In re the Marriage of Beardsley
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-0861
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0861
Filed November 18, 2026
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In re the Marriage of Andrew Beardsley and Charity Beardsley
Upon the Petition of
Andrew Beardsley,
Petitioner–Appellant,
And Concerning
Charity Beardsley,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County,
The Honorable Mark D. Fisher, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Alexander S. Momany of Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, attorney
for appellant.
Charity Beardsley, Homestead, self-represented appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.
1
LANGHOLZ, Judge.
Andrew Beardsley appeals the decree dissolving his nearly eighteen-
year marriage with Charity Beardsley. He challenges only the district court’s
award of eight years of gradually reducing rehabilitative spousal support to
Charity.1 On our de novo review, giving appropriate deference to the district
court’s judgment of the equities, we cannot say that the rehabilitative-
spousal-support award fails to do equity. We thus decline to disturb the award
and affirm the district court’s decree.
We review a district court’s spousal-support award de novo. In re
Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023). But we still defer to the
court’s “important, but often conjectural, judgment calls” in deciding an
equitable award and must not engage in “undue tinkering” on appeal. Id.
at 182–83 (cleaned up). So we will “disturb the district court’s determination
of spousal support only when there has been a failure to do equity.” Id. at 182
(cleaned up).
“Spousal support is not an absolute right; rather, its allowance is
determined based on the particular circumstances presented in each case”
and the statutory factors in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1) (2025). Id. at 185
(cleaned up). The district court awarded Charity rehabilitative spousal
support—one of the four forms of spousal support recognized by our
supreme court. See id. at 185–86. Rehabilitative spousal support seeks to
support “an economically dependent spouse through a limited period of
re-education or retraining following divorce, thereby creating incentive and
opportunity for that spouse to become self-supporting.” Id. at 185–86
1
Among other provisions, the decree also placed the parties’ two minor children
in their joint physical care (a main focus of the trial and the decree), ordered Andrew to
pay child support, and divided the marital property.
2
(cleaned up). Consistent with its goal of self-sufficiency, “the duration” of
rehabilitative spousal support “may be limited or extended depending on the
realistic needs of the economically dependent spouse, tempered by the goal
of facilitating the economic independence of the ex-spouses.” Id. at 186
(cleaned up). But absent “a showing that the recipient spouse seeks
reeducation, retraining, or some discrete period of time to increase earning
capacity to become self-supporting, rehabilitative spousal support is
inappropriate.” Id.
Andrew argues that Charity “failed to support her request for spousal
support” with sufficient evidence showing a need for rehabilitative spousal
support. He highlights that Charity—who represented herself at trial—did
not request a specific amount of support, had been employed for most of the
marriage, and failed to show she could not again be gainfully employed
without more education. And he argues that her lack of financial need can be
shown because she agreed that Andrew should receive an extra $10,000
above an even split of the proceeds of the sale of their marital home in the
property division. So he contends that no spousal support should be awarded
or, at most, we should modify the award to $1,500 in monthly transitional
spousal support for a year.
True, in the joint pretrial statement, Charity said only that she
“requests alimony and leaves it up to the Court to decide the amount.” And
again, when asked by the court at trial what she was requesting, she said
“Whatever the Court allows, sir. . . . I really don’t have any inkling.” But a
party need not request a specific dollar figure to be awarded support. Charity
requested support, and the court had the authority to determine an equitable
amount as she requested. Cf. In re Marriage of Clinton, 579 N.W.2d 835, 838
(Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting challenge to spousal-support award after trial
3
when the requesting party’s answer had only “asked for general equitable
relief” but the opposing party was notified in pretrial order that it would be
at issue at trial); Hopping v. Hopping, 10 N.W.2d 87, 89–93 (Iowa 1943)
(holding that district court could award spousal support in a default judgment
even when it was not specifically requested in the petition).
In considering Charity’s request for spousal support, the court found
that “while the parties are still relatively young and their marriage did not
last twenty or more years, Charity is in need of financial assistance to
rehabilitate herself.” The court reasoned:
Andrew and Charity were married for nearly 18 years. During those
18 years Charity held employment for long periods, but she has been
unemployed for approximately the last year. In addition, Charity suffers
from anxiety to the extent that she receives [Veterans Affairs (“VA”)]
disability. The Court was not provided with detailed income histories for
the parties, but at present Charity earns substantially less than Andrew. At
trial Charity expressed a desire to engage in further education and
reintroduce herself to the workforce. Andrew has the ability to pay spousal
support and Charity has a need. The Court finds that a monthly award of
$1,500 for four years, $1,000 for two years, and $500 for two years will
best serve the purpose of allowing Charity to obtain additional training and
become self-sufficient without destroying Andrew’s ability to enjoy a
similar lifestyle. Indeed, even when considering Andrew’s child support
obligation, he will still have substantially more income each month upon
which to pay his expenses.
The trial record backs up these findings.
As required for rehabilitative spousal support, Charity showed that she
seeks reeducation and training.2 See Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 186. She testified
2
Conversely, we see no basis for concluding that Charity had “short-term liquidity
needs associated with splitting one household into two” that could make transitional
spousal support appropriate as Andrew alternatively suggests. Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 187.
4
that “I will be starting school full-time to . . . better myself and get into a
better career, which is something that was withheld from me while we were
married due to me having the insurance and me paying all the bills.”3 She had
already taken “a couple [college] classes.” She explained her plans to make
that work with her childcare responsibilities—“Whenever they’re at school,
I’ll be at school because I do plan on going back right after all of this is said
and done”—and that she expected to receive VA housing benefits that she
would be eligible for if she went back to school. And while she had not yet
settled on the precise program—mentioning architecture and construction
as interest areas—she had plans to talk with her VA advisor. Andrew brushes
this testimony away as a “vague desire to seek additional education.” But the
district court implicitly credited it. And even on the cold transcript, her plans
read as longstanding and concrete—while understandably not yet final given
the uncertainty about her post-decree financial situation when she was
testifying.
So too does the record show that Charity needs the rehabilitative
spousal support to become independent again. At the time of trial, Andrew
earned about $110,000 a year—roughly seven times Charity’s $14,712.48, all
of which came from her VA disability benefits. To be sure, her testimony
supports Andrew’s contention that she had higher income in the past—
which helped him to continue to progress in his career while she deferred her
educational plans. But even her higher income was well below what Andrew
earns now. And it appears unlikely that Charity could currently find work that
would make her self-supporting—or finish her education and reach that
3
At another point in her testimony, she elaborated that “every time that I’ve
wanted to go back to college, I was unable to because [Andrew] was holding over my head
that I had the insurance and I was making more money than him, so I was never able to do
that.”
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point—without spousal support. The parties’ current income disparity—
along with Andrew’s financial affidavit showing disposable income after his
listed expenses of about $4,000 per month—also shows that it is not
inequitable to require Andrew to provide Charity some support. What’s
more, the parties’ lengthy marriage and Charity’s deferral of her educational
goals to support the marriage and Andrew’s advancing career weigh in favor
of the court’s award. See In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 543–44,
546 (Iowa 2022) (giving “weight to the factors supporting traditional”
spousal support—including the duration of the parties’ seventeen-year
marriage and the “economic consequences of their shared decision” about
the spouses’ roles—when crafting a seven-year rehabilitative-spousal-
support award).4
We recognize that the rehabilitative-spousal-support award is a real
financial obligation for Andrew. But at bottom, we cannot say the district
court’s award failed to do equity. And while another judge might well have
chosen somewhat different amounts or durations for the gradually decreasing
award, any appellate tinkering would be undue. Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 182. We
thus affirm the district court’s decree.
AFFIRMED.
4
Contrary to Andrew’s argument on appeal, Charity’s agreement that Andrew
should receive an extra $10,000 in the property division does not cut against a showing of
her financial need. It buttresses the need—and her credibility. She acknowledged that it
was fair to take that sum from her half of the proceeds of the house because he had to
cover mortgage and other house expenses from his funds after she lost her job. And by
candidly admitting what she owed, she ended up with even less resources available to put
towards her education and Andrew received a greater share of the marital property.
6