In the Interest of A.B., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0869 Filed August 19, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of A.B., Minor Child, K.B., Mother, Appellant, N.B., Father, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Harrison County, The Honorable David W. Brooks, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS _______________ William T. Early, Harlan, attorney for appellant mother. Keith R. Tucker of Woods Tucker, PLLC, Glenwood, attorney for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Jennifer V. Mumm, Assistant Public Defender, Council Bluffs, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, P.J. 1 AHLERS, Presiding Judge. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father to a child born in 2014. Both parents appeal. The mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her motion to continue the termination hearing and challenges one of the statutory grounds for termination. In his separate appeal, the father challenges the statutory grounds authorizing termination of his parental rights, argues that termination of his parental rights is not in the child’s best interests, and requests additional time to work toward reunification. I. The Mother’s Appeal We begin with the mother’s appeal and her procedural challenge. The mother filed a motion to continue the termination hearing because she was in a county jail in Nebraska on the date of the termination hearing. The juvenile court denied the motion, explaining that the mother would be able to attend and participate in the hearing by videoconference. The mother’s attorney renewed the motion prior to the start of the hearing, which the court again denied. The mother argues that the denial of her motions amounted to an abuse of discretion. See In re A.H., 950 N.W.2d 27, 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (“[W]e review the juvenile court’s denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion.”). “A court abuses its discretion when the decision is grounded on reasons that are clearly untenable or unreasonable, such as when it is based on an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (cleaned up). We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motions to continue. It reasoned that, given that the child had been removed from parental custody for over a year, the best interests of the child would be served by not delaying the hearing. And the court ensured that the mother could hear what was going on and provided the mother and 2 her attorney the opportunity for private conversations throughout the hearing. 1 Moreover, the juvenile court noted that the mother was not available to attend the hearing in person because she was jailed and it was not clear when she would be available to attend in person because she also had legal troubles in another county that needed to be resolved. These were all reasonable factors for the juvenile court to consider. And we agree that the child’s best interests necessitated proceeding with the termination hearing rather than continuing it to some undetermined point in the future. As for the mother’s substantive argument on appeal, she challenges the juvenile court’s determination that termination was authorized under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) (2026). But the juvenile court also found statutory grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(f ), and the mother does not challenge that statutory basis for termination. Accordingly, we find the statutory grounds for termination satisfied under the unchallenged ground. See In re L.J., No. 21-0507, 2021 WL 4891064, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021) (“The father only challenges the evidence supporting the first two grounds. Accordingly, we may affirm on the unchallenged ground.”); see also In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). Because the mother raises no other issues on appeal, we affirm the termination of her parental rights. II. The Father’s Appeal Next, we turn to the father’s appeal. Our review is de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). We follow a three-step process of 1 The transcript shows that the mother and her attorney did have private conversations during the hearing and when technical issues arose, the court took steps to resolve those issues and ensured that witnesses repeated any testimony that the mother may have missed due to a technical issue. 3 determining whether (1) the State has established a statutory ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1); (2) the State has established that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests after applying the framework in section 232.116(2); and (3) a permissive exception under section 232.116(3) should be applied. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). However, we do not address any steps not challenged by a parent. Id. After addressing any challenges to the three steps, we address any additional claims raised. Id. The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (f ). The father challenges all three grounds for termination. When the juvenile court terminates on multiple grounds, we can affirm based on any ground supported by the record. Id. We elect to focus on section 232.116(1)(f ), which permits termination of parental rights upon clear and convincing evidence that (1) “[t]he child is four years of age or older”; (2) “[t]he child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance”; (3) the child has been removed from the physical custody of the parent for at least twelve of the last eighteen months; and (4) “at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents.” The father only challenges the last element. We note that in doing so, he misinterprets the last element as considering whether the child could be returned to his custody “now or in the near future.” But section 232.116(1)(f )(4) requires us to consider the parent’s ability to reunify “at the present time,” not at some future time. And our caselaw defines “at the present time” as used in section 232.116(1)(f )(4) to mean at the time of the termination hearing. In re S.O., 967 N.W.2d 198, 207 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (recognizing section 232.116(1)(f )(4) is established by showing by clear and convincing evidence that the child could not be returned to the parent’s 4 custody “at the time of the termination hearing”); see also In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “at the present time” as used in section 232.116(1)(h)(4) to mean at the time of the termination hearing). So, we consider whether the child could have been safely returned to the father’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. Following review of the record, it is clear that the child could not be safely returned to the father’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services initially became involved with this family in response to concerns that the parents were using methamphetamine around the child. But the father has been largely uninvolved since that time. He has had little contact with caseworkers and provided them with an inaccurate home address, hindering their ability to contact him. After being told that his visits with the child would need to take place in a therapeutic setting, the father did not follow through to contact the child’s therapist, and he has not had any visits with the child during the life of the case. Nor has the father participated in any court ordered services or drug screens.2 While the father claims that he has secured employment and stable housing, that does not alleviate the safety concerns. Given the father’s refusal to participate in services and demonstrate his sobriety through drug testing, we agree with the juvenile court that the child could not be safely returned to his custody at the time of the termination hearing. The father also challenges the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interests. When making a best-interests determination, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing 2 At the termination hearing, the father claimed ignorance as to what services he was ordered to comply with and implied he believed they were just recommendations. 5 and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The record reveals no reason to believe that the father can provide for the child’s needs or his safety. And so much time has passed since he spent any meaningful time with the child that the child told a caseworker that he and his father “don’t know each other.” The paternal grandmother with whom the child is placed opined that the child does not know the father well and no longer has an attachment to the father. In an email sent to the guardian ad litem and addressing the court, the eleven-year-old child expressed his desire to stay with his placement—his paternal grandparents—“because [he is] loved and [he] get[s] fed every day” while in their care. He assured the court that he is happy living with his grandparents and does not want “to go with [his] dad,” describing him as “worse” than his mother. We conclude that termination of the father’s rights is in the child’s best interests. Finally, the father makes a request for additional time to work toward reunification. This is a permissible option if termination is denied. See id. § 232.117(5) (permitting the court to enter a permanency order under section 232.104 if it decides not to terminate rights); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b) (providing a permanency option of giving a parent an additional six months to work toward reunification). But to exercise this option, the court must be able to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b). Given that the father has yet to participate in services or complete a drug test and has almost no relationship with the child, we conclude that 6 reunification would be unlikely if the father received an additional six months to work toward reunification. First, we have no reason to believe the father will now start doing what he declined to do for nearly a year and a half. Second, even if the father were to begin to participate in services, he would not be able to make enough progress to allow for reunification within such a short period of time. There is simply too much left to be done. And we will not force the child to wait for permanency any longer. We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS 7