Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0842 Filed September 2, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of L.M., B.S., and P.H., Minor Children, D.D., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, The Honorable Adam D. Sauer, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Matthew B. De Jong, Rochester, Minnesota, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Carrie J. Rodriguez, Garner, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children. Sabrina M. Dow, Mason City, attorney for minor children. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Tabor, C.J. 1 TABOR, Chief Judge. A mother, Destiny, appeals the orders terminating her parental rights to three children: P.H., born in 2012, L.M., born in 2016, and B.S., born in 2021. She contends the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interests. She maintains that she has made progress and “deserve[s] an additional six months to work towards reunification.” Because the record contains ample evidence that securing safe and permanent homes for these children—without further delay—will serve their best interests, we affirm the termination order.1 We review child welfare cases de novo. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). We are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, but we give them respectful consideration, especially when assessing witness credibility. Id. Because Destiny only challenges the best-interests determination, we likewise limit our review.2 See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (recognizing that while we typically analyze terminations in three steps, we only review those steps challenged by the parent). When making a best-interests determination, our top concern is the children’s safety. Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We also consider the best placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth and the children’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. Id. We have 1 We do not address Destiny’s passing request to place the children in guardianships because the juvenile court did not rule on that issue. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 533 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc) (finding a parent failed to preserve error on her guardianship request when the juvenile court did not rule on it). 2 The juvenile court terminated Destiny’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (e) and (f ) (2026). 2 also confirmed that “the parent-child bond is a relevant consideration in the best-interests analysis.” L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 535. Some factual background helps frame this best-interests question. Destiny’s persistent substance use is the main reason for the children’s removal. The family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services in December 2024 when one of the children tested positive for methamphetamine. The department implemented a safety plan with services for Destiny. But she continued to struggle with addiction. And the department removed the children in April 2025 after Destiny “packed the children up and left” to avoid scheduled inpatient treatment. Destiny has not participated in drug testing since then.3 And her visits with the children have been inconsistent. In fact, months went by without contact. On the positive side, when Destiny did have visits with the children, they went well. The service provider described their interactions: “[S]he’s very playful with them. She laughs with them, and they have . . . fun together.” But the department caseworker worried that Destiny “appeared to be more of a friend than a parent.” In the worker’s view, the danger to the children posed by Destiny’s addiction outweighed the benefit of the bond. And the children were also bonded to their current caregivers. At the time of the termination hearing, fourteen-year-old P.H. and four-year-old B.S. were in their grandmother’s care, while nine-year-old L.M. was placed with his father. The department reported that the grandmother was working 3 Destiny testified that she did not have a driver’s license, so transportation was a barrier to obtaining services. The service provider explained that the department offered her transportation to drug testing and other services, but Destiny’s requests were “always last minute to where it wasn’t feasible.” 3 hard to “build structure and routine and consistency,” which benefitted the children. Likewise, L.M. was comfortable in his father’s care. In her petition on appeal, Destiny emphasizes that she tried substance- use treatment twice in 2025. She completed a new evaluation the day before the termination hearing. 4 Counting that last-minute effort as progress, Destiny seeks six more months to reunify with P.H., L.M., and B.S. The juvenile code allows courts to postpone permanency for six months if the need for the children’s removal will no longer exist after that postponement. Iowa Code §§ 232.117(5), 232.104(2)(b). But to implement that option, we must be able to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes” that support our determination. Id. § 232.104(2)(b). We cannot find those supporting factors here. At her new substance-use evaluation, Destiny admitted to using methamphetamine less than a month before the termination hearing. And her other attempts at treatment ended swiftly. Still, we commend Destiny for securing a substance-use evaluation. But that new effort came far too late in the case to warrant an extension of time or prevent termination of her parental rights. See L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 536. She has not shown her ability to maintain sobriety so that she can provide a safe environment for the children. Termination of her parental rights will allow them to find stable, permanent placements. We thus affirm the termination orders. AFFIRMED. 4 Destiny, who was thirty-three years old, told the evaluator that she first used methamphetamine when she was seventeen. According to her self-report, she had ten years of sobriety before starting to use again at age twenty-eight. 4