In re Zaczyk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 130,454 In the Matter of CYNTHIA J. ZACZYK, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE Original proceeding in discipline. Oral argument held September 14, 2026. Opinion filed November 6, 2026. One-year suspension. Matthew J. Vogelsberg, Chief Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Kate Duncan Butler, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, was on the formal complaint for the petitioner. John J. Ambrosio, of Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock & Kennedy, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Cynthia J. Zaczyk, respondent, argued the cause pro se. PER CURIAM: This is an attorney discipline proceeding against respondent Cynthia J. Zaczyk, of Wichita. Respondent received her license to practice law in Kansas in October 2020. On March 17, 2025, the Disciplinary Administrator's office filed a formal complaint against respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). Respondent answered the formal complaint on April 4, 2025. On May 19, 2025, respondent entered into a joint stipulation agreement with the Disciplinary Administrator's office stipulating to violations of KRPC 1.5(a) (fees) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 332) and KRPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 432). 1  Respondent personally appeared and was represented by counsel at the complaint hearing before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys, which was conducted on June 3, 2025. After the hearing, the panel decided that respondent had violated KRPC 1.5(a) and KRPC 8.4(c). The panel set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, along with its recommendation on disposition, in a final hearing report, the relevant portions of which are set forth below. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND "Facts .... "19. Respondent began working for the law firm of Cordell & Cordell (Cordell) as an intern in June 2020. Cordell is a multistate domestic litigation firm. Respondent worked in the firm's Wichita office. Cordell hired the respondent as an associate after she became licensed to practice law. Respondent's initial caseload was about 35 to 40 cases. "20. Respondent reported to four different managers between June 2020 and September 2023. The managers did not work in the Wichita office. Cordell's Wichita office experienced high attorney turnover while the respondent worked there. Respondent and her peers absorbed those attorneys' caseloads when they left. "21. By August 2022 the respondent had 50 to 60 active cases. "22. Cordell expected attorneys to bill 1500 hours every year. "23. Cordell had internal benchmarks attorneys were expected to meet. These expectations included a number of different categories of letters to clients: An initial letter after being retained, an update and roadmap letter after 30 days, a letter after 60 days identifying significant issues, and monthly update letters throughout the life of the case. Clients were charged for those letters. 2  "24. In 2021, the respondent did not meet the 1500-hour requirement. By the end of 2021, the respondent had fallen behind in sending the letters required to meet Cordell's internal benchmarks. "25. In August 2022, the respondent began reporting to Courtney Knox. Knox noticed the respondent had not been meeting the 1500 hours requirement and had not been sending the required letters. Knox urged the respondent to meet those requirements and to send the regular letters. "26. Knox was not located in Wichita. She was in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. "27. Respondent did not keep up with sending the required letters. Instead, to try to keep up with her billable hours requirements, she began billing clients for the letters without preparing them or sending them. Respondent generally billed an hour for each non-existent letter. "28. Respondent also began billing clients for motions, orders, discovery, and other legal work before she had performed such work. Respondent would sometimes complete this work later without additional billing. "29. If the client noticed they had been billed for a letter they did not receive, the respondent would draft the letter and send it to them. Respondent would not bill that client for more non-existent letters. "30. Respondent intended to catch up on the letters when she had time, but her caseload never improved to the point where she was able to do that. "31. Respondent continued to fail to meet the billable hour requirements. In May 2023, Cordell placed her on an employee improvement plan. Respondent was expected to meet billable hour requirements and to meet the internal company benchmarks, including the client letters. Fearing the ramifications of failing to meet her employee improvement plan, the respondent continued to bill clients for letters that she did not write. 3  "32. In August or September 2023, a client contacted Cordell to complain about being billed for a motion that had not been filed. Gray, the respondent's manager, investigated the complaint and could not find the motion in the files. "33. Gray asked the respondent about the motion. Respondent said she had drafted the motion but did not file it because the court clerk had not responded to the respondent's requests for a court date. Gray asked the respondent to forward her the emails from the court clerk. "34. Respondent forwarded an email that she said she had received from the court clerk in June 2023. Gray questioned the email because the date on the email looked like it had been sent in August, not June. Respondent assured Gray the email was authentic, but later admitted it was not. The client was not billed for that particular email. "35. Gray also looked into the electronic file properties of the motion and saw that it had been created around the time Gray had contacted the respondent about the motion. Gray confronted the respondent, who admitted she had not completed the motion at the time she had billed for it. "36. Respondent told Gray she had not billed other clients in this manner. "37. Cordell managers audited the respondent's files and found other instances in which the respondent had billed for work that was not in the files. "38. Gray scheduled a meeting with the respondent for September 8. At the meeting the respondent admitted to the false billing practices. "39. Gray told the respondent she could resign and self-report the misconduct or be terminated. Respondent resigned and self -reported. "40. Gray and other managers at Cordell continued to audit the respondent's files. In addition to letters, some motions and other documents remained uncompleted despite clients having been billed for them. Respondent's fictitious billing spanned from July 2021 until August 2023. 4  "41. Respondent billed clients for approximately 270 documents that she never completed. "42. The vast majority of documents were letters to clients that Cordell mandated attorneys send to clients and then bill the clients for. Respondent estimated roughly 90 percent of the false documents were client letters, but admits some motions or other pleadings were also falsely billed. "43. Cordell refunded $85,434 to clients who were billed for work that had not been performed by the respondent. "44. Respondent cooperated with Cordell to identify which clients had been affected by the false billing. "45. Upon questioning from hearing panel members, the respondent testified she was not aware of any clients who suffered harm or prejudice to their cases as a result of the respondent's practices. "46. Respondent self-reported her misconduct to the disciplinary administrator in September 2023. Respondent supplemented her report with a written statement in November, admitting her misconduct and pledging cooperation with the investigation. "47. Respondent attributed her decision to bill clients for work not performed with a high caseload, lack of support, and pressure from management, struggles with ADHD and narcolepsy, and deaths and illnesses in her immediate family. "Conclusions of Law "48. Based upon the findings of fact taken from the exhibits and testimony presented at the hearing, the respondent's admissions in her answer, and the joint stipulation between the parties, the hearing panel concludes there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 1.5(a) (fees) and KRPC 8.4(c) (misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 5  "KRPC 1.5 "49. KRPC 1.5(a) requires '[a] lawyer's fees shall be reasonable.' Fees for work not performed are patently unreasonable. Respondent stipulated to the violation, and the panel finds clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 1.5. "KRPC 8.4(c) "50. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.' KRPC 8.4(c). Respondent engaged in dishonest conduct by billing clients for letters, motions, and other work she did not perform. Respondent stipulated to the violation, and the panel finds clear and convincing evidence the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c). "American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions "51. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. "52. Duty violated. Respondent violated her duty to her clients to charge reasonable fees, and violated her duty to the legal system and legal profession to maintain her personal integrity. "53. Mental State. Respondent knowingly violated her duties. "54. Injury. Respondent's actions caused harm to clients, although those clients have been refunded by Cordell. Respondent's conduct caused financial harm to Cordell. "55. In addition to these factors, the hearing panel has considered the following ABA standards: 6  '4.6 Lack of Candor 'Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases where the lawyer engages in fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation directed toward a client: '4.62 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client.' "Aggravating Factors "56. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. Rule 226(a)(1)(C) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275). In reaching its recommendation for discipline the hearing panel found the following aggravating factors: "57. Dishonest or Selfish Motive. Respondent was motivated by a desire to keep her job. The panel finds that the respondent was motivated by a selfish motive—that of keeping her employment. "58. Pattern of Misconduct. Respondent engaged in the false billing practices for over a year and did so for dozens of clients. The panel concludes the respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct. "Mitigating Factors "59. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. Rule 226(a)(1)(C). In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel found the following mitigating factors: 7  "60. Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. Respondent has not previously been disciplined. "61. Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Problems Contributed to the Misconduct. During the relevant time period, the respondent 'lost a number of close family members in a short amount of time.' Respondent's mother 'faced very severe medical problems that nearly took her life.' The evidence presented at the hearing established that the respondent was overwhelmed and overworked. For instance, of the five attorneys that worked at the office when the respondent began working for Cordell, three were terminated within the next year and a half. Respondent absorbed their caseloads and felt like she was unable to rely on the single paralegal in the office because that person was overwhelmed with the other attorneys' work. Respondent's caseload increased from 35-40 cases to nearly 60 cases over that time. Respondent presented evidence regarding difficulties caused by attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and narcolepsy. The panel finds that the respondent's working conditions, mental health, and physical health conditions contributed to the misconduct. Respondent sought treatment, including a medication regimen for ADHD and narcolepsy. Respondent is in compliance with the treatment plans. Further, at the time of the hearing, the respondent was in the process of entering into a monitoring agreement with KALAP. Finally, the respondent had plans to begin attending the resiliency program through KALAP. The panel finds this is a mitigating factor. "62. Timely Good Faith Effort to Make Restitution or Rectify Consequences of Misconduct. Respondent fully cooperated with Cordell to identify all clients who had been overbilled; the respondent's former supervisor testified that Cordell refunded all affected clients. Respondent has expressed willingness to repay Cordell the $85,000 that was refunded to clients, and her counsel mentioned plans to reach a payment arrangement with Cordell. The panel finds this is a mitigating factor. "63. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the Transgressions. Respondent self-reported the misconduct and fully cooperated with the disciplinary investigation. Respondent admitted the facts that gave rise to the violations. The panel finds this is a mitigating factor. 8  "64. Inexperience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in October 2020; the position with Cordell was the respondent's first job upon being admitted. The panel finds this is a mitigating factor. "65. Character and Reputation. The panel heard glowing testimony from Ward and Bridgess—the respondent's former and current supervisors, respectively, regarding the respondent's diligence, character, attitude, and work ethic. Ward, who had employed the respondent at Ward's firm after the respondent left Cordell but elected to terminate the respondent after the misconduct allegations came to light, said she would have no concerns for the best interests of clients if the respondent were to represent them. Bridgess, who supervises the respondent at Kansas Legal Services, described her work as excellent and especially praised the respondent's skill in handling difficult clients. Several attorneys who worked with the respondent or as opposing counsel, and one former judge, also wrote letters in support of the respondent's character and reputation. Respondent notified the individuals who testified or wrote letters on her behalf of the misconduct. "66. Remorse. Respondent expressed genuine remorse at her conduct and did not seek to shift blame or evade responsibility: 'Q. [By Mr. Ambrosio] Do you have anything that you would like the Panel to know? 'A. 'Um, that I am sorry. 'Um, I feel genuine remorse and regret for what I did, and not just because I got caught or because I'm in trouble now, but because I did hurt my clients. I hurt my firm. I hurt the profession. I hurt the reputation of every attorney in this room. The public already doesn't see attorneys in very good light, certainly not domestic attorneys, and my actions have done nothing to try to address that or fix it and I have to live with that. 'But I also know that I've learned so much. I've learned how to better manage myself, how to better manage my process, how to ask for help which is so outside my nature, and how to—how to push back when it needs 9  to be pushed back. And these are things I should have learned or should have developed at Cordell, and it's through no fault of theirs that I didn't. Would have, should have, could have. But I've learned now and all I want is the opportunity to continue to try to make up for what I did.' "The panel finds the respondent's remorse is a mitigating factor. "Recommendation of the Parties "67. Noting the similarities between the cases and relying on the imposition of discipline in In re Kupka, 311 Kan. 193, 458 P.3d 242 (2020), the disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent's license to practice law be suspended for a period of two years. The disciplinary administrator further recommended that the respondent be allowed to apply f or reinstatement after serving nine months of the suspension. Finally, the disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent undergo a reinstatement hearing. "68. Through counsel, the respondent recommended that her license be suspended for a period of 30 or 60 days and that following the period of suspension that she be immediately reinstated to the practice of law, without needing to undergo a reinstatement hearing, subject to a plan of probation to be mutually agreed upon between the disciplinary administrator and the respondent. "Discussion "69. ABA Standard 4.62 suggests that suspension is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Both the disciplinary administrator and the respondent requested suspension; albeit with differing lengths of time and conditions. The panel likewise agrees that a recommendation of suspension is appropriate in this matter, but the specific terms are less obvious. 10  "70. The panel recognizes that each disciplinary sanction is based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case and that other sanctions provide limited guidance. In re Jordan, 316 Kan. 501, 550, 518 P.3d 1203 (2022), In re Williams, 302 Kan. 990, 1003, 362 P.3d 816 (2015). "71. The panel agrees with the disciplinary administrator that this case shares many similarities with Kupka. That case also involved a respondent who created documents to make it appear as though she had completed work she had not. Beyond that, Kupka also involved an attorney who had recently graduated from law school, was hired by a large firm with demanding expectations, was not provided with mentorship, support, or adequate supervision, absorbed other attorneys' caseloads when they departed the firm, and suffered mental health complications as a result of these stresses. 311 Kan. at 194, 199. There, the court ordered a two-year period of suspension, with the respondent being eligible to apply for reinstatement after nine months. 311 Kan. at 204. "72. However, the panel also recognizes a single, but significant, difference in this matter. Kupka did not involve billing clients for work not performed. "73. In In re Miller, 282 Kan. 689, 692, 694, 699, 147 P.3d 150 (2006), the respondent was suspended for two years for a practice of billing the Workers Compensation Fund for inflated, unearned, and unreasonable attorney 's fees over a period of nine years. See also In re Scimeca, 265 Kan. 742, 760, 962 P.2d 1080 (1998) (indefinite suspension in case involving attorney who billed for time not spent representing client). "74. Respondent did not submit a probation plan as per Rule 227 nor did she request probation as a sanction. Through counsel, the respondent acknowledged—as does the panel—that probation is not appropriate for cases involving dishonest conduct. In re Stockwell, 296 Kan. 860, 868, 295 P.3d 572 (2013). "75. The panel declines to consider or recommend a post hoc probation plan as suggested by the respondent's counsel. Although the Supreme Court has wide latitude to fashion appropriate discipline per Rule 225(a)(7), the court has indicated that it will not consider probation plans that do not comply with Rule 227's requirements that any 11 proposed probation plan must be submitted to, and reviewed by, the hearing panel. In re Daniels, 320 Kan. 365, 380-81, 568 P.3d 846 (2025) (declining to approve probation plan developed after the formal hearing; Rule 227 does not provide any procedure for such a plan). "76. Although the respondent was careful not to seek to shift the blame to the unreasonable demands and lack of adequate supervision or support of her workplace, the hearing panel suffers no such reluctance. The clear and convincing evidence presented in this case shows a freshly-barred attorney thrust into a high demand family law practice— already a high stress practice area—with an inflexible 1500 annual billable hour requirement and a set of required, pre-planned client letters that were considered to be performance benchmarks. In the respondent's time at Cordell she saw several other attorneys dismissed for 'performance issues' and when the respondent failed to meet her 1500-hour requirement, management made it clear that the respondent should not repeat the shortcoming. The evidence shows that the respondent never had a supervising attorney in the same office in which she was physically located for her entire tenure at Cordell. Respondent had four different supervisors throughout her time at the firm and often had trouble contacting them, and when she was able to communicate with them they often focused on billing and collections rather than substantive legal issues with the client's cases. "77. This is not to excuse or minimize the respondent's responsibility for her own conduct. The preamble to the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct states: 'The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self - government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self -interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct.' (Emphasis added.) Rule 240[12] (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 320). "78. The panel also looks askance at the $85,434 purportedly owed to Cordell. With the respondent's assistance, Cordell identified clients who were affected by the false billing practices and refunded those clients. However, it is not as if Cordell was owed that money in the first place, so it is misleading to characterize this figure as a loss to Cordell. To wit: the evidence establishes that the overwhelming majority of items for which 12 clients were billed were for letters—letters that were only required by Cordell's company policy, not by any apparent legal necessity of the client's underlying cases. Indeed, the respondent said that her supervisors focused a great deal of attention on these letters and pressured the respondent to catch up with these internally-imposed requirements. While there may be some, the hearing panel can discern little tangible benefit for clients. Rather, this pressure on the respondent to continually churn various pieces of mail to her clients seems designed largely to benefit Cordell. "79. The issue of restitution is not before this panel. The disciplinary administrator did not recommend it as a requirement for reinstatement. Respondent indicated, through counsel, that she would pursue restitution efforts to Cordell. At any rate, the panel would not be inclined to condition any reinstatement on such efforts. "80. The panel is also cognizant of the practical realities of the length of time the reinstatement process can take. See In re Janoski, 316 Kan. 370, 389, 516 P.3d 125 (2022) (acknowledging any hearing on a reinstatement petition will take some time to be resolved). By the time a petitioner has filed the necessary documents under Rule 232, a reinstatement hearing panel has coordinated and conducted a hearing, a hearing report has been issued, and the Supreme Court has considered the matter, a significant period of time will have elapsed well beyond the underlying period of suspension. (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 292). Moreover, when considering the factors a petitioner must establish for reinstatement per Rule 232(e)(4), the panel questions what additional evidence the respondent would present beyond what she has already presented at the formal hearing. "Recommendation of the Hearing Panel "81. Based on the findings of fact, conclusions of law, the ABA Standards on Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and the discussion above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends the respondent be suspended for 90 days. Rule 225(a)(3). The panel further recommends that a reinstatement hearing should not be required. Rule 232(d). "82. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 13  We held oral argument in the matter on September 14, 2026. Respondent personally appeared and was represented by counsel. Respondent addressed the court. She described several factors that she felt contributed to her falling behind at work, including her inexperience, an overwhelming and emotionally draining family-law caseload, high supervisor and colleague turnover, and the social isolation of living alone in a new state. Respondent made clear that this context did not excuse her conduct and that her clients and firm were the victims here. She took full responsibility for her actions and described the concrete steps she had taken towards rehabilitation . She also expressed a strong desire to continue representing rural and low-income clients at Kansas Legal Services after a period of suspension. DISCUSSION In a disciplinary proceeding, our court generally considers the evidence, the disciplinary panel's findings, and the parties' arguments to decide whether KRPC violations exist and, if they do, the appropriate discipline to impose. Attorney misconduct must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see also Supreme Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 281). Clear and convincing evidence is "evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that 'the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, and she filed an answer. Prior to the hearing before the disciplinary panel, respondent entered into a joint agreement stipulating to violations of KRPC 1.5(a) and 8.4(c). No exceptions were filed in the case, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the hearing panel's final 14 report are deemed admitted. See Supreme Court Rule 228(g)(1), (2) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 287). The evidence before the panel clearly and convincingly established that the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.5(a) (fees) and KRPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). The only issue left for us to resolve is the appropriate discipline. We generally look to the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to aid in determining discipline. That framework considers "four factors in determining punishment: (1) the ethical duty violated by the lawyer; (2) the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury resulting from the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." In re Hodge, 307 Kan. 170, 231, 407 P.3d 613 (2017). Three different recommendations for discipline are before us. The Disciplinary Administrator recommended that respondent's license to practice law be suspended for two years and that, after serving nine months of the suspension, respondent be allowed to apply for reinstatement and undergo a reinstatement hearing. Respondent recommended that her license be suspended for 30 or 60 days and that, following the suspension, her license be immediately reinstated without undergoing a reinstatement hearing. Respondent further recommended that she be subject to a probation plan to be mutually agreed upon between the Disciplinary Administrator and respondent. The hearing panel recommended that respondent's license be suspended for 90 days and that she not be required to undergo a reinstatement hearing. We are not bound by these recommendations. In re Long, 315 Kan. 842, 853, 511 P.3d 952 (2022). It is our view that the recommendations of the hearing panel and respondent significantly underappreciate the severity of respondent's misconduct. Respondent did not 15 have an isolated lapse: she billed for work she had not completed on approximately 270 documents over two years. Then when a client's complaint triggered scrutiny, respondent fabricated a cover story, forwarded a backdated email, and then initially insisted it was authentic before admitting that it was not. These were knowing violations. And although respondent self-reported to the Disciplinary Administrator, she did so only after her misconduct was discovered and her supervisor gave her an ultimatum to resign and self- report or be fired. Our court has imposed two-year suspensions in some similar cases. See In re Kupka, 311 Kan. 193, 458 P.3d 242 (2020); In re Orrick, 290 Kan. 727, 233 P.3d 257 (2010); In re Miller, 282 Kan. 689, 147 P.3d 150 (2006). Yet as we have often said, "'[e]ach disciplinary sanction is based on the specific facts and circumstances of the violations and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented in the case ,'" which means that "'past sanctions provide little guidance.'" In re Jordan, 316 Kan. 501, 550, 518 P.3d 1203 (2022). Here we find it significant that, although respondent billed for work she had not yet completed, the hearing panel determined that respondent intended to complete the work when she had time. The hearing panel, as the trier of fact, had the opportunity to observe respondent and evaluate her demeanor, and it is beyond our scope of review to reweigh evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses. See In re Dennis, 286 Kan. at 725. We also believe that respondent's presentation at oral argument demonstrated both her genuine remorse and her efforts toward rehabilitation. Considering these circumstances, the court concludes that the appropriate discipline is a one-year suspension of respondent's license. Following that suspension, respondent may petition our court for reinstatement without undergoing a reinstatement hearing under Supreme Court Rule 232 (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 292). A minority of the 16 court would have imposed a two-year suspension of respondent's license. That suspension would have been stayed after one year provided that the Disciplinary Administrator approved an oversight plan. CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Cynthia J. Zaczyk is suspended for one year from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, effective the date of this opinion, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 225(a)(3) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 280), for violating KRPC 1.5(a) and KRPC 8.4(c). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall comply with Supreme Court Rule 231 (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 291) (notice to clients, opposing counsel, and courts following suspension or disbarment). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if respondent applies for reinstatement, she shall comply with Supreme Court Rule 232 (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 292) and shall not be required to undergo a reinstatement hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 17