In the Interest of E.B., N.B., A.P., J.P., M.L., B.T. and K.L., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1086 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of E.B., N.B., A.P., J.P., M.L., B.T. and K.L., Minor Children, J.B., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, The Honorable Hunter W. Thorpe, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Ling Harl of Harl Law PLLC, Ankeny, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. James Thornton of Thornton & Coy, PLLC, Ankeny, attorney for minor child K.L. Patrick Peters of Patrick Peters Law LLC, Clive, attorney for minor child B.T. Nancy Pietz of Pietz Law Office, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor children K.L. and B.T., attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children E.B., N.B., A.P., J.P., and M.L. 1  _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Tabor, C.J. 2 TABOR, Chief Judge. A mother appeals the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to seven children. The mother raises two arguments. She claims the juvenile court erred in not granting her six more months to reunify. And she argues termination is not in the children’s best interests under Iowa Code section 232.116(2) (2026). Under that best-interests heading, she also suggests that we should apply permissive exceptions to termination under section 232.116(3). We affirm because the mother waived the argument for a six-month extension, termination serves the best interests of the children, and no exception overcomes the children’s need for safety and stability.1 I. Facts and Prior Proceedings This case involves a mother and her seven children: K.L. born in 2012, B.T. born in 2014, M.L. born in 2016, A.P. and J.P. born in 2018, N.B. born in 2020, and E.B. born in 2023. The family started receiving services in 2023 because of domestic violence in the home. An assessment by the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services confirmed that three of the children witnessed their mother’s paramour, Jason, strangle her during the summer of 2023. In December 2023, the State filed a petition alleging the children were in need of assistance (CINA). After the CINA petition was filed, police tried to arrest Jason at his home where he was supervising the children. Jason tried to evade arrest, and the children were exposed to pepper spray. 1 We review termination of parental rights de novo. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). In our review, we give weight to but are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual determinations. Id. 3  In March 2024, the parents stipulated that the children were in need of assistance under Iowa Code section 232.96A(3)(b). But before the court could hold a dispositional hearing, police executed a search warrant at Jason’s house, finding illegal substances. The children all lived in that house, and the department was concerned about the accessibility of the drugs and paraphernalia. So in April, the court approved removal of the children. Throughout the rest of 2024, the mother struggled with illegal substance use and her mental health. The department also had safety concerns about her ongoing ties to Jason.2 Yet despite its unease about “the on and off nature” of the mother’s relationship with Jason, the court approved the department’s recommendation for “an additional six months to work towards reunification.” The court returned the children to her custody in July 2025 with a warning that ongoing contact with Jason would be grounds for another removal. After the mother tested positive for cocaine in August 2025, the court granted the State’s request to remove the children for a second time. The children had been in her custody for fewer than forty days. In the time between this removal and the next permanency review hearing, the court noted that the mother “was again found with Jason in violation of the [no contact order] but this time at a casino.” The mother also “smoked marijuana and was charged with driving while barred during this incident.” Still, in November 2025, the court granted another six months for the mother to work toward reunification. 2 The mother frequently denied maintaining a relationship with Jason. But the facts contradicted her denials. Despite no contact orders and warnings from the court, the mother continued to have documented contact with him. 4  In January 2026, the court again returned the children to their mother’s custody. This return lasted only thirty-five days. The third removal was followed the execution of a search warrant at the mother’s home that found a significant amount of marijuana and psilocibin mushrooms. During the execution of the search warrant, Jason was present at the home, sleeping in the mother’s bed. Following this removal, the court directed the State to petition for termination of parental rights. After a hearing in May 2026, the court ordered the mother’s parental rights terminated. The mother appeals.3 II. Analysis The mother raises two arguments: (1) the juvenile court erred in not granting her another six-month extension, and (2) the court erred in terminating her parental rights because termination is not in the children’s best interests and exceptions to termination applied. A. Six-Month Delay in Permanency The State argues the mother waived the first issue because she “fail[ed] to provide any legal authority to support her position or argument.” We agree that the lack of supporting authority waives this argument. See In re E.S., No. 25-0887, 2025 WL 2408122, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2025); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996). But even if she had not waived the issue, the juvenile court did not err denying another six-month delay in permanency. 3 The j uvenile c ourt a lso t erminated t he p arental r ights o f K.L.’s father, Christopher, and any unknown and putative fathers of the other children. No father appeals. The mother argues in her petition on appeal that the court should not have terminated the fathers’ rights. But we do not address her argument on their behalf. 5  An order under section 232.102 to continue placement of the children requires the court to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). Like the juvenile court, we cannot find that the need for the children’s removal will disappear at the end of another six-month extension. The mother has already been granted two six-month extensions. Her actions demonstrate that a third extension will not produce different results. The mother claims that she has “made noticeable progress throughout the case” regarding her relationship with Jason, including “[s]tarting [Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR)] therapy [as] her newest attempt to address her mental health issues and build healthy boundaries and relationships.”4 We view the mother’s claim that progress has been “noticeable” with skepticism and find the State’s framing of the situation as a “pattern of progress and regression” to be more accurate. The mother has not shown that her ability to create and enforce boundaries with Jason has meaningfully improved. As the State observes, “the mother continues to make the same decisions that jeopardize her children’s safety, wellbeing, and stability.” Because of that, and because the mother was twice given more time with no meaningful change, we find that the juvenile court wisely denied a third delay in permanency. 4 The mother began EMDR therapy in April 2026, but by the time of the termination hearing in May 2026 the mother had been released as a client because she repeatedly missed appointments without notice. 6  B. Best Interests The mother argues that the court erred because termination is not in the children’s best interests under section 232.116(2) and that exceptions to termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3) apply. When considering whether to terminate parental rights under section 232.116, courts must give primary consideration to the children’s safety, to the best placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth, and to their physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2). In determining best interests: [W]e look to the child[ren]’s long-range as well as immediate interests. This requires considering what the future holds for the child[ren] if returned to the parents. When making this decision, we look to the parents’ past performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future. J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 798. The mother’s past performance does not instill confidence in what the future holds for these children. The mother has squandered several chances to improve the quality of care available to her children. We are left to believe that their long-range and immediate interests are best served by terminating her parental rights. The mother also contends that we should apply the exceptions under paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 232.116(3).5 For paragraph (b), she argues that “[a]t the time of the termination, all the children objected to the 5 Paragraph (b) applies when “[t]he child is over ten years of age and objects to the termination.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3). And paragraph (c) applies when “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Id. 7 termination of [her] parental rights.” But only B.T. and K.L. were older than ten, so the exception under section 232.116(3)(b) would only apply to them. Eleven-year-old B.T. testified at the termination hearing about her desire to remain with her mother. We agree with the mother’s counsel that testifying in court required a lot of courage. But we reiterate that the exceptions under section 232.116(3) are “permissive, not mandatory.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014). We have recognized that when analyzing “the child-objection factor” of section 232.116(3)(b), it helps to borrow the framework used in custody disputes in divorce cases, where the “preferences of minor children while not controlling are relevant and cannot be ignored.” In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019) (citation omitted). When weighing a child’s custody preferences, the court considers: (1) their age and education level; (2) the strength of their preference; (3) their intellectual and emotional make-up; (4) their relationship with family members; (5) the reason for their decision; (6) the advisability of honoring the children’s desire; and (7) the court’s recognition it is not aware of all the factors influencing the children’s view. Id. We focus on the reason for B.T.’s decision and the advisability of her wishes. When asked why she opposed termination, B.T. simply said: “because we all love her.” We do not doubt that love, but we cannot sacrifice B.T.’s safety and wellbeing because of the children’s natural loyalty and affection for their mother. And B.T. recognized that she and her siblings could not safely live with their mother at the time of the termination hearing. Although K.L. did not testify at the termination hearing, a department case worker characterized K.L.’s preferences: “She said if [she] cannot be 8 with her mother or be returned to her mother, that she would be good with being at the [foster family’s home].” Again, we believe that her safety and wellbeing far outweigh her preference to return to her mother. The mother also argues that her “very close relationship” with the children and the fact that “the seven children are very bonded and protective of each other” should have satisfied the exception to termination under section 232.116(3)(c). But our supreme court has determined that “the existence of a bond is not enough.” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021). There needs to be “clear and convincing evidence that ‘termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.’” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c)). Such evidence does not exist here. The record shows that the children have all been doing well in their respective placements. They are receiving the care they need and have had glimpses of stability between the repeated removals. The mother has not shown that termination would harm the children. On the contrary, termination will provide the stability they need but have not been afforded through this process of repeated removals. We disagree with the mother that termination should have been avoided under paragraph (c). Because the permissive exceptions to termination do not apply and because termination serves the best interests of the children, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. AFFIRMED. 9