In the Interest of G.R., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1589 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of G.R., Minor Child, A.V., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Harrison County, The Honorable David W. Brooks, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Jennifer V. Mumm of the Office of the State Public Defender, Council Bluffs, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Keith R. Tucker of Woods Tucker, PLLC, Glenwood, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ. Opinion by Greer, J. 1 GREER, Judge. A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, who was born in 2020.1 She challenges the grounds for termination, the delivery of reasonable efforts, and the finding it was in the child’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. The mother also urges that we should apply an exception to termination because of the close bond the mother and the child have. After our de novo review, we find the State proved the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) (2026) and given the mother’s inability to conquer her substance-use issues, it was in the child’s best interests to terminate her rights. We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e), (f ), and (l). Because we can affirm on any ground supported by the evidence, we do so based upon section 232.116(1)(f ). See In re J.B.L., 844 N.W.2d 703, 704 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). To review the termination of parental rights, we follow a three-step analysis. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa 2021). First, we determine whether a ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) has been established. Id. Second, we consider whether the best interests of the child support termination, as laid out in section 232.116(2). Id. And finally, we look to see if any exceptions to termination in section 232.116(3) should 1 The father’s parental rights are not implicated in this appeal. 2 be applied. Id. Ultimately, “[t]he State must prove termination was proper by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 312. In February 2025, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was alerted that the parents of G.R. used methamphetamine in the presence of the child. HHS pursued the mother, but she refused to allow HHS access to the child and refused to submit to drug tests. Apparently, the mother had active warrants that were issued for her arrest, and finally in March she was arrested. When the deputies found the mother, they located drug paraphernalia and a white substance on a nightstand next to the child’s bed. The next day, the child’s hair was tested and was positive for methamphetamine. The child was placed with the maternal uncle. The father admitted using drugs and that the mother also used while the child was present. Allegations of denial of critical care, failure to provide proper supervision, and presence of dangerous substances were founded against the parents. Based on the details providing the basis for the founded abuse reports, the juvenile court adjudicated G.R. as a child in need of assistance (CINA) in April. It ordered that the care and custody of the child be placed with HHS. Specific to the mother, she was to participate in drug testing and undergo substance-use and mental-health evaluations. The child remained with the uncle except for about a one-month period at the end of July, when the child lived with the mother in an inpatient treatment facility (ITF) the mother had entered in June. While the mother could sustain progress for short periods of time, she could not remain sober. Although the mother was receiving substance-use and mental-health treatment and attending parenting classes at the end of August, she was unsuccessfully discharged from the ITF. It was noted that 3 the mother failed to accept feedback and broke several rules. The child was returned to the maternal uncle and the grandmother. At this point, the mother missed or refused drug tests and engaged in criminal behavior that included forgery and misdemeanor theft charges. In January 2026, the mother completed a substance-use-disorder evaluation. The substance-use-disorder assessment found that the mother suffered from a severe methamphetamine use disorder, moderate cannabis use disorder, and mild benzodiazepine use disorder, and that her prognosis was “poor.” A few months before the termination hearing in March, the mother placed the child in danger in a vehicle she drove while under the influence of methamphetamine. This resulted in a new HHS child abuse assessment with allegations of failure to provide proper supervision and use of dangerous substances. In April, the mother reported she would enter a treatment program, but she left shortly after and was incarcerated at the time of the July termination hearing. The mother blamed her lack of progress on transportation issues, her criminal warrants, and a claim that her Family Access Center (FAC) worker used methamphetamine with her. But at the April permanency hearing, it was noted that the mother had not maintained regular contact with her HHS social worker, was not participating in regular visits with the child, had regressed and was not drug testing, and was still using methamphetamine even though the FAC worker had been removed from her case. The juvenile court terminated her parental rights in July and the mother appeals from that ruling. II. Standard of Review. We review termination of parental rights cases de novo. In re L.P., 32 N.W.3d 804, 812 (Iowa 2026). “As always, our fundamental concern is the child’s best interests.” Id. (citation omitted). 4  III. Analysis. A. Grounds for Termination. Under section 232.116.(1)(f ), the State must prove that all of the following have occurred: (1) The child is four years of age or older. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102. “At the present time” means at the time of termination hearing. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). The mother disputes that she was unable to regain custody of the child, but she does not assert she could have at the time of the termination hearing. Instead, she argues that with more time, had an extension been granted, she would have been able to regain custody. We do not find that the mother asked for more time before the juvenile court, and even if she had, the facts would not have supported an extension of time to reunite with the child. Likewise, at the time of the termination hearing, the mother was incarcerated and so, physically, could not have taken custody of the child. On top of that, there were still the unresolved substance use struggles that the mother had faced throughout the course of these proceedings. So, the State proved the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. 5  B. Reasonable Efforts. On appeal, the mother presents a unique reasonable efforts challenge. Her challenge was not framed as a reasonable efforts concern until this appeal, however. In April 2026, the mother alleged that she had been using methamphetamine with her FAC worker who had been supervising her visits with the child. Once HHS learned of the allegations, they contacted the agency and required the worker to be removed from the case. The HHS social worker testified that it is possible that the FAC worker did use drugs with the mother, but she did not believe that possibility caused the mother to relapse. According to the mother, she first used methamphetamine with the FAC worker in December 2025, but that did not explain the mother’s failure to complete her treatment in June 2025. The mother did not disclose her usage with the FAC worker to HHS until April. And as the State argued at the termination hearing: If we assume the truth that she used with [the FAC worker], versus [the FAC worker] just asked her to hook her up with the dealer, that may explain some difficulties between December [2025] and April [2026]. It doesn’t explain why [the mother] failed to cooperate with the services being provided through Family Access Center between March 2025 and June 10th of 2025. It doesn’t explain why [the mother] felt compelled to not complete programming at Iowa Family Works, and in particular, the Court can go back and look at the exhibits in the CINA action and, in particular, the exhibits as they reflect her discharge reasons for Iowa Family Works, and it has to do with the fact that she doesn’t like being told what to do. The juvenile court summarized the reasonable efforts undertaken to help with reunification in the termination order and its view on the use of drugs with the FAC worker as follows: Throughout the CINA case, HHS offered [the mother] numerous services to support reunification, including substance use disorder evaluations, inpatient and outpatient substance-use treatment, drug 6  testing, therapy, visitation, and financial assistance for programs designed to help her achieve stability. While [the mother] used some services and showed brief periods of progress, she ultimately did not take advantage of the services to overcome the issues that led to adjudication. In conducting a qualitative analysis, the Court has weighed [the mother’s] testimony that [the FAC] provider encouraged her methamphetamine use and that they used together. Even if true, [the mother’s] claim does not explain her methamphetamine use before and after [the FAC provider’s] conduct. Reasonable efforts are services to “preserve and unify a family prior to the out-of-home placement of a child in foster care or to eliminate the need for removal of the child or make it possible for the child to safely return to the family’s home.” Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a); see In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 528–29 (Iowa 2019). We do not find that the mother’s choice to allegedly engage in methamphetamine use with her FAC worker is a failure of HHS to provide reasonable services towards reunification. “The State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). If these allegations are true, we find it alarming, but the mother’s better choice would have been to immediately report the FAC worker and continue engaging in the services offered. And the mother also had the obligation to request other services during the course of the proceedings and not wait until the termination hearing to address any deficiencies in services. See In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). Because appropriate services were offered to the mother, although we understand the mother was vulnerable, her issue is not one of reasonable efforts but of choices made. C. Best Interests of the Child. We next consider if it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the mother’s parental rights. We start with 7 the considerations found in section 232.116(2), which provides that we “shall give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” When considering the child’s long-term and immediate interests, we must “consider[] what the future holds for the child if returned to the parents.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). “When making this decision, we look to the parents’ past performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.” Id. (citation omitted). Our primary concern in termination proceedings has always been the best interests of the child. L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 529. We find termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child for several reasons. First, the mother’s illegal drug use places the child in dangerous situations, and the mother has shown no progress on that front. Second, the child needs stability and has been out of the mother’s custody and care for over fourteen months where the mother has been in and out of engagement with the child. The child is doing well with her uncle and grandmother. The mother’s struggles with illegal substances stand in the way of a safe and stable environment for the child. As the mother progressed through this case, she regressed in her efforts to stay connected with the child and stay sober. As another factor, the criminal conduct of the mother also inhibits her ability to safely parent. For all of these reasons, termination is in the child’s best interests. D. Permissive Exception. After we establish that termination is appropriate, the last step of our analysis is to determine whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude the termination. In re A.S., 8 906 N.W.2d 467, 475 (Iowa 2018). The parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an exception to termination. Id. at 476. So, the mother had to show, by clear and convincing evidence, “that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). And the focus of this exception “must center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709. The mother contends that the closeness of her relationship with the child should support a permissive exception to the termination of her parental rights. By all accounts, the mother and child have a good relationship, but whether reasons exist that termination should not be granted because of that bond is another question. Here, we must answer it in the negative because the concerns over safety outweigh the benefits of the bond. IV. Conclusion. On our de novo review and for the reasons detailed in this opinion, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. AFFIRMED. 9