In the Interest of A.A., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1480 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of A.A., Minor Child, K.A., Father, Appellant. E.G., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, The Honorable Scott Strait, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS _______________ Abby L. Davison of the Office of the State Public Defender, Council Bluffs, attorney for appellant father. Mandy L. Whiddon of Whiddon Law, Omaha, Nebraska, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Keith Buzzard, Council Bluffs, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ 1  Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Chicchelly, J. 2 CHICCHELLY, Judge. A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental rights to A.A., born in 2024. They both argue the juvenile court erred by finding that the State proved the statutory grounds for termination, by finding that termination was in the child’s best interests, and by ruling that a permissive exception to termination did not apply. They also argue that the State failed to offer reasonable reunification efforts and that a three-to-six- month extension should have been granted. The father additionally argues the juvenile court erred by not granting a guardianship. Upon our review, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s and the father’s parental rights. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in April 2025 following allegations that the father attempted to swerve into the mother’s vehicle and run her off the road while she was driving with A.A. The father was arrested because of the incident. Following the incident, the police had a difficult time locating the mother and A.A. They later went to A.A.’s maternal grandmother’s home, where they found A.A. The maternal grandmother explained that the mother had dropped off A.A., and she had not heard from the mother in days. The maternal grandmother further explained that the mother’s and father’s relationship had a history of domestic violence. A.A. was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA), removed from the mother’s and father’s custody, and placed with the maternal grandparents. The termination hearing was held in July 2026. Following the hearing, the juvenile court granted the State’s petition to terminate the mother’s and father’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (e), and (h) 3 (2026). The juvenile court also terminated the mother’s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(l). The mother and the father now appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW “Termination proceedings are reviewed de novo.” In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). “We give weight to the [juvenile court’s] factual findings but are not bound by them.” Id. “We generally apply a three-step analysis to review termination of parental rights. First, we consider whether there are statutory grounds for termination. Second, we determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child. Third, we consider whether we should exercise any of the permissive exceptions for termination.” Id. (internal citations omitted). DISCUSSION I. Statutory Grounds We begin with the grounds for termination. “When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We analyze the mother’s and the father’s challenge to the statutory ground for termination of their parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h). Neither parent disputes that the State has met the first three elements for termination under this paragraph. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(1) (A.A. is under three years of age), (2) (A.A. has been adjudicated a CINA), and (3) (A.A. has been removed from the physical custody of the mother and the father for the requisite time period). But the mother and the father dispute the fourth element requiring “clear and 4 convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.” Id. § 232.116(1)(h)(4). We first address whether the State proved this element as to the mother. The mother argues no evidence was offered to support a finding that A.A. could not be returned to her custody within a reasonable period of time considering A.A.’s age and need for a permanent home. The mother further asserts that she is working toward implementing the appropriate tools to parent A.A and points out how domestic violence has affected her. Despite the mother’s argument, the inquiry here is whether A.A. could be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing, not at some later date. See id.; In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (“At the present time means at the time of the termination hearing.” (cleaned up)). The record shows that at the time of the termination hearing, concerns about the mother’s substance use, mental health, and whether she would be able to provide safe and stable housing remained. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (“We do not gamble with the [child’s] future by asking them to continuously wait for a stable biological parent, particularly at such tender ages.” (cleaned up)). Moreover, the mother has engaged in various criminal activity throughout the case, including being charged with domestic violence—third-degree assault. Thus, we find there is clear and convincing evidence that A.A. could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing, and termination of the mother’s parental rights is proper under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h). Turning to whether the State proved this element for the father, the father was imprisoned out-of-state at the time of the termination hearing, 5 with a reported release date in August 2028. 1 The father testified at the termination hearing that he could possibly be released on parole in six months. We find there is clear and convincing evidence that A.A. could not be returned to the father’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. See In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (finding clear and convincing evidence that the child could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing because the mother was incarcerated, and even though she had received notice of her parole, she “would have much to prove” after her release “before resuming custody”). Nonetheless, the father contends that A.A. could be placed with a paternal uncle until the father’s release from incarceration. However, the inquiry here is whether A.A. could be returned to the custody of a parent, not another relative. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4). Thus, we find the termination of the father’s parental rights is proper under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h). II. Reasonable Efforts Both the mother and the father argue that the State failed to offer reasonable reunification efforts “to eliminate the need for removal of the child or make it possible for the child to safely return to the family’s home.” Id. § 232.102A(1)(a). “The State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). We address the parents’ arguments separately. 1 The father was imprisoned on charges which predated his acts that brought the family to the attention of HHS. 6  The mother argues HHS failed to offer her reasonable efforts and that she did what she could to maintain contact and work toward reunification, but it was difficult because of the transportation struggles she faced. Despite the mother’s argument, the record shows that HHS offered her a variety of services throughout the case, including transportation assistance. Nonetheless, the mother inconsistently engaged with services. Furthermore, because the mother raises transportation issues with services for the first time on appeal, they are waived. See In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002) (“In general, if a parent fails to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at the termination proceeding.”); In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (“[HHS] has an obligation to make reasonable efforts toward reunification, but a parent has an equal obligation to demand other, different, or additional services prior to a permanency or termination hearing.”). Therefore, we reject the mother’s argument. As to the father’s argument, he argues HHS did not make the necessary accommodations in the services it offered him because services were not offered in his native language. According to the father, without an interpreter, he could not understand and participate in the required services. The record shows that the father raised interpretation issues with the services provided to him. However, shortly after the father raised these objections, and while HHS was in the process of securing interpretation services, the father was arrested and imprisoned. Based on our review of the record, HHS did not fail to provide the father with reasonable efforts. Even though HHS offered various services, the father inconsistently engaged with them. We understand that this may have been in part because of the language barrier. However, after the father 7 raised the interpretation issues, the record shows HHS made efforts to provide the father with interpretation services. But shortly after raising these issues, the father was incarcerated out-of-state. We acknowledge that “imprisonment [does not] absolve[] [HHS] of its statutory mandate to provide reunification services under all circumstances.” In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) (en banc). And while the father’s imprisonment limited the services that could be offered to him, the record shows that HHS attempted to get him to engage in services by mailing him translated documents. See id. (providing the various factors that are considered when determining whether services are reasonable to an incarcerated parent). Therefore, we reject the father’s argument that reasonable efforts were not made.2 III. Best Interests The mother and the father next argue that termination was not in A.A.’s best interests. Under the best-interests analysis, we “give primary 2 The father also argues that reasonable efforts were not made from the start of the case because HHS did not place A.A. with a paternal uncle instead of the maternal grandparents. This is not an argument that HHS failed to provide the father with reasonable services. Rather, it is the father’s disagreement with where HHS placed A.A. “Once HHS has legal custody of the child, it has ‘the authority to select the specific person or facility within that category for placement, subject to court review at the request of an interested party.’” Iowa Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 27 N.W.3d 76, 83 (Iowa 2025) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.102(1)(b)(1)). Because the father failed to request that the juvenile court review where HHS placed A.A., we hold that he has waived this issue. And even if this issue had not been waived, “[a] party opposing HHS’s placement must prove that HHS ‘failed to act in the child’s best interests by unreasonably or irresponsibly failing to discharge its duties in selecting a suitable placement for the child.’” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 232.102(1)(b)(2)). This “imposes a significant burden of proof.” In re L.P., 32 N.W.3d 804, 819 (Iowa 2026). The father’s mere disagreement as to the relative HHS placed A.A. with falls well short of overcoming this burden. 8 consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). And while we consider the parent-child bond in our best-interests analysis, it is only one factor. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 535 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc) (holding that the parent-child bond should be considered in the best- interests analysis); In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the parent-child bond “is not an overriding consideration, but merely a factor to consider”). The mother asserts that termination is not in A.A.’s best interests because A.A. is bonded with her. Despite the mother’s claim, the record shows that in the time between the start of 2026 and when the termination hearing was held in July, the mother had three visits with A.A. These visits lasted less than a total of five hours. Additionally, concerns about the mother’s substance use, mental health, and criminal activity remain. Thus, we find that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in A.A.’s best interests. Similarly, the father argues that termination of his parental rights is not in A.A.’s best interests because A.A. is bonded with him. However, the father has been incarcerated out-of-state since November 2025. Because of the prison’s rules, the father has not had any contact with A.A. since his incarceration. The record shows that the father has a visiting restriction in place—for both in-person and video visitation—for anyone under the age of nineteen. However, the record also shows that the father could have taken steps to change the restriction. But the father has not taken the necessary steps to remove this restriction, thereby preventing him from participating in supervised visits with A.A. 9  Moreover, this case arose because of allegations of the father’s domestic violence that A.A. was exposed to. See In re J.D., No. 21-0391, 2021 WL 3379037, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2021) (recognizing exposure to domestic violence is harmful to children). And even after A.A. was removed from the father’s custody, the father continued to engage in acts of domestic violence. Therefore, termination of the father’s parental rights is in A.A.’s best interests. IV. Extension The mother and the father both argue that they should be granted a three-to-six-month extension. However, neither parent asked the juvenile court for an extension at the termination hearing.3 Thus, neither parent has preserved error on this issue. See In re G.C., No. 21-1781, 2022 WL 246270, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2022) (“[The mother] did not request this extension at the termination hearing. As such, error has not been preserved, and we do not address the issue.”). Even if the issue had been preserved, the record does not show that the need for removal would no longer have existed at the end of the extension period as to either the mother or the father. See Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b). 3 At the termination hearing, the father made no mention of an extension. The mother, in her petition on appeal, asserts “[a]t the termination of parental rights hearing, [she] was asking for additional time to allow the opportunity to reunify with her child.” However, the only reference the mother made to an extension at the hearing was when her attorney asked an HHS employee if an additional three months would allow A.A. to be returned to the mother. 10 V. Guardianship The father also argues that the juvenile court should have established a guardianship. 4 However, “a guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). And “we would have to be convinced that termination is not in the child’s best interests before we could order the establishment of a guardianship.” In re H.M., No. 25-1292, 2025 WL 2924721, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2025). Because we find that termination of the father’s parental rights is in A.A.’s best interests, a guardianship would not be proper. VI. Permissive Exception Lastly, the mother and the father argue that a permissive exception under Iowa Code section 232.116(3) should be applied to preserve their respective parental rights. Once the State has proven a ground for termination, the burden shifts to the parent to prove an exception to termination. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476. In her petition on appeal, the mother cites section 232.116(3) but does not explicitly state what exception she is arguing applies. However, the mother does argue that A.A. is bonded to her and that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to A.A.’s well-being. Thus, while the mother does not explicitly say so, it appears that she is arguing that the exception under section 232.116(3)(c) applies. Under section 232.116(3)(c), 4 At the termination hearing, the mother’s attorney stated that she would agree to a guardianship after the father’s attorney brought it up. However, in her petition on appeal, the mother makes no mention of a guardianship. Thus, the mother has waived this issue. And even if she had properly presented it on appeal, we would decline to grant the mother a guardianship for the same reasons we decline to grant the father a guardianship. 11 the juvenile court need not terminate parental rights if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Here, “our consideration must center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the parent’s] inability to provide for [the child’s] developing needs.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709. The record does not show that termination of the mother’s parental rights would be detrimental to A.A. As explained above, while the mother argues that A.A. is bonded to her, in the six months before the termination hearing, the mother spent only five hours with A.A. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding that a permissive exception does not apply to the termination of the mother’s parental rights. As to the father, he argues the juvenile court erred by finding that the exception under section 232.116(3)(c) does not apply. He asserts that he maintained a meaningful relationship with A.A. and that termination would be detrimental to A.A. However, based on our review, terminating his parental rights would not be detrimental to A.A. As discussed above, the father has been incarcerated since November 2025, and since then he has had no contact with A.A. due to the prison’s regulations. This is despite the fact that the father could have taken steps to maintain contact. By the time the father is released from incarceration, he will have spent the vast majority of A.A.’s life incarcerated. See In re C.A.V., 787 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (“Under Iowa’s termination case law, a parent ‘cannot use his incarceration as a justification for his lack of relationship with the child.’” (quoting In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Iowa 1993) (en banc)). Thus, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding that a permissive exception does not apply to the termination of the father’s parental rights. 12  CONCLUSION For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the termination of the mother’s and the father’s parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS. 13