Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0141 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ Andrew Christopher Quick, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Morgan Janney, Respondent–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, The Honorable Charles C. Sinnard, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Jamie Hunter of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, attorney for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Buller, J. 1 BULLER, Judge. Andrew Quick appeals the district court’s denial of his petition to modify the custodial decree for his child with Morgan Janney. On appeal, Quick contests the court’s denial of his request to expand visitation and to change the location of visitation exchanges. Finding the district court did not fail to do equity, we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS In 2020, Janney and Quick—who have never been married—had a child. The parties soon split, and in December Quick was arrested for a number of crimes.1 In October 2021, they filed a stipulation on custody and visitation. Relevant to this appeal, the parents had joint legal custody of the child, and Janney had physical care. As of the child starting kindergarten, Quick’s parenting time includes alternating weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. during the school year, full-day extensions in either direction when there is no school on Friday and/or Monday, and the option to trade for all three-day weekends; each party has two nonconsecutive weeks with the child in the summer. Quick lived in Dallas County and Janney lived in Cedar County. So, the order set the visitation exchange location at the law enforcement center in Williamsburg; this complied with a no-contact order protecting Janney from Quick. 1 Quick’s offenses included a class “D” felony burglary charge and violation of a no-contact order—both with Janney as victim—as well as a number of controlled- substance charges from a separate incident. In late 2021, Quick pled guilty to a simple misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct—amended from the burglary count—and the other charges were dismissed. The no-contact order protecting Janney was extended through mid-November 2023, at which time Quick was found to no longer present a threat to Janney. 2 A month after the protective order expired, Quick petitioned to modify custody, asking the court to modify the parenting schedule, allow in-person communication, and move the exchange location west to Brooklyn. By trial, Quick was requesting physical care of the child, with Janney having alternating weekend visitation and alternating summer weeks, and with exchanges occurring in Coralville. He alternatively requested that if Janney maintained physical care, his weekend visits start at 5:00 p.m., the parents alternate summer weeks, and custody exchanges happen in Newton. Janney asked the court to find no material change in circumstances and continue the current parenting time schedule. After a two-day trial, the court made detailed fact findings before concluding the changes in circumstances asserted by Quick were contemplated by the parties and the court at the time of the stipulation and custodial decree. The court denied Quick’s petition for modification of physical care and observed, “Buyer’s remorse is not a substantial ground to disturb a custodial arrangement, so long as the arrangement continues to be in the best interests of the child.” Following a motion to enlarge or amend, the court found circumstances had not materially changed to justify modifying visitation; the court did remove the required location for custody exchange, setting it “wherever the parties may agree,” with a default to Williamsburg if no agreement was made. Quick appeals only the visitation and exchange location rulings. DISCUSSION We review child custody and care matters de novo. Thorpe v. Hostetler, 949 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). Although we review the entire record and decide anew the factual and legal issues presented, “we afford deference 3 to the district court for institutional and pragmatic reasons.” Hensch v. Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). Because the district court has the opportunity to hear the evidence and directly observe the witnesses, “we recognize the reasonable discretion of the trial court to modify visitation rights and will not disturb its decision unless the record fairly shows it has failed to do equity.” In re Marriage of Salmon, 519 N.W.2d 94, 95 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Although this action is brought under Iowa Code chapter 600B, in determining visitation arrangements we consider the statutory factors of section 598.41(3). Iowa Code § 600B.40(2) (2025). “A parent seeking to modify visitation must . . . establish that there has been a material change in circumstances since the decree and that the requested change in visitation is in the best interests of the child[].” In re Marriage of Brown, 778 N.W.2d 47, 51–52 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (cleaned up). “[T]he change in circumstances necessary to modify the . . . visitation provisions of a decree must still have been outside the contemplation of the district court at the time it entered its original decree.” Collett v. Vogt, No. 17-0986, 2018 WL 739333, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2018). “Although liberal visitation is the benchmark, our governing consideration in defining visitation rights is the best interests of the child[], not those of the parent seeking visitation.” In re Marriage of Brainard, 523 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Quick asserts three “dramatic” changes in the legal and factual circumstances of the case: (1) the dismissal of most of the criminal charges pending against him at the time of the decree and the expiration of the no- contact order; (2) Janney’s withholding of visitation one weekend; and (3) the limitations on his parenting time due to geographic distance and the school-year visitation schedule. 4 First, Quick claims the expiration of the no-contact order was not contemplated at the time the decree was entered and so constitutes a material change in circumstances. Janney answers that the resolution of the criminal charges was known, even if the manner of resolution was not, and nothing in Quick’s criminal case impacted the agreed-upon visitation schedule. The district court observed, “The only impact that [the no-contact] order had on the stipulated visitation arra[nge]ment was on the exact place of transferring custody. Elsewise, it was not relevant to the amount of time [Quick] was able to exercise visitation with the child.” We agree with the district court that, given the provisions planning for events several years into the future, the expiration of the no-contact order would have been within the district court’s contemplation at the time of the decree. This did not constitute a material change sufficient to modify visitation. Quick’s second claimed change in circumstances was a weekend in September 2024 when Janney withheld visitation. This incident was also the subject of a concurrent show-cause hearing. The court found Janney in contempt for intentionally withholding visitation and found that her reasons (specifically Quick’s involvement in a rollover accident where alcohol bottles were found) should have been addressed in other ways. The court ordered that if she did not make up the missed visitation, she would have a week-long jail sentence; she was also ordered to pay Quick’s related attorney fees. Because this was an isolated event—rather than habitual or permanent withholding of visits—we find the district court’s approach was appropriate, and the incident does not qualify as a material change in circumstances. See Moellers v. Sindelar, No. 14-1361, 2015 WL 1546464, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015) (cautioning courts to view “the total circumstances, and put[] isolated events into perspective”). 5 As for Quick’s third claimed change in circumstances—the limitation of his parenting time due to geographic distance—we do not see a change in circumstance from when the custodial decree was entered. Quick and Janney already lived more than two hours apart when the original decree was entered, and Quick did not establish any additional move by Janney that would constitute a change in circumstances. The only change limiting Quick’s parenting time is that the child reached school age, so the decree’s school-year provisions took effect, and the child can no longer miss preschool days for Quick’s parenting time as the decree previously permitted. This was contemplated and provided for in the decree. See In re Marriage of Rife, No. 19-0679, 2020 WL 1542314, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2020) (finding a decrease in visitation based on the school schedule was anticipated in an earlier modification and “is not a material change of circumstance”). We also find it relevant that the court—and the decree—left it to the parties to consider more visitation “during the summer in the best interests of the child.” The shorter school-year visits are provided for in the decree and unavoidable given the distance between the parties, as the parties knew and understood at the time of the original decree. We agree with the district court that Quick has failed to prove a material change in circumstances justifying the modification of the visitation schedule. As for the exchange location, we reject Quick’s request to require all future exchanges in Newton. Instead, we agree with the district court’s decision to move exchanges from inside the Williamsburg law enforcement center to “wherever the parties may agree,” with a default of a public location in Williamsburg if they cannot agree. The parties have shown flexibility in the past when adjusting the exchange time based on the child’s schedule; the same should hold true for the location. 6 Finally, Janney requests an award of $5,725 toward her appellate attorney fees. Iowa Code section 600B.26 (2026) allows us to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in a modification action. Appellate attorney fee awards are “within the discretion of the appellate court.” Markey v. Carney, 705 N.W.2d 13, 26 (Iowa 2005). We consider “the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the trial court’s decision on appeal.” Id. (citation omitted). Based on all these considerations, we order Quick to pay $5,725 toward Janney’s appellate attorney fees. AFFIRMED. 7