Full Opinion

No. 129,581 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS TYLER LINGLE, Appellant, v. SUBARU OF WICHITA, EDDY'S VOLKSWAGEN, and BRANDON STEVEN, Appellees. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. To preserve the integrity of the courts and prevent interference with the administration of justice, the use of hallucinated cases, nonexistent quotations, and legal inaccuracies derived from the use of artificial intelligence is not allowed in legal filings and arguments made to the courts. 2. Due to artificial intelligence's propensity to hallucinate, those appearing before a court have a duty to independently verify the validity of artificial intelligence-generated results. This verification should occur before submitting a filing or presenting an argument to a court that was prepared or drafted with artificial intelligence assistance. 3. A self-represented litigant has the same duty as an attorney to independently verify the validity of artificial intelligence-generated results. A party's status as a self- represented litigant does not remove this duty of verification. 1 Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; KEVIN M. SMITH, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed. Tyler Lingle, appellant pro se. Todd E. Shadid, of Klenda Austerman LLC, of Wichita, for appellees. Before CLINE, P.J., COBLE and PICKERING, JJ. PICKERING, J.: The integrity of the courts is preserved when parties submit truthful and accurate legal authority for its consideration. Doing otherwise, such as submitting fabricated cases, "'degrades or impugns the integrity of the Court [and] interferes with the administration of justice.'" United States v. Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1063 (E.D. Cal. 2025); see Williams v. Kirch, 268 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) ("Judges must be able to rely on the authenticity of the authorities cited by the parties to make just decisions."). This case concerns a self-represented litigant's use of artificial intelligence that resulted in filings containing hallucinated citations, incorrect quotations, and legal inaccuracies. The case began when Tyler Lingle, representing himself, sued two car dealerships—both allegedly owned by Brandon Steven—over two separate, but related, transactions. He alleged Subaru of Wichita tampered with the odometer of a Range Rover before selling him the Range Rover. He also alleged Eddy's Volkswagen breached a sales contract for a BMW 5 series and converted his trade-in vehicle, the Range Rover. With the use of generative artificial intelligence, Lingle filed several motions that included fabricated cases and legal inaccuracies. The district court admonished and then sanctioned Lingle for these submissions. Eventually, all parties moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted for the two dealerships. Continuing as a self- represented litigant, Lingle now appeals the denial of his motions for summary judgment, 2 the granting of the dealerships' motions for summary judgment, and the district court's imposed sanctions. Our review of Lingle's pro se brief found numerous hallucinated cases and legal inaccuracies, including misstatements of law. For reasons to be discussed further, we have decided not to take a more hardline approach by striking the brief and dismissing the appeal altogether. Instead, we will consider Lingle's arguments without the fabricated citations and legal inaccuracies. As a result, we find that most of Lingle's arguments are unsupported by any pertinent authority, and he has therefore abandoned the issues. Our review also finds that the district court did not erroneously grant summary judgment to Eddy's Volkswagen (Eddy's) or Subaru of Wichita and Brandon Steven (collectively, Subaru), and we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In December 2024, Lingle sued Eddy's, alleging breach of contract; negligence; violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA), K.S.A. 50-623 et seq.; conversion; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claims stemmed from his attempt to trade in his Range Rover for a BMW, but, because of delays by Eddy's, the sale fell through. Lingle filed a second lawsuit against Subaru. He alleged fraud; violation of the Federal Odometer Act (FOA), 49 U.S.C. § 32710; violation of the KCPA; breach of contract; and negligent misrepresentation. He alleged the odometer on the Range Rover he purchased from Subaru had been tampered with. Subaru obtained a clerk's order for extension of time to plead to the petition. Before expiration of the extension of time, Lingle moved for default judgment. Subaru moved for sanctions—its reasonable attorney fees—based on the frivolous motion. 3 Ultimately, the district court denied the motion for default judgment and granted the motion for sanctions, awarding $750 in sanctions against Lingle. As the case progressed, the motion practice became voluminous, including competing motions to compel, motions to strike, and motions for sanctions. On April 22, 2025, the district court entered orders on the motions to compel and various other pretrial motions. As part of the orders, the district court awarded Eddy's $1,480 in attorney fees as sanctions for Lingle's "numerous supplemental filings" which "caused undue burden on defense counsel that resulted in substantial and otherwise unnecessary legal fees." As the court later noted, it had "admonished [Lingle] multiple times during the life of these cases to verify sources and ensure they complied with Kansas law in his admittedly Artificial Intelligence-generated motions." Lingle's failure to comply with the court's admonitions resulted in the district court sanctioning Lingle for filing submissions containing fabricated cases. Lingle filed a motion for judicial notice of default and non-response regarding notices of trespass he sent defense counsel and Steven (despite Steven not being a named party in the Eddy's lawsuit). Eddy's moved for sanctions. The district court awarded Eddy's $640 as sanctions for the frivolous motion to compel and $920 as sanctions for the motion for judicial notice of default. All Parties Move for Summary Judgment Eventually, all parties filed motions for summary judgment. Eddy's motion for summary judgment asserted that Lingle could not show Eddy's breached a contract. Eddy's also argued that Lingle had presented no proof of damages resulting from any alleged breach of contract. Eddy's similarly argued there was no evidence of deception, oppression, overreach, or intentional misstatement or concealment of facts supporting a claim under the KCPA. Finally, it asserted Lingle had presented no evidence of 4 conversion or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Devlyn Haskins, the general manager of Eddy's, submitted a declaration in support of the motion. Subaru also moved for summary judgment by asserting there was no supporting evidence it had made a false statement, and thus Lingle's fraud claim must fail. Similarly, Subaru argued there was no evidence that it had violated either the FOA or the KCPA. In addition, Subaru's summary judgment motion stated there was no evidence supporting Lingle's claim of breach of contract or negligent misrepresentation. Lingle did not file a response to Subaru's motion for summary judgment; however, he also moved for summary judgment. Lingle moved to strike Haskins' declaration, asserting it was not based on personal knowledge, lacked foundation, and contained assertions contradicted by Eddy's interrogatory answers. The district court denied the motion to strike, finding that "the 'declaration' is in the form of an affidavit and is based on the defendant's personal knowledge. As long as Haskins is available for cross examination, all statements are admissible and reviewable by the court." On June 12, 2025, the district court ordered the cases to be consolidated. On July 16, 2025, Lingle filed a "combined response in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment and cross-motion for summary judgment against Defendant Eddy's Volkswagen." On July 21, 2025, Lingle filed a "notice of Defendants' material admissions and motion for partial summary judgment." It does not appear that either Eddy's or Subaru responded to Lingle's combined response in opposition to summary judgment. 5 The District Court Rules on the Parties' Motions for Summary Judgment That same month, the district court held a dispositive motions hearing. The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of this hearing. After the hearing, the district court issued a written order. First outlining its findings of fact, the district court noted that Lingle "admitted on the record that he did not respond to any of [Subaru's] statement of facts . . . , so the court finds all of [Subaru's] factual allegations uncontroverted." The court found that the bill of sale when Subaru purchased the Range Rover listed the mileage as 77,693, but the odometer listed the mileage as 10,381. Along with the bill of sale was a Statement of Correction provided by JP Morgan Chase Bank, the seller. This statement noted that the handwritten entry on the bill of sale was error and the correct mileage was 10,381. The district court also found the Range Rover's CarFax report listed mileage consistent with an actual mileage of 10,381, not 77,693. For Lingle's claims against Subaru, the district court found there was "no genuine issue of material fact." Stemming from its findings of fact, the district court concluded that Subaru did not commit fraud by failing to disclose JP Morgan Chase Bank's clerical error. The court also concluded the Range Rover's actual mileage was 10,381, not 77,693. Lingle presented no evidence that JP Morgan Chase Bank lied in its Statement of Correction or that Subaru was unreasonable for relying on JP Morgan Chase Bank's Statement of Correction. As a result, the district court found that Subaru had not committed fraud or violated the Federal Odometer Act. As for the claims against Eddy's, the district court determined Eddy's breached its contract for the sale of the BMW and breached its duty to properly tag the vehicle it loaned Lingle while waiting on the BMW. Regarding damages, the district court determined that Lingle had not suffered any economic damages. It also found the failure to properly tag the loaner vehicle was "inadvertent and not intentional," so Lingle was not entitled to damages under the KCPA. The district court also determined that Eddy's did 6 not convert the Range Rover because of the sale agreement's terms, which included language that all oral agreements were void. The district court concluded that Lingle failed to state a claim for either negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lingle moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The court found Lingle's arguments were not meritorious and "adopt[ed] all findings made on the record." That hearing transcript does not appear in the record. The district court's order recalled its earlier admonishments to Lingle about his "admittedly Artificial Intelligence-generated motions" and stated: "The court finds that [Lingle's] response to [Eddy's and Subaru's] motion for summary judgment and his request for summary judgment contains 28 false representations of law, including nonexistent cases. [Lingle] claims he retracted all such misstatements, but his latest filing dated August 12, 2025, a motion for sanctions, contains one nonexistent case as well as a misstatement of law from another case." The district court found Lingle's "frivolous filings and misstatements of fact and law were made to harass [Eddy's and Subaru] and therefore entitle [Eddy's and Subaru] to sanctions." The court awarded $5,120 in new sanctions and affirmed the prior sanction awards totaling $1,560. Lingle appealed and continues to represent himself at the appellate level. ANALYSIS With the release of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools in late 2022, AI tools and systems were viewed with interest and caution. See Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr., My "Hallucinating" Experience with ChatGPT, Judges' Journal, vol. 64, pp. 37-39 (ABA Spring 2023). But due to AI's propensity to hallucinate (some AI tools more than others), coupled with attorneys' and self-represented litigants' use of generative AI as research or 7 drafting tools, courts were soon grappling with fabricated cases, quotations, and misstatements of law caused by AI-generated results. See Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (first known case of attorney's use of generative AI results that included hallucinated cases and numerous inaccuracies). Since the landmark Mata case, the number of cases involving hallucinated cases and misstatements of law has continued to increase. See Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P., 114 Cal. App. 5th 426, 430, 336 Cal. Rptr. 3d 897 (2025). In fact, one person has chosen to create a database that "tracks legal decisions in cases where generative AI produced hallucinated content—typically fake citations, but also other types of AI-generated arguments." Damien Charlotin's AI Hallucination Cases database, https:// damiencharlotin.com. Indeed, such cases continue to be found throughout our states, and Kansas is no exception. See Riverchase v. Goldwyn, No. 128,338, 2026 WL 123280, at *6 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. granted 322 Kan. ___ (2026); Scheer v. Scheer Farms, No. 129,066, 2026 WL 1623023, at *4-5 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion) (Pickering, J., concurring), petition for rev. filed July 2, 2026. This case is such a case. In the argument section of Lingle's brief, several citations are completely hallucinated; the statute or case simply does not exist, and many citations materially misstate the statutory language or caselaw. Before we begin this review, we acknowledge the rapid movement of AI in the legal landscape along with the ever-changing use of AI tools and systems. We considered other courts' responses in the last few years to filings containing AI-generated hallucinations. What we found are a variety of responses, including imposing monetary sanctions, dismissing a party's case, referring the attorney to the respective state attorney disciplinary board, disregarding the fake citation, or issuing a cautionary warning. Regardless of the results, the takeaway is always the same: Those using AI-generated 8 results in either court filings or oral arguments must first verify the results' accuracy before submitting those results for the court's consideration. Hallucinated Statutes and Cases Lingle's brief begins by asserting Eddy's and Subaru failed to follow the statutory requirements before requesting sanctions and the district court failed to comply with the statutory requirements before sanctioning him. Lingle contends Eddy's and Subaru collectively failed to follow K.S.A. 60-211(c)(1)(A) and provide a 21-day safe-harbor notice before filing the motion for sanctions. Similarly, he asserts the district court violated K.S.A. 60-211(c)(3) by failing to issue a show cause order before sanctioning him. Finally, he contends the district court violated K.S.A. 60-211(c)(4) by failing to "describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation and explain the basis for the sanction imposed." But K.S.A. 60-211(c) does not contain any subparagraphs. Instead, K.S.A. 60- 211(c) states, in its entirety: "If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subsection (b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm or party that violated the statute or is responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate or employee. The sanction may include an order to pay to the other party or parties [the] reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper. A motion for sanctions under this section may be served and filed at any time during pendency of the action, but must be filed not later than 14 days after the entry of judgment." As for the caselaw citations, when discussing them, we follow the example of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which faced a similar set of fabricated case names and case citations. There, the court wisely chose not to include the full fabricated 9 citations in order "[t]o avoid memorializing the erroneous citations." Douglas v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 363 A.3d 1088, 1090 n.2 (D.C. 2026). Lingle cites Coonrod v. Atlantic Richfield Co. with a Kansas Reporter citation, for the proposition that a plaintiff may recover for loss-of-use after converted property is returned. This case does not exist. Similarly, Lingle cites Patterson v. Cowley County Motors, Inc., to suggest that odometer misrepresentation supports liability under the KCPA. But this citation appears to have been generated from a combination of two real cases from the Kansas Court of Appeals and the New Mexico Court of Appeals. In addition, St. Catherine Hosp. v. Rodriguez is cited to suggest that punitive damages require a separate proceeding. The Kansas Reporter citation is to the middle of another case, State v. Hall, 45 Kan. App. 2d 290, 247 P.3d 1050 (2011), and the Pacific Reporter citation is to an Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals opinion. Materially Misstated Cases and Statutes We also determined that Lingle's brief contains many other inaccuracies. For instance, some of the cases Lingle cites are real but do not stand for the propositions for which he cites them. The brief substantively misstates the holding of 11 cases 36 times. For example, Lingle cites Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 276 Kan. 393, 402- 03, 77 P.3d 130 (2003), for the proposition that a district court's failure to state the controlling facts and controlling law in a motion for summary judgment violates Supreme Court Rule 165 (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 232), and insufficient findings prevent appellate review. Lingle asserts Burcham holds that the district court's compliance with Rule 165 is a question of law reviewed de novo. But Burcham does not stand for this proposition; the standard of review is never actually identified in the opinion. 10 Similarly, Lingle repeatedly cites Frick v. City of Salina, 290 Kan. 869, 878, 235 P.3d 1211 (2010), to suggest that summary judgment requires competent, admissible proof. But, again, Frick does not stand for that proposition. Instead, the pin cite provided by Lingle merely restates the standard of review for summary judgment. 290 Kan. at 878. The words "admissible" and "competent" do not appear in the opinion, and the admissibility of the evidence does not appear to have been an issue. Overall, this pattern of fictitious citations, fake quotations, and legal inaccuracies infers that Lingle continued his use of artificial intelligence when drafting his appellate brief. See Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 1064-65 (noting variety of characteristics of "hallucinated case" citations generated by artificial intelligence). The use of hallucinated cases and inaccuracies is not allowed in legal filings. An appellate brief containing nonexistent case citations or fake legal authority needlessly undermines the validity of a party's arguments. Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 448- 49. "'An attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system.'" Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 461). "A fake opinion is not 'existing law' and citation to a fake opinion does not provide a non-frivolous ground for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law." Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 461. In light of Lingle's brief containing numerous fabrications, we disregard any of Lingle's arguments supported by nonexistent cases. As provided by K.S.A. 60-211(b)(2), those practicing before our courts have a duty to verify AI-generated results before a document's submission for a court's review. K.S.A. 60-211(b)(2) states: 11 "(b) Representations to the court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion or other paper, whether by signing, filing, submitting or later advocating it, an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: .... (2) the claims, defenses and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying or reversing existing law or for establishing new law." It matters not that Lingle is a self-represented litigant. A self-represented litigant has the same duty as an attorney to independently verify the validity of artificial intelligence-generated results. See Luke v. Department of Health and Human Services, No. 24-1421, 2025 WL 2237311, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (unpublished opinion) (stressing "self-represented litigants and attorneys alike have a duty to independently verify the authenticity and veracity of all sources and assertions when relying on artificial intelligence tools to prepare trial or appellate court filings"). Lingle's status as a person representing himself does not remove his duty to confirm the validity of any cited legal authority. Lingle's disregard for the accuracy of his citations could be sanctionable as courts have inherent power to sanction such behavior. See Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024). Failure to verify the accuracy of citations in a brief—whether hallucinated or merely misstating the law—may result in sanctions up to, and including, striking the brief and dismissal of the appeal. See Kirch, 268 N.E.3d at 288 ("Citations to fictitious, AI-generated authority is a growing problem nationwide. Courts have sanctioned both attorneys and pro se litigants for including them in briefs."). Accordingly, to preserve the integrity of the courts and prevent interference with the administration of justice, the use of hallucinated cases, nonexistent quotations, and legal inaccuracies derived from the use of artificial intelligence is not allowed in legal 12 filings and arguments made to the courts. See Scheer, 2026 WL 1623023, at *5 (Pickering, J., concurring) (citing Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 1064). We therefore issue this cautionary warning to those submitting filings or presenting arguments with the assistance of artificial intelligence and a reminder of the duty to independently verify the accuracy of AI-generated results. Future submissions of filings with hallucinated cases or legal inaccuracies face the prospect of a variety of sanctions, including striking legal filings, case dismissal, monetary sanctions, or referral to attorney disciplinary offices. See Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. LeTennier, 251 A.D.3d 97, 105-06, 250 N.Y.S.3d 260 (2026) (listing cases). Considering the above, we now proceed with reviewing the raised issues while simultaneously disregarding the cases and legal statements which do not exist or do not stand for the proposition for which the case is cited. I. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment Standard of Review "Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and supporting affidavits show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court must resolve all facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing summary judgment, a party must produce evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issue in the case. Appellate courts apply the same rules and, where they find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment is inappropriate. Appellate review of the legal effect of undisputed facts is de novo." GFTLenexa, LLC v. City of Lenexa, 310 Kan. 976, 981-82, 453 P.3d 304 (2019). 13 Discussion On appeal, Lingle asserts that Rule 141 (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 220) requires a party opposing summary judgment to controvert the movant's facts with pinpoint record citations or those facts are deemed admitted. He contends that Eddy's and Subaru failed to adequately controvert his factual statements and the district court erred by failing to deem those facts admitted. As a result, he suggests that the ruling "cannot stand" and he is entitled to judgment. Rule 141 states, in relevant part: "(a) Motion for Summary Judgment; Requirements. A motion for summary judgment must be accompanied by a filing fee and a memorandum or brief that: (1) states concisely, in separately numbered paragraphs, the uncontroverted contentions of fact on which the movant relies; (2) for each fact, contains precise references to pages, lines and/or paragraphs— or to a time frame if an electronic recording—of the portion of the record on which the movant relies; and (3) is filed and served on all counsel of record and unrepresented parties not in default for failure to appear. "(b) Response to Motion for Summary Judgment; Requirements. A memorandum or brief opposing a motion for summary judgment must: (1) state—in separately numbered paragraphs that correspond to the numbered paragraphs of movant's memorandum or brief—whether each of movant's factual contentions is: (A) uncontroverted; (B) uncontroverted for purposes of the motion only; or (C) controverted, and if controverted: (i) concisely summarize the conflicting testimony or evidence and any additional genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment; and (ii) provide precise references as required in subsection (a)(2); and 14 (2) be filed and served on all counsel of record and unrepresented parties not in default for failure to appear no later than 21 days after service of the motion, unless the time is extended by local rule or court order." 2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 220-21. Lingle asserts the district court's order failed to identify any admitted or controverted facts "as Rule 141(b)(1) requires." Rule 141(b)(1), however, does not require anything from the district court's summary judgment order; it applies to a respondent's response to summary judgment. 2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 220. None of the following cases referenced in Lingle's brief supports this assertion either. Munkers v. Pomerenke, 11 Kan. App. 2d 569, 573, 730 P.2d 360 (1986), held a district court may not consider a motion for summary judgment until the full 21-day period in Rule 141 had passed; it did not discuss language of the district court's order. Both Bus. Opportunities Unlimited, Inc. v. Envirotech Heat. & Cooling, Inc., 26 Kan. App. 2d 616, 618, 992 P.2d 1250 (1999), and Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp., 241 Kan. 595, 604, 738 P.2d 1246 (1987), address the parties'—not the district court's— obligations to comply with Rule 141. Lingle also asserts that Eddy's and Subaru "largely replied with conclusory 'controverted/no cite' statements" to Lingle's combined response/cross-motion for summary judgment. He argues the facts in his combined response/cross-motion for summary judgment resulted in deemed admissions. There is no record citation to support this contention, and it does not appear there was a response to his cross-motion for summary judgment. But "[a] disputed question of fact which is immaterial to the issue does not preclude summary judgment. Stated another way, if the disputed fact, however resolved, could not affect the judgment, it does not present a genuine issue" for purposes of summary judgment. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 934, 296 P.3d 1106 (2013). Lingle's brief does not explain how any of the facts 15 he claims should have been deemed admitted would have affected the summary judgment. Lingle also asserts that the district court further erred when it "credited materials not shown to satisfy [K.S.A.] 60-256(e)(1)." This statute requires that affidavits or declarations "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." K.S.A. 60-256(e)(1). But nowhere in this section of the brief are the erroneously admitted documents identified. Lingle concludes that, because Eddy's and Subaru's responses were noncompliant and the district court erred by considering inadmissible documents, he is entitled to judgment or, at least, a reversal to reconsider summary judgment. Lingle raises each of these issues in less than three sentences and with minimal citation to the record. We recognize Rule 141(g), Rule 165(a), and K.S.A. 60-252 require the district court to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law. But nothing in those rules require the district court's order to specifically identify whether a fact is deemed admitted or controverted in making its findings of fact and conclusions of law. No authority is cited for the holding that a district court must specifically identify which facts it deemed admitted. Similarly, Lingle does not explain how the facts he claims should have been deemed admitted entitle him to summary judgment or prevented summary judgment for Eddy's and Subaru. And he neither identifies which documents he believes were improperly admitted nor explains why Eddy's and Subaru were not entitled to summary judgment without those documents. He does not specifically argue any of these points; he merely stacks these suggestions and inferences atop each other and concludes the district court erred. A point raised incidentally in a brief and not argued therein is deemed waived or abandoned. Russell v. May, 306 Kan. 1058, 1089, 400 P.3d 647 (2017). Lingle has abandoned these arguments. 16 II. The District Court Did Not Violate Lingle's Due Process Rights by Granting Summary Judgment Based on an Issue It Raised Sua Sponte Standard of Review "Whether an individual's due process rights were violated is a question of law subject to de novo review." In re Adoption of B.J.M., 42 Kan. App. 2d 77, 81, 209 P.3d 200 (2009). Discussion On appeal, Lingle argues the district court erred by resolving the case on grounds not raised by either party. He asserts this denied him notice and an opportunity to be heard and, therefore, violated his due process rights. He contends that Eddy's and Subaru's summary judgment motions only argued Lingle could not prove liability, not that there was a breach without damages. He alleges the district court found sua sponte there was no actual fraud and no violations under the KCPA. He claims the district court's order contains only bare conclusions and fails to comply with Rule 165. Lingle asks us to vacate the summary judgment order "to the extent it rests on unbriefed or sua sponte grounds" and remand with directions for a different judge to decide "only the issues raised by the parties." His argument lacks support. First, Lingle's argument consists of two sentences: "[Eddy's and Subaru's] summary-judgment papers argued only that Plaintiff could not prove liability; they did not argue 'breach but no damages,' nor did they brief the elements of fraud or KCPA—grounds the court introduced on its own. The July 30, 2025, order found (a) breach with 'no damages' and (b) no actionable fraud/KCPA without those theories being briefed and without notice or an opportunity to respond." 17 Issues not adequately briefed are deemed abandoned. In re Marriage of Williams, 307 Kan. 960, 977, 417 P.3d 1033 (2018). Lingle has, effectively, abandoned this argument. Second, Eddy's memorandum in support of summary judgment argued both that there was no breach of contract and, even if there was a breach, there were no damages. In its motion for summary judgment, Eddy's asserted Lingle "has no proof that he suffered any damages as a direct result." It noted it provided Lingle with a loaner vehicle, and Lingle "had transportation at all times." Eddy's contended that Lingle had provided no proof of legal fees "directly caused by failure to deliver the BMW on the supposed delivery date." And Eddy's asserted there was no fraud or deceptive practice regarding the BMW transaction to warrant a violation under the KCPA. Similarly, Subaru asserted there was no fraud regarding the sale of the Range Rover because there was no evidence it made a false statement. Subaru also argued there was no evidence of deception to support a KCPA claim. Lingle is factually incorrect when he suggests the district court raised these issues sua sponte and that he had no opportunity to brief the issues, had no notice, and had no opportunity to respond. Finally, Lingle misrepresents the holdings of both cases he cites—In re J.D.C., 284 Kan. 155, 159 P.3d 974 (2007), and State ex rel. Slusher v. City of Leavenworth, 285 Kan. 438, 172 P.3d 1154 (2007)—to suggest that resolving an issue sua sponte without notice and an opportunity to be heard violate due process. In re J.D.C. addressed due process in the context of live cross-examination of witnesses, not sua sponte findings in an order. 284 Kan. at 163, 166. And Slusher held that applying a veteran's preference did not create a due process violation, an argument extensively raised and argued by the parties in that case. 285 Kan. 438, Syl. ¶ 7. Lingle also cites Montoy v. State, 275 Kan. 18 145, 62 P.3d 228 (2003), to suggest it is "error to summarily dispose of claims without procedural safeguards." But Montoy did not address, much less find, that the district court's procedure violated due process; our Supreme Court instead found that there were issues of material fact which did not support summary disposition by the district court. 275 Kan. at 156. Due process did not factor into the Montoy court's decision. Lingle has not adequately briefed the issue. He is incorrect about the facts, and his legal authority does not support his argument. We do not find his argument persuasive. III. The District Court Did Not Rely on Inadmissible Evidence Standard of Review "[A] challenge to the legal adequacy of the district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence" at summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 295-96, 373 P.3d 750 (2016), overruled on other grounds by State v. Petersen- Beard, 304 Kan. 192, 377 P.3d 1127 (2016). Discussion Lingle makes two arguments related to the district court's reliance on inadmissible evidence to support summary judgment. First, he asserts the district court relied on inadmissible documents—specifically an AutoCheck printout and the Statement of Correction indicating the odometer reading was entered in error—to support summary judgment. Second, he contends the declaration from Marc Lee, the Platform Used Car Director for Subaru, was "unauthenticated and inadmissible" and that the district court erred by considering Lee's declaration because he was not available to testify at the summary judgment hearing. 19 But the district court's findings of fact indicate that Lingle "admitted on the record that he did not respond to any of [defendants'] statements of facts (see record), so the court finds all the [defendants'] factual allegations uncontroverted." Lingle has not provided a transcript of the summary judgment hearing. The burden is on the party making a claim "to designate a record sufficient to present its facts and arguments to the appellate courts and to establish its claims." Bicknell v. Kansas Department of Revenue, 315 Kan. 451, 462-63, 509 P.2d 1211 (2022). Lingle has not shown that the district court erred by finding Subaru's statement of facts were uncontroverted. As a result, he cannot show that the district court erred by relying on the evidence supporting Subaru's statement of facts. IV. The District Court Made Sufficient Findings to Support Its Order for Sanctions Standard of Review The imposition of sanctions under K.S.A. 60-211 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Wood v. Groh, 269 Kan. 420, 429, 7 P.3d 1163 (2000). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is based on an error of fact or law or is "'arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.'" In re A.S., 319 Kan. 396, 400, 555 P.3d 732 (2024). The burden to establish an abuse of discretion is on the party asserting an abuse of discretion. 319 Kan. at 400. Discussion On appeal, Lingle asserts the district court erred when it sanctioned him without making sufficient findings. He contends neither the district court's $750 sanction nor its $6,680 sanction identified the sanctioned conduct, the subsection of K.S.A. 60-211(b) violated, or a basis for the calculation for the sanction. Lingle argues Eddy's and Subaru 20 "inflated" 28 false citations, asserting the citations were "clerical mis-cites, not sanctionable falsehoods." Here, the district court noted that "it admonished [Lingle] multiple times during the life of these cases