In the Interest of R.H., Minor Child
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-1368
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-1368
Filed November 18, 2026
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In the Interest of R.H., Minor Child,
R.H., Mother,
Appellant,
A.H., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County,
The Honorable Richelle Mahaffey, Judge.
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AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS
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Katie Mitchell of Mitchell Law Office, PLC, Washington,
attorney for appellant mother.
Michael S. Fisher of Fisher Law Office, Pella, attorney for appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.
Sam K. Erhardt, Ottumwa, attorney and guardian ad litem
for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, P.J.
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal after the juvenile court
terminated their respective parental rights to a child born in 2023. The
mother challenges the statutory basis for termination, including whether the
Iowa Department of Health and Human Services made reasonable efforts
toward reunification, and the juvenile court’s determination that termination
is in the child’s best interests. The father also challenges the statutory
grounds for termination and contends termination is not in the child’s best
interests.1
We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re A.B.,
957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Although we are not bound by the juvenile
court’s factual findings, we give them respectful consideration, especially
when evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Id.
Our review follows a three-step process of determining whether
statutory grounds for termination exist, whether termination is in the child’s
best interests, and whether an exception should apply to prevent termination.
Id. at 294. But we do not address any step in this process that is not
challenged on appeal. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).
I. Statutory Grounds
The juvenile court terminated both parents’ rights under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(g), (h), and (l) (2026). When a juvenile court finds
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The father makes passing reference to the services provided to him. To the extent
he intended such reference to raise a reasonable-efforts challenge, we find such challenge
forfeited because the father did not develop any supporting argument. See State v. Jackson,
4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (“A party forfeits an issue on appeal when the party fails
to make more than a perfunctory argument in support of the issue.”).
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multiple statutory grounds for termination satisfied, we may affirm based on
any ground supported by the record. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa
2010). We elect to focus on section 232.116(1)(h) as to both parents.
This ground for termination permits termination upon sufficient proof
that (1) the child is three years old or younger, (2) the child has been
adjudicated as a child in need of assistance, (3) the child has been removed
from the parent’s custody for at least six of the last twelve months, and (4) the
child cannot be returned to the custody of the parent. Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(h). Both parents limit their challenge to the last element—
whether the child could have been returned to their respective custody at the
time of the termination hearing. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (interpreting
“at the present time” as used in section 232.116(1)(h)(4) to mean at the time
of the termination hearing).
We agree with the juvenile court that the child could not be safely
returned to either parent at the time of the termination hearing. These
parents have been involved with the department for some time. In fact, this
court has already affirmed the termination of their parental rights to another
child. In re J.H., No. 23-2108, 2024 WL 1548797 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10,
2024), abrogated on other grounds by, In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 534–35 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). Yet they have not successfully resolved the safety
concerns that led to the prior termination or the department’s involvement
in this case.
At the time of the termination hearing, the father remained on
probation for his numerous criminal offenses; he had recently pleaded guilty
to operating while intoxicated, third offense, and violating his probation. He
struggled with honesty and his protective capacity. Shortly before the
termination hearing, the father was exercising overnight visitation with the
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child. When a caseworker made an unannounced drop-in to check on him,
she found an unknown male also in the home. Both the father and unknown
individual avoided providing her with the individual’s name. Upon
investigation, the worker learned that the unknown individual was actually
the father’s adult son, who has a long criminal history that includes violent
offenses. When questioned about his adult son later, the father became
“guarded and defensive” with the worker.
We understand the father wanting to have contact with his adult child.
But that desire cannot come at the expense of providing appropriate
protective capacity for his young child, who cannot self-protect. Moreover,
parents—especially those who have caused the department to become
involved by their own missteps—must at times work with others for the
benefit of their child. The father demonstrated his refusal to do so when he
tried to evade the caseworker’s questions about the incident and became
combative. See In re C.B., No. 26-1043, 2026 WL 2858985, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Sep. 23, 2026) (“[A] basic ten[e]t of parenting is that one must be able
to constructively interact with others to be able to provide adequate care for
a child, as childrearing necessarily involves collaboration with others . . . .”).
This leads us to conclude the child could not be safely returned to his custody
at the time of the termination hearing.
As to the mother, her mental health and long-standing struggles with
illegal substance use, including methamphetamine, remain barriers to
reunification. While the mother has sought substance-use treatment and has
had some periods of sobriety, she has repeatedly relapsed and has not
demonstrated a sustained period of sobriety outside a supervised setting
since her most recent relapse. So we have concerns about her ability to care
for the child. See In re M.D., No.23-1137, 2023 WL 6290679, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
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App. Sep. 27, 2023) (“Given the absence of any evidence of success following
treatment, we cannot say that the mother’s relationship with
methamphetamine is at an end or that the child could be safely returned to
the mother’s custody.”). For example, after the mother made some progress
in 2025 and the child was returned to her on a trial basis, the mother
overdosed shortly thereafter. At the termination hearing, the mother also
admitted to a history of attempted suicide, yet she chooses not to participate
in medication management for her mental health. While we understand the
mother’s contention that she is trying to avoid the temptation to abuse
medication, it is indicative of the tenuous nature of the mother’s recent
sobriety.
Before we reach our ultimate conclusion as to whether the statutory
grounds for termination are satisfied as to the mother, we must also address
her reasonable-efforts challenge. While not a strict substantive requirement
for termination, “[t]he State must show reasonable efforts [toward
reunification] as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely
returned to the [custody] of a parent.” In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa
2019) (first alteration in original) (quoting In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839
(Iowa 2017)). This implicates the fourth element under
section 232.116(1)(h).
Parents who believe the department is falling short of providing
services necessary for reunification must alert the juvenile court to the
purported deficiencies prior to the termination hearing. See L.M., 904
N.W.2d at 839–40 (“[P]arents have a responsibility to object when they claim
the nature or extent of services is inadequate.”); In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144,
147 (Iowa 2002) (“If, however, a parent is not satisfied with [the
department’s] response to a request for other services, the parent must come
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to the court and present this challenge.”); In re O.T., No. 18-0837, 2018 WL
3302167, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 5, 2018) (“The failure to request different
or additional . . . services in the juvenile court precludes [the parent’s]
challenge to the services on appeal.”); In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a parent has an obligation to demand other,
different, or additional services prior to the termination hearing or the issue
is considered waived for appeal). Here, albeit late in the proceedings, the
mother filed two motions for reasonable efforts seeking additional visitation.
We generally agree that visitation is an important service to provide
families as they work toward reunification. However, we conclude that the
visitation in this case was adequate. While perhaps more visits would have
been better, more were not required in this case. Cf. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d
489, 493 (Iowa 2000) (noting the nature of the reasonable-efforts
requirement varies depending on the circumstances of each case).
Additional services requested by a parent through a motion for reasonable
efforts must relate to the ongoing need for removal and seek services that
would remedy that need. See In re M.G., No. 18-0650, 2018 WL 3912192,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018). Here, the main barrier to reunification
related to the mother’s long history of illegal substance use. That barrier to
reunification would not have been resolved through additional visitation. We
therefore reject the mother’s reasonable-efforts challenge and conclude the
State has established a statutory ground for termination.
We find a statutory ground for termination satisfied as to both parents.
II. Best Interests
Both parents argue termination is not in the child’s best interests.
When making a best-interests determination, we “give primary consideration
to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term
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nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 39 (quoting Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2)). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of
permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under
section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and
be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 41. We conclude
termination of both parents’ rights is in the children’s best interests.
The child has been out of parental custody for the majority of her
young life, and her life has lacked consistency and stability due to her parents’
instability. As the juvenile court aptly stated, the child “deserves to know
where she will grow up, where she will lay her head each night, and that her
caregivers into adulthood will be safe and sober.” The child is currently
placed in a pre-adoptive home; the family is willing to adopt her and
permanently integrate her into their family. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b).
We agree with the juvenile court that termination of both parents’ parental
rights best serves the child’s interests.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
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