Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1117 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ Isaac James Quinn, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Elisabeth Rhea Moriarty, Respondent–Appellant. _______________ Elisabeth Rhea Moriarty, Plaintiff, v. Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Defendant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, The Honorable Michael Harris, Judge. _______________ WRIT ANNULLED; AFFIRMED ON APPEAL _______________ Elisabeth Rhea Moriarty, Kalona, self-represented appellant. Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, attorney for appellee. _______________ 1 Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, J. 2 AHLERS, Judge. This case presents dueling applications for contempt by the parents of a minor child. The father alleged that the mother was in contempt for keeping the child in her care during a portion of his Christmas parenting time. The mother alleged that the father “withholds the child from [her] without good cause or justification.”1 In support of her allegation, her application referenced an attachment showing text messages between the parents discussing whether the father would be willing to switch parenting weekends so the child could accompany the mother to the mother’s brother’s wedding. The district court agreed with the father that the mother violated the Christmas visitation terms in their modified custodial decree and held her in contempt. It denied the mother’s application. In doing so, it refused to consider her claims that the father withheld the child without good cause in other ways beyond the dispute about attending the mother’s brother’s wedding because the mother failed to provide the father with notice of any such additional claims. The mother filed a notice of appeal, which the supreme court treated as a petition for a writ of certiorari as to her challenge to the district court’s decision to hold her in contempt. It granted the writ and transferred the case to this court. We begin by addressing the mother’s claim that the district court incorrectly interpreted the visitation provisions of the custodial decree to conclude that she interfered with the father’s Christmas break parenting time. Because this claim is before us as a certiorari action, “our review is at 1 The mother’s application raised other claims of contempt, but she does not challenge the court’s denial of her application as to those claims. 3 law.” Ary v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 735 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 2007). “When the court’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or when the court has not applied the law properly, an illegality exists” that we can correct. Id. One problem with the mother’s challenge is that her brief is deficient in a key way—it does not include any relevant authority.2 That failure alone “may be deemed waiver of that issue.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3). Even if we overlook the deficiency in the mother’s briefing, the district court’s finding that the mother violated the Christmas visitation schedule is supported by substantial evidence. The mother’s contentions to the contrary require an unsupportable reading of the applicable provision of the decree. Both parties agree that, during the break at issue, the father was to have parenting time during the first portion of Christmas break.3 Under the terms of the decree, he was to have the child in his care from “the day school dismisses from school for winter break after school (or 3:00 p.m. if there is no school) until December 24 at 5:00 p.m.” And that year, school dismissed on Friday, December 20th, for winter break. So, the father was entitled to exercise his Christmas parenting time during the first portion of the break beginning when school let out on Friday and ending on Tuesday, December 24th, at 5:00 p.m. But the mother prohibited the father from exercising his parenting time until 3:00 p.m. on Monday, December 23rd, leaving him with just twenty-six hours with the child to celebrate the holiday. 2 The mother’s brief includes a citation to Brede v. Koop, 706 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Iowa 2005), for her contention that our review should be de novo. But that case is not applicable here, and our review is not de novo. 3 The decree split Christmas break into two portions, with the parents alternating each year who had parenting time during first portion and the second portion. 4 Substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that the mother’s actions constituted a willful violation of the decree, so we find no illegality in the district court’s ruling. As such, we annul the writ. As to the mother’s appeal from the district court’s denial of her application for rule to show cause, we note another significant briefing issue.4 She provides no relevant authority in the argument section of her appellate brief. This is particularly problematic because it is difficult for us to discern the mother’s appellate argument. And citations to relevant authority would help us understand her position on appeal. So, we consider the issue waived for failure to cite relevant authority, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3), and summarily affirm. See In re Maryann Bennett Tr., No. 23-0895, 2024 WL 3688871, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2024). To the extent that the mother is arguing that the district court erred by limiting its consideration of a factual basis to support her claim that the father “withholds the child from [her] without good cause or justification,” she is incorrect and could not obtain relief with a more cogent argument. Because contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal, due process requires the person alleged to be in contempt to be advised of the particular claims raised against them. See McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 1982). The mother’s application used broad language, and the specific conduct that she claimed to be contemptuous could only be discerned from an attachment containing a screenshot of text messages between the parties discussing whether the child would be able to attend the mother’s brother’s wedding. 4 We reiterate our position that it seems procedurally odd that one must seek certiorari review of a finding of contempt but has a right of direct appeal from the denial of an application seeking to hold another in contempt. See In re Marriage of Golden, No. 24-1750, 2025 WL 1704393, at *1 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025) (discussing the oddity of this procedural posture). 5 So, we take no issue with the district court limiting the factual basis for that claim accordingly and not considering evidence of other alleged instances of the father withholding parenting time with the mother. Finally, we address the father’s request that we order the mother to pay his appellate attorney fees. Under Iowa Code section 600B.37A (2025), reasonable attorney fees may be taxed against a party found to be in contempt of an order filed under chapter 600B. But it does not authorize an award of appellate attorney fees in a certiorari action. That is because “[c]ertiorari is a separate, independent and original law action” from the contempt proceedings below. Lane v. Oxberger, 224 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Iowa 1974); cf. Happel v. Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 24-1959, 2026 WL 1329767, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 13, 2026) (analyzing Iowa Code section 598.24, which permits an award of attorney fees in contempt proceedings brought under chapter 598); Sanders v. Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 25-0002, 2026 WL 1329748, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 13, 2026) (same). And it does not provide for attorney fees when a party is not held in contempt. See Iowa Code § 600B.37A (“If an action is brought on the grounds that a party to an order made pursuant to this chapter is in default or contempt of the order, and the court determines that the party is in default or contempt of the order, the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable attorney fees, may be taxed against that party.” (emphasis added)). Because this case is before us on original certiorari review and on appeal from the refusal to hold a party in contempt, section 600B.37A does not authorize an award of attorney fees in this instance. Accordingly, we deny the father’s request for appellate attorney fees. WRIT ANNULLED; AFFIRMED ON APPEAL. 6