In the Interest of C.S. and J.S., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1443 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of C.S. and J.S., Minor Children, J.S., Father, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, The Honorable Christine Dalton, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Steven W. Stickle of Stickle Law Firm, P.L.C., Davenport, attorney for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Christine Frederick, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Badding, J. 1 BADDING, Judge. A father serving a fifteen-year prison sentence appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two young sons.1 The earliest he can be paroled is spring 2028. For this reason and others, the juvenile court found grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f ), and (h) (2026). The father does not challenge those findings. But he contends the court was wrong to conclude that termination was in the boys’ best interests. Our review is de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). Even where statutory grounds for termination exist, “we must still determine whether termination is in the children’s best interests.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012). We give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Termination of parental rights “is an outcome of last resort.” In re B.F., 526 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). That said, “we cannot deprive a child of permanency . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted). The father contends the juvenile court’s best-interests determination overlooked his emotional bond with the boys. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 535 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc) (explaining that the parent-child bond is a “relevant consideration in the best-interests analysis”). He points to a March 2025 family-centered services report noting that he was “always prepared” to meet the boys’ needs during supervised visits and that they 1 The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of the boys’ mother. She does not appeal. 2 “show[ed] affection toward [him] by smiling, laughing, and playing.” But that was more than one year before the July 2026 termination hearing. In late April 2025, the father was arrested for operating while intoxicated after he led police on a motorcycle chase through Davenport. He has been incarcerated since then and has not had any contact with the children. Meanwhile, the boys have been living in a pre-adoptive foster home,2 where they have flourished developmentally. The older son has received extra support for his behavior through therapy and an individualized education plan. He has made friends, participated in T-ball, and learned to dress himself. The younger son—who was two at the time of termination— has shown strides in his speech abilities and toilet training. These milestones stand in stark relief against the life the children knew with their father, whose repeated domestic violence and other criminal conduct more than once threatened their safety. We do not question the father’s love for his sons. Nor have we failed to account for his pre-arrest efforts toward reunification. Sadly, the father’s poor decisions cost him the chance to continue those efforts. “The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). After more than two years of juvenile court involvement, these children are in urgent need of permanency. In this case, termination is the path toward that goal. We reject the father’s arguments that an extension of time or a guardianship could achieve the same result. See In re W.M., 957 2 The boys are placed in the same foster home as an infant brother, who is not involved in this appeal. 3 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Iowa 2021) (noting that “a guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination” (citation omitted)). The father also contends that the juvenile court should have applied a permissive exception to termination based on the strength of his emotional bond with the boys.3 See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). But at the time of the hearing, the father had not seen his sons for more than a year. The caseworker testified that both children had developed a new bond with their foster family, and a letter from the older child’s therapist advised against contact with the father. The burden was on the father to show that termination would be “detrimental” to the boys at the time of the hearing “due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Id.; In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 324 (Iowa 2021). He could not make that showing here. AFFIRMED. 3 Because the father never made this argument to the juvenile court, we could consider it waived. See In re J.R., 20 N.W.3d 839, 843 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). However, in the interest of completeness, we have considered the father’s permissive- exception claim on its merits. 4