In re Marriage of Studley
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1952
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1952
Filed November 18, 2026
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In re the Marriage of James H. Studley and Holly A. Studley
Upon the Petition of
James Hamilton Studley,
Petitioner–Appellant,
And Concerning
Holly Ann Studley, n/k/a Holly Ann Konz,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Scott J. Beattie, Judge.
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AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
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Benjamin Folladori of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese P.C.,
West Des Moines, attorney for appellant.
Kelly M. Ramsey of Ramsey Law, PLC, West Des Moines, attorney for
appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.
1
SANDY, Judge.
James Studley appeals the property division and economic provisions
of the decree dissolving his five-year marriage to Holly Konz. There are two
issues on appeal: (1) James claims the district court erred in equally dividing
the full amount of his retirement account despite the account’s significant
premarital balance and argues the district court erred in valuing the account
as of the date of the decree rather than the date of trial; and (2) James claims
the court failed to articulate a clear final disposition of the parties’ personal
property. While Holly disagrees with James regarding the division of his
retirement account, she agrees that the district court failed to properly divide
their personal property. Both parties also request an award of appellate
attorney fees.
Upon our de novo review, we find the district court’s division of the
retirement account inequitable and adjust the valuation to exclude James’s
premarital account balance and alter the valuation date of the account to the
date of trial rather than the date of the decree. As for the parties’ personal
property, we remand the issue to the district court for a clear distribution of
the parties’ property and entry of an order reflecting the proper valuation
date. Finally, we decline to award either party appellate attorney fees.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
James and Holly were married in October 2019. The parties are
parents to one minor child born in 2022. Until their separation, the parties
lived together in the marital home in Ankeny. James filed for divorce in
May 2024 and trial was held in May 2025. While the trial and subsequent
decree dissolving the marriage determined the parties’ rights regarding
property and child custody, the portions relevant to this appeal only pertain
to the distribution of James’s Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
2
(TIAA) retirement account 1 and the district court’s personal property
distribution.
The first issue concerns James’s TIAA retirement account. Both
parties work at Iowa State University, and since James started there in 2012,
he has paid part of each paycheck into a TIAA retirement account to which
the University also contributed. Records admitted at trial from both parties
indicate that just before the parties’ marriage the TIAA account held
$97,325.53. By the time of trial, the account had increased to $231,376.91. At
trial, James argued he should be awarded the premarital balance of the
account but should split the gains accrued during the marriage equally with
Holly. Instead, the court ordered “that each party’s TIAA account shall be
split equally, with each receiving one-half of the account balance as of the
date of this Decree via Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO).” The
district court did, however, credit James for $21,000 in premarital funds he
withdrew from the TIAA account to purchase their home.
In his post-trial rule-1.904(2) motion, James argued that he should
either retain the entire premarital balance of his TIAA account or
alternatively divide the account according to the Benson formula. 2 Holly
resisted, and the district court found “that [ James] did not provide reliable
documentation demonstrating the claimed premarital value and that his
financial affidavit contained no designation of premarital funds. [ James] was
1
While the parties do not specify the exact type of account James’s TIAA is, the
record indicates that it is a defined-contribution plan through his employer with a
separate, smaller Roth IRA also through TIAA. These accounts are separate and distinct
from his Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) pension plan.
2
See generally In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1996) (creating a
formula for calculating the present value of a defined-benefit pension plan for purpose of
a marital property settlement).
3
already credited for an $18,0003 withdrawal used toward the marital home;
applying any further offset would constitute impermissible double credit.”
The second issue concerns the parties’ personal property, as to which
the court held:
The Court has attempted to equitably divide the personal property. The
Court awards Holly the personal property as listed in the attached
Appendix A. Within seven days of this Decree, Holly shall be allowed a
four-hour visit to the marital home to inventory items. Following the
inventory, Holly shall provide any additional list to James through counsel.
If parties cannot agree, they shall return to mediation. Holly shall then be
allowed two days to pack and move said items. James shall arrange the
requested times within fourteen days and shall not interfere with Holly’s
ability to obtain her items.
Now, James appeals these issues, and both parties request appellate
attorney fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review equitable proceedings, like dissolutions of marriage, de
novo. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Miller, 966 N.W.2d 630, 635
(Iowa 2021). On de novo review “[w]e give weight to the findings of the
district court, particularly concerning the credibility of witnesses; however,
those findings are not binding upon us.” In re Marriage of McDermott, 827
N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). The court’s ruling will be disturbed “only
when there has been a failure to do equity.” Id. (citation omitted).
3
Although the district court credited James for $21,000 in the dissolution decree,
the order on the motion to reconsider inexplicably changed this number to $18,000. This
appears to be a scrivener’s error as both parties agree James received a $21,000 credit for
the premarital funds.
4
DISCUSSION
I. Retirement Account
James claims two errors in the district court’s division of his
retirement account. First, he argues the court should have excluded the
premarital value of his retirement account or, alternatively, applied the
Benson formula to the distribution of his TIAA account. Second, he notes
that the court ordered the parties to divide the account according to its value
on the date the court issued its decree rather than the trial date, an aspect of
the decree that runs contrary to our precedent. See In re Marriage of Clinton,
579 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (“Property, including retirement
benefits, should be valued as of the trial date.”).
In a dissolution decree, the district court is tasked with dividing “all
property, except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party,
equitably between the parties.” Iowa Code § 598.21(5) (2024). “Iowa courts
do not require an equal division or percentage distribution”; instead, we
distribute assets according to “what is fair and equitable in each
circumstance.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 886 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2016) (citation omitted). “To achieve an equitable division, we apply
the factors contained in section 598.21(5), keeping in mind there are no hard
and fast rules governing economic issues in dissolution actions.” McDermott,
827 N.W.2d at 682.
In this case, the district court should have awarded James the
premarital balance of the TIAA account. We have previously stated that
courts “should not separate a premarital asset from the divisible estate and
automatically award it to the spouse who owned it prior to the marriage.
Rather, property brought into the marriage by a party is merely a factor
among many to be considered under section 598.21(5).” Hansen, 886 N.W.2d
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at 872 (citations omitted). Although premarital property is not automatically
excluded or credited to the party who brought the property into the marriage,
we also recognize that in short-term marriages “it is often equitable to simply
award the property to the party that brought it into the marriage.” Id. at 873;
see also In re Marriage of Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982)
(“Where the accumulated property is not the product of the joint efforts of
both parties or where, as here, one party brings property into the marriage,
there need not necessarily be a division. This is especially true where the
marriage was of short duration.”).
In this relatively short marriage of five years where the record states
the premarital value of the account, equity favors crediting James with the
amount he brought into the marriage. The district court failed to articulate
any circumstances that tipped the scale toward an equal division. Absent
other circumstances that would make a different division more equitable, the
district court should have awarded James the premarital balance of the
account. We also believe the court erred in its assertion James “did not
provide reliable documentation demonstrating the claimed premarital value”
since the record includes a quarterly accounting of the TIAA account before
the marriage. We do, however, agree with Holly that James should not get the
benefit of the premarital balance in addition to the court’s $21,000 credit for
the funds used to purchase the marital home. So the amount excluded from
the division includes the premarital account balance of $97,325.53 less the
$21,000 credit, totaling $76,325.53.4
Turning to James’s last claim of error regarding his retirement
account, we agree that the trial court chose the wrong valuation date for the
4
Since we have excluded the premarital balance, we need not consider James’s
alternative request that we divide the account according to the Benson formula.
6
account. The district court ordered the TIAA account be divided according
to its value as of the date of the decree, but this was in error. It is well settled
that “assets should then be given their value as of the date of trial.” In re
Marriage of Keener, 728 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Iowa 2007). Accordingly, we
modify the decree to split the value of James’s TIAA account as of the trial
date. Adjusting for the excluded funds and the altered valuation date, the
modified decree now entitles Holly to $77,525.695 of the TIAA retirement
account.
II. Personal Property
The parties agree the district court’s ruling regarding the personal
property distribution was “open ended” and requires clarification by the
court. Holly claims that, “[s]ince the entry of the Decree, the parties have
continued to litigate division of their personal property with no resolve. The
Decree fails to provide a definitive enforceable resolution.”
We agree with the parties that the district court requires an
opportunity to clarify its personal property division. So we remand for the
personal-property portion of the decree to be set for rehearing and a ruling
clearly setting forth each party’s rights to the contested property.
III. Appellate Attorney Fees
Finally, both parties request appellate attorney fees. Whether to grant
appellate attorney fees is left to the court’s discretion. McDermott, 827
N.W.2d at 687. “In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we
consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other
party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (cleaned up). After
5
Calculated by taking the full value of the account minus the excluded amount and
dividing the result in half: ($231,376.91 - $76,325.53)/2= $77,525.69.
7
reviewing the relevant factors, we decline to award either party appellate
attorney fees. The parties are in substantially similar financial circumstances
and can each pay their respective attorneys.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
8