In re the Marriage of Goken
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1409
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1409
Filed November 18, 2026
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In re the Marriage of Brittany P. Goken and Zachary M. Goken
Upon the Petition of
Brittany P. Goken,
Petitioner–Appellee,
And Concerning
Zachary M. Goken,
Respondent–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County,
The Honorable Christopher L. Bruns, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Chad R. Frese of Kaplan & Frese, LLP, Marshalltown,
attorney for appellant.
Melissa A. Nine of Nine Law Office, Marshalltown, attorney for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Badding, P.J., Sandy, J., and Vogel, S.J.
Opinion by Badding, P. J.
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BADDING, Presiding Judge.
Calling the filings in this case “a hot mess,” Brittany Goken asks us to
dismiss Zachary Goken’s appeal from a district court ruling that denied his
motion to set aside a default decree dissolving their marriage. There are
serious issues with Zachary’s filings, starting with the thirty-nine-day delay
between when he served his notice of appeal and filed it in the district court
and continuing with his appellate briefing. Although the violations are not
trivial, we conclude they do not prevent us from reaching the district court’s
ruling, which we affirm on its merits.
I. Timeliness of Appeal
Because it impacts our jurisdiction, we first consider whether
Zachary’s notice of appeal was timely. See Evenson v. Winnebago Indus., Inc.,
922 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 2019) (“Failure to file a timely notice of appeal
leaves us without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal.”). Under our
appellate rules, an appeal “is taken by filing a notice of appeal within the time
provided in rule 6.101(1)(b) with the clerk of the district court where the final
order was entered.” Iowa R. App. 6.102(2). Rule 6.101(1)(b), in turn, requires
the notice of appeal to be filed “within 30 days after the filing of the final
order or judgment.”
“This strict thirty-day requirement is somewhat tempered by rule
6.101(4), which tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal ʻwhen the notice is
served, provided the notice is filed with the district court clerk within a
reasonable time.’” Brendeland v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 14 N.W.3d 135, 142
(Iowa 2024) (quoting Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(4)). The tolling allowed under
rule 6.101(4) injects “some flexibility” into the appellate process by allowing
the filing to “be completed within ʻa reasonable time’ after serving.” Cook v.
2
City of Council Bluffs, 264 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Iowa 1978) (en banc); accord
Brendeland, 14 N.W.3d at 142.
Zachary filed his notice of appeal with the clerk of the supreme court
on August 28, 2025—the same day that the district court entered its order
denying his motion to set aside the default. The notice stated that it was
served on the district court clerk and opposing counsel through the
electronic data management system. But Zachary did not file the notice of
appeal with the district court clerk until October 6—a delay of thirty-nine
days.1 Was that delay reasonable?
Our supreme court has “embraced a purely time-based approach” in
answering the reasonableness question under rule 6.101(4). Brendeland, 14
N.W.3d at 143 (surveying cases). It has deemed a delay of sixty-three days
“obviously” unreasonable. Gordon v. Wright Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 320
N.W.2d 565, 567 (Iowa 1982). But it has found delays of up to thirty-five days
do not “cross the line.” Brendeland, 14 N.W.3d at 144; see also Thayer v. State,
653 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Iowa 2002) (thirty-two days); Cook, 264 N.W.2d at 787
(twenty-six days). Unpublished decisions from our court have approved filing
delays slightly longer than that. See In re K.C., No. 20-1105, 2021 WL 609081,
at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2021) (forty-three days); Deng v. White,
No. 18-1672, 2019 WL 6358427, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2019) (forty
1
After Zachary filed his notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court, the
supreme court ordered him to file a statement “regarding whether a 39-day delay in filing
his notice of appeal after service is a reasonable amount of time.” Zachary’s statement
asserted that the “oversight in not filing the notice in the district court was a clerical error
not prejudicial to the Appellee.” The court ordered the issue to be submitted with the
appeal.
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days). Under these cases, we find that Zachary’s thirty-nine-day delay was
reasonable. We therefore have jurisdiction to address his appeal.2
II. Appellate Briefing Violations
We next consider Brittany’s assertion that we should dismiss the
appeal because Zachary failed “to substantially comply with the Iowa Rules
of Appellate Procedure.”
As Brittany correctly notes, Zachary’s appellate brief commits several
violations of our rules. The table of authorities does not list the pages of the
brief where the authorities are cited, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(2); the
argument section does not address how the issues were preserved, with
references to the record, see id. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(1); and the conclusion does
not state the precise relief sought, see id. 6.903(2)(a)(9). Zachary also failed
to state the standard of review for each of his issues or support each statement
of fact with references to the record. See id. 6.903(2)(a)(6), (2)(a)(8)(2). And
although his argument includes some general case law and statutes, Zachary
does not connect those authorities to any substantive analysis on the issues
presented in his appeal. See id. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (requiring “citations to the
authorities relied on” to support the contentions in the appellant’s brief ).
2
We note that unlike the appellant in Brendeland, Zachary made other missteps in
perfecting his appeal, including failing to timely pay the appellate filing fee, failing to
timely file the combined certificate with the district court clerk, and failing to serve the
combined certificate on one of the court reporters he listed in the certificate. Cf.
Brendeland, 14 N.W.3d at 141 (noting the appellant “had taken all other steps in a timely
fashion to perfect the appeal”); Deng, 2019 WL 6358427, at *3 (noting the docket fee was
timely paid, the combined certificate was timely filed, and the transcript was timely
ordered). But these missteps do not change our conclusion because “the primary focus”
is “on the period of time involved” between serving and filing the notice of appeal.
Brendeland, 14 N.W.3d at 143.
4
“Rule infractions are not a trivial matter” and can “lead to summary
disposition of the appeal or waiver of an issue.” State v. Lange, 831 N.W.2d
844, 847 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013); see also Myers v. Sellers, 234 N.W.2d 152, 154
(Iowa 1975) (dismissing appeal for briefing violations). Our “principal role is
to dispose justly of a high volume of cases.” Lange, 831 N.W.2d at 847. A
party’s noncompliance interferes with that mandate and wastes judicial
resources, “which is unfair to litigants who brief cases in compliance with the
rules and adds to delays in the appellate process.” In re Marriage of Duggan,
No. 23-1699, 2025 WL 854988, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2025).
Because of the violations listed above, we could summarily dispose of
the appeal as Brittany requests. We instead choose to reach the merits of the
one issue that is properly before us: whether the district court erred in
denying Zachary’s motion to set aside the default dissolution decree.3 See
Smith v. Scarborough, No. 25-1674, 2026 WL 3017016, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 7, 2026) (“As a matter of grace, we have on occasion determined an
appeal even though the appellant has failed to comply with the Iowa Rules of
Appellate Procedure.” (citation omitted)). In doing so, we will “restrain[]
ourselves from undertaking the role of an advocate and developing
arguments” for Zachary. Duggan, 2025 WL 854988, at *2.
3
Zachary also challenges economic provisions of the decree, including the child
support, spousal support, and cash property settlement awarded to Brittany. But he failed
to state how error was preserved on these issues, and Brittany contends that it was not.
Cf. State v. Stoen, 596 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Iowa 1999) (declining to find waiver because of
appellate rule violations where it was clear the issues were raised and ruled upon). Because
we will not do that work for him, we find these issues are waived. See Ronnfeldt v. Shelby
Cnty. Chris A. Myrtue Mem’l Hosp., 984 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Iowa 2023).
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III. Motion to Set Aside Default
Brittany first sought a divorce from Zachary in July 2023, after almost
ten years of marriage and two children together. That November, she and the
children moved out of the marital home. The parties attended mediation and
agreed to joint physical care of the children while their divorce was pending.
In June 2024, in hopes of reconciling, the couple dismissed the
dissolution proceeding. But their reunion was short-lived. At the end of July,
Brittany told Zachary their relationship was over. She filed her second
dissolution petition in August, requesting joint legal custody and physical
care of the children, along with child support, spousal support, and equitable
division of their property, and attorney fees. Zachary was personally served
with notice of that petition on September 5.
After more than twenty days passed with no answer from Zachary,
Brittany mailed him notice of her intent to seek a default judgment. See Iowa
R. Civ. P. 1.972(3)(a). Despite that notice, Zachary failed to act. So Brittany
filed an application for default judgment on October 16. See id. 1.972(2). Two
days later, the district court directed the clerk to enter a default against
Zachary and set a hearing on Brittany’s requested relief for December 20.
The day before the hearing, Brittany filed a motion to continue because she
had just received subpoenaed records from Zachary’s bank. The court
granted Brittany’s motion and reset the hearing for January 17, 2025.
At the hearing, which Zachary did not attend, Brittany testified in
support of the relief that she requested in the dissolution petition. She also
presented the court with an affidavit of financial status, child support
guidelines, tax returns, paystubs, and a proposed property division. Brittany
told the district court that Zachary knew about the dissolution proceedings
but was not taking it seriously. Later that day, the district court entered a
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default dissolution decree placing the parties’ children in their joint legal
custody and Brittany’s physical care, with visitation for Zachary. The court
also ordered Zachary to pay Brittany child support, spousal support, a cash
property settlement, and some of her attorney fees.
Zachary moved to set aside the default decree on February 11,
contending it was inequitable and inaccurate.4 At the hearing on the motion,
Zachary maintained that other than the dissolution petition, he “received
nothing else.” Yet Zachary acknowledged that he had been personally served
with notice of the petition, his address was correct, and he was “aware that
this divorce was pending.” When asked why he “chose not to do anything,”
Zachary answered, “because frankly I didn’t know if it was ever going to turn
around again.” Brittany testified that she never led Zachary to believe the
second dissolution would be dismissed; he was “simply just not handling his
affairs.” She noted that there were “piles” of unopened mail at his house and
that default judgments had been entered against him in several other actions.
The district court denied Zachary’s motion to set aside the default,
ruling:
Zachary introduced no evidence that he made any effort to respond
to the petition and original notice in this case. He had defended the
previous divorce action and must have understood the need to respond as
a result. Zachary’s claims that he never received notice of the intent to take
default or the default hearings was not credible. The court finds that he
simply ignored those notices as he was clearly ignoring other legal
proceedings and mail.
Zachary did not make any effort to defend this action until after
judgment was entered and Brittany began to follow the newly ordered
visitation schedule. Zachary may have convinced himself that Brittany
4
The district court did not rule on Zachary’s challenge to the merits of the decree,
and Zachary did not file a motion asking the court to do so. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2).
7
would ultimately dismiss the case or that the result would be similar to the
agreement reached in the earlier case, but he had no reasonable basis to
believe that would be the case. He cannot bury his head in the sand like an
ostrich and then complain when he is unhappy with the result.
“In ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment, the district
court is vested with broad discretion and will only be reversed if that
discretion is abused.” Sheeder v. Boyette, 764 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct. App.
2009). Here, Zachary claims the court abused its discretion by failing to apply
our “strong preference for resolving cases on their merits rather than by
default.” See No Boundry, LLC v. Hoosman, 953 N.W.2d 696, 699–700 (Iowa
2021). But that objective is “qualified because it cannot be extended to the
point where a default judgment will be vacated when the movant has ignored
the rules of procedure with ample opportunity to abide by them.” Sheeder,
764 N.W.2d at 780. Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.977, a party seeking
to set aside a default judgment must show “good cause” based on “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty.” “Good
cause is a sound, effective, and truthful reason. It is something more than an
excuse, a plea, apology, extenuation, or some justification, for the resulting
effect.” No Boundry, 953 N.W.2d at 700 (citation omitted).
On appeal, Zachary does not identify any “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty” to explain his failure to
respond to the dissolution petition. Iowa R. App. 1.977. Instead, he blames
Brittany, contending that she “saw all this mail piling up” but didn’t
“mention that he should look” at it. He also argues that if Brittany had
“taken action to set up a temporary schedule or mediate” the second
dissolution, “he would have . . . been on alert that she truly was going through
with this divorce.” In sum, Zachary asserts that Brittany’s actions “led [him]
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to the errant belief that this was not a dissolution to be taken as seriously as
it should have.”
These excuses do not satisfy Zachary’s burden under rule 1.977. See
No Boundry, 953 N.W.2d at 700 (“The burden is on the movant to plead and
prove good cause.” (citation omitted)). Brittany served Zachary with notice
of the divorce and complied with our default judgment rules when he failed
to act. Her petition notified him about the relief she was seeking, which
included physical care of the children. And Brittany’s text messages to
Zachary told him that she had given up on reconciling. It was not Brittany’s
responsibility to tell Zachary to open his mail—he should have done that on
his own. Zachary simply made no effort to appear in response to proper
notice. See In re Marriage of Dorland, No. 16-0132, 2016 WL 6652367, at *3–4
(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016) (affirming the denial of a motion to set aside a
default judgment where the movant “chose to ignore the rules of civil
procedure despite being afforded ample opportunity to abide by them”). As
a result, the default judgment must stand. See Sheeder, 764 N.W.2d at 780
(stating we “have never upheld” a ruling setting aside a default judgment
“where the movant fails to show any effort to appear in response to a due and
timely notice” (citation omitted)). We accordingly affirm the district court’s
ruling denying Zachary’s motion to set aside the default judgment.
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees
Brittany asks for an award of $5,350.86 in appellate attorney fees, as
itemized in an attorney fee affidavit. “In determining whether to award
appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party seeking the award,
the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” In
re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2013) (cleaned up).
After considering these factors—and Zachary’s appellate rule violations that
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increased the work that had to be performed by Brittany’s attorney—we
award Brittany the requested appellate attorney fees of $5,350.86.
AFFIRMED.
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