Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1409 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ In re the Marriage of Brittany P. Goken and Zachary M. Goken Upon the Petition of Brittany P. Goken, Petitioner–Appellee, And Concerning Zachary M. Goken, Respondent–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, The Honorable Christopher L. Bruns, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Chad R. Frese of Kaplan & Frese, LLP, Marshalltown, attorney for appellant. Melissa A. Nine of Nine Law Office, Marshalltown, attorney for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Badding, P.J., Sandy, J., and Vogel, S.J. Opinion by Badding, P. J. 1 BADDING, Presiding Judge. Calling the filings in this case “a hot mess,” Brittany Goken asks us to dismiss Zachary Goken’s appeal from a district court ruling that denied his motion to set aside a default decree dissolving their marriage. There are serious issues with Zachary’s filings, starting with the thirty-nine-day delay between when he served his notice of appeal and filed it in the district court and continuing with his appellate briefing. Although the violations are not trivial, we conclude they do not prevent us from reaching the district court’s ruling, which we affirm on its merits. I. Timeliness of Appeal Because it impacts our jurisdiction, we first consider whether Zachary’s notice of appeal was timely. See Evenson v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 922 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 2019) (“Failure to file a timely notice of appeal leaves us without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal.”). Under our appellate rules, an appeal “is taken by filing a notice of appeal within the time provided in rule 6.101(1)(b) with the clerk of the district court where the final order was entered.” Iowa R. App. 6.102(2). Rule 6.101(1)(b), in turn, requires the notice of appeal to be filed “within 30 days after the filing of the final order or judgment.” “This strict thirty-day requirement is somewhat tempered by rule 6.101(4), which tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal ʻwhen the notice is served, provided the notice is filed with the district court clerk within a reasonable time.’” Brendeland v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 14 N.W.3d 135, 142 (Iowa 2024) (quoting Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(4)). The tolling allowed under rule 6.101(4) injects “some flexibility” into the appellate process by allowing the filing to “be completed within ʻa reasonable time’ after serving.” Cook v. 2 City of Council Bluffs, 264 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Iowa 1978) (en banc); accord Brendeland, 14 N.W.3d at 142. Zachary filed his notice of appeal with the clerk of the supreme court on August 28, 2025—the same day that the district court entered its order denying his motion to set aside the default. The notice stated that it was served on the district court clerk and opposing counsel through the electronic data management system. But Zachary did not file the notice of appeal with the district court clerk until October 6—a delay of thirty-nine days.1 Was that delay reasonable? Our supreme court has “embraced a purely time-based approach” in answering the reasonableness question under rule 6.101(4). Brendeland, 14 N.W.3d at 143 (surveying cases). It has deemed a delay of sixty-three days “obviously” unreasonable. Gordon v. Wright Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 320 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Iowa 1982). But it has found delays of up to thirty-five days do not “cross the line.” Brendeland, 14 N.W.3d at 144; see also Thayer v. State, 653 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Iowa 2002) (thirty-two days); Cook, 264 N.W.2d at 787 (twenty-six days). Unpublished decisions from our court have approved filing delays slightly longer than that. See In re K.C., No. 20-1105, 2021 WL 609081, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2021) (forty-three days); Deng v. White, No. 18-1672, 2019 WL 6358427, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2019) (forty 1 After Zachary filed his notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court, the supreme court ordered him to file a statement “regarding whether a 39-day delay in filing his notice of appeal after service is a reasonable amount of time.” Zachary’s statement asserted that the “oversight in not filing the notice in the district court was a clerical error not prejudicial to the Appellee.” The court ordered the issue to be submitted with the appeal. 3 days). Under these cases, we find that Zachary’s thirty-nine-day delay was reasonable. We therefore have jurisdiction to address his appeal.2 II. Appellate Briefing Violations We next consider Brittany’s assertion that we should dismiss the appeal because Zachary failed “to substantially comply with the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure.” As Brittany correctly notes, Zachary’s appellate brief commits several violations of our rules. The table of authorities does not list the pages of the brief where the authorities are cited, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(2); the argument section does not address how the issues were preserved, with references to the record, see id. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(1); and the conclusion does not state the precise relief sought, see id. 6.903(2)(a)(9). Zachary also failed to state the standard of review for each of his issues or support each statement of fact with references to the record. See id. 6.903(2)(a)(6), (2)(a)(8)(2). And although his argument includes some general case law and statutes, Zachary does not connect those authorities to any substantive analysis on the issues presented in his appeal. See id. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (requiring “citations to the authorities relied on” to support the contentions in the appellant’s brief ). 2 We note that unlike the appellant in Brendeland, Zachary made other missteps in perfecting his appeal, including failing to timely pay the appellate filing fee, failing to timely file the combined certificate with the district court clerk, and failing to serve the combined certificate on one of the court reporters he listed in the certificate. Cf. Brendeland, 14 N.W.3d at 141 (noting the appellant “had taken all other steps in a timely fashion to perfect the appeal”); Deng, 2019 WL 6358427, at *3 (noting the docket fee was timely paid, the combined certificate was timely filed, and the transcript was timely ordered). But these missteps do not change our conclusion because “the primary focus” is “on the period of time involved” between serving and filing the notice of appeal. Brendeland, 14 N.W.3d at 143. 4 “Rule infractions are not a trivial matter” and can “lead to summary disposition of the appeal or waiver of an issue.” State v. Lange, 831 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013); see also Myers v. Sellers, 234 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Iowa 1975) (dismissing appeal for briefing violations). Our “principal role is to dispose justly of a high volume of cases.” Lange, 831 N.W.2d at 847. A party’s noncompliance interferes with that mandate and wastes judicial resources, “which is unfair to litigants who brief cases in compliance with the rules and adds to delays in the appellate process.” In re Marriage of Duggan, No. 23-1699, 2025 WL 854988, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2025). Because of the violations listed above, we could summarily dispose of the appeal as Brittany requests. We instead choose to reach the merits of the one issue that is properly before us: whether the district court erred in denying Zachary’s motion to set aside the default dissolution decree.3 See Smith v. Scarborough, No. 25-1674, 2026 WL 3017016, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2026) (“As a matter of grace, we have on occasion determined an appeal even though the appellant has failed to comply with the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure.” (citation omitted)). In doing so, we will “restrain[] ourselves from undertaking the role of an advocate and developing arguments” for Zachary. Duggan, 2025 WL 854988, at *2. 3 Zachary also challenges economic provisions of the decree, including the child support, spousal support, and cash property settlement awarded to Brittany. But he failed to state how error was preserved on these issues, and Brittany contends that it was not. Cf. State v. Stoen, 596 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Iowa 1999) (declining to find waiver because of appellate rule violations where it was clear the issues were raised and ruled upon). Because we will not do that work for him, we find these issues are waived. See Ronnfeldt v. Shelby Cnty. Chris A. Myrtue Mem’l Hosp., 984 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Iowa 2023). 5 III. Motion to Set Aside Default Brittany first sought a divorce from Zachary in July 2023, after almost ten years of marriage and two children together. That November, she and the children moved out of the marital home. The parties attended mediation and agreed to joint physical care of the children while their divorce was pending. In June 2024, in hopes of reconciling, the couple dismissed the dissolution proceeding. But their reunion was short-lived. At the end of July, Brittany told Zachary their relationship was over. She filed her second dissolution petition in August, requesting joint legal custody and physical care of the children, along with child support, spousal support, and equitable division of their property, and attorney fees. Zachary was personally served with notice of that petition on September 5. After more than twenty days passed with no answer from Zachary, Brittany mailed him notice of her intent to seek a default judgment. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.972(3)(a). Despite that notice, Zachary failed to act. So Brittany filed an application for default judgment on October 16. See id. 1.972(2). Two days later, the district court directed the clerk to enter a default against Zachary and set a hearing on Brittany’s requested relief for December 20. The day before the hearing, Brittany filed a motion to continue because she had just received subpoenaed records from Zachary’s bank. The court granted Brittany’s motion and reset the hearing for January 17, 2025. At the hearing, which Zachary did not attend, Brittany testified in support of the relief that she requested in the dissolution petition. She also presented the court with an affidavit of financial status, child support guidelines, tax returns, paystubs, and a proposed property division. Brittany told the district court that Zachary knew about the dissolution proceedings but was not taking it seriously. Later that day, the district court entered a 6 default dissolution decree placing the parties’ children in their joint legal custody and Brittany’s physical care, with visitation for Zachary. The court also ordered Zachary to pay Brittany child support, spousal support, a cash property settlement, and some of her attorney fees. Zachary moved to set aside the default decree on February 11, contending it was inequitable and inaccurate.4 At the hearing on the motion, Zachary maintained that other than the dissolution petition, he “received nothing else.” Yet Zachary acknowledged that he had been personally served with notice of the petition, his address was correct, and he was “aware that this divorce was pending.” When asked why he “chose not to do anything,” Zachary answered, “because frankly I didn’t know if it was ever going to turn around again.” Brittany testified that she never led Zachary to believe the second dissolution would be dismissed; he was “simply just not handling his affairs.” She noted that there were “piles” of unopened mail at his house and that default judgments had been entered against him in several other actions. The district court denied Zachary’s motion to set aside the default, ruling: Zachary introduced no evidence that he made any effort to respond to the petition and original notice in this case. He had defended the previous divorce action and must have understood the need to respond as a result. Zachary’s claims that he never received notice of the intent to take default or the default hearings was not credible. The court finds that he simply ignored those notices as he was clearly ignoring other legal proceedings and mail. Zachary did not make any effort to defend this action until after judgment was entered and Brittany began to follow the newly ordered visitation schedule. Zachary may have convinced himself that Brittany 4 The district court did not rule on Zachary’s challenge to the merits of the decree, and Zachary did not file a motion asking the court to do so. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2). 7 would ultimately dismiss the case or that the result would be similar to the agreement reached in the earlier case, but he had no reasonable basis to believe that would be the case. He cannot bury his head in the sand like an ostrich and then complain when he is unhappy with the result. “In ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment, the district court is vested with broad discretion and will only be reversed if that discretion is abused.” Sheeder v. Boyette, 764 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). Here, Zachary claims the court abused its discretion by failing to apply our “strong preference for resolving cases on their merits rather than by default.” See No Boundry, LLC v. Hoosman, 953 N.W.2d 696, 699–700 (Iowa 2021). But that objective is “qualified because it cannot be extended to the point where a default judgment will be vacated when the movant has ignored the rules of procedure with ample opportunity to abide by them.” Sheeder, 764 N.W.2d at 780. Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.977, a party seeking to set aside a default judgment must show “good cause” based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty.” “Good cause is a sound, effective, and truthful reason. It is something more than an excuse, a plea, apology, extenuation, or some justification, for the resulting effect.” No Boundry, 953 N.W.2d at 700 (citation omitted). On appeal, Zachary does not identify any “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty” to explain his failure to respond to the dissolution petition. Iowa R. App. 1.977. Instead, he blames Brittany, contending that she “saw all this mail piling up” but didn’t “mention that he should look” at it. He also argues that if Brittany had “taken action to set up a temporary schedule or mediate” the second dissolution, “he would have . . . been on alert that she truly was going through with this divorce.” In sum, Zachary asserts that Brittany’s actions “led [him] 8 to the errant belief that this was not a dissolution to be taken as seriously as it should have.” These excuses do not satisfy Zachary’s burden under rule 1.977. See No Boundry, 953 N.W.2d at 700 (“The burden is on the movant to plead and prove good cause.” (citation omitted)). Brittany served Zachary with notice of the divorce and complied with our default judgment rules when he failed to act. Her petition notified him about the relief she was seeking, which included physical care of the children. And Brittany’s text messages to Zachary told him that she had given up on reconciling. It was not Brittany’s responsibility to tell Zachary to open his mail—he should have done that on his own. Zachary simply made no effort to appear in response to proper notice. See In re Marriage of Dorland, No. 16-0132, 2016 WL 6652367, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016) (affirming the denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment where the movant “chose to ignore the rules of civil procedure despite being afforded ample opportunity to abide by them”). As a result, the default judgment must stand. See Sheeder, 764 N.W.2d at 780 (stating we “have never upheld” a ruling setting aside a default judgment “where the movant fails to show any effort to appear in response to a due and timely notice” (citation omitted)). We accordingly affirm the district court’s ruling denying Zachary’s motion to set aside the default judgment. IV. Appellate Attorney Fees Brittany asks for an award of $5,350.86 in appellate attorney fees, as itemized in an attorney fee affidavit. “In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2013) (cleaned up). After considering these factors—and Zachary’s appellate rule violations that 9 increased the work that had to be performed by Brittany’s attorney—we award Brittany the requested appellate attorney fees of $5,350.86. AFFIRMED. 10