Dayton C. Ericson, individually and d/b/a Ericson Auto v. City of Ankeny

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1014 Filed September 2, 2026 _______________ Dayton C. Ericson, individually and d/b/a Ericson Auto, Petitioner–Appellant, v. City of Ankeny, Iowa, Respondent–Appellee. _______________ Certiorari from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Michael D. Huppert, Judge. _______________ WRIT ANNULLED _______________ Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Allison M. Steuterman and Jacob A. Hatanpa of Brick Gentry, P.C., West Des Moines, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Greer, P.J. 1 GREER, Presiding Judge. A magistrate found Dayton Ericson, who owns Ericson Auto, a car sale and service business in Ankeny, Iowa, in contempt of a court order regarding his violation of a city ordinance that, according to Ericson, “purportedly” banned the parking of vehicles being serviced at his business on public streets. Among other penalties, the magistrate sentenced Ericson to fourteen days in jail. Ericson petitioned for certiorari to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate’s findings and annulled the writ. Ericson raises two issues on appeal of the district court ruling. First, he contends the contempt finding was not supported by substantial evidence. Second, he asserts error by the magistrate in revoking his suspended sentence and imposing an additional sentence for a new contempt violation when the City of Ankeny did not ask for that relief. The City contends there was substantial evidence of Ericson’s violation of its parking ordinance and the magistrate court properly selected a lawful sentence, exercising the discretion afforded it under Iowa Code section 665.4(3) (2024) (allowing magistrates to impose a jail sentence “not exceeding thirty days”). We find that substantial evidence supported the contempt finding and that the sentencing options ordered were within the discretion of the magistrate court, thus, we affirm the district court’s ruling and annul the writ. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Since 2022, the City and Ericson have had “a running battle” over the use of city streets surrounding Ericson’s business. Ankeny Code of Ordinances section 150.06, Use for Business Purposes, states: It is unlawful to park, store or place, temporarily or permanently, any machinery or junk or any other goods, wares, and merchandise of any kind 2  upon any street or alley for the purpose of storage, exhibition, sale or offering same for sale, without permission of the Council. The City filed several citations for infractions of the ordinance against Ericson. A magistrate issued several orders 1 addressing Ericson’s various violations of this ordinance and enjoining Ericson from parking vehicles on the neighboring streets. The district court in its ruling on the petition for writ of certiorari succinctly summarized the filings: [Ericson] was cited by the [City] in August of 2022 for an alleged violation of Ankeny City Ordinances 194.01(6)(B) and 150.06; the former ordinance requires “[a]ll parking space, driveways and access drives [to] be surfaced with an asphaltic or Portland cement binder pavement,” while the latter ordinance makes it unlawful “to park, store or place, temporarily or permanently, any machinery or junk or any other goods, wares, and[] merchandise of any kind upon any street or alley for the purpose of storage, exhibition, sale or offering same for sale . . . .” A[n] [October 27, 2022] default judgment was entered against [Ericson], directing him to abate the violations “by parking all vehicles or other merchandise on a lawfully paved surface and removing all vehicles or other merchandise from the public street.” [Ericson] was found in contempt in December of 2022 for violating this order; a jail sentence of 3 days was imposed but suspended pending a subsequent compliance hearing. [Ericson] was later found to be in compliance and the contempt was purged [on June 21, 2023]. On November 6, 2023, yet another application for rule to show cause was filed by the [City], alleging additional violations. The parties stipulated that 1 Filings by the City include: August 9, 2022—default judgment ordering abatement. October 26, 2022—finding of contempt, by agreement of parties a modified order was issued clarifying the contemptuous conduct. June 21, 2023—contempt was purged after Ericson complied with the order. November 6, 2023—stipulated contempt finding with seven-day jail sentence suspended pending further compliance. January 29, 2024—new contempt finding for allowing a pickup and Pontiac Vibe to be parked on the public streets with imposition of a sentence to fourteen days in jail: original seven-day sentence plus a new additional seven-day sentence for the current violation. 3  [Ericson] could be found in contempt of court and sentenced to 7 days in jail; as had been ordered before, this sentence was suspended pending the outcome of a compliance hearing. But, according to the City, that judicial involvement did not stop Ericson from violating the ordinance. In January 2024, the City moved to set a compliance hearing and alternatively applied for rule to show cause. In March, the magistrate addressed the application for rule to show cause at a compliance hearing. The city code enforcement officer testified about several alleged violations that had occurred since November 2023. In its order, the magistrate found “beyond a reasonable doubt [Ericson] ha[d] committed one additional count of contempt by continuing to park numerous vehicles, to include a blue Pontiac Vibe, a white Ford Pick-up, and various other makes and models, at various times and dates since the November 29, 2023, Court Order, on City . . . public streets.” As punishment, the magistrate sentenced Ericson to fourteen days in jail, clarifying that seven of those days related to the sentence imposed in the November order. Ericson filed a notice of appeal, which the district court “construed” as a petition for writ of certiorari.2 Once the matter was set for hearing, the City provided a recording of the two of the magistrate proceedings, including the March 2024 compliance and contempt hearing. In its ruling on the petition for writ of certiorari, the district court read the magistrate’s contempt ruling to focus on illegal parking of two vehicles— 2 Initially, the district court dismissed the petition for “lack of prosecution,” but the case was reinstated after it was discovered the lack of action in the case was because of a clerical error in indexing counsel of record. 4 the white Ford pickup and the blue Pontiac Vibe.3 Ericson summarized the evidence related to the Pontiac Vibe as follows: Then there’s the blue Pontiac Vibe. So what does the evidence show about the blue Pontiac Vibe? There is an Exhibit Number 7, which is a video, and that’s in the record. And the video in the record shows that a tow operator shows up with a blue Pontiac Vibe, the tow operator drops the blue Pontiac Vibe on to the street, and Mr. Ericson is not present when that happens. The tow operator gets out of the car, throws the keys to a gentleman named Brian Gray, who is the boyfriend of the blue Pontiac Vibe owner. And then later in the video you see Mr. Ericson come out, turn the car on, and then the video ends. . . . I asked [the code enforcement officer] if he could identify the individuals in the video. He could identify Mr. Ericson but couldn’t identify the other two. Why is that important? Because in the Court’s factual findings, the Court found that the gentleman who was in the vehicle with the hooded sweatshirt, Brian Gray, was an employee of Ericson Auto, and that is just incorrect. Mr. Ericson testified that that was the owner. His name was Brian Gray, and that—he explained he went out there, listened to the vehicle, heard that it was knocking so bad that he told them there is nothing I can do to repair this vehicle. Ericson argued to the district court that “[i]t bears repeating that at the end of the hearing, the City asked only that he be found in contempt and ʻordered to serve a certain number of days up to seven days in jail.’ Nothing in the Court’s November 29th judgment put Ericson on notice that he could be sentenced to fourteen days in jail.” (Emphasis in original). The City conceded at the hearing that they were only asking for a seven-day jail sentence but argued that it provided a sufficient basis for the magistrate to impose a fourteen-day sentence. 3 There were other vehicles referenced during the March compliance hearing, but the district court noted that the magistrate only referenced these two vehicles in its ruling. 5  The district court found the magistrate abused its discretion in finding that the parking of the white pickup was a violation of the ordinance as it determined the only evidence involved “hearsay on hearsay” testimony from the code enforcement officer. It found “[t]he decision regarding the white pickup was not supported by substantial evidence.” The district court then addressed the violation related to the Vibe vehicle. Finding that substantial evidence supported that contempt, it stated: The same cannot be said regarding the Pontiac Vibe. While much of [the code enforcement officer’s] testimony suffers from the same flaws as that pertaining to the white pickup, what is undisputed is that the petitioner took possession of the Vibe after it was delivered by the tow truck. He retained the keys to the vehicle and used those keys to move it at least twice onto other locations on the street. His version of events was not credible and properly rejected by the magistrate. His claim that he had not been authorized to work on the Vibe and that no work order had been prepared flies in the face of his undisputed involvement with the vehicle which is entirely to the contrary. The magistrate’s decision regarding the Vibe and the petitioner’s involvement with it constituting a willful violation of the November 29, 2023 order was supported by substantial evidence. As the magistrate’s ultimate decision regarding the new contempt could be based on either the white pickup or the Vibe, it will be upheld. The district court affirmed the magistrate’s ruling and annulled the writ of certiorari. Ericson appeals.4 4 Because Ericson seeks review of a district court ruling on a discretionary petition for certiorari reviewing a magistrate’s ruling, we construe his notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari and grant the writ to reach the merits. See Vance v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 907 N.W.2d 473, 480 (Iowa 2018); Iowa Code § 665.11; Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1412; Iowa R. App. P. 6.151(1). 6  II. Standard of Review. Certiorari actions are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 747 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 2008); see also Wells v. Dallas Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 475 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). On our review for correction of errors at law, we are bound by “the district court’s well-supported factual findings” but not its legal conclusions. State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 745 N.W.2d 738, 739 (Iowa 2008) (citation omitted). “Illegality exists when the court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly applied the law.” State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 886 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Iowa 2016). “A contemner’s sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Ary v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 735 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 2007). III. Analysis. A. Substantial Evidence. A finding of contempt is reviewable by a certiorari proceeding. Iowa Code § 665.11. “A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board, tribunal, or court has exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally.” Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 898 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted). We find that illegality exists if “the court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support,” or if “the court has not properly applied the law.” Id. (citation omitted). In the context of a contempt action, “because contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, substantial evidence in this context consists of such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). We first address Ericson’s argument attacking the substantial evidence finding related to the Pontiac Vibe. Applying the ordinance terms, Ericson 7 argues the City had to prove he “park[ed], store[d], or place[d], temporarily or permanently, any machinery or junk or any other goods, wares, and merchandise of any kind upon any street.” From the video evidence, Ericson maintains there is no dispute that, on January 1, the tow truck driver parked the car on the street, not him. He also notes that the tow trucker driver gave the keys to the vehicle’s owner and not Ericson. On top of that, Ericson contends the video evidence also corroborates his testimony that he listened to the vehicle and determined he could not fix it, so the City could not prove the vehicle was parked “for the purpose of storage, exhibition, sale or offering same for sale” as required under the ordinance. On this point, Ericson emphasizes that it is not a violation of the ordinance to simply park a vehicle on the city street, it is only a violation if the vehicle is “machinery or junk or any other goods, wares, and merchandise of any kind” parked “upon any street or alley for the purpose of storage, exhibition, sale or offering same for sale.” He advocates the City did not prove he violated the elements of the ordinance. As the district court noted, it was undisputed that between January 1 and January 4, Ericson moved the vehicle to other locations on the City’s streets near his business. Photographic exhibits confirm these facts. The district court agreed with the magistrate that Ericson’s reasons for moving the vehicle were not credible. The magistrate dug into Ericson’s behavior and asked Ericson’s counsel: “Well, then [Ericson] walked around in the video and kept the vehicle and moved it. How did he move it later if he didn’t have the keys?” His counsel stated: “Because [the car owner’s boyfriend] left the keys on the wheel well. That’s what the testimony was. And, [Ericson] texted him multiple times saying, ʻYou need to come . . . .’” 8  Although Ericson claims the keys were left in the vehicle and he moved the vehicle to keep it from being towed, the district court found “[h]is claim that he had not been authorized to work on the Pontiac Vibe and that no work order had been prepared flies in the face of his undisputed involvement with the vehicle which is entirely to the contrary.” There is substantial evidence that Ericson had control of the Pontiac Vibe at some point such that he could move it around the city streets on two occasions, January 2 and again on January 4, contrary to his testimony that the vehicle was not one that he was servicing and he was only moving it as a favor to the owner. The towing report that the district court judicially noticed indicated that there were no keys in the vehicle when they went to tow it and there were photographs downloaded that show the Pontiac Vibe on January 2 and January 4 on the city street. These exhibits and the testimony of the code compliance officer provided substantial evidence of Ericson’s violation of the ordinance. See State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 2006) (“Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions from the evidence; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding.” (cleaned up)). We find the magistrate properly applied the law and relied upon substantial evidence to find Ericson violated the ordinance. See State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 747 N.W.2d at 220. We next address the sentencing challenge. B. Ericson’s Sentence. Did the magistrate court abuse its discretion when it revoked the suspended seven-day sentence and then imposed an additional seven-day sentence for a new contempt violation? Regarding permissible sanctions, our supreme court has stated: 9  Where a finding of contempt is based on disobedience of a court’s order, our cases recognize that a court may impose punitive sanctions under section 665.4 for past disobedience, impose coercive remedial sanctions under section 665.5 to encourage performance of affirmative acts required by the order, or impose both punitive and coercive remedial sanctions. Ickowitz v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 452 N.W.2d 446, 449 (Iowa 1990). We interfere in the imposition of a sentence only when discretion has been clearly abused, that is, when the court’s decision rests on unreasonable or untenable grounds, or erroneous legal conclusions. See Shedlock v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 534 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Iowa 1995). Ericson frames his challenge as a “problem” in that “the City did not seek to revoke [his] suspended sentence and prosecute an additional contempt violation.” Instead, he asserts the City only sought “revocation or contempt.” Ericson turns the City’s words at the hearing against its current position and points to the City’s representation to the magistrate that the hearing would address a “motion for compliance or alternatively an application for show cause.” Likewise, after the hearing, the City requested the magistrate find Ericson in “contempt and be ordered to serve a certain number of days up to seven days in jail.” Ericson urges that “the magistrate transformed the City’s request into ʻan Application for Rule to Show Cause and a compliance hearing.’” (Emphasis in original). From this record, Ericson argues Iowa Code “chapter 665 does not authorize contempt by ambush.” In the November 29 order, the magistrate endorsed the parties’ stipulation to cancel the November hearing and enter a judgment against Ericson that found him guilty of one count of contempt of previous orders, assessed a fine against him, and ordered seven days’ imprisonment in the county jail, “suspended pending further hearing on continued compliance.” 10 If Ericson showed continued compliance, the magistrate ordered that imprisonment could be purged. From our reading of the November 29 order, we find that the parties agreed that Ericson had violated the ordinance. The parties then agreed to allow him the chance to avoid punishment, by the date of a compliance hearing, if he could show he had complied with the ordinance. But the order continued and ordered Ericson to comply with ordinance 150.06. At the compliance hearing, the magistrate determined that there was evidence establishing that on at least one occasion Ericson had not complied. Thus, the seven-day sentence that was imposed for the earlier violation was not “purged” and instead another paragraph of the order came into play. The order also stated that “[a] failure to rectify all issues and orders set forth herein will result in [Ericson] immediately being taken into custody at the compliance hearing.” While Ericson disagrees with the conclusion that he violated the ordinance after November 29, he does not contest that the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the first seven-day sentence given its ruling. As for the imposition of the additional seven-day sentence, Ericson contends that the magistrate cannot impose a sanction that the City did not request. Ericson emphasizes that this is “contempt by ambush.” Here, although the City used the terms “in the alternative,” it did move to enforce the November 29 order but left open the possibility that the court also consider a rule to show cause matter. But during the hearing the magistrate did refer to it as a show cause hearing and the evidence focused on violations after the November 29 order. The City’s code enforcement officer testified that he took the photographs of the Pontiac Vibe on different days on different city streets that were both near Ericson Auto. 11  Contrary to Ericson’s arguments, we do not find that “the conduct giving rise to noncompliance with the court’s prior order . . . was the same conduct giving rise to the contempt finding.” In the November 29 order, Ericson stipulated to a finding that he was guilty of one count of contempt, and his punishment was seven days in jail. He just had an opportunity to avoid that sanction. See Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Iowa 1998) (noting a court may withhold commitment to jail for past acts of contempt conditioned on compliance with court-ordered conditions). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Slaughter, 3 N.W.3d 540, 546 (Iowa 2024) (citation omitted). “The right of an individual judge to balance the relevant factors in determining an appropriate sentence inheres in the discretionary standard.” State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983). The magistrate applied the previous sanction that related to the pre-November 29 violation and issued a new finding of contempt with a new sanction. We do not see any abuse of discretion and instead find the magistrate acted within its statutory authority. See Iowa Code § 665.4(3). The magistrate found Ericson’s testimony was not credible and that he “exhibited what could best be described as flippant behavior during the hearing, to include laughing at the [code enforcement officer], on more than one occasion.” Thus, Ericson’s behavior might have invited the sentence he now contests. But, without more, an abuse of discretion does not occur just because a sentencing court ignores the parties’ recommendations, and so it does not matter that the City did not request a sanction of fourteen days in jail. We affirm the sentence imposed by the magistrate as it was within the magistrate’s discretion. See id. 12  IV. Conclusion. Because we, like the district court, find there was substantial evidence to support the magistrate’s findings related to the ordinance violation and the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a fourteen-day jail sentence, we affirm the district court order on certiorari and annul the writ. WRIT ANNULLED. 13