Terry Joseph Christner v. State of Iowa
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledSeptember 23, 2026
Docket25-0552
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0552
Filed September 23, 2026
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Terry Joseph Christner,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
The Honorable Joel W. Barrows, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Jane M. White of Boles, Witosky & Stewart, Des Moines,
attorney for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ.
Opinion by Schumacher, J.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Terry Christner appeals the district court’s summary dismissal of his
third postconviction-relief (PCR) application, asserting the dismissal was
improper because the district court failed to provide a hearing or notice.
Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Following his plea of guilty in three felony criminal cases, Christner
filed his first PCR application, asserting he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. After a PCR trial was held in district court, the court dismissed the
application. Christner did not appeal the ruling.
Christner then initiated his second PCR action, alleging that counsel
from his first PCR proceeding was ineffective for failing to notify Christner
of the dismissal, which caused Christner to miss his opportunity to appeal.
Christner also argued that the three-year statute of limitations under Iowa
Code section 822.3 (2024) was unconstitutional because of the United States
Supreme Court’s ruling in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1
(2022). The State moved for summary judgment, arguing Christner’s
application was barred by the statute of limitations in section 822.3. The
district court agreed, finding Bruen did not save Christner from the statute-
of-limitations language in section 822.3, and as such, Christner’s second
application was time-barred. Christner did not appeal.
Christner then filed a third PCR application, the subject of this appeal.
Christner claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to notify him of the
dismissal of his second application, again resulting in Christner not having an
opportunity to file an appeal. Christner, as before, argues that 822.3’s statute-
of-limitations provision is unconstitutional under Bruen. Christner also
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requested the appointment of counsel. The district court instructed
Christner and his counsel to “file a recasted Application for Post Conviction
Relief no later than June 5, 2025, stating Applicant’s specific claims for relief.
In the alternative, counsel may file a statement that no recasted petition will
be filed.”
On March 12, 2025, the State filed a motion for summary disposition,
asserting this third application for PCR was beyond section 822.3’s three-
year statute of limitations. The State also argued that Christner failed to
allege new facts or law related to his previous convictions that would exempt
his claims from the statute of limitations, and that Bruen did not apply to his
statutory right to counsel. Christner did not file a resistance to the motion.
The district court granted the State’s motion on March 27, 2025. Christner
now appeals.
II. Analysis
Christner raises arguments on appeal: (1) the district court was
required to notify him before dismissing the application and failed to do so;
(2) the district court was required to provide Christner fifteen days to resist
the State’s motion; (3) the district court improperly granted the State’s
motion prior to the June 5 deadline for Christner to recast his application;
and (4) Bruen renders section 822.3’s statute of limitations unconstitutional.
The State argues that error is not preserved on these claims. We agree.
Here, the State’s motion for summary disposition argued that section
822.3’s statute-of-limitation provision barred Christner’s third PCR
application. The district court granted the motion fifteen days after it was
filed, with a lack of resistance to the motion by Christner. Christner did not
file a motion to reconsider with the district court.
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“An important consideration of error preservation is for the district
court to have an opportunity to consider the issue raised on appeal.”
Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 696 N.W.2d 24, 28 (Iowa 2005). “[I]t is
fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly on an
issue it was never given the opportunity to consider.” Id. (citation omitted).
When a district court considers issues raised on appeal by the
nonmoving party “in ruling on an uncontested summary judgment motion,”
then the nonmoving party need not file a post-judgment motion to preserve
error. Id. But, if the district court enters judgment following a summary
disposition motion and does not address claims raised on appeal by the
nonmovant, “the nonmovant must at least preserve error by filing a motion
following the entry of judgment, allowing the district court to consider the
claim of deficiency.” Id. (quoting Bill Grunder’s Sons Constr., Inc. v. Ganzer,
686 N.W.2d 193, 197–98 (Iowa 2004)).
Here, the claims were not addressed by the district court before or
after it entered judgment on the State’s motion for summary disposition. And
the State’s motion did not preemptively consider these claims. While these
claims arose only after the order was entered, Christner was required to
present those claims to the district court through a post-judgment motion to
reconsider. See id. Accordingly, the district court never had the opportunity
to rule on these issues raised on appeal and so error was not preserved. See
id. (finding an issue raised on appeal not preserved because it “was never
considered by the district court”).
Regarding Christner’s claim that Bruen exempts him from the statute
of limitations under section 822.3, we also agree with the State that the issue
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was not preserved. 1 Although Christner cites Bruen in his brief, the only
quasi-substantive argument relating to Bruen states:
The argument raised [at the previous PCR proceeding] is essentially the
same as raised in the instant case, that the statute of limitations imposed
by Iowa Code § 822.3 violates the applicant’s right to Due Process and
Counsel as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the US
Constitution under a Bruen analysis, and any statutory limitation is
therefore, unconstitutional.
“A party forfeits an issue on appeal when the party fails to make more
than a perfunctory argument in support of the issue.” State v. Jackson, 4
N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024). And “[a] party forfeits an issue on appeal when
the party fails to cite any authority in support of the issue. Id. Christner’s
brief failed to make argument in support of his Bruen claim, his argument is
perfunctory, and he fails to cite any authority to support the claim, except
Bruen. Christner did not pinpoint, quote, or analyze any of Bruen’s language
or holdings when asserting his argument. Accordingly, Christner’s Bruen
issue is waived. See id.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, we affirm the district court’s summary
dismissal of Christner’s third PCR application.
AFFIRMED.
1
Even if Christner had preserved this issue, our court has repeatedly concluded
that Bruen does not extend the time period to file a PCR application. See Burnett v. State,
No. 24-0724, 2025 WL 2237277, at *1 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025) (collecting cases).
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