In the Matter of the Guardianship of V.H.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledAugust 19, 2026
Docket25-1911
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1911
Filed August 19, 2026
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In the Matter of the Guardianship of V.H.,
B.H.,
Father-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County,
The Honorable Patrick McAvan, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Becky E. Wilson (until withdrawal), of Becky E. Wilson, Attorney, PLLC,
Winfield, and Patricia J. Lipski, Washington, attorneys for appellant.
Sasha L. Finke of Finke Law Firm PLC, Ainsworth,
attorney for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.
A father appeals from the order appointing a guardian for his child. He
challenges the juvenile court’s choice of guardian between the two qualified
candidates, contending that his preference as parent should decide. He also
contends that his choice of guardian is best equipped to serve the child’s best
interest. Because the choice of guardian is governed by the child’s best
interest and the mother’s sister is best suited to serve as guardian, we affirm.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The child was born in September 2024. When the child was two
months old, she and the mother were passengers in a car that crashed. The
child was restrained in a car seat and uninjured, but the mother died from
injuries she sustained.
Soon after the mother died, the father recognized that he could not
care for the child. He asked his cousin to be the child’s caretaker and gave
her power of attorney. The father did not set up a guardianship.
In May 2025, the mother’s sister petitioned for guardianship of the
child. The father did not contest the guardianship. Instead, he asked the
court to appoint his cousin as the child’s guardian.1 A September hearing
focused on who was best suited to serve as the child’s guardian: the mother’s
sister or the father’s cousin.
The juvenile court found that both women were suitable guardians for
the child and could meet the child’s financial needs. In the cousin’s favor,
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At the guardianship hearing, the father’s attorney told the court that the father
“recognize[d] the need for a guardianship and . . . consent[ed] to the formation of a
guardianship. The only disputed matter is who is to be the guardian.”
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the court noted that the child had been living with the cousin for about nine
months and had settled into her home. But the court had concerns about the
cousin. First, it found that the cousin had acted as a “gatekeeper” to limit
the child’s interactions with some of the mother’s family while being less
discerning with others. Second, the cousin had served as a guardian once
before but sought release when things became difficult. Finally, the cousin
waited until trial to express concerns about the child’s car seat rather than
raising her concerns when she noticed the issue. As a result, the juvenile
court concluded that the mother’s sister was better suited to serve the child’s
emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs and to ensure the
child’s relationship with both sides of her family. The court appointed the
sister guardian, ordered visitation with the cousin and the father at a
minimum of every other weekend, and directed that the cousin be considered
as a childcare provider before others.
The father appeals.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
Proceedings involving guardianships for minors under chapter 232D
are equitable, so we review them de novo. See In re Guardianship of L.Y., 968
N.W.2d 882, 892 (Iowa 2022); In re Guardianship of J.M., No. 20-1638, 2021
WL 4304224, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 22, 2021). On de novo review, we
give weight to the juvenile court’s findings of fact but are not bound by them.
L.Y., 968 N.W.2d at 892.
DISCUSSION
The father raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends his
preference as a parent should govern the choice between two equally
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qualified applicants. He also claims that the child’s best interest is served by
appointing his cousin as guardian.
I. Is the Father’s Preference of Guardian Determinative?
Iowa Code chapter 232D (2025) offers two types of guardianship for
minors: those in which a parent knowingly and voluntarily consents to the
guardianship, Iowa Code § 232D.203, and those formed without parental
consent, id. § 232D.204. The juvenile court appointed a guardian for the
child without parental consent under section 232D.204(2), finding clear and
convincing evidence that the father was unwilling or unable to care for the
child and appointing a guardian is in the child’s best interest. The father does
not challenge the appointment of a guardian but argues his choice of guardian
should weigh heavily when the choice is between two equally qualified
applicants.
Chapter 232D gives little guidance on selecting a guardian.
Section 232D.308(1) states that the court shall appoint “a qualified and
suitable person who is willing to serve” subject to two preferences. The first
preference is for a qualified and suitable person nominated as guardian in a
will executed by a parent who died while having legal custody of the child. Id.
§ 232D.308(2). The second is for a person requested by a minor who is
fourteen years of age or older. Id. § 232D.308(3). Neither applies here.
The legislature enacted chapter 232D in 2019. See 2019 Iowa Acts
ch. 56, §§ 1–29. Although there are fewer cases interpreting chapter 232D
than its predecessor, the section addressing choice of guardian for a minor is
almost identical to the statute in force before the 2019 amendment. Compare
Iowa Code § 633.559 (2019), repealed by, 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 56, § 43, with
Iowa Code § 232D.308 (2025). Iowa courts interpreting the earlier version
of the law held “that the determinative factor in deciding between two or
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more qualified and suitable persons is the best interest of the child.” In re
Guardianship & Conservatorship of D.D.H., 538 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1995). The question is “which party can better provide for the child’s
emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs.” Id. at 884. Using
this standard, the juvenile court appointed the mother’s sister guardian.
The juvenile court applied the correct standard in deciding between
two qualified guardians for the child. In addition to the similarities between
section 232D.308 and the earlier version of the law, the child’s best interest
is “the first and governing consideration of the courts” in child custody
cases. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(n); see also Iowa Code § 232D.102(5)
(defining “guardian” as “a person appointed by the court to have custody of
a minor”). This notion is reinforced through repeated references to the
child’s best interest, not just in sections 232D.203 and .204, but throughout
chapter 232D. See Iowa Code §§ 232D.104(2)(a) (applying a best-interest
standard to venue transfers in guardianship proceedings), .303(2) (requiring
attorneys representing minors in guardianship proceedings to advocate for
the child’s best interest), .305(4)(c) (requiring a court visitor to include in a
written report to the court any matters deemed relevant to the child’s best
interest), .502(3) (governing when to hold a hearing on removal of a
guardian), .503(4) (governing modification of a guardian’s powers). Most
notably, section 232D.402 addresses the duties and responsibilities of a
guardian for a child and states that guardians are fiduciaries who “shall act in
the best interest of the minor.” Id. § 232D.402(1). That section adds that
unless otherwise limited by the court, “a guardian has the duty and
responsibility to ensure the minor’s health, education, safety, welfare, and
support,” id. § 232D.402(2), which is akin to the child’s best interest.
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The father contends that his preference in guardian must be afforded
weight because he consented to the guardianship under section 232D.203.
Although the father did not contest appointment of a guardian, the court
appointed a guardian after finding the criteria in section 232D.204(2) was
satisfied. Whether the court could have instead appointed a guardian under
section 232D.203 is irrelevant.2
Finally, the father claims the juvenile court’s choice of guardian
violated his fundamental right to make decisions about the care, custody, and
control of his child. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); L.Y.,
968 N.W.2d at 894. Because this claim was not raised before and decided by
the juvenile court, error is not preserved for our review on appeal. See In re
L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 533 (Iowa 2025) (en banc).
II. Which Party Will Serve the Child’s Best Interest as Guardian?
Having decided that the best-interest standard is determinative in
deciding between two equally qualified individuals, the question is whether
the mother’s sister or the father’s cousin is best suited to serve as guardian.
Like the juvenile court, we begin by reviewing the facts in the record.
The mother’s sister was twenty-four years old and in good health at
the guardianship hearing. She lived with the mother during the mother’s
pregnancy and after the child was born. She has no children and shares an
apartment with her brother and his girlfriend. She has worked in a kitchen
for over one year and was promoted to shift leader, working early morning
2
The supreme court in L.Y., 968 N.W.2d at 895, held that when a guardianship is
formed with parental consent under section 232D.203, we presume the parent will act in
the child’s best interest over all others. Whether this presumption extends to choice of
the child’s guardian is not before us.
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hours until noon from Monday through Friday. Since July 2025, the sister
has spent Wednesdays and alternating weekends with the child. Her brother
and his girlfriend have provided daycare while she is working on Wednesdays.
She has support from her extended family and testified that she is committed
to maintaining the child’s relationship with the father and his family.
The father’s cousin was forty years old and in good health at the
hearing. She has three children who are adults and a seventeen-year-old child
who lives with a relative. The cousin and her mother live with the child’s
paternal grandfather. It is the cousin’s sixth residence in five years. She quit
her job when she moved to care for the child and was unemployed for about
six months until she began working for a roofing company in June 2025. She
works from 1:15 p.m. until midnight from Monday through Thursday and
occasionally works on Friday. A nineteen-year-old who lives nearby provides
childcare while she is at work. The cousin was appointed guardian for a
friend’s child. She served as guardian for about one year before relinquishing
her guardianship after the child attempted suicide.
The Court Visitor appointed for the child found both the sister and
cousin provided safe homes for the children and that both were suitable
caretakers.3 All else equal, she recommended placement with the maternal
aunt because she has a closer biological relationship with the child.
We share the same concerns about the father’s cousin that the juvenile
court articulated. Although the cousin opposed allowing the child to visit the
mother’s sister, she allowed the child to spend ten days out of state with the
3
Although both home environments are proper for the child, the Court Visitor
noted that the paternal grandfather, who lives with the cousin, has “a number of criminal
charges for assault and domestic abuse” with the most recent in 2020. But he travels often
for work.
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maternal grandfather despite his criminal history and the visit delaying the
child’s medical appointments.4 We also share concern that the cousin asked
to be released from her role as guardian to another child. Weighing the
child’s best interest, we agree that the mother’s sister should be guardian.
CONCLUSION
The juvenile court began its ruling by asking how one splits a baby—a
reference to the biblical tale of King Solomon in which two women fight over
a child with each claiming that they were the child’s mother. See 1 Kings 3:16–
28. To settle the dispute, King Solomon ordered the child cut in half and
split between the women. 1 Kings 3:25. Only one woman asked the king to
give the child to the other woman rather than killing him. 1 Kings 3:26.
Because she put the child’s best interest ahead of her own, the king identified
her as the child’s true mother. 1 Kings 3:27.
We are hopeful that the parties remember this parable moving forward.
Although the child suffered a tragic loss at just two months of age, she is
fortunate that both sides of her extended family want to be involved in raising
her. Considering the high stakes, intense grief, and other emotions involved,
the tension that has arisen between each side of this family is unsurprising.
The child’s mother can never be replaced. Though we conclude that the
mother’s sister should be named as the child’s guardian, the parties still have
4
During an April 2025 medical appointment, a nurse practitioner encouraged the
cousin to have the child immunized. The cousin sent the child to visit the paternal
grandfather in June, and the child tested positive for whooping cough in July. In late
September, the child still needed the immunizations.
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the opportunity to serve the mother’s legacy and the child’s best interest by
putting their conflicts aside and raising this child in one large, unified family.
AFFIRMED.
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