Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1368 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of R.H., Minor Child, R.H., Mother, Appellant, A.H., Father, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, The Honorable Richelle Mahaffey, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS _______________ Katie Mitchell of Mitchell Law Office, PLC, Washington, attorney for appellant mother. Michael S. Fisher of Fisher Law Office, Pella, attorney for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Sam K. Erhardt, Ottumwa, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ 1 Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, P.J. 2 AHLERS, Presiding Judge. A mother and father separately appeal after the juvenile court terminated their respective parental rights to a child born in 2023. The mother challenges the statutory basis for termination, including whether the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services made reasonable efforts toward reunification, and the juvenile court’s determination that termination is in the child’s best interests. The father also challenges the statutory grounds for termination and contends termination is not in the child’s best interests.1 We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Although we are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, we give them respectful consideration, especially when evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Id. Our review follows a three-step process of determining whether statutory grounds for termination exist, whether termination is in the child’s best interests, and whether an exception should apply to prevent termination. Id. at 294. But we do not address any step in this process that is not challenged on appeal. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). I. Statutory Grounds The juvenile court terminated both parents’ rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g), (h), and (l) (2026). When a juvenile court finds 1 The father makes passing reference to the services provided to him. To the extent he intended such reference to raise a reasonable-efforts challenge, we find such challenge forfeited because the father did not develop any supporting argument. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (“A party forfeits an issue on appeal when the party fails to make more than a perfunctory argument in support of the issue.”). 3 multiple statutory grounds for termination satisfied, we may affirm based on any ground supported by the record. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). We elect to focus on section 232.116(1)(h) as to both parents. This ground for termination permits termination upon sufficient proof that (1) the child is three years old or younger, (2) the child has been adjudicated as a child in need of assistance, (3) the child has been removed from the parent’s custody for at least six of the last twelve months, and (4) the child cannot be returned to the custody of the parent. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). Both parents limit their challenge to the last element— whether the child could have been returned to their respective custody at the time of the termination hearing. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (interpreting “at the present time” as used in section 232.116(1)(h)(4) to mean at the time of the termination hearing). We agree with the juvenile court that the child could not be safely returned to either parent at the time of the termination hearing. These parents have been involved with the department for some time. In fact, this court has already affirmed the termination of their parental rights to another child. In re J.H., No. 23-2108, 2024 WL 1548797 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2024), abrogated on other grounds by, In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 534–35 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). Yet they have not successfully resolved the safety concerns that led to the prior termination or the department’s involvement in this case. At the time of the termination hearing, the father remained on probation for his numerous criminal offenses; he had recently pleaded guilty to operating while intoxicated, third offense, and violating his probation. He struggled with honesty and his protective capacity. Shortly before the termination hearing, the father was exercising overnight visitation with the 4 child. When a caseworker made an unannounced drop-in to check on him, she found an unknown male also in the home. Both the father and unknown individual avoided providing her with the individual’s name. Upon investigation, the worker learned that the unknown individual was actually the father’s adult son, who has a long criminal history that includes violent offenses. When questioned about his adult son later, the father became “guarded and defensive” with the worker. We understand the father wanting to have contact with his adult child. But that desire cannot come at the expense of providing appropriate protective capacity for his young child, who cannot self-protect. Moreover, parents—especially those who have caused the department to become involved by their own missteps—must at times work with others for the benefit of their child. The father demonstrated his refusal to do so when he tried to evade the caseworker’s questions about the incident and became combative. See In re C.B., No. 26-1043, 2026 WL 2858985, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 23, 2026) (“[A] basic ten[e]t of parenting is that one must be able to constructively interact with others to be able to provide adequate care for a child, as childrearing necessarily involves collaboration with others . . . .”). This leads us to conclude the child could not be safely returned to his custody at the time of the termination hearing. As to the mother, her mental health and long-standing struggles with illegal substance use, including methamphetamine, remain barriers to reunification. While the mother has sought substance-use treatment and has had some periods of sobriety, she has repeatedly relapsed and has not demonstrated a sustained period of sobriety outside a supervised setting since her most recent relapse. So we have concerns about her ability to care for the child. See In re M.D., No.23-1137, 2023 WL 6290679, at *1 (Iowa Ct. 5 App. Sep. 27, 2023) (“Given the absence of any evidence of success following treatment, we cannot say that the mother’s relationship with methamphetamine is at an end or that the child could be safely returned to the mother’s custody.”). For example, after the mother made some progress in 2025 and the child was returned to her on a trial basis, the mother overdosed shortly thereafter. At the termination hearing, the mother also admitted to a history of attempted suicide, yet she chooses not to participate in medication management for her mental health. While we understand the mother’s contention that she is trying to avoid the temptation to abuse medication, it is indicative of the tenuous nature of the mother’s recent sobriety. Before we reach our ultimate conclusion as to whether the statutory grounds for termination are satisfied as to the mother, we must also address her reasonable-efforts challenge. While not a strict substantive requirement for termination, “[t]he State must show reasonable efforts [toward reunification] as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the [custody] of a parent.” In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019) (first alteration in original) (quoting In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017)). This implicates the fourth element under section 232.116(1)(h). Parents who believe the department is falling short of providing services necessary for reunification must alert the juvenile court to the purported deficiencies prior to the termination hearing. See L.M., 904 N.W.2d at 839–40 (“[P]arents have a responsibility to object when they claim the nature or extent of services is inadequate.”); In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002) (“If, however, a parent is not satisfied with [the department’s] response to a request for other services, the parent must come 6 to the court and present this challenge.”); In re O.T., No. 18-0837, 2018 WL 3302167, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 5, 2018) (“The failure to request different or additional . . . services in the juvenile court precludes [the parent’s] challenge to the services on appeal.”); In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a parent has an obligation to demand other, different, or additional services prior to the termination hearing or the issue is considered waived for appeal). Here, albeit late in the proceedings, the mother filed two motions for reasonable efforts seeking additional visitation. We generally agree that visitation is an important service to provide families as they work toward reunification. However, we conclude that the visitation in this case was adequate. While perhaps more visits would have been better, more were not required in this case. Cf. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000) (noting the nature of the reasonable-efforts requirement varies depending on the circumstances of each case). Additional services requested by a parent through a motion for reasonable efforts must relate to the ongoing need for removal and seek services that would remedy that need. See In re M.G., No. 18-0650, 2018 WL 3912192, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018). Here, the main barrier to reunification related to the mother’s long history of illegal substance use. That barrier to reunification would not have been resolved through additional visitation. We therefore reject the mother’s reasonable-efforts challenge and conclude the State has established a statutory ground for termination. We find a statutory ground for termination satisfied as to both parents. II. Best Interests Both parents argue termination is not in the child’s best interests. When making a best-interests determination, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term 7 nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 39 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 41. We conclude termination of both parents’ rights is in the children’s best interests. The child has been out of parental custody for the majority of her young life, and her life has lacked consistency and stability due to her parents’ instability. As the juvenile court aptly stated, the child “deserves to know where she will grow up, where she will lay her head each night, and that her caregivers into adulthood will be safe and sober.” The child is currently placed in a pre-adoptive home; the family is willing to adopt her and permanently integrate her into their family. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). We agree with the juvenile court that termination of both parents’ parental rights best serves the child’s interests. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS. 8