Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1086 Filed August 19, 2026 _______________ Timothy Micheal Wood, Applicant–Appellant, v. State of Iowa, Respondent–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, The Honorable Joel D. Yates, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Samantha Wagner, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Greer, P.J. 1 GREER, Presiding Judge. Timothy Wood appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief (PCR) challenging his parole revocation. He argues the PCR court failed to meaningfully analyze his ineffective-assistance claims. More specifically, Wood alleges his parole-revocation counsel failed to (1) investigate possible defenses, (2) challenge the scope and application of the parole condition prohibiting unauthorized contact with minors, and (3) present mitigating evidence relevant to the violation and proposed sanction. Additionally, Wood argues that if he had received effective assistance, there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different, including continuing parole or a lesser sanction. Upon our de novo review, we find that Wood is unable to prove prejudice given his admissions at the parole-revocation hearing, and so, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims fail. Thus, we affirm. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. In 2011, Wood was convicted of lascivious acts with a child, received a suspended ten-year prison sentence, and was placed on probation with a special lifetime parole under Iowa Code section 903B.1 (2011). He was released on parole, but his parole was revoked several times and then reinstated until his most recent revocation in November 2022. This recent revocation was due to several parole violations, some stemming from interactions with a minor in 2022. By way of a statement, the sixteen-year-old minor reported to Wood’s parole officer that she worked at a fast-food restaurant with Wood on September 4 and 5. On the first day, he approached her several times shortly after her shift began and emphasized his relationship status was single. She 2 described his remarks as giving her “the impression he was interested in [her] in a way that made [her] uncomfortable.” Her manager also noticed and sent her into the office to get her away from Wood when the restaurant was not busy. When she returned to work the following day, Wood repeatedly tried to engage her in conversation again and asked her age. She replied that she was sixteen. She reported that several of her coworkers had noted his inappropriate behavior toward her and had notified the manager. According to the minor, at one point, Wood got close to her and asked, “Do you value me as a friend?” Then he offered to stay late after his shift ended to cover her break time. The minor discussed these interactions with her parents who reported Wood’s actions to the manager at the fast-food restaurant. Ultimately, the manager fired Wood because he made people feel “uncomfortable” at work. On September 13, Wood met with his parole officer to discuss the incident. According to the violation report, Wood admitted that he was sexually attracted to the sixteen year old; he wanted to have a friendship with her; and even after he learned her age, “he continued to pursue contact with her.” Wood did not report contact with her until the complaint was made against him. Overall, the violation report alleged twelve different incidents, including the event with the minor, detailed the violations of the conditions of his parole, and recommended revocation and incarceration. At a November parole revocation hearing, a parole officer testified, “Mr. Wood pursued this [minor] in hopes of maybe her, you know, wanting to have a relationship with him. . . . Therefore, we are recommending revocation to prison.” Wood testified that he first met the minor on September 3 and thought she “looked young.” He was initially attracted to her, but he was no longer attracted to her after learning she was sixteen years 3 old. He also testified that he spoke with her on September 4 at work. An administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Iowa Board of Parole (IBOP) found that the State had met its burden of proof, and the parties presented arguments about whether the special sentence should be revoked. Wood testified, “I know that contact was not supposed to occur between me and [the minor].” He explained that he would have reported the conduct but for the holiday weekend and his inability to communicate with his parole officer over text and continued, “I knew it was wrong.” The ALJ then pointed out that the meeting with the parole officer happened over a week later, not the day after a holiday weekend, plus he did not come forward until the complaint was made. Ultimately the ALJ revoked Wood’s special parole for a period of up to five years because he violated his parole by failing to (1) maintain contact with his supervising officer as directed, (2) have no unapproved contact with a “minor child, direct or indirect,” (3) complete treatment, rehabilitation, and other programming, (4) complete sex offender treatment and aftertreatment programming, and (5) maintain employment. Wood appealed through the IBOP administrative appeal process. IBOP affirmed the revocation in December 2022, and Wood remains incarcerated. In 2023, Wood filed a PCR application arguing ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that his revocation-hearing attorney failed to adequately present his case, which resulted in unlawful detention or a harsher punishment. He also asserted he was actually innocent. In 2025, the PCR court held a hearing, and Wood testified that prior to working at the restaurant he had received verbal permission from his parole officer to communicate with minors “as it relates to work.” Also, Wood presented evidence of his GPS monitoring log that showed his location on the dates the minor claimed some of the conversations occurred. The log 4 showed that in 2022, he was at the restaurant from approximately 3:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. on Saturday, September 3, and from approximately 11:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, September 4. On Monday, September 5, the GPS log did not show Wood at the restaurant. His PCR counsel argued that this was a “significant discrepanc[y]” from the minor’s statement that the contact occurred on Saturday, September 4 and Sunday, September 5, but the State maintained the discrepancy only related to the minor referencing an incorrect date, not day of the week. Even so, Wood admitted that he had contact with the minor and that he did not report his contact with the minor to his parole officer. After a hearing, the court dismissed his PCR application. The PCR court found that Wood admitted that he found a minor sexually attractive, “continued to be attracted to her and approached her,” and did not inform his parole officer of his contact with the minor for over a week. Wood appeals. II. Error Preservation. “It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). The State argues that Wood failed to properly preserve error on his claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) “present mitigating evidence relevant to both the alleged violation and the appropriate sanction” and (2) “challenge the scope and application of the parole condition prohibiting unauthorized contact with minors.” During the PCR trial, Wood testified that he had been given verbal permission by his parole officer to have contact with minors at the restaurant 5 so long as it was related to work. Also, Wood’s PCR counsel questioned him about his revocation counsel’s failure to present witnesses to verify his GPS log showing his whereabouts on September 5. Wood was then asked: Q. Is this the basic allegation that you’re raising for ineffective assistance of counsel? A. Yes. Q. Are there any other grounds that you wish the Court to be aware of that you believe entitles you to relief? A. No. The PCR court order dismissing the PCR application only considers “the claim that Wood’s attorney failed to pursue certain exculpatory evidence and/or pursue certain witnesses.” The record shows that the claims raised before and decided by the PCR court were that his revocation counsel was ineffective for failing to admit evidence that he had verbal permission from his parole officer to have contact with a minor about work and evidence relating to his whereabouts on September 5, 2022. We only address these two preserved claims below. III. Standard of Review. Typically, we review PCR proceedings for correction of errors at law, but “we review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo.” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). IV. Analysis.1 We evaluate effectiveness of counsel under a two-prong test. State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 393 (Iowa 2007). To prevail on an ineffective- 1 For the purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that chapter-903B revocations are subject to postconviction relief and that there is a right to effective counsel at a 903B revocation hearing. 6 assistance-of-counsel claim, the applicant “must show that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted.” Id. If an applicant “fails to establish either of these elements, we need not address the remaining element.” Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 754 (Iowa 2016) (cleaned up). Under the prejudice prong, the applicant must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. We must decide whether there is a reasonable probability that, if Wood’s revocation counsel had presented evidence that (1) Wood’s parole officer had given him permission to communicate with a minor at work and (2) Wood was not at the restaurant on September 5, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Beginning with Wood’s claim that he received verbal permission from his parole officer, we note that at the revocation hearing, Wood testified he knew he was “not supposed to” contact the minor. Later he reaffirmed that he “knew it was wrong” and had planned on discussing it with his parole officer. Tellingly, he waited over a week and after the minor reported the contact to discuss the situation with his parole officer. In light of his admissions that what he did was wrong and considering his delay in reporting, his conflicting testimony that he had verbal permission from his parole officer does not create a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. He cannot prove prejudice on this claim. Next, we consider whether he was prejudiced by his revocation counsel not presenting evidence about his whereabouts on one of the dates the minor indicated they had contact. The minor claimed that the 7 interactions occurred on Saturday, September 4 and Sunday, September 5. At the PCR trial, Wood presented evidence that he was not at the restaurant on Monday, September 5, but did engage with her on both Saturday, September 3 and Sunday, September 4. While the dates given by the minor appear to be in error, the actual day of the week was correct in the minor’s report. We also note that Wood admitted to having the conversations that the minor described in the report, including asking her age. He differs with precisely what was said in those conversations, but he did admit to being there and talking to her over two days of employment. In the minor’s statement, she claimed that he was there prior to the start of her 5:00 p.m. shift that Sunday and his GPS records confirm that he was. She alleged that he offered to stay late when his shift ended at 7:00 p.m. in the evening and she continued working later. His GPS records confirm that he stayed at the restaurant until at least 7:00 p.m. Wood’s revocation counsel’s introduction of his GPS records would not have aided him because the minor did not allege that she had any contact with Wood on a Monday. For the same reasons as above, testimony from his own mother, brother, and girlfriend at the time concerning his whereabouts on Monday, September 5, would not have resulted in finding that he did not violate his parole. Wood cannot show that the reasonable probability that if the GPS log or witness testimony was provided the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Thus, he cannot show prejudice, and his claim fails. 8 V. Conclusion. Because Wood failed to prove the prejudice prong of his ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims; we affirm the PCR court’s denial of Wood’s PCR application. AFFIRMED. 9 10