Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1952 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ In re the Marriage of James H. Studley and Holly A. Studley Upon the Petition of James Hamilton Studley, Petitioner–Appellant, And Concerning Holly Ann Studley, n/k/a Holly Ann Konz, Respondent–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Scott J. Beattie, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS _______________ Benjamin Folladori of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese P.C., West Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Kelly M. Ramsey of Ramsey Law, PLC, West Des Moines, attorney for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Sandy, J. 1 SANDY, Judge. James Studley appeals the property division and economic provisions of the decree dissolving his five-year marriage to Holly Konz. There are two issues on appeal: (1) James claims the district court erred in equally dividing the full amount of his retirement account despite the account’s significant premarital balance and argues the district court erred in valuing the account as of the date of the decree rather than the date of trial; and (2) James claims the court failed to articulate a clear final disposition of the parties’ personal property. While Holly disagrees with James regarding the division of his retirement account, she agrees that the district court failed to properly divide their personal property. Both parties also request an award of appellate attorney fees. Upon our de novo review, we find the district court’s division of the retirement account inequitable and adjust the valuation to exclude James’s premarital account balance and alter the valuation date of the account to the date of trial rather than the date of the decree. As for the parties’ personal property, we remand the issue to the district court for a clear distribution of the parties’ property and entry of an order reflecting the proper valuation date. Finally, we decline to award either party appellate attorney fees. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS James and Holly were married in October 2019. The parties are parents to one minor child born in 2022. Until their separation, the parties lived together in the marital home in Ankeny. James filed for divorce in May 2024 and trial was held in May 2025. While the trial and subsequent decree dissolving the marriage determined the parties’ rights regarding property and child custody, the portions relevant to this appeal only pertain to the distribution of James’s Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association 2 (TIAA) retirement account 1 and the district court’s personal property distribution. The first issue concerns James’s TIAA retirement account. Both parties work at Iowa State University, and since James started there in 2012, he has paid part of each paycheck into a TIAA retirement account to which the University also contributed. Records admitted at trial from both parties indicate that just before the parties’ marriage the TIAA account held $97,325.53. By the time of trial, the account had increased to $231,376.91. At trial, James argued he should be awarded the premarital balance of the account but should split the gains accrued during the marriage equally with Holly. Instead, the court ordered “that each party’s TIAA account shall be split equally, with each receiving one-half of the account balance as of the date of this Decree via Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO).” The district court did, however, credit James for $21,000 in premarital funds he withdrew from the TIAA account to purchase their home. In his post-trial rule-1.904(2) motion, James argued that he should either retain the entire premarital balance of his TIAA account or alternatively divide the account according to the Benson formula. 2 Holly resisted, and the district court found “that [ James] did not provide reliable documentation demonstrating the claimed premarital value and that his financial affidavit contained no designation of premarital funds. [ James] was 1 While the parties do not specify the exact type of account James’s TIAA is, the record indicates that it is a defined-contribution plan through his employer with a separate, smaller Roth IRA also through TIAA. These accounts are separate and distinct from his Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) pension plan. 2 See generally In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1996) (creating a formula for calculating the present value of a defined-benefit pension plan for purpose of a marital property settlement). 3 already credited for an $18,0003 withdrawal used toward the marital home; applying any further offset would constitute impermissible double credit.” The second issue concerns the parties’ personal property, as to which the court held: The Court has attempted to equitably divide the personal property. The Court awards Holly the personal property as listed in the attached Appendix A. Within seven days of this Decree, Holly shall be allowed a four-hour visit to the marital home to inventory items. Following the inventory, Holly shall provide any additional list to James through counsel. If parties cannot agree, they shall return to mediation. Holly shall then be allowed two days to pack and move said items. James shall arrange the requested times within fourteen days and shall not interfere with Holly’s ability to obtain her items. Now, James appeals these issues, and both parties request appellate attorney fees. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review equitable proceedings, like dissolutions of marriage, de novo. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Miller, 966 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 2021). On de novo review “[w]e give weight to the findings of the district court, particularly concerning the credibility of witnesses; however, those findings are not binding upon us.” In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). The court’s ruling will be disturbed “only when there has been a failure to do equity.” Id. (citation omitted). 3 Although the district court credited James for $21,000 in the dissolution decree, the order on the motion to reconsider inexplicably changed this number to $18,000. This appears to be a scrivener’s error as both parties agree James received a $21,000 credit for the premarital funds. 4 DISCUSSION I. Retirement Account James claims two errors in the district court’s division of his retirement account. First, he argues the court should have excluded the premarital value of his retirement account or, alternatively, applied the Benson formula to the distribution of his TIAA account. Second, he notes that the court ordered the parties to divide the account according to its value on the date the court issued its decree rather than the trial date, an aspect of the decree that runs contrary to our precedent. See In re Marriage of Clinton, 579 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (“Property, including retirement benefits, should be valued as of the trial date.”). In a dissolution decree, the district court is tasked with dividing “all property, except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party, equitably between the parties.” Iowa Code § 598.21(5) (2024). “Iowa courts do not require an equal division or percentage distribution”; instead, we distribute assets according to “what is fair and equitable in each circumstance.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 886 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (citation omitted). “To achieve an equitable division, we apply the factors contained in section 598.21(5), keeping in mind there are no hard and fast rules governing economic issues in dissolution actions.” McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 682. In this case, the district court should have awarded James the premarital balance of the TIAA account. We have previously stated that courts “should not separate a premarital asset from the divisible estate and automatically award it to the spouse who owned it prior to the marriage. Rather, property brought into the marriage by a party is merely a factor among many to be considered under section 598.21(5).” Hansen, 886 N.W.2d 5 at 872 (citations omitted). Although premarital property is not automatically excluded or credited to the party who brought the property into the marriage, we also recognize that in short-term marriages “it is often equitable to simply award the property to the party that brought it into the marriage.” Id. at 873; see also In re Marriage of Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (“Where the accumulated property is not the product of the joint efforts of both parties or where, as here, one party brings property into the marriage, there need not necessarily be a division. This is especially true where the marriage was of short duration.”). In this relatively short marriage of five years where the record states the premarital value of the account, equity favors crediting James with the amount he brought into the marriage. The district court failed to articulate any circumstances that tipped the scale toward an equal division. Absent other circumstances that would make a different division more equitable, the district court should have awarded James the premarital balance of the account. We also believe the court erred in its assertion James “did not provide reliable documentation demonstrating the claimed premarital value” since the record includes a quarterly accounting of the TIAA account before the marriage. We do, however, agree with Holly that James should not get the benefit of the premarital balance in addition to the court’s $21,000 credit for the funds used to purchase the marital home. So the amount excluded from the division includes the premarital account balance of $97,325.53 less the $21,000 credit, totaling $76,325.53.4 Turning to James’s last claim of error regarding his retirement account, we agree that the trial court chose the wrong valuation date for the 4 Since we have excluded the premarital balance, we need not consider James’s alternative request that we divide the account according to the Benson formula. 6 account. The district court ordered the TIAA account be divided according to its value as of the date of the decree, but this was in error. It is well settled that “assets should then be given their value as of the date of trial.” In re Marriage of Keener, 728 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Iowa 2007). Accordingly, we modify the decree to split the value of James’s TIAA account as of the trial date. Adjusting for the excluded funds and the altered valuation date, the modified decree now entitles Holly to $77,525.695 of the TIAA retirement account. II. Personal Property The parties agree the district court’s ruling regarding the personal property distribution was “open ended” and requires clarification by the court. Holly claims that, “[s]ince the entry of the Decree, the parties have continued to litigate division of their personal property with no resolve. The Decree fails to provide a definitive enforceable resolution.” We agree with the parties that the district court requires an opportunity to clarify its personal property division. So we remand for the personal-property portion of the decree to be set for rehearing and a ruling clearly setting forth each party’s rights to the contested property. III. Appellate Attorney Fees Finally, both parties request appellate attorney fees. Whether to grant appellate attorney fees is left to the court’s discretion. McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 687. “In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (cleaned up). After 5 Calculated by taking the full value of the account minus the excluded amount and dividing the result in half: ($231,376.91 - $76,325.53)/2= $77,525.69. 7 reviewing the relevant factors, we decline to award either party appellate attorney fees. The parties are in substantially similar financial circumstances and can each pay their respective attorneys. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 8