In the Interest of B.B., Minor Child
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-1292
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-1292
Filed November 18, 2026
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In the Interest of B.B., Minor Child,
S.B., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County,
The Honorable Linnea M.N. Nicol, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Luke C. Jenson of Jenson Law Firm, PLC, Waterloo, attorney for appellant
father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.
Sarah Dooley Rothman of Rothman Law Office, Albion, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his three-year-
old son, arguing that termination is not in the son’s best interest.1 On our de
novo review, we agree with the juvenile court. Given the father’s conviction
for endangering the son, the lack of bond, and the son’s success in his family
placement, the son’s best interest is served by termination. We thus affirm
the juvenile court’s termination of the father’s parental rights.
I.
At the son’s birth in September 2022, he and his mother both tested
positive for methamphetamine. The Iowa Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) began engaging with the family. But after a series of
negative substance tests, HHS closed the case as a successful intervention.
The parents’ relationship eventually faltered. And a dispute in 2024
led to a physical altercation between the parents in a parking lot that ended
with the father driving away in his van while the son sat on his lap and the
mother tried to reach into the van to get the son back before she fell and was
injured. As a result, the father pleaded guilty to misdemeanor child
endangerment in February 2025. See Iowa Code § 726.6 (2024). And a
criminal no-contact order prohibited further contact between father and son.
HHS also reengaged with the family. The mother again tested positive
for methamphetamine. So in March 2025, the son was adjudicated a child in
1
We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—
unlike the juvenile court’s orders—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2025),
with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110; see also Iowa Ct. R. 21.25.
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need of assistance and removed from the home. Now in the care of his
maternal grandmother, he was “thriving” as a “happy and resilient child.”
The parents’ lives then took very different arcs. The mother did not
avail herself of the services offered by HHS and struggled to stay sober,
demonstrating an “overall lack of progress.” But the father made strides. He
became and stayed sober after an early, brief relapse. He consistently
participated in the services offered to him and actively cooperated with HHS.
In short, he did “everything that he’s been requested to do.”
In May 2025, the criminal no-contact order was modified so the father
could interact with the son at the discretion of HHS. The two had one
supervised interaction to assess their relationship in August, which was
tentative, and the son then had outbursts that some attributed to the father’s
presence. The juvenile court and HHS did not permit further contact, citing
the son’s safety. And HHS was unable to find a therapist to oversee
supervised interactions. As a result, the father did not rekindle a bond with
the son.
The State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents in
November. The guardian ad litem also supported terminating the father’s
parental rights, stressing that the clock had run but acknowledging the
father’s efforts: “I do feel bad for [the father] because I think since the
removal he has tried.” After a March 2026 termination hearing, the juvenile
court terminated the father’s parental rights under paragraphs “d,” “h,” and
“i” of Iowa Code section 232.116(1).2 In considering the son’s best interest,
the court reasoned that he “needs permanency now,” the father “has no
relationship with” him, and the maternal grandmother would provide “[t]he
2
The mother’s parental rights were also terminated. But she does not appeal.
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best place to further the long-term nurturing and growth . . . because she is
the only parent he has known who met his basic needs for food, clothing,
shelter, and attention” and has been his “safe shelter in the storm of his
parents[’] substance use and domestic violence.” The father now appeals.
II.
Terminating parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 takes three
steps. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). First, the State must prove
a statutory ground for termination. See id. Second, the State must prove
termination is in the best interest of the child. See id. And third, the parent
has the burden to show that a discretionary exception applies and precludes
termination. See id.; In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). We need
not address any steps not challenged by a parent. See In re P.L.,
778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). And we review a termination decision de
novo, giving “respectful consideration” to the juvenile court’s factual
findings, particularly those based on credibility determinations. In re W.M.,
957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021).
Here the father challenges only the second step—whether termination
is in the best interest of the son. 3 The best interest of the child is the
“paramount concern in a termination proceeding.” L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313.
We consider both the long-range and immediate interests of the son. See In re
C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). And we must “give primary
3
The father’s petition on appeal identifies only this single “legal issue[] presented
for appeal.” In his argument, he mentions that he “was never given a chance to progress
with supervised visitation.” But he does not identify a lack of reasonable efforts or a failure
to prove the statutory grounds as legal issues for our review or flesh out such issues with
any argument or authority. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 534 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025)
(en banc). So we confine our review to the single issue that he raises.
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consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the
long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); see also
In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016). And a parent only has a limited
time to dispel the concerns about their stability and suitability. See P.L.,
778 N.W.2d at 41.
The father and son do not share a bond, and permitting more time to
rebuild one would be a gamble. To be sure, the father has genuinely
cooperated, improved, and “done everything that he’s been requested to do.”
And the father has not been able to develop a relationship with the son or
prove any parenting skills. But the juvenile court found interaction would
harm the son. HHS’s restrictions on interaction stem from the father’s
conviction for endangering the son—a concern for safety created by the
father’s own actions. And there is evidence that interaction with the father
retraumatized the son. The father also acknowledges that he has not yet
rebuilt an emotional bond with his son. And the son is “thriving with his
current placement” in the care of his grandmother, whom he is bonded to.
“[W]e cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a
ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a
parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.M.,
843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (cleaned up). So on de novo review, we
agree with the juvenile court that termination is in best interest of the son.
We thus affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the father’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
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