In the Interest of R.W., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0917 Filed September 2, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of R.W., Minor Child, C.T., Mother, Appellant., B.W., Father, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, The Honorable Matthew A. Schuling, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS _______________ Sara E. Benson of Meldrum & Benson Law, P.C, Council Bluffs, attorney for appellant mother. Whitney A. Estwick, Omaha, Nebraska, attorney for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Katie Johnson, Shenandoah, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ 1  Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Sandy, J. 2 SANDY, Judge. A mother and father each appeal the termination of their parental rights to their infant son under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (g) and (h) (2026). On appeal, the parents challenge the statutory grounds for termination—including whether the State provided reasonable reunification efforts and the juvenile court’s denial of their request for an additional six months to pursue reunification—as well as whether termination was in the child’s best interests. Upon our de novo review, we affirm on both appeals. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The child came to the attention of law enforcement just nineteen days after his birth when the staff of a local hotel called police to report a mother who was trying to give away her newborn baby; the child reportedly had not eaten in days. When police arrived, they found the child in the hotel staff’s care. The staff told police that the parents had been living in the hotel and had called the front desk several times to ask for help with the child, who was not eating and crying constantly. The police took the child to the hospital to be treated for hypothermia—his body temperature was recorded as 95.1 degrees—and hypoglycemia. Doctors determined the child’s weight had dropped fourteen percent from birth, and he met the criteria for acute severe malnutrition. Nurses discovered that the child had never learned how to eat, so they had to feed him with a syringe. After sending the child away in an ambulance, law enforcement found the mother outside smoking a cigarette. When asked why she did not approach the ambulance when she saw her baby being taken away, she replied that she was busy on the phone with her fiancé and needed a minute away 3 from her baby. She initially denied the staff’s allegations that she tried to give away her baby, but she later admitted to a child protective worker that she left the baby with hotel staff and told them she could no longer care for him. Police arrested the parents for child endangerment. A protective custody order was issued the next day, and the child was removed from the parents’ custody. Due to this incident, the child was adjudicated a child in need of assistance on April 9, 2025. As part of the adjudication, the parents were ordered to participate in Family Centered Services (FCS) and to complete a mental-health evaluation, a psychological evaluation with an IQ component, and complete a parenting assessment. The juvenile court further ordered the parents to participate in consistent visitation, submit to random drug screens, and obtain safe and stable housing. Over the next year of reunification efforts, little progress was made regarding any of the court-ordered services. Throughout the case, the parents struggled to find stable housing and lived in a shelter in Nebraska. The department could not evaluate the shelter for possible placement of the child due to issues with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). The father completed his psychological evaluation in September 2025, but the mother never completed the psychological evaluation, which was a prerequisite for the parenting assessment. In addition to these issues, the parents failed to consistently attend visits and the child’s medical appointments, and neither parent progressed beyond fully supervised visits. After a year of minimal progress towards reunification, the State petitioned to terminate both parents’ parental rights in February 2026. Shortly afterward, the parents filed a motion to continue the termination when the father discovered the department had not processed the necessary 4 referral to begin the court-ordered parenting assessment. The parents claimed the department’s failure to process the referral violated the reasonable-efforts requirement of Iowa Code section 232.102. A hearing on the termination petition was held on March 27. At the beginning of the hearing, the parents requested a continuance based on their written motion regarding reasonable efforts. The juvenile court denied the motion on the record, finding that the child’s need for permanency outweighed any concerns about completing the assessment after the case had been open for over a year. Following the hearing, the juvenile court issued a written ruling terminating the father’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (g), and (h). The mother’s rights were terminated under section 232.116(1)(e) and (h). Both parents appeal, challenging the statutory grounds for termination, arguing the State failed to provide reasonable reunification efforts, requesting an additional six months to pursue reunification, and challenging the juvenile court’s best-interests determination. STANDARD OF REVIEW We conduct a de novo review of termination proceedings under a familiar three-step analysis that asks whether: (1) the statutory grounds for termination are met; (2) “termination is in the best interest of the child”; and (3) “we should exercise any of the permissive exceptions for termination.” In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022); see also Iowa Code § 232.116(1)–(3). Our review is confined to the steps raised by the parent on appeal, along with any ancillary issues. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). 5  DISCUSSION I. Statutory Grounds for Termination The parents first argue that the State failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination. To affirm the juvenile court’s ruling, “we need to find facts to support just one of the grounds.” In re J.E., 907 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). For both parents, we can affirm as to section 232.116(1)(h). Under that section, the State must prove that the child: (1) is three or younger; (2) “has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance”; (3) has been removed from the parents’ physical custody for at least six months; and (4) cannot be returned to the parents’ custody at the present time. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h); see In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (finding “at the present time” means the date of the termination hearing). The parents only challenge the last element, arguing the State failed to prove that the child could not safely be returned to their custody at the time of the termination hearing. The mother bases her argument on the fact that “important court- ordered assessments remained incomplete at the time of termination, leaving significant questions regarding the Mother’s reunification potential unresolved.” While it is true the court-ordered parent assessment was incomplete, that does not alter the fact that the child could not be returned to the mother’s care at the time of the termination hearing. No evaluation could change that the parents still lacked suitable housing, had not progressed beyond supervised visitation, and had not addressed their underlying mental-health concerns. The mother’s challenge to the statutory grounds for termination falls short and instead rests on a reasonable-efforts argument. 6  The father argues the child could be returned to his custody because he “engaged in services, completed all court ordered evaluations,” and there were “no safety concerns noted regarding the father’s interactions with the child.” But this overlooks the juvenile court’s primary concerns about his lack of stable housing, his failure to comply with mental-health recommendations, and his inconsistent attendance at scheduled visits. As summarized by the juvenile court: “Nothing before the Court, from the denied ICPC to the failure to secure stable transportation, communication, and housing gives the Court the impression that either of the parents has the stability needed to care for a child that has had such a traumatic start to his life.” Given the significance of the ongoing concerns, we agree with the juvenile court that the child could not be safely placed in the care of either parent at the time of the termination hearing or in the foreseeable future. II. Reasonable Efforts The parents’ appeal centers on whether the department’s failure to process the referral for their parenting assessment violated the reasonable- efforts requirement. Allegedly, “[t]he failure to complete the parenting assessments is significant because the juvenile court ultimately relied upon concerns that those assessments were specifically intended to evaluate, including parenting capacity, parental functioning, ability to meet [the child]’s needs, and ability to safely parent in the future.” Iowa Code section 232.102(6) requires the department to “make every reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests of the child.” However, “the reasonable efforts requirement is not viewed as a strict substantive requirement of termination.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). “Still, 7 where the elements of termination require reasonable efforts by [the department], the scope of [the department]’s efforts after removal impacts the burden of proving those elements.” In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019). “Thus, in considering the sufficiency of evidence to support termination, our focus is on the services provided by the state and the response by [the parent], not on services [the parent] now claims the [department] failed to provide.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 494. Here, the parents were provided with ample services to work towards reunification. The department supervised visits; facilitated FCS services; coordinated drug screens; attempted a home study; provided transportation assistance, paternity testing, and psychological evaluations; and offered habilitation services. As stated by the juvenile court: The overall service array offered between February 23, 2025, and the termination hearing supports a finding of reasonable efforts. Both parents were offered substantial services throughout the last 13 months, and they failed to avail themselves of those services. [Mother] and [Father] failed to consistently attend [R.W.’s] medical appointments and visitation, they failed to follow through on their mental health recommendations and therapy, and they failed to secure appropriate housing to support [R.W.]. While it is true the father’s parenting assessment was incomplete partially due to the department’s failure to process the referral, the delay in completing just one of the evaluations is insufficient to find a lack of reasonable efforts by the department. The father waited until the eve of termination to even attempt the evaluation, and it is worth noting that the mother never completed the psychological evaluation which was a prerequisite for the parenting assessment. After reviewing the services offered, we agree with the juvenile court that the department satisfied the reasonable-efforts requirement of Iowa Code section 232.102. 8 III. Request for Additional Time The parents also request more time to work toward reunification. But to continue placement for six months, section 232.104(2)(b) requires the court to decide “the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the extension.” In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). Like the juvenile court, we cannot make that finding. As already stated, the parents’ efforts have fallen short throughout the year of services. Neither parent has stable housing, neither parent has progressed in visitation, and neither parent has meaningfully addressed their mental-health concerns. There is no evidence that the need for removal would be alleviated in another six months. Given the lack of progress, delaying permanency is unwarranted. IV. Best Interests Finally, the parents challenge the juvenile court’s best-interests analysis. “In determining best interests, we look to the child’s long-range as well as immediate interests, consider what the future holds for the child if returned to the parents, and weigh the child’s safety and need for a permanent home.” L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 529 (cleaned up). “When making this decision, we look to the parents’ past performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). There are significant ongoing concerns with both parents’ housing and mental health. Additionally, their parenting abilities are called into question by their failure to move past fully supervised visits or even consistently attend visits or medical appointments. “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination 9 under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 777 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). Despite the year of services, the parents are in no better position to care for the child than when the case began. The child has been out of the parents’ care for over a year, and when statutory deadlines for reunification have passed, “termination proceedings must be viewed with a sense of urgency.” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). “It is simply not in the best interests of children to continue to keep them in temporary foster homes while the natural parents get their lives together.” A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778 (citation omitted). Rather, the child’s best interests are served by termination. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS. 10