 244 Kan. at 104-05. And the Julian court said the Act was intended to apply to those in the custody of the Secretary of Corrections, which is how the statute reads now. 244 Kan. at 105. We are duty-bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent unless there is some indication that the Supreme Court is departing from its previous position. State v. Patton, 315 Kan. 1, 16, 503 P.3d 1022 (2022). Because she was no longer in the Secretary's custody, Bellamy's argument fails. These facts are pertinent to the jail credits question. We turn now to the issue about jail credits. Simply put, Bellamy argues her jail credit was improperly calculated under State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, 566 P.3d 481 (2025). 5  In Riley County case 20CR451, Bellamy had pled guilty to two counts of violation of the Kansas Offender Registration Act, K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq. These violations occurred between December 2019 and March 2020. In February 2021, the district court sentenced Bellamy to 48 months in prison and then granted her a downward dispositional departure to probation for 24 months. The court awarded her 36 days of jail credit for the period starting October 27, 2020, to December 1, 2020. After that, she was in jail from March 1, 2021, to July 26, 2021. In June 2022, the State moved to revoke her probation. On September 23, 2024, the district court revoked her probation. After the court revoked her probation, the court awarded her another 291 days of jail credit. In Riley County case 21CR71, Bellamy pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine. This crime occurred in March 2021. On July 26, 2021, the court sentenced her to 20 months in prison with probation granted for 12 months. The court ordered the sentence to run consecutive to 20CR451 mentioned above. Bellamy stayed in jail from March 1, 2021, to July 26, 2021. The court awarded her 90 days' jail credit for the periods beginning March 1, 2021, to March 5, 2021, and from May 3, 2021, to July 26, 2021. In June 2022, the State moved to revoke this probation as well. On September 23, 2024, the district court revoked this probation, along with the probation in the prior case. After the court revoked her probation, the court awarded her another 35 days of jail credit. Should we address this jail-credit issue? Bellamy did not object to the district court's ruling on jail credit. Generally, issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised on appeal. State v. Green, 315 Kan. 178, 182, 505 P.3d 377 (2022). Undeterred by this general rule, Bellamy argues this issue 6 may be reviewed despite her failure to object to her jail credit calculation below because it is a question of law and its resolution is necessary to prevent the denial of fundamental rights. She says the record is insufficient to determine whether her award of jail credit was correct. The State argues we should decline to remand the case because Bellamy did not preserve the issue for our review, and Bellamy admits there are insufficient facts in the record to decide this issue as a question of law. Bellamy merely speculates that relief may be available under Ervin. And there are no fundamental rights at stake. The Ervin court used an exception to the preservation requirement to reach the jail credit issue for the first time on appeal, finding that Ervin presented a question of law on admitted facts. 320 Kan. at 306. But the court ultimately remanded the case to the district court, recognizing that a hearing may be necessary because of a conflict between the calculation of jail credit at the sentencing hearing and the journal entry. 320 Kan. at 312. Here, the record is undisputed that Bellamy was in jail for both cases from March 15, 2024, to September 23, 2024, pending her probation violation hearing. She only received jail credit for this time on one of the cases. We thus hold that this issue is reviewable as a question of law on admitted facts. A long-standing rule on jail credit is swept away by a new vision of the law. With the passage of time, laws and interpretations of the law change. At the time that Bellamy committed her crimes (2019-2021), the long-standing interpretation of K.S.A. 21-6615(a) was that defendants only received jail credit for time spent in custody "solely" on the charge being sentenced. Campbell v. State, 223 Kan. 528, Syl. ¶ 1, 575 P.2d 524 (1978). This interpretation banned duplicative credit for time spent in jail. 7  On October 20, 2023, our Supreme Court revealed a new view and departed from its long-standing interpretation of K.S.A. 21-6615(a). The court held that, under the plain language of the statute, a defendant gets credit for all time spent in custody pending disposition of the defendant's case. State v. Hopkins, 317 Kan. 652, 656-57, 537 P.3d 845 (2023). More changes followed the Hopkins revelations. Effective May 23, 2024, the Legislature preemptively amended K.S.A. 21- 6615(a). L. 2024, ch. 96, § 7. That portion of the statute now states: "When computing the defendant's sentence, the following shall not be considered time spent incarcerated pending disposition of the defendant's case: (A) Any time awarded as credit in another case when consecutive sentences are imposed on a defendant." K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21- 6615(a)(2)(A). But the Supreme Court was not done. In Ervin, decided on April 11, 2025, interpreting the pre-2024 statute, the court held a defendant gets one day of credit for each day incarcerated pending disposition of the defendant's case regardless of whether the defendant received a credit for some or all of that time against a sentence in another case. 320 Kan. at 311-12. A legislative response followed. The Legislature again amended K.S.A. 21-6615 by adding a new subsection (d), effective July 1, 2026. L. 2026, ch. 62, § 1. K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d)(1) reads: "When consecutive sentences are imposed on a defendant, days spent in custody that are attributable to more than one case shall be credited only once against the aggregated consecutive term." The new subsection states that the change is retroactive for "[a]ll sentences, whether pronounced before, on or after July 1, 2026," and applies to "any case posture, including, but not limited to, direct appeals, probation revocation proceedings, motions to correct 8 illegal sentence, habeas corpus actions and actions filed under K.S.A. 60-1507, . . . pending on or filed after July 1, 2026." K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d)(2). Days and dates are important here. Here is what we can glean from the record. In Riley County case 20CR451, Bellamy pled guilty to two violations of the Kansas Offender Registration Act. These violations occurred between December 2019 and March 2020. In February 2021, the district court sentenced Bellamy to 48 months in prison. The court granted her a downward dispositional departure to probation for 24 months. The court awarded her 36 days of jail credit for the period October 27, 2020, to December 1, 2020. She was in jail from March 1, 2021, to July 26, 2021. In June 2022, the State filed a motion alleging Bellamy violated her probation. On September 23, 2024, the district court revoked her probation. After the court revoked her probation, the court awarded her another 291 days of jail credit. In Riley County case 21CR71, Bellamy pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine. This offense occurred in March 2021. On July 26, 2021, the court sentenced her to 20 months in prison with probation granted for 12 months. The court ordered the sentence to run consecutive to 20CR451. She was in jail from March 1, 2021, to July 26, 2021. The court awarded her 90 days of jail credit for the periods March 1, 2021, to March 5, 2021, and May 3, 2021, to July 26, 2021. In June 2022, the State filed a motion alleging Bellamy violated her probation. On September 23, 2024, the district court revoked her probation in this and the previous case. After the court revoked her probation, the court awarded her another 35 days of jail credit. 9 The Ex Post Facto Clause is implicated because canceling jail credits lengthens the time in prison. Though not a part of the offender's original sentence, the United States Supreme Court has held that laws canceling early release credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the laws "'lengthen[ed] the period that someone in petitioner's position must spend in prison.'" Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 442, 117 S. Ct. 891, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1997); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33-34, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981). The Kansas Supreme Court held the same in Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 417, 960 P.2d 227 (1998): "[F]or each good time credit the petitioner failed to earn, his conditional release date and, thus, the actual term of his punishment, would be extended." This holding also applies to laws canceling jail credit. For someone who had jail credit calculated according to Ervin, later applying K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) would lengthen that person's term of imprisonment. An ex post facto law is any law "'that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.'" Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 532-33, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 186 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2013). The Court considered whether a new law posed a "'sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.'" 569 U.S. at 539. In other words, an ex post facto law creates "a significant risk of increased punishment . . . ." Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 257, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 146 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2000). The central concern of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution is "'the lack of fair notice . . . when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed'" when the crime was committed. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30; see U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10. And the Clause restricts "arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29. 10  The State's argument that jail credit is not part of a defendant's punishment misses the point. The Ex Post Facto Clause is implicated because K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) has the potential to lengthen the period that an offender must spend in prison. It does not matter whether jail credit is, in a technical sense, part of the defendant's sentence. The defendant's effective sentence is altered by the calculation of jail credit. See Lynce, 519 U.S. at 445. "The presence or absence of an affirmative, enforceable right is not relevant, however, to the ex post facto prohibition, which forbids the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred. Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated. Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature, it violates the Clause if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense." Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30-31. Stansbury, 265 Kan. 404, Syl. ¶ 3. If we follow these principles in this case, we must decide what notice did Bellamy receive when she committed her crime and then decide if the 2026 amendments increased her sentence beyond what was prescribed when she committed her crime. This is not a question of whether she is entitled to less punishment. We find no ex post facto violation here. The Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated in Bellamy's case because the no duplicate jail credit law is the same now as it was when Bellamy committed her crimes and violated her probation. She cannot lose what she never had. The prohibition against ex post facto laws only applies to criminal statutes "which disadvantage the offender 11 affected by them." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1990). The ex post facto law is measured against the law in effect at the time the crime was committed. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 533. The purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give fair warning to individuals before crimes are committed. Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441. Bellamy had fair warning that she would not be awarded duplicate jail credit before she committed her crimes as that was the long-standing interpretation of the statute by Kansas courts. Bellamy committed her crimes and violated her probation before the Hopkins and Ervin decisions when our Supreme Court interpreted K.S.A. 21-6615 to permit duplicate jail credit. The Hopkins decision changed the law after Bellamy committed her crimes. In response to Hopkins, the Legislature codified the no duplicate jail credit rule before our Supreme Court had the chance to decide Ervin. Bellamy has never been awarded jail credit under Ervin (decided while this appeal was pending). Thus, Bellamy is not disadvantaged by the application of K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) to her sentence. Bellamy has not shown that application of K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) to her sentence would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Said another way, with the enactment of the 2026 amendments, the question is not whether Bellamy is entitled to the benefit of the Hopkins and Ervin holdings, but whether application of the amendments to her case violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. It does not, because she committed her crime before Hopkins. Application of the 2026 amendments to her case would not change her punishment and would not inflict a greater punishment that the law annexed to the crime when committed. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 532-33. Going further on this point, we hold that the rule in State v. Dawson, 310 Kan. 112, Syl. ¶ 1, 444 P.3d 914 (2019), does not apply to Bellamy's probation revocation appeal. That rule is limited to direct criminal appeals. In State v. Jacobson, 319 Kan. 70, 12 70-71, 552 P.3d 1239 (2024), a case resolving criminal history error claims, the court held: "Our law distinguishes between a direct appeal from sentencing and an appeal from denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. In a direct appeal, the defendant benefits from changes in the law occurring during the appeal process. But that is not true for the latter . . . ." The Jacobson court then observed: "Typically, criminal defendants challenge their sentence in three ways: (1) a direct appeal from sentencing, (2) an appeal from a district court's denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504, and (3) a civil proceeding collaterally challenging the sentence under K.S.A. 60-1507. . . . .... "An appeal from sentencing or resentencing necessarily falls under the first method when that appeal is directly 'from the judgment of conviction,' not an appeal of a district court's ruling on a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which is the second method." Jacobson, 319 Kan. at 77. This point was further clarified in State v. Murdock, 309 Kan. 585, 591-92, 439 P.3d 307 (2019): "To the extent our prior caselaw confused the procedural mechanism of a direct appeal with a motion to correct an illegal sentence, we now clarify the distinction. Put simply, a party may seek and obtain the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of a direct appeal, but a party moving to correct an illegal sentence is stuck with the law in effect at the time the sentence was pronounced." Bellamy's appeal of the jail credit computation made in a probation revocation motion is not a direct appeal. "[I]n a direct appeal, a defendant will receive the benefit of any change in the law that occurs while the direct appeal is pending. See, e.g., State v. Ford, 302 Kan. 455, 471, 353 P.3d 1143 (2015) ('[I]t is generally true that changes in the 13 law apply prospectively and only to cases on direct review.')." Murdock, 309 Kan. at 591. Thus, Bellamy is not entitled in this appeal to any changes made in the law. Conclusion Because Bellamy was released from prison on parole and returned to the district court to face her motions for probation revocation before the expiration of the 180-day limit in the Detainers Act, we hold the district court did not lose jurisdiction to hear those motions to revoke. Bellamy was convicted in 2021. Because Bellamy's current appeal is not a direct appeal as described by K.S.A. 22-3504(c)—"an appeal from the judgment of conviction"—she is not entitled to duplicate jail credit. Thus, the enactment of K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d)(2)(B), retroactively denying duplicate jail credits, has no ex post facto effect on her case. Bellamy lost nothing with that law's enactment. Under the Campbell rule, she was not entitled to duplicate jail credit then; she is not entitled to it now. See 223 Kan. 528, Syl. ¶ 1. Affirmed. 14