Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0861 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ In re the Marriage of Andrew Beardsley and Charity Beardsley Upon the Petition of Andrew Beardsley, Petitioner–Appellant, And Concerning Charity Beardsley, Respondent–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, The Honorable Mark D. Fisher, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Alexander S. Momany of Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant. Charity Beardsley, Homestead, self-represented appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Langholz, J. 1 LANGHOLZ, Judge. Andrew Beardsley appeals the decree dissolving his nearly eighteen- year marriage with Charity Beardsley. He challenges only the district court’s award of eight years of gradually reducing rehabilitative spousal support to Charity.1 On our de novo review, giving appropriate deference to the district court’s judgment of the equities, we cannot say that the rehabilitative- spousal-support award fails to do equity. We thus decline to disturb the award and affirm the district court’s decree. We review a district court’s spousal-support award de novo. In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023). But we still defer to the court’s “important, but often conjectural, judgment calls” in deciding an equitable award and must not engage in “undue tinkering” on appeal. Id. at 182–83 (cleaned up). So we will “disturb the district court’s determination of spousal support only when there has been a failure to do equity.” Id. at 182 (cleaned up). “Spousal support is not an absolute right; rather, its allowance is determined based on the particular circumstances presented in each case” and the statutory factors in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1) (2025). Id. at 185 (cleaned up). The district court awarded Charity rehabilitative spousal support—one of the four forms of spousal support recognized by our supreme court. See id. at 185–86. Rehabilitative spousal support seeks to support “an economically dependent spouse through a limited period of re-education or retraining following divorce, thereby creating incentive and opportunity for that spouse to become self-supporting.” Id. at 185–86 1 Among other provisions, the decree also placed the parties’ two minor children in their joint physical care (a main focus of the trial and the decree), ordered Andrew to pay child support, and divided the marital property. 2 (cleaned up). Consistent with its goal of self-sufficiency, “the duration” of rehabilitative spousal support “may be limited or extended depending on the realistic needs of the economically dependent spouse, tempered by the goal of facilitating the economic independence of the ex-spouses.” Id. at 186 (cleaned up). But absent “a showing that the recipient spouse seeks reeducation, retraining, or some discrete period of time to increase earning capacity to become self-supporting, rehabilitative spousal support is inappropriate.” Id. Andrew argues that Charity “failed to support her request for spousal support” with sufficient evidence showing a need for rehabilitative spousal support. He highlights that Charity—who represented herself at trial—did not request a specific amount of support, had been employed for most of the marriage, and failed to show she could not again be gainfully employed without more education. And he argues that her lack of financial need can be shown because she agreed that Andrew should receive an extra $10,000 above an even split of the proceeds of the sale of their marital home in the property division. So he contends that no spousal support should be awarded or, at most, we should modify the award to $1,500 in monthly transitional spousal support for a year. True, in the joint pretrial statement, Charity said only that she “requests alimony and leaves it up to the Court to decide the amount.” And again, when asked by the court at trial what she was requesting, she said “Whatever the Court allows, sir. . . . I really don’t have any inkling.” But a party need not request a specific dollar figure to be awarded support. Charity requested support, and the court had the authority to determine an equitable amount as she requested. Cf. In re Marriage of Clinton, 579 N.W.2d 835, 838 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting challenge to spousal-support award after trial 3 when the requesting party’s answer had only “asked for general equitable relief” but the opposing party was notified in pretrial order that it would be at issue at trial); Hopping v. Hopping, 10 N.W.2d 87, 89–93 (Iowa 1943) (holding that district court could award spousal support in a default judgment even when it was not specifically requested in the petition). In considering Charity’s request for spousal support, the court found that “while the parties are still relatively young and their marriage did not last twenty or more years, Charity is in need of financial assistance to rehabilitate herself.” The court reasoned: Andrew and Charity were married for nearly 18 years. During those 18 years Charity held employment for long periods, but she has been unemployed for approximately the last year. In addition, Charity suffers from anxiety to the extent that she receives [Veterans Affairs (“VA”)] disability. The Court was not provided with detailed income histories for the parties, but at present Charity earns substantially less than Andrew. At trial Charity expressed a desire to engage in further education and reintroduce herself to the workforce. Andrew has the ability to pay spousal support and Charity has a need. The Court finds that a monthly award of $1,500 for four years, $1,000 for two years, and $500 for two years will best serve the purpose of allowing Charity to obtain additional training and become self-sufficient without destroying Andrew’s ability to enjoy a similar lifestyle. Indeed, even when considering Andrew’s child support obligation, he will still have substantially more income each month upon which to pay his expenses. The trial record backs up these findings. As required for rehabilitative spousal support, Charity showed that she seeks reeducation and training.2 See Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 186. She testified 2 Conversely, we see no basis for concluding that Charity had “short-term liquidity needs associated with splitting one household into two” that could make transitional spousal support appropriate as Andrew alternatively suggests. Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 187. 4 that “I will be starting school full-time to . . . better myself and get into a better career, which is something that was withheld from me while we were married due to me having the insurance and me paying all the bills.”3 She had already taken “a couple [college] classes.” She explained her plans to make that work with her childcare responsibilities—“Whenever they’re at school, I’ll be at school because I do plan on going back right after all of this is said and done”—and that she expected to receive VA housing benefits that she would be eligible for if she went back to school. And while she had not yet settled on the precise program—mentioning architecture and construction as interest areas—she had plans to talk with her VA advisor. Andrew brushes this testimony away as a “vague desire to seek additional education.” But the district court implicitly credited it. And even on the cold transcript, her plans read as longstanding and concrete—while understandably not yet final given the uncertainty about her post-decree financial situation when she was testifying. So too does the record show that Charity needs the rehabilitative spousal support to become independent again. At the time of trial, Andrew earned about $110,000 a year—roughly seven times Charity’s $14,712.48, all of which came from her VA disability benefits. To be sure, her testimony supports Andrew’s contention that she had higher income in the past— which helped him to continue to progress in his career while she deferred her educational plans. But even her higher income was well below what Andrew earns now. And it appears unlikely that Charity could currently find work that would make her self-supporting—or finish her education and reach that 3 At another point in her testimony, she elaborated that “every time that I’ve wanted to go back to college, I was unable to because [Andrew] was holding over my head that I had the insurance and I was making more money than him, so I was never able to do that.” 5 point—without spousal support. The parties’ current income disparity— along with Andrew’s financial affidavit showing disposable income after his listed expenses of about $4,000 per month—also shows that it is not inequitable to require Andrew to provide Charity some support. What’s more, the parties’ lengthy marriage and Charity’s deferral of her educational goals to support the marriage and Andrew’s advancing career weigh in favor of the court’s award. See In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 543–44, 546 (Iowa 2022) (giving “weight to the factors supporting traditional” spousal support—including the duration of the parties’ seventeen-year marriage and the “economic consequences of their shared decision” about the spouses’ roles—when crafting a seven-year rehabilitative-spousal- support award).4 We recognize that the rehabilitative-spousal-support award is a real financial obligation for Andrew. But at bottom, we cannot say the district court’s award failed to do equity. And while another judge might well have chosen somewhat different amounts or durations for the gradually decreasing award, any appellate tinkering would be undue. Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 182. We thus affirm the district court’s decree. AFFIRMED. 4 Contrary to Andrew’s argument on appeal, Charity’s agreement that Andrew should receive an extra $10,000 in the property division does not cut against a showing of her financial need. It buttresses the need—and her credibility. She acknowledged that it was fair to take that sum from her half of the proceeds of the house because he had to cover mortgage and other house expenses from his funds after she lost her job. And by candidly admitting what she owed, she ended up with even less resources available to put towards her education and Andrew received a greater share of the marital property. 6