Larry Lewis, individually and as Trustee of the Claude, Doc & Larry Lewis Irrevocable Trust v. Tom Jimenez
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledAugust 19, 2026
Docket25-1813
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1813
Filed August 19, 2026
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Larry Lewis, individually and as Trustee of the Claude, Doc & Larry
Lewis Irrevocable Trust,
Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
Tom Jimenez,
Defendant–Appellee.
_______________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monroe County,
The Honorable Amber L. Thompson, Judge.
_______________
AFFIRMED
_______________
S.P. DeVolder of The DeVolder Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Norwalk,
attorney for appellants.
John A. Morrissey of Court Street Law Offices, Fairfield, and Edwin F.
Kelly, Oskaloosa, attorneys for appellee.
_______________
Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
Opinion by Schumacher, P.J.
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SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
Larry Lewis appeals the district court’s judgment and order following
a bench trial that dismissed his claims of trespass, negligence, willful
property damage, and intentional removal of monuments against his
neighbor, Tom Jimenez. Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Lewis is the trustee and manager of the Claude, Doc, and Larry Lewis
Irrevocable Trust (the trust), which owns farmland in Monroe County.
Lewis’s neighbor to the east and south is Jimenez, who also operates
farmland. Previously, relatives of Lewis, two brothers, owned both
properties. Lewis has had control and operated his farm continuously since
either 1994 or 1995. Jimenez began renting the farmland to the south and east
in 1999 and eventually purchased it in 2001. Both farms are primarily tillable
acres used for row cropping.
The farms share and are separated by approximately one and a quarter
mile of fenceline. The fenceline was separated in the district court
proceedings into three sections for ease of identification: Fence #1 runs north
and south for one-half mile from 110th Street to the north, with its southern
corner meeting Fence #2; Fence #2 runs east and west for one-quarter mile
from the corner meeting Fence #1 then west to the northern corner of Fence
#3; and Fence #3 runs north and south for one-half mile from the western
corner of Fence #2 and runs south to the end of the parties’ neighboring land.
Jason Rogers has been custom farming the Lewis farm since 2021, with
Lewis paying Rogers to plant, spray, fertilize, and harvest the crops that are
owned and sold by Lewis. Randy Rozenboom is a cash rent tenant of the
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Jimenez farm; Rozenboom plants, sprays, fertilizes, and harvests his crop on
the Jimenez farmland.
Lewis’s first claim for trespass and negligence involved alleged crop
loss in 2021 and 2022 from over spraying or drifting herbicides from the
Jimenez farm onto Lewis’s farm. The alleged errant spraying happened in
proximity to Fence #1, destroying Lewis’s soybeans and corn. Lewis based
this claim on the testimony of Jason Rogers. Rogers testified that the spraying
that caused damage must have originated from the Jimenez farm, and he
stated he personally observed the loss by seeing dead or dying crops. Rogers
also compared crop yields in 2021 and 2022 to other years and found
significant deviation, purportedly showing diminished yields. Rogers
estimated the losses for the 2021 and 2022 yields totaled $8,500.
The second claim for trespass and negligence arose from Jimenez
allegedly altering his land near Fence #1, which increased water flow onto
Lewis’s farm. This alteration occurred in 2020 because of terracing, tile
work, and the addition of dirt on the Jimenez farm. Lewis claimed that this
increased waterflow caused large ditches in his land and erosion. Rogers and
Lewis both testified they observed this increase in waterflow. Lewis offered
evidence that remediation expenses for the waterflow totaled $25,190.20,
work that included bulldozing, dirt fill, and tile work.
Third, Lewis asserted a trespass and negligence claim based on
construction and placement of the fenceline between the parties’ farms. Prior
to 2015, Fence #1 was historically considered the boundary between the two
farms in that section. In 2015, Lewis and Jimenez agreed to remove Fence #1,
clean the line, and reconstruct the fence in the same place. The fenceline was
rebuilt in 2021. During the period between 2015 and 2021, both parties
continued to plant and harvest up to the original fence line. But, as Lewis
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testified, Jimenez allegedly rebuilt his side of the fence aiming at a gate pole
west of the original fence line, encroaching six to eight feet on Lewis’s
property. Lewis then hired a surveyor to determine the farm boundaries.
Lewis did this without notifying Jimenez. The surveyor believed the property
line should have been altered up to six feet on Jimenez’s land near the north
end of Fence #1. Lewis asserts the total invoice from the survey was $2,700
and that he lost an acre of land because of the new fence placement, valued
at $12,000.
After this survey, the surveyor placed rebar markers in the field that
Jimenez had traditionally farmed to indicate where the former legal property
boundary was located. Jimenez discovered these markers sticking out of the
ground and removed them as they could potentially damage his farm
equipment. While removing the rods, Jimenez measured from where the rods
were to the boundary fence. He wrote the distances with permanent marker
on duct tape that he attached to the boundary fence. Jimenez did this to
indicate the distance from the fence to where each marker had been placed.
Jimenez found later that someone had removed the setoff tape markers and
that new rods had been placed in the field. This time, Jimenez drove the rods
into the ground. These actions by Jimenez form the basis of Lewis’s
destruction-of-monuments claim.
Lastly, Lewis claims that in rebuilding Fence #1, Jimenez failed to build
a “livestock-tight” fence on his section, amounting to negligence. He asserts
he sustained $13,500 in damages from the defective portion of the fence
because he was unable to graze cattle for three years, and he estimated repair
costs to fix Jimenez’s side of the fence to be $11,800.
After a two-day bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of Jimenez
on all counts. Regarding the fence encroachment, the district court found
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that credible testimony showed the fence line was in the same location since
at least 1999, and that boundary-by-acquiescence may apply. For the crop-
damage claim, the court found there was not a preponderance of evidence
showing the alleged crop damage was caused by Jimenez. The district court
also found that Lewis may have experienced erosion on his land from water
run-off, but there was insufficient proof that Jimenez caused it. Concerning
the claim that Jimenez failed to build a tight fence, the court found there was
no duty required of Jimenez to build such a fence without a written
agreement. Lastly, the district court ruled that the surveyor pins that Jimenez
removed did not qualify as “monuments” under Iowa Code section 355.1(7)
(2024), and Jimenez acted reasonably to protect his equipment. Lewis now
appeals.
II. Analysis
We review a district court’s judgments in a bench trial for correction
of errors at law. See Walnut Creek Townhome Ass’n v. Depositors Ins. Co., 913
N.W.2d 80, 87 (Iowa 2018). “The district court’s factual findings in a bench
trial are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (cleaned
up). “[E]vidence [is] substantial if a reasonable person would accept the
evidence as adequate to reach the district court’s conclusion.” Smith v. State,
845 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted). “In determining whether
substantial evidence exists, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the district court’s judgment.” Chrysler Fin. Co. v. Bergstrom, 703 N.W.2d
415, 418 (Iowa 2005). The burden of proof in civil cases is measured by
preponderance of the evidence. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(f ).
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A. Trespass Claims
“[A] claim for trespass on land is the wrongful interference with one’s
possessory rights in property.” Garrison v. New Fashion Pork LLP, 977 N.W.2d
67, 89 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). A person who intentionally “enters
land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or third person to do so”
commits trespass. Robert’s River Rides, Inc. v. Steamboat Dev. Corp., 520
N.W.2d 294, 301 (Iowa 1994) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by,
Barreca v. Nickolas, 683 N.W.2d 111, 123 (Iowa 2004).
We begin by determining if substantial evidence supports the district
court’s ruling that Lewis failed to prove Jimenez trespassed on Lewis’s land
by rebuilding Fence #1 on an incorrect boundary line. Lewis claims that
Jimenez rebuilt the north half of Fence #1 using the wrong guidepost,
resulting in the fence encroaching on Lewis’s land by six to eight feet. Lewis
alleges this caused him to lose approximately one acre of land to Jimenez.
Lewis bases this claim on the survey he commissioned that showed the
historical property line did not align with Fence #1 before and after it was
rebuilt.
We find the district court correctly determined substantial evidence
supports an absence of trespass on this claim. The district court explained:
[T]he surveyor’s findings support Lewis’ contention that the north end of
Fence #1 was directed north to the wrong post and is, therefore,
encroaching on Lewis’ property. The question, however, is when did this
encroachment start?
Jimenez testified that Fence #1 was removed in 2015 at Lewis’
request. The property line remained without a fence for several years and
each party farmed along the property line as they previously had as the
fence line was still visible . . . . Jimenez testified that the current position
of his farm field is where the field has always been for as long as he has
farmed the ground since 1999 . . . . Rozenboom recalls farming it through
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the years after 2015 when there was no fence and could still farm up to the
same lines, which were visible. Jimenez claims the current location of the
fence to be the boundary by acquiescence.
....
[T]he claim from Jimenez and Rozenboom that the fence line has
been in its current location at least since 1999 is supported by the assessor’s
aerial photographs showing the field entrances in the field and the fence
line running south from the road. The issue is not directly before the Court
in this matter, but it is plausible that the current location of the fence is
now the boundary line by acquiescence.
It was Lewis’ burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the fence is a trespass on his land but there is no evidence, other than
Lewis’ memory, that Jimenez put Fence #1 back in a place it wasn’t in
2015. Based upon the evidence presented to the Court and the credible
testimony of Jimenez and Rozenboom, the Court believes it is quite
possible that Fence #1 has been running to the wrong corner post for
twenty years or more. It is quite likely Jimenez was in possession of the
land for which Lewis claims he is now trespassing on. A person cannot be
found to have trespassed on land he has known as his own for nearly 25
years.
....
. . . . By this ruling, the Court is not making any ruling on the legal
boundary line between the parties. In finding there was no trespass, the
Court is only making a finding that there could be a legitimate claim under
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence which negates the trespass claim
and the intentions of the defendant. The issue of the parties’ boundary line
is not before the Court in this action, and the Court makes no definitive
finding relative thereto.
The district court found the testimony of Jimenez and his cash rent
tenant to be credible, “[a]nd credibility questions are reserved for the
factfinder.” State v. Lang, 30 N.W.3d 757, 764 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc).
Further, we agree with the district court that the historical recognition of the
boundary line of Fence #1 implies that Jimenez was unaware of the possibility
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of trespass, showing a lack of intentionality. Because we defer to the district
court’s fact judgments, we find substantial evidence supports the ruling in
favor of Jimenez on this issue. Chrysler Fin. Co., 703 N.W.2d at 418.1
We now consider Lewis’s next trespass claim—that Jimenez or his
agents over sprayed herbicide onto the Lewis farm, damaging his hay,
soybean, and corn crops. Lewis alleges this occurred in 2020, 2021, and 2022
to each respective crop. Substantial evidence supports the district court’s
finding that Lewis failed to prove this claim.
Although Lewis and his tenant stated they observed crop damage from
overspray in the fields bordering Jimenez’s farm in 2020 and 2021, the
district court found the corroborating exhibits offered were unconvincing.
The exhibits were maps that showed low crop yields in red during those
years. The district court noted “it is not obvious that the red low yield
portions on the map are solely along the Lewis Jimenez boundary line.” And
Rozenboom testified that the maps appeared to originate from combine data,
which can be affected by the combine’s speed, and can be “a little bit
deceiving because when the combine speeds up or slows down, it would be a
difference on the recording in the mass load sensor.”
We find the district court did not err in determining, “The claim is
simply not proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Further, we also find
the district court did not err in dismissing Lewis’s willful destruction of crops
1
Lewis also raised an identical claim regarding the east-west Fence #2, alleging
Jimenez moved the fence north by six feet in 2015, constituting trespass. We agree with
the district court, which held, “There was simply little to no evidence offered to support
this claim. The allegation itself is from 2015, more than five years before the petition was
filed. It is therefore denied for lack of sufficient proof and beyond the statute of
limitations.” See Iowa Code § 614.1(4).
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claim based on over spraying in violation of Iowa Code section 717A.3 for the
same reasoning.
Lewis’s final trespass claim alleged that Jimenez or his agents terraced
his land adjoining the east portion of Lewis’s farm in 2022, causing increased
waterflow and flooding to his farm. The district court’s judgment and order
extensively detailed the facts relevant to this claim. Importantly, Jimenez’s
farm sits at a higher elevation than Lewis’s farm. The evidence shows that
Jimenez, since he purchased the farm in 2001, made many modifications to
his land to mitigate flooding and erosion. But Lewis still experienced flooding
and erosion that he also attempted to mitigate, and he blamed Jimenez.
Absent testimony from the parties and their agents concerning the mitigation
efforts, the only evidence allegedly showing water damage is a few photos of
Lewis’s land showing a small ditch that could have been formed by erosion.
The evidence concerning this issue was murky at best, and the district court
determined:
The Court did not hear from a single neutral party regarding
whether the terrace and basin work done on the Jimenez property was
done properly or was the cause of the increased erosion problems on the
Lewis farm. The Court is left with the opinion of Lewis and his tenant
versus the opinion of Jimenez and his tenant. Other than Exhibits . . .
which show a washout area in a grassy part of Lewis’ farm, there is no
additional evidence of the erosion provided to the Court and certainly no
evidence of the cause of the erosion. It is Lewis’ burden to prove that
Jimenez or his agents caused excess water runoff constituting a trespass on
Lewis’ farm. The Court believes Lewis experienced increased issues with
soil erosion on his farm as evidenced by the work he had completed but is
not convinced that there is enough evidence to prove Jimenez or his agents
were the cause of it. Lewis has not met his burden to prove trespass by
excess water runoff.
Because substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings that
Lewis failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Jimenez
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directly caused the alleged waterflow damage, we find the district court did
not err in dismissing this claim. See Walnut Creek Townhome Ass’n, 913
N.W.2d at 87; Lang, 30 N.W.3d at 764.
B. Negligence Claims
Lewis also claims that Jimenez acted negligently with actual or legal
malice by the same facts as above regarding crop damage, water-caused
property damage, the rebuilt fence line, and, further, in Jimenez failing to
maintain a livestock-tight fence. Lewis asserts these actions support an award
for punitive damages.
“The essential elements of a tort claim for negligence generally
include: (1) the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to protect
plaintiff from injury; (2) a failure to perform that duty; (3) a reasonably close
causal connection, i.e., legal or proximate cause; and (4) damages.” Garcia v.
Iowa Interstate R.R., No. 11-1721, 2013 WL 988635, at *4 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 13, 2013) (quoting Bockelman v. State, 366 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa
1985)). One “acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care
under all the circumstances.” Hill v. Damm, 804 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2011) (citation omitted). “Primary factors to consider in ascertaining
whether the person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable
likelihood that person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity
of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or
reduce the risk of harm.” Id. (citation omitted).
To establish proximate cause, “a plaintiff must show both that the
defendant’s conduct in fact caused the plaintiff’s damage, and that the policy
of the law requires the defendant to be legally responsible for them.” Warner
v. Moore, No. 05-0403, 2006 WL 334259, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2006)
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(cleaned up). The foreseeability of the damage by the defendant “is an
important element in the establishment of causation.” Id. (citation omitted).
If a plaintiff meets their burden of showing damages, punitive damages
may be appropriate if, “Whether, by a preponderance of clear, convincing,
and satisfactory evidence, the conduct of the defendant . . . constituted
willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of another.” Iowa Code
§ 668A.1(1)(a). To award punitive damages, the plaintiff must show actual or
legal malice on the part of the defendant. Clark-Peterson Co. v. Indep. Ins.
Assocs., Ltd. 514 N.W.2d 912, 916 (Iowa 1994). “A showing of wrongful
conduct committed or continued with willful or reckless disregard for
another’s rights is sometimes sufficient to show legal malice.” Id.
We incorporate our analysis above for the crop-damage, fenceline-
replacement, and water-runoff claims. Substantial evidence supports the
district court’s finding that Lewis failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Jimenez or his agents were the cause of the alleged damages.
So, Lewis has failed to show proximate cause on these claims, and
accordingly the district court did not err in finding Jimenez was not negligent.
It follows that an award of punitive damages is not appropriate. See Shepherd
Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612, 617
(Iowa 1991) (stating punitive damage awards, in requiring legal or actual
malice, should be based on “wrongful conduct . . . with a willful or reckless
disregard for another’s rights” (emphasis added)).
Lewis’s remaining negligence claim is based on Jimenez failing to
maintain a livestock-tight fence on his half such that Lewis could not safely
graze cattle on his property. Lewis’s complaints concerning Jimenez’s half of
the fence include the barbed wire being rusty, too many splices in the wire,
and the distances between the fence posts. Lewis asserts that he requested
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Jimenez build a fence of the same quality as Lewis’s and Jimenez failed to do
so. The district court found that the evidence showed Jimenez’s fence was
of lower quality and less tight than Lewis’s fence, “but finds no law requiring
Jimenez to match the quality of fence Lewis installed.”
Under Iowa law, neighboring properties can “be compelled to erect
and maintain partition fences, or contribute thereto, and keep the same in
good repair throughout the year” after a written request by either property
owner. Iowa Code § 359A.1A. “In case adjoining owners or occupants of land
shall use the same for pasturing sheep or swine, each shall keep that one’s
share of the partition fence in such condition as shall restrain such sheep or
swine.” Id. § 359A.21. When a controversy accrues concerning a partition
fence, fence viewers who serve as trustees of the local township “shall have
authority to hear and decide all questions related to matters that are part of
the controversy.” Id. § 359A.2A.
Here, as the district court pointed out, there was no evidence of a
written request or written agreement between the parties to maintain the
partition fence. Further, the evidence shows that at no time while owning the
farm Lewis or his tenant grazed cattle or any other livestock next to Jimenez’s
land. See id. § 359A.21. Lastly, Lewis never initiated proceedings with the
local fence viewers, who have authority to hear and decide issue of fencing
controversy per section 359A.2A.
“In Iowa there is no common law duty for landowners to fence their
property,” and landowners are only required to erect and maintain a partition
fence through a written agreement under section 359A.12 or written request
under section 359A.1A. Longfellow v. Sayler, 737 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Iowa
2007). We agree with the district court that because there was no written
request or agreement between the parties regarding a partition fence,
12
“Jimenez had no obligation to build or keep a tight fence.” Further, because
Lewis has not pastured livestock on the land adjoining Jimenez, Jimenez has
no obligation to maintain a tight fence. See Iowa Code § 359A.21. We find the
district court did not err in finding Jimenez was not negligent by failing to
maintain a tight fence.
C. Intentional Removal of Monuments
Lewis’s last claim is that Jimenez or his agents intentionally removed
“monuments”—the survey markers—in 2022 and 2023 with legal malice,
and Lewis should be awarded punitive damages.
We agree with the district court that the markers, metal rods placed in
the ground on the purported official boundary line between the properties,
are not “monuments.” The statutory definition of “ʻ[m]onument’ means a
physical structure which marks the location of a corner or other survey
point.” Id. § 355.1(7). “ʻCorner’ means a point at which two or more lines
meet.” Id. § 355.1(1).
The surveyor testified during trial that he located monuments “in the
field that have been set prior to my surveying by previous surveyors, and [the
plat survey] would show you the monuments I set during the survey.” But
during cross-examination, the surveyor clarified that the markers he placed
indicating the property line “would not have been technically survey
monuments.” Further, the surveyor referred to a “point of beginning” as
“the midpoint between two known survey monuments.” This testimony
shows a distinction between his placed markers and the preexisting corner
monuments. There is no evidence showing that a corner monument was
removed by Lewis, only the rebar markers that he felt could cause harm to his
farming equipment.
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Substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that Jimenez
did not intentionally, and with malice, remove any monuments.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Lewis’s claims.
AFFIRMED.
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