Echo Park Perry, LLC v. Hendricks County Assessor
CourtIndiana Tax Court
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25T-TA-00024
JudgeJudge McAdam
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER: ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT:
BRADLEY D. HASLER AYN K. ENGLE
JEFFREY T. BENNETT Indianapolis, IN
DENTONS BINGHAM GREENEBAUM LLP
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA TAX COURT
ECHO PARK PERRY, LLC, )
)
FILED
Petitioner, ) Nov 17 2026, 1:31 pm
) CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
v. ) Case No. 25T-TA-00024 Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
)
HENDRICKS COUNTY ASSESSOR, )
)
Respondent. )
ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL DETERMINATION OF
THE INDIANA BOARD OF TAX REVIEW
FOR PUBLICATION
November 17, 2026
MCADAM, J.
This case presents a novel question about the meaning of Indiana Code
§ 6-1.1-4-39(a), which governs the assessment of apartment complexes and other large
residential rental properties. The statute requires that the true tax value of rental
property be “the lowest valuation determined by applying” each of the three standard
appraisal approaches (i.e., cost, sales comparison, and income capitalization). The
question presented by the taxpayer here is whether that mandate requires the Board to
generate the lowest possible valuation that could be created under the three
approaches from the probative evidence. The Court concludes that it does not. The
statute only affects the choice among the values determined by the three approaches
and does not require the approaches to be applied in a way that minimizes the valuation
of the property. It does not require the Board to prepare its own appraisal, nor does it
lower the standard of proof on which the Board may base its findings.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Echo Park Perry, LLC, owns a multi-family rental apartment complex in Plainfield,
Indiana, that sits just west of the Indianapolis International Airport. (See Certified Admin.
R. at 30, 57.) The complex improvements were built during 2018 and 2019 and consist
of eighteen total buildings situated on a twenty-three-acre parcel. There are sixteen
apartment buildings with 274 rental units, ranging from 1-bedroom, 1-bath units to 3-
bedroom, 2-bath units. The property also includes several amenities, such as a
clubhouse, pool, built-in garages, and surface parking spaces. For tax years 2021,
2022, and 2023, the Hendricks County Assessor assessed Echo Park’s property at
$41,134,200, $42,272,400, and $42,284,800, respectively.
Believing the assessed value of its property to be high, Echo Park appealed the
assessments first to the Hendricks County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals
and then to the Indiana Board of Tax Review. The parties ultimately stipulated that the
2021 value was $28,900,000 and eventually dismissed the appeal for that year. The
parties also stipulated that the scope of the hearing before the Board would be limited to
the determination of the true tax value for 2022 and that the true tax value for 2023
would be 1.5% higher than that for 2022.
The Board conducted a three-day hearing concerning the 2022 true tax value,
during which both parties presented the appraisals and testimony of professional
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appraisers. Echo Park’s appraisal was prepared by Robert Becker, and the Assessor’s
appraisal was prepared by David Hall. Both appraisers used all three appraisal
approaches—the cost, the sales comparison, and the income capitalization
approaches—to estimate the value of the property. The appraisers concluded to the
following values:
Appraisal Values for the 2022 Tax Year
Approach Hall Becker
Cost Approach $45,600,000 $30,500,000
Sales Comparison Approach $44,300,000 $44,800,000
Income Capitalization Approach $46,700,000 $39,800,000
Based on the statute at the center of the present dispute, Indiana Code
§ 6-1.1-4-39(a), both appraisers reconciled their three approaches to their lowest value.
In Hall’s case, that meant Hall reconciled his three valuation approaches by concluding
to the value produced by his sales comparison approach, $44,300,000. Becker
explained that the income capitalization approach would typically represent the best
indication of value under generally accepted appraisal principles given that the subject
property was income-producing. (See Certified Admin. R. 115–116.) Nonetheless,
because of the statutory mandate, he also reconciled to his lowest value, $30,500,000,
which he determined using the cost approach.
In its post-hearing briefing, Echo Park did not advocate for Becker’s valuation,
proposing that instead the Board select components from Hall’s and Becker’s appraisals
to fashion a value of $30,538,949 under the cost approach and $39,062,775 under the
income capitalization approach. Citing Subsection 39(a), Echo Park’s counsel
painstakingly parsed the evidence under each approach for the Board, choosing
components from both Hall’s and Becker’s appraisals that “le[d] to a lower valuation.”
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(Certified Admin. R. at 1467.) In doing so, Echo Park contended that, because
Subsection 39(a) requires that the property’s true tax value be the lowest valuation, the
Board must adopt the value-minimizing conclusion whenever a piece of evidence is
deemed probative. (See Certified Admin. R. at 1466–67.) As Echo Park put it:
In determining the true tax value for the subject property, Indiana Code
§ 6-1.1-4-39(a) compels the Board to ignore the evidence that would lead
to a higher valuation, even if the Board considers such evidence to be
more probative, more persuasive, better-supported or better-reasoned
than the competing probative evidence that leads to a lower valuation. Ind.
Code § 6-1.1-4-39(a). If the record contains probative evidence that could
support more than one conclusion on any given issue, then the correct
conclusion is necessarily the one that results in the lowest valuation.
(Certified Admin. R. at 1467.) In short, Echo Park argued that the Board was “tasked
with determining which evidence will lead to the lowest valuation” under each of the
approaches. (Certified Admin. R. at 1466.)
In its final determination, the Board ultimately rejected Becker’s appraisal. It
found (1) his cost approach had “significant issues” that made it unreliable, (2) his
income approach suffered likewise from several “substantial errors and unsupported
decisions” that rendered it unreliable, and (3) that his sales comparison approach
produced a value conclusion that was $500,000 higher than Hall’s value conclusion,
thus making it unnecessary to review. (Certified Admin. R. 1602.)
It also rejected Echo Park’s proposed alternative valuations. Pushing against
Echo Park’s interpretation of Subsection 39(a), the Board reasoned that the plain
meaning of the statute did not require that the true tax value equal the lowest valuation
possible under the evidence presented. (Certified Admin. R. 1606.) The Board found
instead that, notwithstanding Subsection 39(a)’s application, its “valuation
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determinations under each approach must still be based on the preponderance of
probative, credible, and persuasive evidence.” (Certified Admin. R. at 1606.)
After rejecting Becker’s appraisal and the alternative valuations constructed by
Echo Park’s counsel, the Board found that Hall’s appraisal provided the most reliable
valuations under each of the approaches. It thus selected the lowest of Hall’s three
approaches, ordering the 2022 assessment changed to reflect Hall’s conclusion of
$44,300,000 and, in accordance with the parties’ stipulated agreement, the 2023
assessment changed to $44,964,500.
Echo Park then appealed the Board’s decision to this Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court’s review of Indiana Board decisions is governed by Indiana Code
§ 33-26-6-6, which closely mirrors the language governing judicial review of
administrative decisions under Indiana’s Administrative Orders and Procedures Act.
Compare IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(e) (2026), with IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (2026). The
party seeking to overturn the final determination of the Board bears the burden of
demonstrating its invalidity. IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(b). Challengers must demonstrate
that they have been prejudiced by a final determination of the Board that is arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of or short of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; without observance of the procedure required by
law; or unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence. IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(e). The
Board’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and its factual determinations are
afforded deference when they are supported by substantial and reliable evidence.
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Majestic Props., LLC v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor, 241 N.E.3d 642, 644 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2024) (citing Indiana Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n v. Spirited Sales, LLC, 79 N.E.3d 371,
375 (Ind. 2017)).
DISCUSSION
The dispute in this appeal revolves entirely around the meaning and application
of Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-39(a), which governs the tax assessment of apartment
complexes and other large residential rental properties. Under the provision, the true tax
value of rental property must be “the lowest valuation determined by applying” each of
three standard appraisal approaches. It provides:
[T]he true tax value of real property regularly used to rent or otherwise
furnish residential accommodations for periods of thirty (30) days or more
and that has more than four (4) rental units is the lowest valuation
determined by applying each of the following appraisal approaches:
(1) Cost approach that includes an estimated reproduction or
replacement cost of buildings and land improvements as of the date
of valuation together with estimates of the losses in value that have
taken place due to wear and tear, design and plan, or
neighborhood influences.
(2) Sales comparison approach, using data for generally
comparable property.
(3) Income capitalization approach, using an applicable
capitalization method and appropriate capitalization rates that are
developed and used in computations that lead to an indication of
value commensurate with the risks for the subject property use.
IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-39(a) (2022) (emphasis added). The issue on appeal concerns how
the phrase “determined by applying” interacts with Subsection 39(a)’s directive to select
the “lowest valuation” as the subject property’s true tax value.
Echo Park believes that selecting the lowest valuation means choosing, during
application of each appraisal approach, probative evidence which leads to a lower
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valuation over probative evidence which leads to a higher valuation, such that the
lowest determinable valuation emerges as a result. According to Echo Park, applying
Subsection 39(a)’s approaches to valuing property is in the sole service of determining
the lowest valuation—that is, “the lowest valuation possible under the evidence
presented.” (Pet’r’s Br. at 5 (quoting Certified Admin. R. at 1606) (emphasis added).) In
Echo Park’s view, “[w]hen the probative evidence enables the Board to determine
different valuations, the higher valuation does not reflect true tax value for this property
type.” (Pet’r’s Br. at 9.) Said differently: the “standard does not permit the Indiana Board
to favor probative evidence leading to a higher valuation over probative evidence
leading to a lower valuation.” (Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 2.) Instead, Echo Park maintains the
Board is authorized to “sift the evidence” and must “assemble” an ultimate conclusion of
value, regardless of how that value may have departed from any witness’s testimony.
(Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 4.) It “must choose which basic fact[s] to use” and “choose to
assemble the basic facts” to manifest the lowest valuation. (Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 2.) Echo
Park argues that by proceeding as it normally would—finding one appraiser
comparatively more persuasive, credible, and reliable than the other—the Board failed
to demonstrate that the value of $44,300,000 was more likely than not the lowest
valuation determined by applying the cost, sales comparison, and income approaches,
and yielded a higher valuation than the statute permits. (Pet’r’s Br. at 5.)
The Court concludes that Echo Park’s approach to Subsection 39(a) is not
supported by the statutory text. The statute is a limited directive to select a value—the
lowest produced by the three standard appraisal approaches—from amongst those
found by the factfinder to be supported by the evidence. It does not dictate that the
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standard appraisal approaches are to be applied in a manner that will yield the lowest
possible valuation. In effect, the statute replaces the standard final reconciliation
process established by generally accepted appraisal principles with a statutorily
prescribed rule of decision. Subsection 39(a) does not otherwise alter the Board’s duty
as fact finder. The Board remains bound to determine all facts by a preponderance of
the evidence as required by statute and is not free to accept facts which it does not find
persuasive.
The Meaning of Subsection 39(a)’s Command
When interpreting a statute, courts first decide “whether the Legislature has
spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question.” City of Carmel v. Steele,
865 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind. 2007). If it has, then courts interpret the statute’s clear and
unambiguous meaning and apply its terms in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. See
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 281 N.E.3d 97, 102 (Ind.
Tax Ct. 2026). The plain and unambiguous meaning of a statute is the meaning that
“virtually anyone competent to understand it, and desiring fairly and impartially to
ascertain its signification, would attribute to the expression in its context . . . .”
Johnson Cnty. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 568 N.E.2d
578, 581 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1991) (quoting Hutton v. Phillips, 70 A.2d 15, 17 (Del. Super. Ct.
1949)), aff’d, adopted, and incorporated by reference, 585 N.E.2d 1336 (Ind. 1992). A
court may not expand or contract the meaning of an unambiguous statute by reading
into it language to correct supposed omissions or defects and may not substitute
language that it feels the legislature may have intended. See, e.g., Mi.D. v. State, 57
N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016) (indicating courts must heed both what statutory language
8
says and what it does not say). “Clear and unambiguous statutes leave no room for
judicial construction” and do not require “any rules of construction” other than to give the
words their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. Steele, 865 N.E.2d at 618.
Subsection 39(a) supplies a narrow directive to choose the lowest value
produced by three separately applied appraisal approaches as the property’s true tax
value. The statute is not ambiguous and should be understood according to its plain and
ordinary meaning. It provides that the true tax value of qualifying rental property “is the
lowest valuation determined by applying each of the following appraisal approaches,”
and then lists the three approaches—the cost approach, the sales comparison
approach, and the income capitalization approach. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-4-39(a). Read in
their ordinary sense, the operative words describe a two-step implementation. First,
each of the three approaches is “appl[ied]” and thereby yields a “valuation.” Second, of
the three valuations so “determined,” the statute directs the assessor or the factfinder
on appeal to select one—“the lowest.” The word “lowest” operates upon the three
“determined” approach values as its objects. It does not dictate how to apply each of the
approaches. Nor does it operate on the inputs or evidentiary choices internal to any
single approach. The statutory command merely governs the choice among the outputs
of the three approaches.
The only textual guidance the statute offers about applying the approaches
appears in Subdivisions 39(a)(1) through (a)(3), and that guidance is descriptive. In
describing the three appraisal approaches, Subsection 39(a) does not require the data
or methodology for each approach to be optimized to achieve the lowest possible value.
None of the three says anything about selecting among competing probative inputs or
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analytical methodologies, and none directs that competing inputs be resolved in favor of
the lower value. The statute does its work at the level of completed approaches; nothing
in its text purports to instruct the appraiser or the factfinder to minimize the inputs as
each approach is built: it does not say the “lowest valuation possible,” the “lowest
valuation that can be determined,” or the “lowest valuation capable of being achieved
with the evidence.” The legislature instructed only that the true tax value be the lowest
value produced by the three approaches. Echo Park’s interpretation of the statute would
require the Court to ignore the text and engraft words into the statute that are not
present. This the Court cannot do as it must give effect to the words the legislature
chose and may not add words the legislature did not use. See Family & Soc. Servs.
Admin. v. Saint, 258 N.E.3d 972, 980 (Ind. 2025).
Subsection 39(a) does not exist in isolation. It is part of a larger tapestry of laws
that govern the determination of true tax value for real property in Indiana based on
generally accepted appraisal principles. Indiana assesses real property at its “true tax
value,” a term the legislature has directed the Department of Local Government Finance
to define, see IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(f) (2022), but has decided equates to neither fair
market value nor the value of the property to the user. See IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(c),
(e). Of particular importance to this case, the DLGF has instructed true tax value to be
determined by applying the three standard appraisal approaches “in accordance with
generally recognized appraisal principles.” 2021 Real Property Assessment Manual
(incorporated by reference at 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.4-1-2 (2022)) at 2. These principles
address the entirety of appraisal practice and analysis, including the meaning,
application, and reconciliation of the three standard appraisal approaches, and have
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been at the heart of true tax value since the time the legislature first adopted Subsection
39(a). See, e.g., 2002 Real Property Assessment Manual (incorporated by reference at
50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.3-1-2 (2002)) at 2–6 (grounding true tax value in professional
appraisal practice and generally accepted appraisal principles).
These principles provide, then, useful context for understanding what Subsection
39(a) requires. Each of the three approaches listed in Subdivisions 39(a)(1) through
(a)(3)—cost, sales comparison, and income capitalization—derives meaning from
specific processes within the appraisal profession. 1 As a process, each “approach”
denotes a series of steps completed by an appraiser and has its own applicability,
limitations, and procedures that are traditionally employed and understood within the
industry. See generally APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE (12th ed.
2001) 349–66 (cost approach), 417–28 (sales comparison approach), 471–96 (income
capitalization approach). 2 When conducted, or applied, appraisal approaches result in a
value indication (valuation) of a property’s true tax value. See THE APPRAISAL OF REAL
ESTATE at 597. As a part of standard appraisal practice, an appraiser endeavors to
develop one or more such value indications, often under more than one appraisal
approach, sometimes within a single appraisal approach, or both. See THE APPRAISAL OF
REAL ESTATE at 597. The appraiser must then reconcile the different indications of value
both within each appraisal approach and between the approaches to arrive at a final
1 The statutory descriptions of the three approaches described in subsections (a)(1) through (a)(3) are consistent with
generally accepted appraisal principles. Compare IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-39(a), with APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL
OF REAL ESTATE (12th ed. 2001) 349–66, 417–28, 471–96.
2 The Court cites the twelfth edition of The Appraisal of Real Estate, which was published in 2001, as it represents a
contemporaneous statement of generally accepted appraisal principles at the time the legislature adopted Subsection
39(a), see Pub. L. No. 1-2004, § 8, 2004 Ind. Acts 16, 17.
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opinion of value. See THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE at 597. The reconciliation process
reflects the appraiser’s professional judgment, the availability and quantity of accurate,
reliable data, and other factors. See THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE at 600–02.
Importantly, under generally accepted appraisal principles, the final opinion need
not be the lowest indication of value. In a normal, non-Subsection 39(a) situation, the
reconciliation of value indications is context specific and depends upon various criteria
and factors, as well as the approaches taken and the value indications that result. See
THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE at 597–602. The final opinion of value may be a point
proximate to any of the indications, a range of values, or a benchmark amount such as
a minimum or maximum. See THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE at 602–03. Using
professional judgment, an appraiser is free to ultimately select as the final opinion of
value the largest indication or the lowest indication or any other number proximate to
the valuations indicated by the approaches—the selection depends on the
circumstances. See THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE at 600–03.
When compared to standard appraisal practice, it is apparent that Subsection
39(a) is designed to displace the final reconciliation step of the typical appraisal process
with a different rule. It intervenes at—and only at—the later step where the value
indications between the approaches are reconciled, altering the context-driven final
reconciliation to one that is rote and mechanical. When taken altogether, the entire
phrase “lowest valuation determined by applying . . . appraisal approaches” seeks to
eliminate any of the usual criteria or intervening factors that would otherwise govern the
selection of a final opinion of value under generally accepted appraisal principles. It
specifically mandates, without exception, the selection of the lowest indication of value
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produced by the three approaches. For example, if Approach B (sales comparison)
produces a lower indication of value than Approach A (cost) or Approach C (income
capitalization), then Approach B’s value must be selected—regardless of whether
generally accepted appraisal principles, the appraiser’s professional judgment, or some
other factor would dictate that Approach C is more appropriate. The practice that the
statute displaces thus confirms what its plain language supplies: Subsection 39(a)
replaces the appraiser’s reasoned reconciliation of the value indications produced by
each of the three appraisal approaches with a fixed rule and does nothing more.
Echo Park’s construction of Subsection 39(a) mistakes the Board’s institutional
role. The Board resolves the appeal on the evidence presented by the parties and must
“adopt a value based exclusively on evidence in the administrative record.” CVS Corp.
v. Searcy, 137 N.E.3d 1053, 1056 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019); see also Ind. Code §
6-1.1-15-4(j) (2025) (“Findings must be based exclusively upon the evidence on the
record in the proceeding and on matters officially noticed in the proceeding.”). It is not
empowered to act as an expert witness in its own proceeding or supply an appraisal the
parties failed to prove. The Board recognized as much when it “decline[d] Echo Park’s
request to ignore the most credible and persuasive expert opinion and, instead,
fabricate a piecemeal valuation for the sole purpose of reaching a lower valuation than
either expert reached.” (Certified Admin. R. at 1606.) The legislature could empower the
Board to take a more active role in the process by granting it authority to develop its
own independent appraisal but has chosen instead to position the Board as a neutral
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arbiter. 3 See IND. CODE § 6-1.5-4-1 (2022) (requiring the Board to “conduct an impartial
review” of assessment appeals).
Taken to its logical end, Echo Park’s reading thrusts the parties’ burden of
presentation onto the Board. If Subsection 39(a) required the Board to construct the
lowest value permitted by the probative evidence in the record, a party could satisfy its
obligation by merely depositing an array of probative inputs before the Board and
leaving it the task of assembling them into a value-minimizing appraisal. The Board’s
role would be recast from factfinder to expert witness. That is inconsistent with the
adjudicative process established by the legislature. See IND. CODE § 6-1.1-15-20(f).
The statute does not alter the normal evidentiary concerns of the Board or its role
as factfinder. Subsection 39(a) does not displace the ordinary rules of evidence or the
standard of proof governing every other assessment appeal. It does not mention the
preponderance standard or require evidentiary conflicts be resolved in favor of the lower
input. No part of Subsection 39(a) alters the standard of proof applicable to the Board’s
underlying factual determinations; as factfinder, the Board must continue to determine
all facts—including the inputs and assumptions that comprise each approach—by a
preponderance of the evidence. Importantly, the statute does not relax the standard of
proof to permit the Board to rest its findings on evidence that is probative but not
persuasive. The Board must, “as trier of fact, weigh the evidence and decide the true
tax value of the property as compelled by the totality of the probative evidence before
3 The Court does not reach the question of the extent to which the Board may draw on persuasive components of
different appraisals or other evidence to determine a true tax value different than the values presented by either party.
See, e.g., Marion Cnty. Assessor v. Gateway Arthur, Inc., 43 N.E.3d 279, 285 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2015) (affirming the
Indiana Board’s increase of an assessed value above the taxpayer’s appraisal valuations based on the assessor’s
evidence that the appraisal did not include property taxes).
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it,” IND. CODE § 6-1.1-15-20(f), and its factual findings must rest on a preponderance of
the evidence. See IND. CODE § 6-1.1-15-4(j). Mere probativeness, without
persuasiveness, is insufficient to carry the day. See Madison Cnty. Assessor v. Kohl’s
Indiana, LP, 272 N.E.3d 592, 601 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2025).
The Board complied with Subsection 39(a)’s command
Here, the Board successfully fulfilled its duty as trier of fact and followed
Subsection 39(a)’s command to select the lowest valuation. The Board fully embraced
its fact-finding role by weighing the credibility and probative value of competing
evidence. Considering both Hall and Becker’s appraisals, the Board accounted for all
three approaches taken by each appraiser. (See Certified Admin. R. at 1582–90
(discussing Hall’s appraisal and approaches), 1590–97 (discussing Becker’s appraisal
and approaches).) The Board examined the two appraisals separately and based its
decision on the evidence before it. The Board found by a preponderance of the
evidence that Hall’s appraisal provided the most reliable indications under each of the
three standard valuation approaches and selected the lowest valuation. (Certified
Admin. R. at 1606.) This is all that the disputed language of Subsection 39(a) requires.
Equally important, the Board never found that any other value in the record was
established by a preponderance of the evidence. When Echo Park ultimately
“abandon[ed]” Becker’s reconciled valuation opinion of $30,500,000 and instead offered
two other numbers its counsel had calculated using parts of Becker’s and Hall’s
individual approaches—$30,538,949 (drawn from the parties’ cost approaches) and
$39,062,775 (drawn from their income capitalization approaches)—the Board rejected
the piecemeal valuations. (Certified Admin. R. at 1605.) The Board did not find the
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hybrid value indications to be reliable, probative, or supported by a preponderance of
the evidence; it declined to credit them at all. 4 (See Certified Admin. R. at 1605–06.)
As the Board duly complied with Subsection 39(a) by selecting the lowest
valuation from among those the evidence supported, the Board did not abuse its
discretion and its final determination is in accordance with law.
CONCLUSION
The Indiana Board’s final determination in this matter is AFFIRMED.
4 To the extent that Echo Park discusses various specific appraisal inputs to demonstrate how the property’s true tax
value could be lower under its interpretation of Subsection 39(a), (see Pet’r’s Br. at 10–35,) the Court understands
that discussion as illustrative of how Echo Park would apply its proposed interpretation and does not perceive any
claim for the Court to resolve on appeal.
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