Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1170 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of A.L., Minor Child, A.L., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, The Honorable Shawna L. Ditsworth, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Pamela Wingert of Wingert Law Office, Spirit Lake, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Debra De Jong, Orange City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Langholz, J. 1 LANGHOLZ, Judge. A mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two-year-old daughter.1 She argues that termination is not in the daughter’s best interest and that the parent-child-bond exception under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) (2026) should apply to preclude termination. But on our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that the record shows that the mother’s “methamphetamine use is ongoing and remains a barrier to being a safe parent” to the daughter. And we cannot find that the disadvantage of termination overcomes the mother’s inability to provide for her young daughter’s developing needs. So despite the bond between the mother and the daughter, the daughter’s best interest is served by terminating the mother’s parental rights, and it is not appropriate to apply a permissive exception to preclude termination. We thus affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights. I. Background Facts and Proceedings In November 2024, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) received a report that the mother “was driving while intoxicated” with her then-one-year-old daughter “sitting on her lap in the driver’s seat.” The mother tested positive for methamphetamine about two months later “after using in a Walmart bathroom” while she was at the store with the daughter. The mother then entered a twenty-eight-day inpatient substance-use treatment program, which she successfully completed. But a few months later, HHS “got a call stating that [the mother] had relapsed again 1 The juvenile court also terminated the father’s parental rights. He does not appeal. We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion— unlike the juvenile court’s orders—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2026), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110; see also Iowa Ct. R. 21.25. 2 . . . outside her home in a vehicle with a friend while [the daughter] was in the home.” Based on these facts, the State petitioned for the daughter to be adjudicated as a child in need of assistance in April 2025. Later that month, the juvenile court ordered that the daughter be temporarily removed from the mother’s custody after HHS reported that the mother drank at a bar while caring for the daughter and again tested positive for methamphetamine. HHS placed the daughter in foster care, where she has remained with the same foster family throughout this case. The court adjudicated the daughter as a child in need of assistance in May 2025. Over the next several months, the mother attended inpatient and outpatient substance-use and mental-health treatment and participated in drug court. She also engaged in supervised visits with the daughter. But she admittedly “struggle[d] to remain clean” and “continued to use methamphetamines.” Then, in January 2026, the mother successfully completed another inpatient substance-use treatment program. The next month, she achieved forty-five days of sobriety and progressed to semi- supervised visits with the daughter. Based on her progress, the juvenile court granted a six-month extension for the mother to continue working toward reunification after the permanency hearing in March. Unfortunately, the mother’s progress was short-lived. Around the time of the permanency hearing, she relapsed again. Her visits with the daughter “moved back to fully supervised due to [her] recent meth use.” And in April, the State petitioned to terminate her parental rights. The mother entered another inpatient substance-use treatment program later that month, which she successfully completed. But three days after her discharge, she again used methamphetamine. 3 The juvenile court held a combined permanency-review and termination hearing in June 2026—fourteen months after the daughter’s removal from the mother’s custody. During the hearing, the court heard testimony from the mother’s drug-court probation officer, the HHS worker, a family-centered-services worker, and the mother. The probation officer testified that the mother admitted to last using methamphetamine the day before the hearing. And the HHS worker testified that the daughter could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the hearing due to the mother’s “drug use” and “inability to stay and remain sober.” The HHS worker believed that the mother and the daughter “have a good bond” but did not “believe that [the daughter] would be irrevocably harmed by termination.” The HHS worker also testified that the daughter was “doing very well” in her foster family’s home and had “a strong safe bond” with the foster parents. The family-centered-services worker testified that the mother made the daughter meals and had activities planned for her during visits. She also recalled “there were times that [the daughter] . . . would cry” and not want to leave the mother at the end of her visits. The mother testified that her bond with the daughter “keeps getting better as [the daughter] gets older.” She explained the daughter showed affection for her “more and more” during visits through “things like hugs and cuddles.” The mother also acknowledged that she had “been using for decades,” that she “struggled” to remain sober, and that she “got high” the day before the hearing because she was “stressed out.” But she insisted that she was “not giving up” on her recovery and that she “want[ed] to be a good mom.” Ultimately, the mother asked “for additional time to achieve reunification”—emphasizing the “new supports that [she had] found for herself” and her “growing bond with her daughter that is not easily severed.” 4 After the hearing, the juvenile court denied the mother’s request for more time and terminated her parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) and (l)—concluding that the State proved the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, termination is in the daughter’s best interest, and no permissive exceptions to termination should apply. The mother now appeals. II. The Daughter’s Best Interest Terminating parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a three-step process. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). First, the State must prove a statutory ground for termination. Id. Second, the State must show that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. And third, the parent bears the burden to show whether a permissive exception applies that should preclude termination. Id.; see also In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). We need not address any step not challenged by a parent. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). We review a termination decision de novo, giving “respectful consideration” to the juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when based on credibility determinations. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). The mother does not challenge the statutory grounds. Instead, she first argues that termination is not in the daughter’s best interest. The child’s best interest is the “paramount concern in a termination proceeding.” L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313. We consider both the child’s long-range and immediate best interests. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). And we must “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); see also In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016). 5 The mother contends that the “juvenile court erred in failing to recognize that [she] had demonstrated an ability to live a sober life” and in failing “to give appropriate consideration to the close bond between [the] mother and daughter.” But on our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that the record shows the mother’s “methamphetamine use is ongoing and remains a barrier to being a safe parent” to the daughter—despite the mother’s participation in substance-use treatment and recovery services for more than a year since the daughter’s removal from her custody. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012) (“We have long recognized that an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug addiction can render a parent unfit to raise children.”); see also In re C.M., No. 18-0600, 2018 WL 3650355, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2018) (finding that a parent’s “failure to attain long- lasting sobriety has a direct, negative impact on [the parent’s] ability to provide for [the] child’s long-term growth and physical, mental, and emotional well-being”). And while “the parent-child bond is a relevant consideration in the best-interests analysis,” In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 535 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc), the “defining elements in a child’s best interests” are the “child’s safety” and “need for a permanent home.” In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (cleaned up). We thus agree with the juvenile court that despite the bond between the mother and the daughter, the daughter’s best interest is served by terminating the mother’s parental rights so that the daughter can achieve permanency in a stable home with safe and sober caregivers. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” (cleaned up)). 6 III. Parent-Child-Bond Exception The mother also argues that the permissive exception under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) should apply to preclude termination.2 The court may decline to terminate parental rights under that exception if it finds “clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). While such a finding permits a court “not to terminate parental rights, the factors weighing against termination in section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory.” M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 225 (cleaned up). A court has “discretion, based on the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this section to save the parent-child relationship.” Id. (cleaned up). The mother contends that the “evidence clearly and convincingly showed that [she] loves [the daughter] and shares a bond with her.” But a parent’s love for a child alone is not enough to establish the exception under section 232.116(3)(c). See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010). Neither is the mere existence of a bond between the parent and the child. See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021); see also W.M., 957 N.W.2d 2 The State contests error preservation on this issue, pointing out that while “the mother testified that she has a bond with her child” and the “mother’s attorney also referenced the parent-child bond in closing,” that “reference was in connection to a request for additional time, rather than to urge the juvenile court to apply a permissive exception to termination.” Cf. In re J.R., 20 N.W.3d 839, 843 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc) (holding that the permissive-exception issue was unpreserved where the parent “neither addressed these statutory exceptions nor offered evidence to support them” at the termination hearing). But the juvenile court specifically decided this issue in its order after the mother presented evidence and argued that they had a strong bond. So we assume, without deciding, that the issue is preserved and reach the merits. See In re A.B., No. 24-1979, 2025 WL 1324338, at *4 n.6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 7, 2025). 7 at 315–16. Instead, “our consideration must center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the parent’s] inability to provide for [the child’s] developing needs.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709. On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that the mother did not meet her burden to establish the parent-child-bond exception to termination under section 232.116(3)(c). At the time of the termination hearing, the daughter had spent nearly half her life removed from the mother’s custody. She “appeared to thrive in her foster placement,” where she has remained with the same caregivers since April 2025. And her foster parents are a potential adoptive placement for her. Meanwhile, the mother never progressed past supervised visits with the daughter, and her continued methamphetamine use prevented the daughter’s safe return to her custody. So, while we do not doubt that the mother loves the daughter and shares a bond with her, we cannot find that the disadvantage of termination overcomes the mother’s inability to provide for her young daughter’s developing needs. See id. We thus affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. AFFIRMED. 8