Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1584 Filed August 19, 2026 _______________ In re the Marriage of Douglas Kroeger and Denise Kroeger Upon the Petition of Douglas Kroeger, Petitioner–Appellant, And Concerning Denise Kroeger, Respondent–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, The Honorable Elizabeth O’Donnell, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Thomas E. Maxwell of Leff Law Firm, L.L.P., Iowa City, attorney for appellant. Ryan M. Beckenbaugh of Beckenbaugh Law P.C., Davenport, attorney for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Greer, P.J. 1 GREER, Presiding Judge. Doug Kroeger and Denise Kroeger separated in December 2023 and then terminated their twenty-one-year marriage in June 2025. After a trial, the district court addressed the property division by awarding the marital home to Denise, with her assuming the existing mortgage, and by further dividing the personal property, vehicles, and other assets in a manner so that no one owed the other an equalization payment. Denise requested a spousal support award, and the district court ordered Doug to pay $800 per month until Denise “remarries or becomes eligible to receive full social security benefits.” Doug appeals with two issues to resolve. First, he asserts that the parties had an agreement to have the marital home appraised so that half of its equity would be paid to Doug and the district court failed to honor that agreement. And second, he contests the award of spousal support contending Denise is only entitled to $400 per month until the youngest child is no longer eligible for child support. Denise denies the existence of an agreement related to the marital home and asserts the spousal support award is fair given her income and the long-term marriage. Denise also requests appellate attorney fees. We find that Doug’s characterization of the parties’ agreement related to the marital home is not found in the trial record and that the property division was equitable. On the spousal support issue, because of the length of the marriage and disparity in income, the award was equitable. We also award Denise appellate attorney fees of $4,000. 2 I. Background Facts and Proceedings. The parties married in September 2001 and have three children, two of whom were minors at the time Doug filed for dissolution of the marriage. At the time of trial, Doug was forty-eight years old and Denise was fifty-one years old. The district court determined that Doug earned $80,000 per year and Denise $42,789.72 per year. Denise attended college but testified she no longer uses her associate’s degree in culinary arts. After a trial where the testimony primarily focused on disputes related to the children, the district court entered an order establishing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the dissolution decree in June 2025. Each party asked the court to reconsider some portion of the decree. No one requested a hearing. In his motion to reconsider, Doug urged that “[i]t was [Doug’s] understanding that the parties agreed that [Denise] would get the marital home but that the parties would have the home appraised and whatever that value came back at, [Denise] would owe [Doug] half of the equity, if any, in the home.” Denise responded by asserting that the equity in the home was “minimal or negative” and the court took that into consideration in the ruling. The district court addressed Doug’s argument that the parties had an agreement about how the marital residence would be handled and noted that “[n]either party testified to this agreement nor filed a stipulation to support this claim,” but that both parties did testify that Denise should be awarded the marital home. The court declined to amend the decree on this issue. Additionally, the district court refused to modify the decree to respond to Doug’s contention that the spousal support award should be changed, as it found his motion to reconsider arguments were a rehash of those made at trial. On this issue, per Doug’s calculations, he argued that Denise will have an additional $12,670.08 in income per year post-tax money after he pays the 3 child and spousal support. He proposed $400 per month as a fair spousal support award, which should terminate when the last child graduates from high school. After the district court denied his motion to reconsider, Doug appealed. II. Standard of Review. Because dissolution-of-marriage proceedings are equitable actions, our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). On our review, “we examine the entire record and adjudicate anew the issue of the property distribution.” In re Marriage of Towne, 966 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (citation omitted). We do not disturb the district court’s decree unless there has been a failure to do equity, and we give the court considerable latitude when we review questions over spousal support. In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015). “We give weight to the factual determinations made by the district court; however, their findings are not binding upon us.” Id. III. Analysis. A. Property Division and the Marital Home. Asserting that the property division is inequitable, Doug points to an error he contends the district court made in its ruling. 1 He asserts that the determination that “[b]oth parties agree that Denise should be awarded the marital residence” did not mean that he was waiving his right to his portion of the marital residence’s equity. He urges that the district court referred to an agreement between the parties that did not exist and did not consider the agreement that 1 We choose to bypass Denise’s challenge over Doug’s failure to preserve error on this issue although the record is scant and unclear about what Doug’s trial position was related to the division of assets. 4 did exist. Second, he faults the district court for not engaging in the “foundational task” of identifying the value of the marital assets. Doug states that the record is devoid of any evidence about the value of the marital home, the amount of the mortgage, and the resulting net equity. Because the district court did not identify the equity value in the marital home, Doug argues that the court should remand the case for further evidence, as was done in In re Marriage of Hitchcock, 265 N.W.2d 599, 605–07 (Iowa 1978). For Doug’s part, he directs us to his exhibits, which provided a “price evaluation” from a realtor and a copy of the 2025 property tax assessment to aid the district court in valuing the parties’ main asset. The “price evaluation,” listed a realtor’s valuation model estimated range of $232,600 to $284,200 for the property.2 The property tax assessment reflected that Denise and Doug purchased the property in 2019 for $189,000 and that the property had a 2025 assessed value of $193,000. Doug also filed an affidavit of financial status before the hearing on temporary matters, which reflected his opinion of the property’s value at $189,500 with a mortgage encumbrance of $181,750, for a net equity of $7,750. Neither party complied with the order setting trial that required the parties to file financial statements if the division of assets and debts were an issue for trial. During a court conference at the beginning of the trial, counsel for the parties indicated that there was “a joint statement of assets and liabilities” that could be used to resolve some of the smaller personal property issues. The district court asked for a copy of the statement. The trial began, and after the parties took a long break, the district court reconvened the trial and 2 A realtor’s valuation model is an exclusive property valuation tool available to realtors. As the report cautioned, it is not an appraisal of the property, but simply a model generated by a proprietary computer software program. 5 stated that its “understanding is that the parties have reached an agreement regarding many of the items of personal property of the parties, including the residence.” The attorneys for the parties both agreed with the court’s representation and reported they would make the agreement an exhibit and upload it at lunch. From our review of the record, this “agreement” never made the court file and was not marked as an exhibit or admitted at trial. So, this record does not provide the details of any stipulation related to the marital home. We have no ability to verify Denise’s representation in her resistance to Doug’s motion to reconsider that there was minimal or negative equity in the marital home, other than Doug’s earlier financial affidavit. And the district court correctly found that there was no evidence of the agreement as characterized by Doug. Denise did offer a “proposed stipulation for decree” as an exhibit,3 which was admitted, but it did not list asset or debt values and only stated that Denise would take the real estate subject to the existing mortgage. At this stage of the process, we do not know if the district court received a copy of any stipulated division of property and debts. Instead, we consider that the district court found that “[b]oth parties agree that Denise should be awarded the marital residence” and that she would assume responsibility for the existing mortgage. Still, the decree contained a detailed itemized listing of personal assets, but that list was provided in Denise’s proposed stipulation. 3 The attorneys indicated after the evidence closed that this exhibit was not the stipulation they had referred to earlier and that they would upload a copy. The district court said, “Just make sure that gets uploaded if you want to incorporate it into the decree.” 6 On appeal, Doug requests that we remand the case so that he can present evidence of the equity in the home for purposes of achieving an equitable division of property. “An equitable distribution of marital property, based upon the factors in [Iowa Code section] 598.21(5), does not require an equal division of assets.” In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 682 (Iowa 2013) (citation omitted). Based on this record, we cannot know if the division is inequitable, and Doug did not provide that evidence, so we decline to vacate the district court’s ruling regarding the marital home. And we decline to consider Doug’s argument that the court failed to perform its “foundational tasks of identifying and valuing the parties’ assets” as the court can only address those assets, debts, and valuations presented to it by the parties. We distinguish this factual pattern from cases Doug cited in his brief where remand was granted because of the failure of either counsel to produce evidence of the property’s value because here, based upon the record developed at trial, the district court found that the parties had agreed that Denise would be awarded the property. Hitchcock, 265 N.W.2d at 606–07 (voiding purported settlement agreement entered into under duress and finding the record insufficient to make findings relative to the property division); Locke v. Locke, 246 N.W.2d 246, 253 (Iowa 1976) (remanding for further evidence as the value of the farmland could not be established from any part of the trial record). No one testified about what the home’s equity was or how it should be divided even though the court had information about the marital home’s value. From our reading of the record, that is a fair determination, and the property division appears to be equitable, as at best, Doug would only have been entitled to one-half of the $7,750 equity he set out in his earlier financial affidavit. 7 We affirm the district court’s treatment of the marital home in the property division. B. Spousal Support Award. A district court has considerable latitude in making an award of spousal support, and we will disturb the court’s award only if it is inequitable. See In re Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Iowa 2012). In the decree, the district court set out the factors it was to consider under the Iowa Code, including: (1) the length of the marriage; (2) the age, physical and emotional health of the parties; (3) the property distribution; (4) the parties’ educational level; (5) the earning capacity of the party seeking support; (6) the feasibility of the party seeking support becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage; and (7) the tax consequences to each party. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1) (2024); Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 407–08 (requiring a review of all of the statutory factors to craft the appropriate spousal support award). It then concluded that, because of the length of the marriage and the disparity in income, traditional alimony was appropriate and ordered Doug to pay $800 per month until Denise either remarries or becomes eligible for full Social Security benefits. We start with the trial record. Here, the parties alerted the district court that spousal support was an issue. Denise set out her request in her proposed stipulation exhibit, requesting $1,500 per month until she remarried or received full Social Security benefits. As for the parties’ income, the district court accepted the child support affidavit proposed by Doug, which provided evidence of the parties’ respective annual incomes with Doug earning $80,000 and Denise earning $42,789.72 annually. At trial, Doug never mentioned whether he agreed or disagreed with Denise’s spousal support proposal, only raising objections later in his motion to 8 reconsider. There is no record from Denise or Doug about the standard of living the couple had during the marriage or what their monthly expenses were. Thus, from our de novo review, what we do know is that this is a long- term marriage of twenty-one years and there is a significant disparity between Doug’s earnings and Denise’s. We find that, based upon the record afforded us on appeal, traditional alimony is appropriate. See In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 539 (Iowa 2022) (noting there are four types of spousal support: rehabilitative, reimbursement, transitional, and traditional; each with a different goal). “An award of traditional spousal support is equitable in marriages of long duration to allow the recipient spouse to maintain the lifestyle to which he or she became accustomed.” In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Iowa 2023). Denise’s spousal support of $800 per month would provide her additional income of $9,600, for a total annual income of $52,398.72. We can assume that because the parties once shared income of $122,789.72 (the annual earnings combined), and because they did not show any large reserves of cash in Denise’s proposed stipulation, both parties will now be living below the standard of living they once shared. See In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 2008) (spousal support is intended “to maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable to that . . . enjoyed during the marriage.”). While we wish we had a more robust record, we view what was provided by the parties and find that the spousal support award was equitable. C. Appellate Attorney Fees. Denise submitted an affidavit setting forth the fees and expenses incurred to prepare her appellate brief. She requests attorney fees of $6,150 and expenses of $62.50. “In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party 9 making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the decision of the trial court on appeal.” In re Marriage of Hoffman, 891 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (citation omitted). Here, because Denise was successful in defending the decree, and without question Doug has the financial ability to pay the fees, we award appellate attorney fees of $4,000. Judgment is entered against Doug in the sum of $4,000. IV. Conclusion. For the reasons set out above, we affirm the district court’s decisions related to the division of the marital home and the award of spousal support. Further, we award Denise the sum of $4,000 toward her appellate attorney fees. AFFIRMED. 10