Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-2133 Filed August 19, 2026 _______________ Tony William Clubb and Robbin Clubb, as Executors of the Estate of Willard Decker Jr., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Joseph E. Clubb, Julie M. Clubb, County Bank and Veridian Credit Union, Defendants–Appellees. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Keokuk County, The Honorable Michael Carpenter, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, attorney for appellants. Paul A. Miller of Miller Law Office, Fairfield, attorney for appellees Joseph E. Clubb and Julie M. Clubb. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Chicchelly, J. 1 CHICCHELLY, Judge. Tony William Clubb and Robbin Clubb, as Executors of the Estate of Willard Decker Jr., appeal an adverse judgment following a bench trial on their claims of adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence. On appeal, they argue the district court erred by finding that the estate had not proven its claim of boundary by acquiescence. Upon our review, we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Willard Decker Jr. owned a 0.42 acre parcel of land in rural Keokuk County. The property contains a residence that has long been accessed by a driveway crossing a neighboring property owned by Joseph and Julie Clubb. The driveway traverses the parcel, and a line of trees and an old fence run generally parallel to the north side of the driveway. According to several longtime residents, the driveway has served as the sole access to the Decker property for decades. Testimony at trial established that the driveway existed and was used in substantially the same location since at least the 1960s and, according to some witnesses, as far back as the 1950s. Joseph Clubb purchased the neighboring property approximately twenty-two years before the trial.1 He testified he understood the disputed parcel was included within his legal description and that he had a verbal agreement allowing Decker to continue using the driveway because an alternative access route had not been constructed. Joseph maintained that Decker’s use of the driveway was permissive. Decker continued to use the driveway without interference during his lifetime. 1 Joseph and Julie have owned the property as joint tenants since 2022. For simplicity, we refer to it as Joseph’s property throughout this opinion. 2 Decker entered a nursing home in approximately 2022. Shortly thereafter, Joseph posted “no trespassing” signs and installed surveillance cameras in the disputed area. Decker died in November 2023, leaving his real estate to Tony and Robbin Clubb, who were also appointed executors of his estate. In April 2024, Tony attempted to bring a bulldozer onto the property using the driveway but was prevented from doing so when Joseph’s sons blocked access. Tony ultimately obtained alternative access through an adjacent property. Following the bulldozer dispute, both parties retained surveyor Rob Lance. A survey commissioned by Tony identified a 0.42-acre tract encompassing the driveway and surrounding area that the estate claimed through acquiescence or adverse possession. A subsequent survey commissioned by Joseph Clubb reflected the boundary lines described in the parties’ legal descriptions and showed the disputed tract to be within Joseph Clubb’s property.2 The Decker estate then filed a petition asserting ownership of the disputed parcel under theories of boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession. Joseph denied the claims and asserted a counterclaim for trespass. Following a bench trial, the district court determined the estate failed to prove either acquiescence or adverse possession. The court found insufficient evidence that adjoining landowners mutually recognized the tree line or fence line as a boundary for the statutory period and further found the estate failed to establish the hostility element of adverse possession because Decker’s use of the driveway was permissive. The court dismissed the petition. The estate appeals. 2 Julie 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW “[O]ur appellate standard of review of an acquiescence claim is statutorily defined as correction of errors at law.” Albert v. Conger, 886 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). But this case was filed and tried in equity, so our review is de novo. See Woods v. Charles Gabus Ford, Inc., 962 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2021). We give “great weight to trial court’s findings,” as the trial court is in a much” better position to weigh the credibility of witnesses” than we are. Sundance Land Co. v. Remmark, 8 N.W.3d 145, 150 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). DISCUSSION The estate only challenges the district court’s order regarding boundary by acquiescence.3 To create a new property boundary by acquiescence, a petitioner must show clear evidence that the desired boundary “has been recognized and acquiesced in by the parties” for at least ten straight years. Iowa Code § 650.6 (2024); id. § 650.14 (providing that if the court finds the new boundary has “been so recognized and acquiesced in,” the boundary “shall be permanently established”); Harvey v. Platter, 495 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). Acquiescence is “the mutual recognition by two adjoining landowners for ten years or more that a line, definitely marked by fence or in some manner, is the dividing line between 3 Despite the estate only challenging the district court’s decision regarding boundary by acquiescence, upon our de novo review, we similarly find its adverse possession claim fails. To prevail on a claim of adverse possession, a party “must establish hostile, actual, open, exclusive and continuous possession, under a claim of right or color of title, for at least ten years.” Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315 N.W.2d 782, 784 (Iowa 1982) (emphasis added). Because the record is clear that Joseph gave Decker permission to use the property, the adverse possession claim fails for lack of hostility. See id. 4 them.” Vaudt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 4 N.W.3d 45, 49 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). “[A]cquiescence may be inferred by the silence or inaction of one party who knows of the boundary line claimed by the other and fails to take steps to dispute it for a ten-year period.” Ollinger v. Bennett, 562 N.W.2d 167, 170–71 (Iowa 1997) (cleaned up). It may also be found when “a person who knows that he is entitled to impeach a transaction or enforce a right neglects to do so for such a length of time that, under the circumstances of the case, the other party may fairly infer that he has waived or abandoned his right.” Dwight v. City of Des Moines, 156 N.W. 336, 338–39 (Iowa 1916). Tony testified that the driveway had been the sole means of accessing the Decker property for over fifty years. He also testified that he believed the fence and tree line marked the boundary between the parcels. A neighbor, who lived across the street neighbor for forty-six years, also testified that the driveway and tree line had remained in the same location for four decades. He also testified that he was unaware of any dispute regarding the property line. Another witness, who grew up on the property now owned by Joseph Clubb, testified that the fence line was always considered the southern boundary of that property dating back to the 1950s. But what we do not find in the record any indication that the owners or predecessors in interest “recognized and acquiesced” to the boundary line. See Iowa Code § 650.14. The district court concluded the estate failed to prove mutual recognition because no witness could testify to an actual agreement between prior titleholders. We agree. While acquiescence may be inferred by the silence or inaction of one party who knows of the boundary line, the record here only contains testimony by witnesses who were not owners and cannot establish acquiescence by prior owners. See Ollinger, 562 N.W.2d at 170–71. 5 Instead, the record establishes that Joseph (1) placed “no trespassing” signs and installed surveillance cameras once Decker moved from the property and no longer required the driveway for access, and (2) that Joseph blocked Tony’s attempt to bring a bulldozer onto the property. We find that these actions show an enforcement of Joseph’s right over the property, undercutting the estate’s acquiescence claim. See Dwight, 156 N.W. at 338–39. While it is clear that Joseph allowed Decker to use the driveway within the disputed area for many years, we do not find clear evidence in the record that the tree line or fence line were recognized for the statutory period by any property owners or predecessors in interest, nor do we find that the alleged boundary was recognized as a boundary. Accordingly, we find the estate failed to prove its claim for boundary by acquiescence. Because we find a failure of proof, we affirm the district court’s order in its entirety. AFFIRMED. 6