In the Interest of A.G., J.G. and R.G., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1075 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of A.G., J.G., and R.G., Minor Children, S.T., Mother, Appellant, D.G., Father, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, The Honorable Patrick McAvan, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS _______________ Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, attorney for appellant mother. Katie Mitchell of Mitchell Law Office, PLC, Washington, attorney for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Patricia J. Lipski, Washington, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children. 1  _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, P.J. 2 AHLERS, Presiding Judge. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of a mother and father to three children—born in 2023, 2024, and 2025. The parents separately appeal, arguing the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification and termination of their parental rights is not in the children’s best interests.1 We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Although we are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, we give them respectful consideration, especially regarding the credibility of witnesses. Id. Our review follows a three-step process of determining whether statutory grounds for termination exist, whether termination is in the children’s best interests, and whether an exception should apply to prevent termination. Id. at 294. However, “[w]e do not address any steps not raised by a parent.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). Here, the juvenile court found grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2026), which permits termination when the child is three years of age or younger, has been adjudicated as a child in need of assistance, has been removed from parental custody for at least six of the last twelve months, and the child cannot be safely returned to the parent’s 1 The father also makes a passing reference to seeking additional time to work toward reunification, but he does not develop any supporting argument. So, we deem any request for additional time forfeited. See In re T.L., No. 26-0471, 2026 WL 3019698, at *1 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2026) (“Because the father did not develop a cogent, more-than-perfunctory argument on these issues, we deem them to be forfeited.); In re N.J., No. 24-1679, 2025 WL 548207, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025) (declining to take on advocacy role of developing an argument for a party). 3 custody. Neither parent directly challenges the juvenile court’s conclusion that this ground for termination is satisfied. However, both indirectly challenge the statutory grounds for termination by arguing the department failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. While not a strict substantive requirement for termination, “[t]he State must show reasonable efforts [toward reunification] as a part of its ultimate proof the child[ren] cannot be safely returned to the [custody] of a parent.” In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019) (first alteration in original) (quoting In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017)). This implicates the fourth element under section 232.116(1)(h). Parents who believe the department is falling short of providing services necessary for reunification must alert the juvenile court of the purported deficiencies prior to the termination hearing. See In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839–40 (Iowa 2017) (“[P]arents have a responsibility to object when they claim the nature or extent of services is inadequate.”); In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002) (“If, however, a parent is not satisfied with [the department’s] response to a request for other services, the parent must come to the court and present this challenge.”); In re O.T., No. 18-0837, 2018 WL 3302167, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 5, 2018) (“The failure to request different or additional . . . services in the juvenile court precludes [the parent’s] challenge to the services on appeal.”); In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (stating the parent has an obligation to demand other, different, or additional services prior to the termination hearing or the issue is considered waived for appeal). This requirement allows the court to take corrective action early on so that the case does not languish on and permanency can be reached within a reasonable time for the children. Doing so obviates the need for additional time to address service deficiencies only identified at the termination hearing when a family is on the precipice of termination. So we will only 4  determine whether previously identified alleged service deficiencies remain and require additional time to address. In re E.H., No. 21-0467, 2021 WL 2709486, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021). Here, both parents filed motions for reasonable efforts prior to the termination hearing. First, the mother filed a motion for reasonable efforts seeking placement of the children with their maternal grandmother or some other family member. Then the father filed a motion for reasonable efforts several months later, which the mother joined, requesting his visitation with the children be reinstated and moved to the family residence after it was suspended over concerns the father injured a child while changing her diaper during a supervised visit. That motion was granted. The father filed a second motion for reasonable efforts, again joined by the mother, requesting an increase in “visitation supervised by a suitable other and to progress to semi- supervised visitation in order to continue to progress toward[] reunification.” So, the only reasonable-efforts challenges properly before us are limited to these issues.2 See id. The mother does not re-raise her complaint about the children’s placement. Instead, both parents complain about the fact that visitation was limited to fully supervised visitation and argue that structured setting 2 The mother attempts to raise complaints about the quality of the reunification services provided to her because she contends they were not adequately tailored to her personal learning and psychological needs. The father complains generally about the services provided and specifically that the department did not respond to a parenting evaluation that he completed by providing him with additional services. And he complains that the parents requested that the department provide them both one-on-one time with the children but did not receive that time. Neither parent brought these issues to the juvenile court’s attention prior to the termination hearing, so we do not address them. See E.H., 2021 WL 2709486, at *2. 5 prohibited them from demonstrating their ability to safely parent the children on their own. But before parents and children may move to a less restrictive form of visitation, there must be reason to believe that the children will be safe doing so. See In re L.H., 13 N.W.3d 627, 629 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (concluding that a child cannot be returned to a parent’s custody when the parent “never progressed beyond fully-supervised visits”), partially overruled on other grounds by In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 534 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). Unfortunately, that was not possible in this case. According to a case worker, there have been “over a hundred visits with the children and their parents.” She went on to explain, “We’re still seeing basic parenting issues and safety concerns where without [a supervisor] present, I don’t know what would happen to these children.” For example, during a visit about a month prior to the termination hearing, one of the children pried off the safety cover of an electrical socket and was getting ready to stick his finger in it. The visitation supervisor had to intervene to protect the child. And the parents still require prompting to provide for the children’s basic needs like feedings and diaper changes. From this, it is apparent that neither parent was ready to move beyond fully supervised visits. For these reasons, we reject both parents’ reasonable-efforts challenges. We turn to the parents’ contentions that termination of their respective parental rights is not in the children’s best interests. When making a best-interests determination, we “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). We conclude termination of both parents’ rights is in the children’s best interests. 6  The department became involved with this family because medical providers discovered one of the infant children had several broken bones in various states of healing from non-accidental injury. In other words, someone in the familial home intentionally physically harmed the infant. And the parents do not seem to understand the significance of that or take any accountability for it.3 And after more than a year and a half of involvement with the department, the parents still struggle to meet the children’s basic needs even in a supervised setting. In short, it is not safe for the children to be in either parent’s care, and consideration of the children’s safety is our paramount concern when making a best-interests determination. See In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011). So, following our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that termination is in the children’s best interests. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS. 3 At the time the injuries were discovered, the children lived with their parents, their maternal grandparents, their mother’s siblings, and their uncle’s girlfriend and her children. It is not known which of these people is responsible for the child’s injuries. 7