Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0799 Filed August 19, 2026 _______________ Brett Thomas Wilkinson Petitioner–Appellant, v. Lacey Schmelzer, Respondent–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, The Honorable Thomas A. Bitter, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Brett Thomas Wilkinson, Boscobel, Wisconsin, self-represented appellant. Myia E. Steines of Clemens, Walters, Conlon, Runde & Hiatt, L.L.P., Dubuque, attorney for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Sandy, J. 1 SANDY, Judge. Brett Wilkinson appeals from the district court’s order granting Lacey Schmelzer physical care of the parties’ son, B.W., born in 2024. 1 Brett was granted reasonable visitation rights pursuant to the parties’ mutual agreement and a minimum visitation schedule. Brett contends the district court committed “reversible error” in admitting certain evidence while excluding other evidence and challenges Lacey’s credibility. Although child custody cases are equitable proceedings subject to de novo review, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Roberts, 954 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020), we still review evidentiary rulings in those cases for abuse of discretion, In re Marriage of Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464, 469 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). And we “defer especially” to the district court’s fact findings “where the credibility of witnesses is a factor in the outcome.” 2 Hora, 5 N.W.3d at 645 (cleaned up). While both parents are suitable caregivers, the parties’ relationship has been fraught with “immaturity” and “drama and divisiveness” dominating the co-parenting relationship. Thus, the district court was faced with the difficult task of deciding which parent is most likely to support the other parent’s relationship with the child. With those facts in mind and agreeing 1 The parties were never married. Our “legal analysis employed in resolving a question concerning the custody of a child born [to unmarried parents] is the same as that which would have been utilized if the child’s parents had been married and a dissolution of their marriage had resulted.” Hensch v. Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Lambert v. Everist, 418 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Iowa 1988)). 2 “This deference . . . is pragmatic because the district court has a front-row seat to the live testimony, viewing the demeanor of both the witness as she testifies and the parties while they listen, whereas our review is limited to reading black words on a white page of a sterile transcript.” Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024). 2 that “Lacey has been the party who has best tried to set aside her animosity and begin working toward the child’s best interests,” we agree that granting Lacey physical care is in the child’s best interests. And Brett has not preserved error on his evidentiary or credibility claims. For those reasons, we affirm. Lacey requests appellate attorney fees and additionally requests sanctions for Brett’s purported use of artificial intelligence (AI) in his appellate filings. Although we decline to impose sanctions, we award Lacey all her appellate attorney fees pursuant to her appellate-attorney-fee affidavit and assess costs to Brett. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Brett and Lacey started dating in 2022 and briefly lived together in both Missouri and Wisconsin. At the time of the 2025 trial, Brett was twenty- five years old and Lacey was twenty-four years old. Lacey gave birth to the child in March 2024 while the parties were living together in Wisconsin. The parties agree that their relationship deteriorated significantly over the course of the pregnancy. Brett alleges that Lacey suffered from mental health issues, and Lacey alleges that Brett engaged in physical and emotional abuse, including kicking her in the stomach while she was pregnant. While it is difficult to ascertain exactly how conflicts transpired during the pregnancy, the record establishes that it was a harbinger of the conflicts that escalated following the child’s birth. The parties ended their relationship in June 2024, shortly after the child’s birth. Following their split, Brett continued to live in Boscobel, Wisconsin where he works as a jail officer at Grant County Jail. Lacey moved to Durango, Iowa where she lives with her parents and works mixing feed for 3 livestock. The district court found that Lacey has been the historical caretaker during the life of the child, even while the two parents were living together. Lacey expressed that “sometimes it feels like I’m a single parent” and often attended the child’s doctor appointments without Brett. She testified that Brett had only cared for the child alone once while they were living together. After her initial move to Iowa, Lacey was “overly protective” of the child and would generally offer Brett visitation with the child in public places such as the local mall. Brett often refused these visits, as they were not offered on his terms. Yet, Lacey did offer to provide Brett with visitation of the child on Father’s Day 2024. Later that month, Brett petitioned for custody and visitation, requesting physical care of the child. The court entered a temporary-matters order in August, consistent with the parties’ agreement. That agreement provided that the parties would share the child on a 2-2-3 shared-physical-care schedule. This schedule appears to have greatly increased the opportunities for friction and conflict between Brett and Lacey, both of whom initially acted inappropriately and needlessly escalated conflict. Exchanges typically occurred at a Casey’s gas station. These exchanges began poorly due in part to the fact that Brett had just begun dating Lacey’s (former) close friend, Shannon. Shannon, who became engaged to Brett as early as November, regularly showed up to exchanges with Brett. Indeed, because of Brett’s work schedule, Shannon often showed up to exchanges alone to collect the child. This intensified Lacey’s self-perception as a target of Brett’s scorn. Lacey expressed frustration that Shannon, who had been there for Lacey as a friend in the delivery room, was now engaged to Brett and removing the child from Lacey’s possession multiple times per week. Police were called multiple 4 times by both sides during exchanges, and Lacey was charged twice with disorderly conduct and later pleaded guilty to one charge. Lacey testified to being diagnosed with postpartum depression and anxiety. She also testified that her symptoms have improved since she started taking medication and agreed that she is “in a better place now.” Additionally, some exchanges have been handled by Brett’s parents, which Lacey testified “go just fine. I can stand there and have a conversation with them, and we talk about [B.W.], how he’s doing, what’s he eating.” The district court explained that while Brett “has been the more calm and seemingly more stable parent, he has also been the parent who created more drama and divisiveness,” describing a more calculated approach to undermining Lacey. Most notably, Brett reported Lacey to the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services in June 2024, alleging abuse, denial of critical care, and failure to provide proper supervision. The department, which has had no other involvement with this family before or since, investigated and ultimately concluded that there were no safety concerns. The department’s family assessment summary found that the report was unfounded and the “[p]arents need to communicate and coparent for the sake of [B.W.].” Lacey did not know that Brett was the source of the abuse report until trial. Brett did not fully articulate the reason for his abuse report during his testimony but admitted he may have been “playing into the drama and chaos that was going on.” The district court proceeded to explain that Shannon has proved to be “the biggest obstacle” in the coparenting relationship. Lacey has openly admitted the jealousy she feels towards Shannon but has also expressed a desire to work around those emotions for the sake of the child. The court noted the efforts Lacey has taken to mend the coparenting relationship since 5 giving “strong words to the parties in the November 2024 temporary custody order.” She has engaged in efforts such as suggesting they each pass a memories notebook back and forth as well as keeping Brett informed of medical appointments. The court observed that Brett has not been supportive in the same way. In its order, the court reasoned that “[t]his is a very close and very difficult case” because the parties do not work well together and shared physical care is not an option due to distance. But because Lacey has done most of the parenting in the child’s life and has displayed more openness to working with Brett since the temporary-matters order, the court granted the parties joint legal custody while placing physical care of the child with Lacey. Brett then appealed. Shortly after filing his notice of appeal, Brett’s counsel moved to withdraw, and Brett has since proceeded as a pro se litigant. Lacey moved to dismiss the appeal following Brett’s failure to file a timely brief. Brett requested an extension of time which the supreme court granted. The supreme court struck that brief for failure to comply with Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure 6.903(1), 6.903(2), and 6.904(4) and ordered Brett to submit an amended brief within ten days. Brett submitted amended briefs, and those briefs were again struck for failure to comply with Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure 6.903 and 6.904 and Iowa Rule of Electronic Procedure 16.305. The supreme court ordered Brett to submit a compliant amended brief within fifteen days and to submit an amended reply brief within seven days of the amended brief. Brett then submitted an amended brief, attachment, and appendix, all of which contained prohibited confidential information. The supreme court struck those filings and then ordered Brett to submit another amended brief, warning that “[i]f the amended brief does not include a proper signature, or is materially deficient as a whole in other 6 respects, or both, appellant should expect that the brief will be stricken and the appeal will be dismissed.” Brett submitted another amended brief which again contained prohibited confidential information, and Lacey filed a motion to dismiss. The supreme court denied Lacey’s motion to dismiss and ordered Brett to submit another amended brief with all confidential information removed, explaining that Brett “may not make any other alterations in preparing the amended brief.” Brett filed his fourth amended brief and, two weeks after that, moved for limited remand, alleging that Lacey had “engaged in a pattern of conduct that materially affects the welfare of the parties’ minor child and could not have been discovered or addressed during the original proceedings.” Lacey resisted and requested that sanctions be imposed against Brett for the purported use of AI in his limited-remand motion and briefs. The supreme court denied the motion for limited remand and ordered the issue of sanctions be submitted with this appeal. The appeal was then transferred to our court. DISCUSSION I. Evidentiary Rulings We first consider the evidentiary issues that Brett has raised. He argues the district court abused its discretion 3 by “improperly excluding critical evidence of [Lacey]’s stalking behavior while simultaneously admitting [Lacey]’s misleading testimony denying such behavior.” 3 Brett argues, without proper citation to authority, that our standard of review on these evidentiary rulings is de novo. Brett attempts to support this proposition by citing Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.904(2), which outlines the requirements for proper reference to legal authority in briefs. As clarified above, we review evidentiary rulings— even in child custody proceedings—for abuse of discretion. Heiar, 954 N.W.2d at 469. 7 Brett fails to describe how he preserved error on this issue. His “Error Preservation” statement within this issue’s argument section simply contains references to exhibits supporting his argument on this claim. And while Lacey does not contest error preservation, we have a duty to assess whether error has been preserved sua sponte. See Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000). To preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be raised and then decided at the trial level. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). To preserve error on evidentiary rulings, a party is required to object at the time evidence is admitted or excluded. See Top of Iowa Coop., 608 N.W.2d at 470 (“[F]ailure to object to the admission of parol evidence at trial prevents a party from assigning the admission of such evidence as error on appeal.”); Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919, 924 (Iowa 1974) (“[A] proper objection at th[e] time” evidence is admitted or excluded “is necessary to preserve the right to complain on appeal.”). Upon our review, we can find no place in the trial record where Brett objected to the admission of any portion of Lacey’s testimony or to the exclusion of any of his proposed exhibits.4 Thus, Brett failed to preserve error on his evidentiary claims. 4 As Lacey observes, Brett’s briefs lack citations to the record. The lack of such citations makes the effort of verifying many of Brett’s vague claims akin to searching for a needle in a haystack. Such failure also violates rule 6.904(4)(a)(1), which provides that “[b]riefs must contain a citation to the record for each material statement of fact.” 8 II. Assessment of Lacey’s Medical Testimony Brett also contends that the court improperly accepted Lacey’s “misleading testimony characterizing her mental health diagnosis as temporary ‘postpartum depression’ while failing to give appropriate weight to contradictory medical documentation.” This claim also fails for failure to preserve error. Lacey’s claim that she suffers from postpartum depression was never challenged by Brett at trial. There is no indication in the record that Brett has ever disputed Lacey’s claims as to her diagnosis or treatment for postpartum depression before this appeal. III. Best Interests Lastly, Brett argues that it is not in the child’s best interests to place the child in Lacey’s care due to the “evidence of [her] aggressive behaviors.” Specifically, he contends that the district court failed to consider her disorderly conduct charges, police intervention, and pattern of escalation. But the district court did consider those actions, noting: Because the parties live a considerable distance apart, they have been meeting at a Casey’s gas station for the child exchanges. Those exchanges have not gone well, particularly in the beginning. Brett often brought along his new girlfriend, Shannon . . . , who was previously Lacey’s friend. Lacey was jealous and hurt, and she typically got emotional and inappropriate if Shannon was present. The police were called numerous times, and Lacey was eventually charged with some sort of disorderly conduct on two separate occasions. (Lacey later pled guilty to one of those counts, and the other count was dismissed.) The district court determined that both parties’ actions, including Lacey’s interactions with the police and erratic behavior around Shannon, made this “a very close and very difficult case for deciding physical care.” 9 But the erratic behavior was hardly limited to Lacey. As the district court recognized in its temporary-matters order, the parties are immature, and they both act like teenagers in the middle of a nasty break-up, rather than adults who share an infant. By someone’s count, law enforcement has been involved on seven occasions. Lacey has two pending charges for disorderly conduct related to events that occurred at child exchanges. [The department] has been involved. It seems that Lacey has a foul-mouth and difficulty controlling her temper. On the other hand, Brett’s current fiancé, Shannon, was formerly one of Lacey’s best friends. That relationship is difficult for Lacey to accept, and it has contributed to the level of acrimony. Because of Brett’s work hours, he usually cannot be present for the child exchanges. Shannon typically attends the child exchanges. Sometimes, she is there in Brett’s place. Sometimes, Shannon is there together with Brett. Without question, Brett and Shannon know that Shannon’s presence will upset Lacey. Shannon even posted a picture on Facebook of Brett, Shannon, and [B.W.] together—and Shannon is holding [B.W.] Shannon only started living with Brett in mid-August, and already they are engaged. Shannon is also listed with the doctor’s office as someone who is authorized to act on [B.W.]’s behalf. At this time, the Court is not concerned with the care either party provides for the child. The Court is far more concerned with the way the parties are behaving toward each other and in the child’s presence. Critically though, Brett fails to address any behavior following the district court’s reprimand in the temporary-matters order. Having concluded that both parties were at fault prior to that order, the district court’s physical- care determination was based on the parties’ behavior since entry of that order. And it found that Lacey “is more likely to support regular contact between Brett and the child and more likely to encourage and facilitate effective communication about the child and his best interest.” Brett does not dispute the district court’s characterization of the parties’ behavior since the temporary-matters order. And we agree that Lacey’s actions of keeping Brett informed about events and medical issues as well her olive-branch attempts 10 have shown growth over the course of these proceedings. Brett’s continued use of Shannon as a wedge in the coparenting relationship as well as his failure to communicate well with Lacey display less growth. Placing the child in Lacey’s physical care is in the child’s best interests. We affirm. SANCTIONS AND APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES In her resistance to Brett’s motion for remand and request for sanctions, Lacey asked our supreme court to impose sanctions on Brett for purported use of generative AI in his briefs. The use of generative AI presents an interesting challenge for modern courts. While Brett is correct that “mere use of [AI] drafting assistance . . . does not constitute sanctionable conduct,” we have stated that “self-represented litigants and attorneys alike have a duty to independently verify the authenticity and veracity of all sources and assertions when relying on artificial intelligence tools to prepare trial or appellate court filings.” Luke v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 24-1421, 2025 WL 2237311, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025). The twist is that, absent the presence of a hallucinated case, it is difficult to differentiate poor human drafting from unverified generative AI. Here, we can find no hallucinated case. And it is impossible for us to say with certainty whether Brett’s single reference to the nonexistent “Iowa R. App. P. 6.1004(3)” was a simple typo or the result of unchecked AI use. Thus, we decline to apply sanctions for Brett’s purported use of AI. But regardless of whether Brett’s briefs were directly drafted by him or a faraway datacenter, he is bound by the same duty to verify his briefs’ accuracy and compliance with our appellate rules. See id.; Iowa R. App. P. 6.903. We are cognizant of Brett’s status as a self-represented litigant and 11 hesitate to punish him based on dubious legal arguments. Yet, Brett consistently violated the same Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure over multiple iterations of his initial and amended briefs—even after being directly informed by our supreme court of the rules with which he was noncompliant. That failure consumed judicial resources and cost Lacey and her counsel unnecessary expense. However, because “Iowa has separate ‘Rules of Appellate Procedure,’ and they do not refer to or incorporate by reference [Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.413,” we cannot use rule 1.413 as a basis for a sanction or fee award as Lacey requests. See In re Marriage of Whiteside, No. 07-0739, 2007 WL 3376902, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2007). Even so, after carefully considering Lacey’s appellate- attorney-fee affidavit and the ability of the parties to pay, and because Lacey is the prevailing party on all issues in this appeal, see In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005), we award Lacey all of her requested appellate attorney fees pursuant to the appellate-attorney-fee affidavit she submitted on November 17, 2025. All costs are assessed to Brett. AFFIRMED. 12