Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-2113 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ Colton Jon Van Surksum, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Abbie Joleen Van Otterloo f/k/a Abbie Joleen Glaser, Respondent–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, The Honorable Robert D. Tiefenthaler, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Brandon J. Krikke of DeKoter, Thole, Dawson, Rockman & Krikke P.L.C., Sibley, attorney for appellant. Kelly J. Goslinga of Clabaugh & Goslinga, PLC, Sioux Center, attorney for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Buller, J. 1 BULLER, Judge. Abbie Van Otterloo appeals a custody modification order placing two of her children in the physical care of Colton Van Surksum, their legal father. The district court placed physical care with Colton because Abbie’s paramour exposed the children to domestic violence and instability. Abbie appeals, arguing Colton cannot provide superior care and that he failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances. On our review, we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Abbie and Colton’s older child was born in 2015; their youngest child was born in 2017, and Colton is listed as the father on the youngest child’s birth certificate. While not her legal father, Colton considers Abbie’s oldest child his daughter—her custody is not at issue in this action. 1 Abbie and Colton separated in 2019; all three children were “mostly” in Colton’s care for several years. A month after the separation, Abbie began an on-and-off relationship with Raymond Glaser (Ray), and the two married shortly after they met. All three children call Ray “dad.” Ray has a wide-ranging criminal history across several states, including convictions for felony burglary, various drug crimes, operating while under the influence, assault causing bodily injury or mental illness, and domestic abuse aggravated assault— strangulation. In late 2022, Colton petitioned to establish paternity and custody. Abbie and Ray separated six months later, and the child and family reporter (CFR) recommended Abbie have physical care of both children. Abbie showed the CFR her divorce petition, and the CFR told Colton that Ray 1 When we refer to “the oldest child” in this opinion, we mean Abbie’s older daughter, though we do not determine her custody here. 2 would no longer be living with the children. Colton deferred to the CFR’s recommendation, and the parties entered a stipulation placing physical care of the children with Abbie. In July of 2024, Colton said the oldest child told his family, “Mommy told me to lie to protect Ray,” and that Ray had been living with them for months. Colton’s wife called the sheriff’s office requesting a welfare check for Abbie; the oldest child was audibly bawling in the background. Colton’s wife told the police that the oldest child told her Ray had previously threatened Abbie with a gun. In late 2024, both Colton and his wife noticed the children were “swearing” and “talking back more than they normally would,” leading them to believe Ray was back. In January 2025, Ray was pulled over and cited for driving Abbie’s car without a license; Abbie was in the vehicle and received a citation for allowing Ray to drive in the same incident. In February 2025, Colton sent interrogatories to Abbie, designed in part to find out if Ray was living with the children. Abbie denied living with Ray twice. Colton then hired a private investigator, who obtained video of Ray at Abbie’s apartment. After Abbie saw the video evidence, she updated her interrogatories, admitting Ray had been living with her for months. At trial, Colton testified that Abbie told him Ray beat and abused her multiple times, sometimes “in front of the kids.” On one occasion, Colton helped Abbie move out after Ray “shoved her down the steps.” In contrast, Abbie claimed Ray had a positive impact on the children. She denied that Ray physically abused her or the children. Abbie admitted Ray was charged with domestic abuse, but she testified the underlying incident never occurred. Addressing her oldest child’s prior statement about 3 Ray threatening her with a gun, Abbie said Ray had never “physically” threatened her with a gun. Abbie invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked if she had continued to allow Ray to drive her car. Ray also testified. He denied having a gun and denied Abbie’s previous testimony that he owned a gun. Ray also said he “would never put [his] hands on a child” and he’d “never put [his] hands on [Abbie].” Despite the welfare-check call made in July 2024, the oldest child said Ray had never “spanked” or “hurt” any of the children or “hit” her mom. But she admitted she was testifying to “try to get [the younger children] either on Mom or Dad’s side but mostly Mom’s side.” The district court did not find Abbie or Ray credible. The court determined Colton had established a substantial change in circumstances, and that Colton could provide superior care to Abbie. Abbie appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review rulings on petitions to modify custodial decrees de novo. Hensch v. Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). We give weight to the district court’s factual findings, particularly regarding the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007). “The children’s best interest is the controlling consideration,” providing “the flexibility necessary to consider unique custody issues on a case-by-base basis.” In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015) (cleaned up). DISCUSSION In an action brought under Iowa Code section 600B.40(3) (2025), we apply the same principles as in dissolution cases. 4 To change a custodial provision . . . , the applying party must establish by a preponderance of evidence that conditions since the decree was entered have so materially and substantially changed that the children’s best interests make it expedient to make the requested change. The changed circumstances must not have been contemplated by the court when the decree was entered, and they must be more or less permanent, not temporary. They must relate to the welfare of the children. A parent seeking to take custody . . . must prove an ability to minister more effectively to the children’s well being. The heavy burden upon a party seeking to modify custody stems from the principle that once custody of children has been fixed it should be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons. In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983); see also Skaggs v. Carson, 39 N.W.3d 169, 179–80 (Iowa Ct. App. 2026) (applying these same criteria to a physical care modification action). To determine who is better able to minister to a child’s needs, we ask which custodian would “place the children in the environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 695. First, on our review of the record, we agree with the district court that Abbie’s reunion with Ray constitutes a substantial change in circumstances. Although Ray is not identified by the 2024 stipulation, there is ample evidence in the record that the physical-care stipulation was based on Abbie’s pending divorce with Ray. We agree with the district court that Abbie tried to use her divorce from Ray as a “smokescreen” to gain physical care of the children. Abbie cannot mislead Colton and then use her lies against him in a modification proceeding. The previous order did not contemplate Ray would continue to live with Abbie, given that Abbie told the CFR she was divorcing Ray. The district court’s review of Ray’s criminal history and domestic abuse speaks for itself. 5 Second, we agree that Colton has proven he is the superior caregiver. Abbie places too much weight on half of a sentence in the district court order: “In a vacuum, the Court finds both parties would have equal ability to parent the children . . . .” But we are not persuaded by this attempt to pluck the quote from its context. The second half of that sentence starts with “however,” and the rest of the paragraph makes the district court’s view quite clear: however, the negative environment in Abbie’s home due to Ray’s presence and actions, and her continued choice to allow this negativity and abuse around her children, as discussed above, diminishes Abbie’s ability to adequately parent the children. . . . Therefore, the Court finds that Colton’s ability to parent the children is superior to Abbie’s ability to parent the children, primarily due to Abbie’s willingness to put Ray’s interests above the best interests of herself and her children. When read in context, there is no finding from the district court that Abbie and Colton provide equal care. The order says Colton provides superior care. Abbie also attacks the district court’s findings that her relationship with Ray was toxic and exposed the children to domestic abuse. But the district court relied on an array of evidence, including Abbie’s prior statements, to assess Ray’s harmful impact on the household. Our independent review of the record corroborates years of bad acts perpetrated by Ray, most or all of which have or will negatively impact the children. Third, Abbie argues it was not in the children’s best interests to be separated from their sibling. There is a strong preference for keeping children of broken homes together. See In re Marriage of Orte, 389 N.W.2d 373, 374 (Iowa 1986). But this presumption is not “ironclad.” In re Marriage of Jones, 309 N.W.2d 457, 461 (Iowa 1981). Abbie points to the CFR’s recommendation, which cautioned against splitting up the children. But at 6 the time of the recommendation, Ray was not around and now he is back. The district court noted it would like to place all three children with Colton, but it could “only do what is best to protect the two children who are [at] issue in this matter.” We agree that the district court properly overcame the sibling presumption. Fourth, Abbie argues that the significant reduction in her parenting time is contrary to the children’s best interests. She contends there was not substantial evidence showing a risk of continued harm resulting from contact with her. We disagree. Our finding that Ray negatively impacts the children also applies here, as contact with Abbie means contact with Ray. The district court correctly limited Abbie’s parenting time in light of her chosen paramour. Finally, Colton asks us to award $19,000 in appellate attorney fees. In a modification action, “the court may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees.” Iowa Code § 600B.26. Given our deference to the district court’s fact-finding that Abbie and Colton both have similar financial means, we decline to award appellate attorney fees to Colton. AFFIRMED. 7