State of Iowa v. Krista Pauline Godat

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1853 Filed August 19, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Krista Pauline Godat, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, The Honorable Mark R. Lawson, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ryan M. D’Eliseo (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. Opinion by Schumacher, P.J. 1 SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge. Krista Godat appeals her sentence following a guilty plea to identity theft in violation of Iowa Code section 715A.8(3)(b) (2024). Godat alleges there was a defect in the sentencing procedure because the State breached the plea agreement by recommending incarceration rather than a suspended sentence and probation. Upon our review, we affirm. I. Background Facts and Proceedings Godat was charged via trial information with identity theft after she was alleged to have fraudulently used another individual’s identification to cash a $1,500 check. The trial information indicated that the State intended to pursue a habitual offender enhancement because of Godat’s prior felony convictions. Godat later pleaded guilty to the charge pursuant to a written plea agreement. The agreement outlined that the State would forgo the habitual offender enhancement and the parties would jointly recommend a suspended sentence. The agreement also permitted the State to withdraw its recommendation if “Defendant fails to cooperate with Correctional Services in preparing the [presentence investigation report]” (PSI). The district court accepted the guilty plea, set a sentencing hearing, and deferred acceptance of the plea agreement until completion of the PSI. Over the next several months, the probation officer assigned to complete the PSI was unable to contact Godat. When Godat finally contacted the probation officer, Godat stated she was “in and out of the hospital for the preceding five months.” She sent the probation officer an email with an attachment she purportedly received from an employee of the University of 2 Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) to corroborate the hospital visits. The email was from an “AOL.com” email domain. The probation officer contacted UIHC and submitted a release of information signed by Godat. In response, UIHC stated there were no records showing admittance of Godat during the months she failed to complete the PSI. And UIHC explained that they do not use “AOL.com” as an email domain. The probation officer determined that Godat tried to mislead the officer “with apparently falsified documents and unverifiable emails from alleged medical professionals.” The PSI ultimately recommended incarceration. At an initial sentencing hearing scheduled for September, three months after the completion of the PSI, the State informed the district court and Godat that Godat had been uncooperative with the PSI preparation. The hearing was continued at the request of Godat due to the unavailability of defense counsel. At the rescheduled hearing, which took place a month later, the State requested that the court impose an indeterminate prison term of five years. Godat asked the district court to follow the terms of the plea agreement and impose a suspended sentence. After listing the court’s concerns with the plea and citing the criminal history in the PSI, the court informed the parties the court would not be adopting the recommendations of the plea agreement. The district court then afforded Godat an opportunity to visit with her counsel and the opportunity to withdraw her plea. The State indicated an intent to pursue the habitual offender enhancement if Godat withdrew her guilty plea. After consultation with counsel, Godat requested to proceed with the sentencing hearing. 3  The district court imposed an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed five years. Godat appeals, asserting the State improperly breached the plea agreement by failing to provide notice of withdrawal of the plea agreement and by doing so without a determination from the district court that Godat breached the agreement. II. Error Preservation The State urges us to “reconsider [our] approach to error preservation on these types of claims,” as the “current approach is untenable and invites sandbagging and other mischief.” The State argues that a defendant should be required to object to a prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation to preserve error. Under our precedent, “[w]hile some forms of sentencing error require a timely objection or challenge to preserve an issue for appellate review, an allegation the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at the time of sentencing is a species of error to which the traditional rules of error preservation are inapplicable.” State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Iowa 2021); see also id. at 71 (holding “[a] prosecutor’s breach of the plea agreement at sentencing irreparably taints the sentencing proceeding and a claim of breach is reviewable on direct appeal even in the absence of contemporaneous objection”). “Although the State urges the Iowa Supreme Court to reconsider its approach to error preservation on these kinds of claims, this appeal has been transferred to our court, and we must apply controlling precedent.” State v. Pool, No. 24-1427, 2025 WL 2795296, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (cleaned up); State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (“We are not at liberty to overrule controlling supreme court precedent.”). 4  Accordingly, we find Godat has preserved error and consider the merits of her appeal. See State v. Newman, 970 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Iowa 2022) (explaining “a defendant establishes good cause to appeal by asserting a challenge to a sentencing hearing or sentence because a defendant need not preserve error to assert such claims on appeal”). III. Analysis We review sentences for correction of errors at law, and we only reverse upon finding an “abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Patten, 981 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). “Breach of a plea agreement is such a defect.” Id. Godat asserts the State breached the plea agreement in two ways: (1) when it “withdrew from the agreement at sentencing without providing notice of its intent to do so ahead of (or even at) the sentencing hearing; and (2) [when it] unilaterally withdrew from the agreement without a District Court ruling.” The State contends that Godat was properly notified of its intention to withdraw from the agreement and that there is no requirement that the State obtain approval from the district court before withdrawing if it has shown the defendant first breached the agreement. “The relevant inquiry in determining whether the prosecutor breached the plea agreement is whether the prosecutor acted contrary to the common purpose of the plea agreement and the justified expectations of the defendant and thereby effectively deprived the defendant of the benefit of the bargain.” Id. at 131 (citation omitted). As plea agreements involve defendants waiving fundamental rights, we “hold prosecutors to the most exacting standards of promise and performance.” State v. Doyle, No. 24-0033, 2024 WL 4502134, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2024) (citing State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Iowa 2008)). “We require strict, not substantial, 5 compliance with the terms of plea agreements.” Patten, 981 N.W.2d at 131 (cleaned up). When a prosecutor violates “the terms or the spirit of the agreement,” the violation is “intolerable and adversely impact[s] the integrity of the prosecutorial office and the entire judicial system.” Id. (citations omitted). When the State asserts the defendant breached the plea agreement, it “has the burden to show the defendant has failed to live up to [their] end of the bargain.” State v. Foy, 574 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1998). “Whether the State has carried its burden is determined by examining the record made at the time of sentencing.” Id. at 339–40. “[T]he State may not unilaterally withdraw from the agreement without providing some basis for its action or affording some sort of due process.” Id. at 339. But “[w]hen a defendant fails to uphold [their] end of a plea bargain, the State has no obligation to provide defendant the anticipated benefits of that bargain.” State v. Hovind, 431 N.W.2d 366, 368 (Iowa 1988). Godat asserts that the State failed to properly notify her of its intention to withdraw from the plea agreement because of her alleged breach. She relies on State v. Barker to argue that notice of withdrawal is required before the sentencing hearing to properly adhere to due process and fundamental fairness. 476 N.W.2d 624, 629 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). The State contends that notice was properly given to Godat at the original sentencing hearing when the prosecutor stated its position that she had not cooperated with the PSI. We determine Barker to be distinguishable from this appeal. In Barker, the prosecutor withdrew from the plea agreement after the defendant already pleaded guilty without providing notice before the sentencing hearing or offering a factual basis for the withdrawal. See id. Our 6 court found that the combined absence of notice and evidence of the defendant’s breach “amount[ed] to abuse of prosecutorial discretion.” Id. Here, although the State did not give notice to Godat of its intention to withdraw from the agreement before the original sentencing hearing, the prosecutor informed Godat and the court at the first hearing that “[s]he was not cooperative with the PSI process. That’s the State’s position.” The district court then continued the hearing “to get to the bottom of this” and directed Godat to provide alleged medical correspondence to the PSI author. The district court stated the purpose of the continuance was for the PSI author to investigate the documents and then to see “if there’s any new recommendations or the same recommendation based on these documents.” Godat argues this statement was referring to the PSI author potentially making a new sentencing recommendation, not the prosecutor, implying the State had not provided notice. But even if that assertion is true, the State still presented a legitimate basis for withdrawal at the subsequent evidentiary hearing. At the rescheduled sentencing hearing, the State provided evidence, including testimony from the PSI author, that these documents were fabrications for the purpose of avoiding participation in the PSI. Godat brought additional documents to rebut the State’s allegations. After the evidence was presented, the district court asked the State for its recommendation. The State then formally withdrew from its “original recommendation of a suspended sentence and [asked] for incarceration.” We conclude that even if the State only alluded to its intention to withdraw for the first time at the initial sentencing hearing, it “provid[ed] some basis for its action and afford[ed] some sort of due process” by proffering evidence of Godat’s breach and by giving Godat an opportunity to rebut the accusation. 7 Foy, 574 N.W.2d at 339. But see Barker, 476 N.W.2d at 629 (“Coupled with the distinct lack of any evidence in the record . . . the failure to give notice by the prosecutor amounts to an abuse of prosecutorial discretion.” (emphasis added)). Godat next contends that “[t]he State breached the plea agreement by unilaterally withdrawing from it without a District Court ruling.” Godat acknowledges that there are no published decisions by Iowa’s appellate courts that have directly ruled on this issue. But she cites State v. Jordan’s “cautionary admonition,” where the supreme court pointed out the sentencing court failed to acknowledge “that the parties agreed [the defendant] had breached the plea agreement, let alone that [the defendant’s] breach . . . automatically relieved the State of its agreement obligations.” 959 N.W.2d 395, 400 (Iowa 2021). In Jordan, the admonition resulted from the district court failing to rule that the agreement was breached, and by also failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to prove the breach. See id. That is not what happened here. The district court in this appeal rescheduled the sentencing hearing for the purpose of allowing the State and Godat to present evidence of the alleged breach. There was an evidentiary record at sentencing, which satisfied Jordan’s admonition. See id. at 401 (“Attorneys and sentencing courts should strive to ensure any issues involving a breach of a plea agreement are discussed on the record at the sentencing hearing to avoid the potential need for remand and resentencing following an appeal.”). Godat also highlights federal caselaw, asserting “the majority of circuits hold that a district court ruling is necessary before the government can be relieved of its obligations under a plea agreement.” See United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wilson, 841 8 F. App’x 571, 575 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Cudjoe, 534 F.3d 1349, 1355 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Brown, 801 F.2d 352, 355 (8th Cir. 1986). While these courts may require a ruling by a district court before the government nullifies a plea agreement, our caselaw does not. See Jordan, 959 N.W.2d at 400–01; see State v. Johnson, No. 22-1302, 2023 WL 8449563, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023) (“Nothing requires the State to obtain court approval before withdrawing from the agreement, so long as the State carries its burden to show [the defendant] first breached the agreement when called to do so.”); see State v. Young, 863 N.W.2d 249, 257 (Iowa 2015) (reiterating that federal precedent possesses persuasive value, “but we are no means bound by it” (citation omitted)). Here, the district court, after hearing evidence supporting Godat’s breach, declined to follow the plea agreement. And it did so after specifically explaining why it made that decision: “the fact that [Godat] was not very diligent in getting in to see the PSI author, and it appears to me that she has submitted fake documentation.” While the district court did not specifically use language that Godat breached the agreement, the court did find the State proved Godat used fake documentation to avoid participating in the PSI, which was the basis of the State’s allegation she breached the plea agreement. Because the State carried the burden of showing Godat first breached the agreement, we affirm the conviction and sentence. See Johnson, 2023 WL 8449563, at *2; see also Hovind, 431 N.W.2d at 369 (“It is evident from a review of the record that the trial court had ample basis and evidence to conclude defendant did not honor his obligations under the plea bargain agreement and that the State was free to pursue a full prosecution . . . .”). While we are affirming the district court, we take some time to highlight the implications of our current caselaw regarding plea agreement 9 breaches. For more than fifty years, our supreme court has emphasized the importance of plea bargaining to our system of justice. See Patten, 981 N.W.2d at 127. An estimated ninety-five percent of criminal convictions are obtained through negotiated guilty pleas. Id. “Given the significant rights forfeited by a criminal defendant in entering a guilty plea agreement, we place a heightened expectation on prosecutors to meticulously carry out the promises they make as part of a plea deal.” Id. at 128. Consistent with that heightened expectation, once the district court “has accepted a plea based on a plea agreement, the State may not unilaterally withdraw from the agreement without providing some basis for its action or affording some sort of due process.” Foy, 574 N.W.2d at 339. “The basic or fundamental elements of due process are notice and opportunity to be heard.” Barker, 476 N.W.2d at 628 (citation omitted). Those basic elements were just barely met here, and we urge prosecutors to provide a clearer record when claiming that a defendant has breached a plea agreement. Considering the important role that plea agreements play in the criminal judicial system, our supreme court requires “strict compliance with those agreements.” State v. Beres, 943 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). “Violations or casual withdrawals of these agreements after detrimental reliance by the defendant are intolerable and adversely impact the integrity of the prosecutorial office and the entire judicial system.” State v. King, 576 N.W.2d 369, 370 (Iowa 1998); accord Patten, 981 N.W.2d at 131. The appellate record as to the prosecutor’s withdrawal from its plea agreement with Godat was perilously close to casual. Godat argues that “the State made no mention of its intent to withdraw from the agreement until the moment it actually recommended 10 imprisonment, contrary to its agreement to recommend probation.” The State asserts “[t]hat’s factually untrue.” But the record here is not a model of clarity. Pointing to the first sentencing hearing in September 2025, the State contends that Godat was notified of its intent when the prosecutor told the district court that Godat “was not cooperative with the PSI process.” That comment was made while the parties were discussing Godat’s request to continue the sentencing hearing because her attorney was in trial and the attorney covering for her was not prepared to proceed. The exchange was limited to the following: THE COURT: . . . Let’s address this request for a continuance of the sentencing today. Does the State resist that? THE PROSECUTOR: I would. Obviously, we’d like to go forward. She was not cooperative with the PSI process. That’s the State’s position. We had to do a warrant at one point. We already continued this on a different date. No mention was made at that hearing—or in the pleadings—that the prosecutor planned to withdraw from the agreement because of Godat’s uncooperativeness. See Beres, 943 N.W.2d at 586 (“The record of the proceedings in open court controls our analysis, not any off-the-record side deals.” (citation omitted)). The first time the word “withdrawal” was mentioned was at the continued hearing when the State made its sentencing recommendation. Maybe Godat knew that her failure to cooperate would be an issue. But it is not clear that she knew the State was going to withdraw from its agreement until it actually withdrew. Such a significant event should have been clear. Godat is right that “[s]urprise eleventh-hour withdrawals do not comport with ʻour time-honored fair play norm[s] and accepted professional standards.’” (Quoting King, 576 N.W.2d at 370). Those standards, under the 11 American Bar Association guidelines, require that a prosecutor who “believes that a defendant has breached an agreement that has been accepted by the court” to “notify the defense regarding the prosecutor’s belief and any intended adverse action.” Standards of Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function § 3-5.7(e) (Am. Bar Ass’n 4th ed. 2017); see State v. Aschan, 366 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Iowa 1985) (citing the American Bar Association’s standards for prosecutors’ compliance with plea agreements); State v. Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 1999) (same). That did not happen here. As in Barker, where the prosecutor did not notify the defendant of the State’s withdrawal from the plea agreement before the sentencing hearing, “[t]his lack of notice impinges on our sense of fundamental fairness.” 476 N.W.2d at 629. Under our case law, however, lack of notice alone is insufficient. See id. (“Coupled with the distinct lack of any evidence in the record . . . the failure to give notice by the prosecutor amounts to abuse of prosecutorial discretion.” (emphasis added)). In Jordan, the supreme court found that a prosecutor did not breach a plea agreement by recommending prison instead of remaining silent at the sentencing hearing where there was no factual dispute that the defendant had breached the agreement first. 959 N.W.2d at 400–01. The court reached that conclusion even though there was no acknowledgment in the record “by the sentencing court that the parties agreed [the defendant] had breached the plea agreement” or that his breach “automatically relieved the State of its agreement obligations.” Id. at 400. While Godat disputed the allegations in the PSI that she lied and falsified documents, the State presented evidence on that issue, and Godat was given an opportunity to rebut it. That seems to be enough under our precedent. See id. at 401 (“Attorneys and sentencing courts should strive to ensure any issues involving a breach of a plea agreement are discussed on the record at the sentencing hearing. . . .”). 12  In addition to the lack of notice, Godat argues the State “breached the plea agreement by unilaterally withdrawing from it without a District Court ruling.” In support of this argument, Godat cites to federal caselaw and contends “the majority of circuits hold that a district court ruling is necessary before the government can be relieved of its obligations under a plea agreement.” She is correct. See United States v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 70–71 (1st Cir. 1992); Wilson, 841 F. App’x at 575; United States v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 836 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Frazier, 213 F.3d 409, 419 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cox, 985 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Livar, 108 F.4th 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2024) (per curiam); Calabrese, 645 F.2d at 1390. In Calabrese, the Tenth Circuit explained: Because important due process rights are involved, plea negotiations must accord a defendant requisite fairness and be attended by adequate safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. We believe that one requisite safeguard of a defendant’s rights is a judicial determination, based on adequate evidence, of a defendant’s breach of a plea bargaining agreement. The question of a defendant’s breach is not an issue to be finally determined unilaterally by the government. If the pleadings reveal a factual dispute on the issue of breach, the district court must hold a hearing to resolve the factual issues. If the pleadings reveal no disputed factual issues, no hearing is necessary and the court may determine the issue of breach as a matter of law. 645 F.2d at 1390 (cleaned up). Our appellate courts have not yet gone as far as the federal courts. Although we are not bound by federal precedent, our supreme court has followed it in the plea-bargaining realm. See Patten, 981 N.W.2d at 130–31. Requiring a ruling from the district court on a defendant’s breach of a plea 13 agreement makes sense, especially considering that our supreme court has recognized that “the State may not unilaterally withdraw” from a plea agreement. Foy, 574 N.W.2d at 339; see also Beres, 943 N.W.2d at 585 (“[I]t is a basic precept of contract law that one side is not free to unilaterally withdraw and go back to the beginning just because it wants to do so.”). All that said, as we held earlier in this opinion, “[w]hile the district court did not specifically use language that Godat breached the agreement, the court did find the State proved Godat used fake documentation to avoid participating in the PSI, which was the basis of the State’s allegation she breached the plea agreement.” That finding seems to be sufficient under our precedent, which only requires the State to provide “some basis for its action” or afford “some sort of due process.” Foy, 574 N.W.2d at 339; see also Jordan, 959 N.W.2d at 400. Because the basis for the State’s withdrawal is clear from the record made at the sentencing hearing—which afforded Godat an opportunity to rebut the State’s allegation that she did not cooperate with the presentence investigation process—we affirm her conviction and sentence. We must affirm because of our current precedent on the issue. But if prosecutors were required to follow the American Bar Association’s standards and federal caselaw when they believe a defendant has breached a plea agreement, clear advanced notice of their withdrawal from an agreement would be required. A judicial determination of the breach would also follow. The combination of these two steps heightens clarity of the trial court and appellate record. As our supreme court recognized in Horness, there is more at stake in holding prosecutors to their agreements “than just the liberty of the defendant. At stake is the honor of the government, public confidence in 14 the fair administration of justice, and the efficient administration of justice.” 600 N.W.2d at 298 (cleaned up). IV. Conclusion For the above reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 15