Samuel R. Willson v. Louisa County Board of Supervisors, Brad Quigley, Randy Griffin, and Chris Ball

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0405 Filed September 2, 2026 _______________ Samuel R. Willson, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Louisa County Board of Supervisors, Brad Quigley, Randy Griffin, and Chris Ball, Defendants–Appellants. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Louisa County, The Honorable Clinton R. Boddicker, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS _______________ Holly A. Corkery (argued) (until withdrawal) and Samantha R. Kuntz of Lynch Dallas, P.C., Cedar Rapids, attorneys for appellants. Jennifer L. Zahradnik (argued), and Gage G. Kensler of Kollmorgen, Schlue, & Zahradnik, P.C., Belle Plaine, and Roger A. Huddle of Weaver & Huddle Law Office, Wapello, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Badding, J. 1 BADDING, Judge. In a comment to a Facebook post questioning, “Isn’t a conservation board supposed to conserve?????” Louisa County Conservation Board member Samuel Willson cryptically stated, “They are supposed to, [b]ut when the board is corrupted, it runs astray.” After members of the conservation board complained about Willson’s comment, the county’s board of supervisors met in closed session—citing “potential imminent litigation” under Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(c) (2022)—to discuss Willson’s removal. When the supervisors came out of closed session, they voted to remove Willson from the conservation board “due to false allegations that constitute malfeasance[].” Willson filed suit against the Louisa County Board of Supervisors, 1 challenging his removal from the conservation board through a petition for writ of certiorari and alleging the board’s closed session violated the Open Meetings Act. The district court sustained the writ, finding that Willson’s Facebook comment was not malfeasance and ordering him reinstated to the conservation board. The court also found the closed session was unlawful under section 21.5(1)(c) because litigation was not imminent. The board of supervisors appeals. I. Background Facts and Proceedings In early 2022, the Louisa County Conservation Board was considering whether to sell Baird Timber—an 18.5-acre timberland donated to the county decades earlier. A member of the county’s board of supervisors described the issue as “contested” and “publicized,” saying it resulted in a “lot of 1 Willson also named supervisors Brad Quigley, Randy Griffin, and Chris Ball as defendants. 2 pitchforks and torches [at] every meeting.” Samuel Willson, who was the chair of the conservation board, agreed the issue generated more publicity than normal, with “a lot of people . . . discussing it very openly, you know, in many different forms.” After hearing comments from the public on the issue at its meeting on June 6, 2022, the conservation board voted unanimously to retain Baird Timber. The next day, in a comment to a news article on Facebook discussing the issue, a member of the public asked, “Isn’t a conservation board supposed to conserve?????” Someone replied, “yes, but when the county supervisors can appoint[] members to the board, believing in conservation doesn’t seem to be a requirement to sit on the conservation board.”2 Willson weighed in, commenting: “They are supposed to, [b]ut when the board is corrupted, it runs astray.” The person who posted the initial question asked Willson, “are they elected up there? I forget? Even if they are appointed….. elections do have consequences….. it might be worth finding out who presented the sale for vote.” Willson replied, “No, soil and water conservation board members are elected. County conservation board members are appointed by the board of supervisors.” From there, other members of the public chimed in, with some saying, “That seems wrong,” and others commenting, “Moral of the story… never trust any government body.” One person asked Willson, “what do you mean ʻcorrupted?’” but he did not reply. Joellen Schantz, a member of the conservation board, saw Willson’s comment and “was very unhappy” because she believed it was not true. She 2 Iowa Code section 350.2(3) allows a county’s board of supervisors to appoint members to a conservation board “on the basis of their demonstrated interest in conservation matters.” 3 testified, “I personally don’t think that any one of us were or have ever been corrupted.” Schantz reported the post to other conservation board members, who were also upset by it, and to the county’s human resources contractor, Paul Greufe. On June 8, Greufe called Willson to discuss the comment. In the recorded call, Greufe asked Willson, “Who is it that you think is corrupt?” Willson responded, “I’m not necessarily going to say. It’s maybe some lines of thinking, not necessarily people.” Towards the end of the conversation, Greufe questioned Willson about whether he saw “any sort of a problem, maybe being inappropriate or unprofessional, to just kind of throw out that the conservation board in Louisa County is corrupt?” Willson answered, “I think I’m going to consult with a lawyer,” and the call ended. Willson did not have further contact with Greufe or the board of supervisors until the board’s regular meeting on June 21. On the morning of that meeting, he learned that his removal from the conservation board was an agenda item. Willson attended the meeting, as did Greufe and county attorney Adam Parsons. After Parsons advised the board that litigation appeared imminent, the supervisors closed the meeting under Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(c).3 When the board reconvened in open session, they voted to remove Willson “due to false allegations that constitute malfeasance[].” Three weeks later, on July 13, the board of supervisors sent Willson a letter formally notifying him of his removal from the conservation board. See Iowa Code §§ 350.2(4), 331.321(3). The letter stated the supervisors’ decision was “based on [Willson’s] written statements posted on Facebook 3 This provision of the Open Meetings Act permits a governmental body to hold a closed session “[t]o discuss strategy with counsel in matters that are presently in litigation or where litigation is imminent where its disclosure would be likely to prejudice or disadvantage the position of the governmental body in that litigation.” Iowa Code § 21.5(1)(c). 4 alleging corruption on the Conservation Board.” Based on those statements and Willson’s “position as a member and chairman of the Louisa County Conservation Board,” the supervisors found that Willson’s allegations of corruption are unsubstantiated and foster a hostile environment on the . . . Conservation Board. The Board of Supervisors further finds that you should be, and are, hereby ordered removed from your position on the Louisa County Conservation Board for making false allegations on a public social media platform constituting malfeasance within the meaning of Iowa Code [s]ection 350.2(4). Through counsel, Willson appealed his removal and requested a formal public hearing before the board. See Iowa Code § 331.321(3). At the hearing in August, Willson’s attorney argued “that nothing Sam said was illegal, unlawful or fits malfeasance.” Instead, he asserted that Willson “only offered his opinion.” Greufe disagreed, countering that members of the conservation board felt Willson “crossed the line” and viewed his “allegation of members being corrupt” as “defamation of character and slander.” The board of supervisors tabled the issue until its meeting in September, where it reaffirmed its decision to remove Willson. One week after his removal, Willson sued the board of supervisors and its members. He petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing the board’s action in removing him was illegal because “the allegations did not constitute malfeasance as defined by law or statute.” Willson also claimed the board violated the Open Meetings Act by voting on his removal in closed session. After a bench trial in September 2024, the district court ruled in Willson’s favor. The court found that Willson’s conduct was not malfeasance, reasoning that his comment “was not a wholly wrong and unlawful act but an expression of opinion” about whether the conservation board “had the goals of conservation at heart in relation to the proposal to 5 sell Baird Timber.” The court sustained the writ, annulled the board’s removal decision, and ordered Willison to “be immediately reinstated to the Board to serve a term equal to his remaining term as of June 21, 2022,” the date he was removed. On the open meetings claim, the court found that “the only statement Willson made which could lead a reasonable person to believe that litigation was imminent was when he told Greufe over the phone that he wanted to talk to a lawyer before discussing the matter further.” The court noted that Willson did not bring an attorney with him to the June meeting and that he “made no explicit threat of litigation either prior to or at” that meeting. Under those facts, the court found litigation was not imminent. But because the individual supervisors “had a good faith reason for believing the facts as outlined by Parsons regarding litigation,” the court did not assess damages against them. See Iowa Code § 21.6(3)(a)(2). It did, however, assess court costs and Willson’s attorney fees against the board of supervisors. See id. § 21.6(3)(b). The board of supervisors filed a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), asking the district court to—among other things— reconsider its remedy in sustaining the writ of certiorari. The board argued that Willson’s remaining term in office from the date of his removal was two years and 194 days, meaning that the court’s reinstatement order extended Willson’s term through July 23, 2027, violating the five-year statutory term in Iowa Code section 350.2(2). The court denied the board’s motion, and this appeal followed. 6 II. Analysis A. Writ of Certiorari A writ of certiorari may be brought when a party claims that “an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial functions, or a judicial magistrate exceeded proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401. “An illegality is established if the board has not acted in accordance with a statute; if its decision was not supported by substantial evidence; or if its actions were unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.” Perkins v. Bd. of Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). We review the district court’s judgment in a certiorari proceeding for the correction of errors at law. Waddell v. Brooke, 684 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Iowa 2004). 1. Mootness Before examining the district court’s judgment, we must first consider whether the certiorari proceeding is moot. See Riley Drive Ent. I, Inc. v. Reynolds, 970 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Iowa 2022) (noting that mootness is a threshold question); Bribriesco-Ledger v. Klipsch, 957 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 2021) (stating that even though no party raised mootness as an issue, “an appellate court has responsibility sua sponte to police its own jurisdiction” (citation omitted)). Willson’s term with the conservation board started on January 1, 2020, and expired five years later. See Iowa Code § 350.2(2). The district court, however, ordered Willson reinstated to a term that extends until July 2027. The board of supervisors argues the court exceeded its authority in doing so. We agree for the reasons that follow. And because we agree, the board’s challenge to the court’s determination that its removal decision was illegal is moot. See Homan v. Branstad, 864 N.W.2d 321, 328 (Iowa 2015) (“A case is moot if it no longer presents a justiciable 7 controversy because the issues involved are academic or nonexistent.” (citation omitted)). “The scope of review by certiorari is strictly limited.” Grant v. Fritz, 201 N.W.2d 188, 199 (Iowa 1972); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1403 (“[R]elief by way of certiorari shall be strictly limited to questions of jurisdiction or the legality of the challenged acts, unless otherwise provided by statute.”). Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1411,4 the judgment on certiorari shall be limited to annulling the writ or to sustaining it, in whole or in part, to the extent the proceedings below were illegal or in excess of jurisdiction. The judgment shall prescribe the manner in which either party may proceed, and shall not substitute a different or amended decree or order for that being reviewed. While the district court could review the legality of the board’s action in removing Willson under this rule, it could not order his reinstatement to a term that extends beyond the expiration of his statutory five-year term. See Nissen v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen & Helpers of Am., 295 N.W. 858, 867 (Iowa 1941) (“Certiorari is merely a writ of review to determine legality.”). By doing so, the court improperly substituted its judgment for the board’s. See, e.g., Schmidt v. City of Sioux City, No. 13-0290, 2014 WL 1495497, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2014) (finding that the court exceeded its authority under rule 1.1411 by ordering a city to pay its employee’s medical expenses); Holiday Lake Owners’ Ass’n v. Poweshiek Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 09-0511, 2010 WL 447104, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2010) (concluding the court incorrectly substituted its judgment for the board when it directed the board to establish a rural improvement zone); 4 Like rule 1.1403, this rule does not apply where a statute provides other relief. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1411 (limiting certiorari judgments “[u]nless otherwise provided by statute”). There is no such statute here. 8 see also Echelberger v. State, No. 04-0995, 2005 WL 2756166, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2005) (“Final judgment on certiorari does not encompass injunctive relief.”). Because Willson’s term on the conservation board has expired, and because the district court exceeded its authority in ordering an extension of that term for Willson, whether the board of supervisors acted illegally in removing him for malfeasance is moot. Cf. Bribriesco-Ledger, 957 N.W.2d at 649 (noting that because a commissioner’s term had expired, a ruling in her favor on appeal would be without force or effect); Cornette v. City of Davenport, No. 23-1999, 2024 WL 4615902, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024) (finding that because all parties agreed a councilman could not be reinstated after his term expired and he lost a reelection bid, “[w]hether the removal proceeding was proper and whether an injunction was warranted are now merely academic questions”). Whether Willson’s Facebook comment was malfeasance or not, he must stop serving on the board—so a decision on that question would be of no force or effect. See Belin v. Reynolds, 989 N.W.2d 166, 171 (Iowa 2023) (“The key in assessing whether an appeal is moot is determining whether the opinion would be of force or effect in the underlying controversy.” (citation omitted)). However, we choose to address the merits of the issue under the “public-importance” exception to our mootness doctrine. See Bribriesco-Ledger, 957 N.W.2d at 649. We do so because the question of what constitutes malfeasance under Iowa Code section 350.2(4) is a public one, and an adjudication of the issue will guide public officials in their future conduct. Homan, 864 N.W.2d at 330 (considering those factors in determining whether the public-importance exception should be applied). Most importantly, the issue is likely to evade review because the length of time remaining on a removed official’s term 9 “might often be relatively short” and, as happened here, expire before the lawsuit concludes. Bribriesco-Ledger, 957 N.W.2d at 649. 2. Merits Turning then to Iowa Code section 350.2(4), “[m]embers of the county conservation board may be removed for cause by the board of supervisors as provided in section 331.321, subsection 3, if the cause is malfeasance, nonfeasance, disability, or failure to participate in board activities as set forth by the rules of the county conservation board.”5 Neither section 350.2(4) nor any other statutory removal provision defines “malfeasance.” The board of supervisors argues that it simply means the “doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all” and asserts that Willson’s comment that the conservation board was “corrupted” meets that standard. We disagree. While our supreme court has defined malfeasance as the commission “of an act which a person ought not to do at all,” the court did so in distinguishing it from nonfeasance and misfeasance. See E.H. Emery & Co. v. Am. Refrigerator Transit Co., 184 N.W. 750, 752 (Iowa 1921) (“Nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a person ought to do; misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do; and malfeasance is the doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all.” (citation omitted)); accord Proksch v. Bettendorf, 257 N.W. 383, 384 (Iowa 1934). Neither case involved the removal of a public official from a government position. See E.H. Emery & Co., 184 N.W. at 752 (discussing the liability of an agent to a third party); Proksch, 257 N.W. at 384 (examining the actions of a 5 Iowa Code section 331.321(3) sets out the removal process for various positions appointed by a board of supervisors. 10 director of a trust company). So, while the supreme court may have defined the outer edges of malfeasance in those cases, we do not agree with the board that the malfeasance required to remove a public official is confined to that broad definition. Instead, we conclude the district court correctly determined that malfeasance is not just the “doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all” but also “a wholly wrong and unlawful act” and “a substantial departure from what is required of a public official.” See 67 C.J.S. Officers & Public Employees § 235 (2026); see also 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers & Employees § 182 (2026) (defining malfeasance as “the doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all,” which “must be accompanied by some evil intent or motive, or with such gross negligence as to be equivalent to fraud”). Other states have adopted a similar definition of malfeasance for the removal of public officials. See, e.g., Jacobs v. City of Columbia Heights, 9 N.W.3d 536, 541 (Minn. 2024) (defining “malfeasance in an official capacity” as “evil conduct or an illegal deed, the doing of that which one ought not to do, the performance of an act by an officer in their official capacity that is wholly illegal and wrongful” (cleaned up)); In re Removal of Kuehnle, 830 N.E.2d 1173, 1189 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (stating that “[r]emoval is not to be ordered lightly for minor or isolated infractions” and that malfeasance “require[s] a substantial departure from what is required of a public official” before it will result in removal); Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 1090 (Utah 1985) (defining “malfeasance in office” to mean “an intentional act or omission relating to the duties of a public office, which amounts to a crime, or which involves a substantial breach of the trust imposed upon the official by the nature of his office” and “is of such a character as to offend against the commonly accepted standards of honesty and morality” (emphasis removed) (citation omitted)). 11  Under that higher standard, we agree with the district court that the board of supervisors’ decision to remove Willson for his Facebook comment was not supported by substantial evidence. While Willson’s comment may have been ill-advised, it was not a wholly wrong and unlawful act or a substantial departure from what is required of a public official. Cf. Jacobs, 9 N.W.3d at 542 (finding that while “[m]aking racially insensitive comments and lying is certainly shameful behavior,” it did not amount to malfeasance); see also State v. Watkins, 914 N.W.2d 827, 844–45 (Iowa 2018) (reversing the district court’s removal of a county attorney for “willful misconduct” and “maladministration” in office where, although the attorney’s “actions and statements were disgraceful, disrespectful, and inappropriate,” it was not done “with a bad or evil purpose” or “contrary to a known duty” (citation omitted)). We accordingly affirm the district court’s ruling sustaining Willson’s writ of certiorari. But because the court’s judgment in a certiorari proceeding is “limited to annulling the writ or sustaining it, in whole or in part,” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1411, we reverse its order reinstating Willson to the conservation board. B. Open Meetings Violation “[T]o give Iowans access to the deliberations and decisions of their government,” Teig v. Hart, 28 N.W.3d 272, 274–75 (Iowa 2025), Iowa’s Open Meetings Act requires that all “[m]eetings of governmental bodies . . . shall be held in open session unless closed sessions are expressly permitted by law,” Iowa Code § 21.3(1). Section 21.5 lists twelve exceptions under which a closed session may be held. The exception at issue here is paragraph “c,” which authorizes a closed session “[t]o discuss strategy with counsel in matters that are presently in litigation or where litigation is imminent where 12 its disclosure would be likely to prejudice or disadvantage the position of the governmental body in that litigation.” Iowa Code § 21.5(1)(c). “We review the district court’s interpretation of chapter 21 for correction of errors at law.” Teig, 28 N.W.3d at 277. “Once the plaintiff establishes that the governmental body is subject to chapter 21 and held a closed session,” which is undisputed here, the burden shifts to the board “to prove that the meeting was closed in compliance with the Act.” Gausman v. Sioux City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 34 N.W.3d 238, 242 (Iowa 2026). “We are bound by the district court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence.” Id. “Substantial evidence supports a factual finding when the finding ʻmay be reasonably inferred from the evidence presented.’” Id. (citation omitted). On the advice of county attorney Parsons, the board of supervisors cited “potential imminent litigation” under Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(c) before it went into closed session to discuss Willson’s removal from the conservation board. Willson claimed this violated the Open Meetings Act because there was no pending or imminent litigation. The district court agreed, finding that “Willson made no explicit threat of litigation either prior to or at the” June 2022 meeting when the board of supervisors went into closed session. The board challenges this finding on appeal, arguing that litigation was imminent because in Willson’s conversation with Greufe, the county’s human resources consultant, Willson said that he planned to consult an attorney. The board also relies on Parsons’ testimony that Willson’s attorney told him before the supervisors’ meeting that he had “considered or was considering or would consider representing” Willson. In making this last argument, the board raises an evidentiary issue, which we address before examining the merits of its claims. 13  1. Evidentiary Issue At the bench trial, Willson called Randy Griffin—who was on the board of supervisors when Willson was removed—as a witness. On redirect examination, Willson’s attorney asked Griffin what Parsons told him about litigation being imminent. Griffin answered, “Somewhere along the line I thought [Parsons] said something about he heard it from you.” Willson’s attorney then asked, “And if Mr. Parsons will testify later and both he and I tell you that’s not true, could your recollection be mistaken?” The board’s attorney objected, arguing “We’re at the point where an attorney may become a witness who’s representing a party.” The court directed Willson’s attorney to rephrase the question, following which he asked Griffin, “You relied upon the advice of Mr. Parsons that litigation was imminent as a grounds to go into closed session, did you not?” Griffin agreed, and that line of questioning ended. Willson’s attorney picked it back up on direct examination of Parsons, when he asked whether Parsons had “any recollection of an attorney on [Willson’s] behalf contacting you prior to June 21 of ’22 . . . including myself?” Parsons answered, “Well, no. We had an informal conversation like right before the meeting where you had maybe indicated that you were considering—or would consider representing Mr. Willson, but nothing beyond that.” Parsons repeated on cross-examination that he had a “brief and informal conversation” with Willson’s attorney before the meeting, during which the attorney said that he had “considered or was considering or would consider representing” Willson. On redirect examination, Willson’s attorney pressed that point, asking: “Factually, isn’t it more correct, Mr. Parsons, that I never spoke with you about Sam Willson’s potential termination until after 14 the June 21 meeting because I had never met Sam Willson before that in this context?” The board did not object, and Parsons answered: My recollection is that you had talked to me potentially the morning of that meeting informally in passing about something to the effect of that you would consider or were considering representing Sam Willson potentially pro bono. I didn’t know if you were serious or if that was—I didn’t know . . . the status of that. I didn’t ask about it. You didn’t clarify. But I did have that in my mind when I went to the meeting and I did—I believe I am on recording not mentioning your name but mentioning that an attorney had said that to me. The district court recounted this testimony in its ruling, although it incorrectly attributed it to Willson’s attorney: Parsons testified that he believed that litigation was imminent at the time of the June 21, 2022 [board] meeting. Parsons recommended closed session. Parsons based his belief that litigation was imminent on a conversation he had with [Willson’s attorney] earlier in the day on June 21. Parsons recalled that [Willson’s attorney] stated he was representing Willson. [Willson’s attorney], while cross-examining Parsons, implied that he and Parsons discussed the case in passing only, that he had yet to be retained by Willson, that he had few, if any, details of the controversy, and that he jokingly stated, in passing, that he might just represent Willson for free. Citing this paragraph of the ruling, the board of supervisors claims that the court “improperly relied on statements and/or implications made by Mr. Willson’s counsel on [re]direct examination, evidence created by counsel, in making its decision that [the board] violated” the Open Meetings Act. We reject this claim for two reasons. First, we question whether error was preserved. See State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590, 598 (Iowa 2021) (“The preservation of error doctrine is grounded in the idea that a specific objection to the admission of evidence be made known, and the trial court be given an opportunity to pass upon the 15 objection and correct any error.” (citation omitted)). The board’s only objection to this line of questioning was during Willson’s redirect examination of Griffin. The district court directed Willson’s attorney to rephrase the question, which we view as sustaining the objection. The board was accordingly required to repeat the objection when Willson’s attorney asked a similar question during his redirect examination of Parsons. See id. at 599 (“The general rule is that where an objection is sustained, it must be repeated each time similar testimony is offered by the opposing party.”). Second, it does not appear that the district court relied on the version of events that Willson’s attorney suggested in his questions. Instead, the challenged portion of the court’s ruling came from Parsons’ testimony. And the court noted that even if Parsons’ testimony was accepted, it “cannot find that brief comments made in passing between lawyers constitutes a threat of imminent litigation.” See Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a) (“A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party. . . .”). 2. Merits With that evidentiary issue out of the way, we turn to the main issue before us: what constitutes “imminent” litigation under Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(c)? Because chapter 21 does not define “imminent,” we may “look to this court’s decisions, other courts’ decisions, dictionary definitions, similar statutes, and common usage to define the term.” In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 43 (Iowa 2014). Cases using those sources have defined “imminent” in other contexts to mean “ʻready to take place, ʻnear at hand,’ ʻhanging threateningly over one’s head,’ and ʻmenacingly near.’” Id. (citations omitted). It has also been defined to mean “a threatened act ʻis impending or about to occur’” or “on the point of happening.” Id. (citations 16 omitted). Consistent with these cases, we conclude that the district court correctly interpreted “imminent” to mean “near at hand or ready to take place.” Our conclusion is supported by other courts that have similarly interpreted the “litigation exception” in their state’s open meetings acts. For instance, in City of Bloomington v. Raoul, the court determined that evidence “litigation ʻcould be plausible’” was insufficient to qualify as “probable or imminent” under Illinois’ litigation exception. 184 N.E.3d 366, 370, 372 (Ill. Ct. App. 2021). Similarly, in Carter v. Smith, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that its litigation exception does not apply “where the possibility of litigation is remote or unsubstantiated.” 366 S.W.3d 414, 419–20 (Ky. 2012) (noting the plaintiff never “threaten[ed] litigation or intimate[d] he would bring suit if the Board actually took the steps necessary to remove him as superintendent”). Instead, “[t]here must be a direct suggestion of litigation conditioned on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a specific event.” Id. Finally, in Claxton Enterprise v. Evans County Board of Commissioners, the court found an employee’s statement that “he would use whatever legal means necessary to get compensated” did not qualify as “potential litigation” under the litigation exception to Georgia’s Open Meetings Act. 549 S.E.2d 830, 832, 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). The court reasoned that “[i]n our litigious society, a governmental agency always faces some threat of suit. To construe the term ʻpotential litigation’ to include an unrealized or idle threat of litigation would seriously undermine the purpose of the Act.” Id. at 834. Following the reasoning of these cases, and our supreme court’s definition of “imminent” in other contexts, we agree with the district court that there was no imminent litigation here. Willson’s statement that he 17 planned to consult an attorney—and an attorney’s passing mention that he might represent Willson—did not mean that litigation was ready to take place, near at hand, impending, about to occur, or on the point of happening. Instead, the record shows that litigation was, at most, simply possible. And that is not enough to invoke the exception in section 21.5(1)(c). See, e.g., Olinger v. Smith, 889 N.W.2d 476, 482 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (noting that the “litigation exception” in section 21.5(1)(c) “was drafted narrowly” and that an amendment trying to change “imminent” to “possible” lost). Our conclusion is also supported by the federal district court’s decision in Holecek v. City of Hiawatha, No. 09-CV-113, 2010 WL 3927801, at *15 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 4, 2010), 6 which applied the same definition of “imminent” as we have in its interpretation of Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(c). The court in Holecek found the exception applied, noting that before the closed session, the plaintiff had filed a formal grievance with the city requesting, among other relief, “monetary compensation for emotional and physical duress” and reinstatement to her job with back pay. Id. The plaintiff included a letter to the city council with her grievance that noted a copy had been sent to her attorneys and union. And, at the meeting where the city council went into closed session, the plaintiff was present with her attorney. Id. at *16. Willson, in contrast, never retained counsel or provided the board with a document making legal claims. Nor did any attorney contact the board 6 We look to Holecek and the out-of-state cases discussed above because the litigation exception in Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(c) has not been interpreted by our appellate courts. While our court did mention the exception in Fettkether v. City of Readlyn, 595 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999), we do not find that case particularly instructive, considering that it cited the exception in addressing a discovery dispute and— as the dissent points out—was light on reasoning and factual detail. 18 on his behalf or attend the meeting where his removal was discussed for the first time. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that litigation was not imminent and affirm its determination that the board of supervisors violated the Open Meetings Act. Because of that violation, Willson is entitled to an award of appellate attorney fees. See Iowa Code § 21.6(3)(b) (requiring “the payment of all costs and reasonable attorney fees in the trial and appellate courts to any party successfully establishing a violation”). But since Willson did not submit an attorney fee affidavit with his request for appellate attorney fees, we remand that issue to the district court. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Samuels, 15 N.W.3d 801, 808 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (noting that “[w]hile not currently required by any appellate rule, we prefer that parties requesting appellate fees . . . submit an attorney-fee affidavit” with a request for a specific dollar amount and itemization). III. Conclusion The district court properly determined that the board of supervisors acted illegally in removing Willson from the conservation board for malfeasance, and we thus affirm its ruling sustaining Willson’s petition for writ of certiorari. But because the court exceeded its limited authority under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1411 by ordering Willson’s reinstatement to the board, we reverse that portion of the court’s ruling. On Willson’s open meetings claim, we affirm the court’s determination that because litigation was not imminent, the board of supervisors violated the Open Meetings Act 19 by going into closed session. We remand Willson’s request for appellate attorney fees under Iowa Code section 21.6(3)(b) to the district court. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. Tabor, C.J., concurs; Langholz, J., dissents in part and concurs in part. 20 LANGHOLZ, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I join in most of our court’s well-reasoned opinion. I agree that we should reach the merits of Louisa County Board of Supervisors’ appeal of the district court’s ruling sustaining the writ of certiorari to the Board, that the district court correctly decided that the Board improperly removed Samuel Willson from the conservation board, and that the district court lacked authority to extend Willson’s tenure on the conservation board beyond the expiration of the five-year statutory term he was serving. But I part ways on the resolution of the Board’s appeal of Willson’s open-meetings claim under Iowa Code chapter 21 (2022). The crux of this dispute is a question of statutory interpretation: when does the open-meetings statute authorize a government body to go into a closed session “[t]o discuss strategy with counsel in matters that are presently in litigation or where litigation is imminent where its disclosure would be likely to prejudice or disadvantage the position of the governmental body in that litigation”? Iowa Code § 21.5(1)(c). The district court and the majority both offer reasonable interpretations of this text. But based on the Iowa precedent interpreting this provision and the term “imminent” elsewhere in the Iowa Code, the deep roots of attorney-client privilege in Iowa law, and the serious concerns about adopting an interpretation that infringes on a governmental body’s ability to litigate effectively, I would hold that the district court interpreted “imminent” too narrowly in this context. And if the court credited the testimony of the members of the Board and its counsel, there was enough evidence from which it could have found litigation was imminent. But because the court did not make the necessary factual findings applying the correct interpretation of the statute, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings on the open-meetings claim. 21 IV. The Proper Interpretation of the Imminent-or-Pending-Litigation Ground for a Closed Session of a Governmental Body’s Meeting We all start in the same place—the ordinary meaning of the governing statute’s text. When a governmental body also satisfies other procedural requirements not at issue here, it “may hold a closed session only to the extent a closed session is necessary for” one of the specifically listed “reasons” in Iowa Code section 21.5. Id. § 21.5(1). One of those reasons— and the ground relied on by the Board in holding the closed session challenged by Willson—authorizes a closed session “[t]o discuss strategy with counsel in matters that are presently in litigation or where litigation is imminent where its disclosure would be likely to prejudice or disadvantage the position of the governmental body in that litigation.” Id. § 21.5(1)(c). Relying on this imminent-or-pending-litigation ground requires a few things. First, the governmental body must be planning “[t]o discuss strategy with counsel.” Id. So its counsel must be present. See Olinger v. Smith, 889 N.W.2d 476, 481–83 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). Second, that strategy must be about “matters that are presently in litigation or where litigation is imminent.” Iowa Cod