Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1214 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of N.B., Minor Child, M.S., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Rachael E. Seymour, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Cole J. Mayer of Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Nicole Garbis Nolan of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Buller, J. 1 BULLER, Judge. A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to a child born in 2019. She challenges the statutory grounds for termination, the denial of additional time or a guardianship, and best interests, and she asserts her bond with the child should preclude termination. We affirm. Background Facts and Proceedings. The child has been involved with the juvenile court system for the majority of her life. She tested positive for morphine at birth. After a previous child-welfare case resolved in 2023, the child came back to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 2024 after police conducted a drug raid of the mother’s home. Police discovered various marijuana products, all accessible to the child. The child was removed and placed with the paternal grandmother. After removal, the child tested positive for THC and was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA). In fall 2025, an uncontested permanency hearing resulted in a six- month extension for reunification based on the mother’s progress. Following the permanency hearing, during an unsupervised visit with the child, the mother invited over a man with an extensive criminal history. The man became domestically violent with a third party in front of the child. The mother attempted to lie about the incident until she was confronted with conflicting reports from the child. This behavior was especially concerning because the mother had influenced the child to lie and keep secrets for the mother’s benefit in the past. Before the permanency hearing, the mother had provided clean drug screens. But in the six months leading up to the termination trial, the mother failed to return drug patches and—according to text messages provided to HHS—was attempting to buy Xanax on the street. The mother intentionally 2 did not attend the termination trial. At trial, the social services worker was concerned that being around drugs and domestic violence was a “cycle” for the mother, and that she had been in that cycle for years. The worker also said the mother “prioritiz[ed] her needs over [the child’s] safety.” Consistent with recommendations from HHS, the county attorney, and the child’s guardian ad litem, the court terminated the mother’s rights to the child under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) and (l) (2026). The mother appeals, and we review de novo. See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). Statutory Elements. The mother challenges both statutory grounds for termination. When a juvenile court terminates a parent’s rights on multiple grounds, we need only find one statutory ground supported by clear and convincing evidence to affirm. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We elect to review under section 232.116(1)(f ). The mother challenges only the fourth element, whether the child could have been safely returned to her at the time of trial. See In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Iowa 2021) (interpreting statutory language “at the present time” as “at the time of” the termination trial). At the outset, we recognize our record is limited in part by the mother’s failure to attend the termination trial. As we have said before, “[I]t is typically a tough road at trial and on appeal for any parent who does not testify regarding their progress toward reunification.” In re L.F., No. 24-1141, 2024 WL 4620507, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024). That observation holds true here. In her petition on appeal, the mother points to her limited progress participating in services. But the child has been involved with HHS and the 3 juvenile court for most of her life—the mother has had years of services to make the necessary progress. The child had been removed for more than a year at the time of the current termination trial. The child is young, and her current familial placement offers the permanency and support she needs. We also recognize the failure to progress to unsupervised visits is an important consideration in determining whether a parent will be able to safely resume custody. See, e.g., In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 533 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). Although the mother progressed to unsupervised visits in this case, a month later she exposed the child to a man with a criminal record who became domestically violent in front of the child. The mother had also slipped back into substance abuse during the last few months preceding trial. The juvenile court properly determined the mother could not safely resume custody. Additional Time. The mother asserts she should have been granted additional time to resume custody of the child pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b). “[T]he juvenile court may deny termination and give the parent an additional six months for reunification only if the need for removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.’” W.T., 967 N.W.2d at 323 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). The parent bears the burden to make that showing. Id. Before reaching the merits, we question whether the mother preserved error. At the termination trial, her attorney said her “main request” was for a guardianship and briefly mentioned the previous six-month extension. But she never requested a new extension. This likely leaves us no ruling to review. But assuming without deciding we can reach the issue, we do not think this record warrants additional time. The mother argues she has been making continued progress. But the court had already granted her a six-month 4 extension before the termination trial. And in those six months, it became less likely she would be able to resume custody based on her ongoing substance abuse and poor decision making, negatively impacting the child. Guardianship. Alternatively, the mother argues the juvenile court should have ordered a guardianship. Our case law recognizes that “a guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2018) (quoting In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017)). A guardianship requires continued court involvement and provides less stability for the child. See id. at 477–78. In N.B.’s case, the HHS worker recommended against a guardianship because she thought it would be “distressing” for the child to worry about whether she would remain with her paternal grandmother in the future. We conclude that a guardianship was not warranted for largely the same reasons that weighed against additional time. Best Interests. The mother argues that termination is not in the child’s best interests. In our analysis, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The juvenile court said it well: [T]he safety concerns that led to removal continue to exist today. . . . Mother has been involved with [HHS] since [the child’s] birth and continues to make decisions that place both herself and this child in danger. Mother’s lack of meaningful response to services shows an inability or unwillingness to make necessary changes to have the child placed in her care. . . . It is not in this child’s best interest to continue to suspend the crucial days of childhood while the parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems. 5 We agree with all those observations and the conclusion. Permissive Bond Exception. The mother urges that the juvenile court should have applied the permissive bond exception found in Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) to thwart termination. A parent resisting termination has the burden to prove this permissive exception by clear and convincing evidence, and our case law recognizes that—without more—neither a parent’s love nor the mere existence of a bond is enough to prevent termination. In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169–70 (Iowa 2021) (requiring clear and convincing evidence severing the bond would be detrimental to the child). We find the mother failed to carry her burden on this record, especially considering her lack of participation in the termination trial. There is little to no evidence in this record of the bond between the mother and child or any potential detriment termination might cause. AFFIRMED. 6