Full Opinion

IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Terrence D. Fleming, Jr., FILED Appellant-Defendant Sep 30 2026, 10:43 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff September 30, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CR-715 Appeal from the Adams Superior Court The Honorable Samuel K. Conrad, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 01D01-2506-CM-185 Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judge Altice concurs. Senior Judge Baker dissents with a separate opinion. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 1 of 25 Weissmann, Judge. [1] Terrence Fleming violated a Decatur city ordinance one night by parking his car in a public park and hanging out in the back seat after the park closed at 10:00 p.m. When a patrolling police officer came upon Fleming’s car, he parked his police cruiser behind it and approached Fleming on foot with his flashlight drawn. Fleming raised his hands in the air as the officer arrived at his open car window and began questioning him. The officer told Fleming he could not be in the park because parks close at 10:00 p.m. The officer then asked for identification, which Fleming refused to provide. [2] The State charged Fleming with Class C misdemeanor refusal to provide identification information, which required proof that Fleming knew he had been detained for an infraction or ordinance violation. A jury found Fleming guilty as charged, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction on the verdict. Fleming appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he knew his presence in the park after 10:00 p.m. was an infraction or ordinance violation. But the circumstances of the stop, combined with statements made at the scene, support a reasonable inference that Fleming had such knowledge. We affirm. Facts [3] While on patrol at 10:52 p.m. one night, Decatur Police Officer Luke Roby observed a blue Nissan Sentra with activated headlights parked in the driveway of Decatur’s American Legion Park. By city ordinance, Decatur does not Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 2 of 25 permit people to “remain, stop or park within the confines of a park between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.” Decatur, Ind. Code of Ordinances § 94.60 (Curfew Ordinance). Officer Roby parked his police cruiser behind the Sentra and approached it on foot. He found two individuals in the Sentra’s backseat: a male on the driver’s side and a female on the passenger’s side. The male was eventually identified as Fleming. [4] When Officer Roby shined his flashlight through Fleming’s open car window, Fleming raised his hands in the air. The following exchange then began between Officer Roby, Fleming, and the female passenger: Officer Roby: Hey, guys. What’s going on? Female: Oh, goodness. Hi. Officer Roby: Hi, what’s going on tonight? Fleming: We’re just chilling. Officer Roby: Just chilling? Fleming: Yes, sir. Officer Roby: Okay, so… parks close at ten o’ clock. Okay? Fleming: Okay. Officer Roby: So… you can’t just be chilling out here. Alright? Fleming: Alright. Officer Roby: Do you guys have any IDs on you, by chance? Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 3 of 25 Fleming: I, yeah, I don’t have my registration, it’s up front, but… Officer Roby: That’s fine. Exh. 9 at 0:35-1:00. [5] At this point, Fleming leaned forward between the Sentra’s front seats and retrieved his wallet from the center console. When he sat back down, the exchange resumed: Fleming: So are you… Am I getting trespassed? Officer Roby: No, no, I just, the only reason I’m asking for identification is I want to know who I’m talking to, okay? This is a suspicious vehicle, so, that’s the reason I’m requesting your ID. Fleming: I don’t want to be a stickler, but I don’t feel the need to present it. Officer Roby: You don’t feel the need to present it? Fleming: Correct. Officer Roby: Okay. Id. at 1:04-1:24. [6] Officer Roby radioed for backup, to which Fleming confidently remarked, “That’s fine.” Id. at 1:28. The exchange then became more confrontational: Officer Roby: Oh, you’re just failing to identify to a law enforcement officer? So that’s a crime. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 4 of 25 Fleming: You don’t have probable cause. Officer Roby: I do because this is a suspicious vehicle, the park is closed. Female: Just show it, oh my gosh. Id. at 1:29-1:40. [7] After hesitating for a moment, Fleming pointed to the Sentra’s dashboard camera. The exchange continued: Fleming: Okay, so, do me a favor. That’s recording. Are you requesting this as a lawful order, you’ll arrest me if not? Officer Roby: I’m requesting your identification. Fleming: Is that a lawful order? Officer Roby: Are you the registered owner of the vehicle? Fleming: I am. Officer Roby : Alright. Id. at 1:42-1:57. [8] Officer Roby walked to the back of the Sentra and radioed its license plate number to dispatch. The dispatcher, in turn, provided Officer Roby with Fleming’s name. A second officer soon arrived, ordered Fleming out of the Sentra, and questioned him about his refusal to provide identification: Second Officer: Why are you not identifying yourself? Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 5 of 25 Fleming: Because he didn’t have probable cause. Second Officer: Are you a law enforcement officer? Fleming: No, sir. But I know the law. Second Officer: Tell me what law that is. Fleming: That we are not a… that you have to have probable cause to request identification. Second Officer: Wrong. Fleming: No. Second Officer: Okay, do you know where you’re at? Fleming: Yes, sir. Second Officer: You know where you’re at, you’re in a city park. Fleming: Yeah? Second Officer: Past closing… Fleming: Okay. If you’re trespassing me, sure. Second Officer: …because a city ordinance. Against a city ordinance. Fleming: Okay? Second Officer: I can identify you. You’re refusing to identify because of a city ordinance for a misdemeanor is an arrestable offense [sic]. Fleming: So, he said that he wanted to identify me because he just wanted to know who he was talking to. That right there is not probable cause. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 6 of 25 Second Officer: That’s because he was being nice. Fleming: And that’s why I asked him if it was a lawful order. Second Officer: It is a lawful order. Congratulations, you said no, so… Fleming: [Unintelligible] that was a crime. Um, trespassing, if you’re going to trespass me, then you need my ID. Otherwise… Second Officer: What law school did you go to? Fleming: I didn’t. I just did a whole lot of research. Second Officer: A whole lot of research? Fleming: Yes, because I wanted to be a cop. Second Officer: Okay, so we went to the police academy. And I am telling you, you are in the city park past closing, which is a city ordinance. You’re violating that city ordinance. As us, we can identify you because of that. Failure to identify for an ordinance is an arrestable offense... Fleming: Okay. Second Officer: … okay? And you failed to identify yourself. Put your hands up there [on the hood of a police cruiser]. Fleming: So I am going to jail? Can I give you my ID? Because I didn’t know that. Second Officer: Well, it’s too late now. Id. at 4:35-6:21. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 7 of 25 [9] The second officer searched Fleming for weapons. Officer Roby then placed Fleming in handcuffs. As he was doing so, Fleming apologized, asked for a second chance, and explained: “I didn’t know that it was a city ordinance, and that was my lack of information.” Id. at 7:34-7:39. [10] Fleming was never cited for violating the Curfew Ordinance but was charged with Class C misdemeanor refusal to provide identification information. The case proceeded to a jury trial, at which Officer Roby testified about the incident. Among other things, he acknowledged that the hours for American Legion Park are not posted on the premises and that he usually does not issue citations for Curfew Ordinance violations. The State also presented a video of the incident, which was recorded by Officer Roby’s body-worn camera. The jury found Fleming guilty as charged, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction on the verdict. The court later sentenced Fleming to 60 days in jail with 38 suspended to probation and the remaining 22 credited for time served. Discussion and Decision [11] On appeal, Fleming challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for refusal to provide identification information. “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom without reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility.” Farral v. State, 263 N.E.3d 794, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “We will affirm the conviction ‘unless no reasonable [factfinder] could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “The Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 8 of 25 evidence need not ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’” Id. (quoting Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 147). [12] The State charged Fleming with refusal to provide identification information under Indiana Code § 34-28-5-3.5 (the Refusal Statute). That statute provides: A person who knowingly or intentionally refuses to provide either the person’s: (1) name, address, and date of birth; or (2) driver’s license, if in the person’s possession; to a law enforcement officer who has stopped the person for an infraction or ordinance violation commits a Class C misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3.5. [13] Fleming does not dispute that he possessed his driver’s license during the stop and refused to give it to Officer Roby. Rather, he claims the State failed to prove his refusal was knowing or intentional. “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Id. § 2(b). And “[u]nless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if a kind of culpability is required for commission of an offense, it is required with respect to every material element of the prohibited conduct.” Id. § 2(d). Thus, the State was required to prove that Fleming was conscious of the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 9 of 25 fact, or at least aware of its high probability, that Officer Roby stopped him for an infraction or ordinance violation. [14] In analyzing Fleming’s claim, we first observe that Indiana Code § 34-28-5-3(a) (the Good Faith Statute) authorizes a law enforcement officer to detain a person whom the officer “believes in good faith . . . has committed an infraction or ordinance violation.” That detention, however, may last only “for a time sufficient to”: (1) inform the person of the allegation; (2) obtain the person’s: (A) name, address, and date of birth; or (B) driver’s license, if in the person’s possession; and (3) allow the person to execute a notice to appear. Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3(a). [15] Fleming does not dispute that Officer Roby detained him based on a good faith belief that he was violating the Curfew Ordinance. He also does not challenge his detention as unjustifiably long in time. The Good Faith Statute is therefore inapplicable to Fleming’s claim. Although the statute contemplates a law enforcement officer informing a stopped person of their alleged “infraction” or “ordinance violation,” we do not read it as requiring the officer to have specifically used those words to support a conviction for refusal to provide identification information. Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 10 of 25 [16] Rather, to support a conviction under the Refusal Statute, the State can present any evidence of probative value from which a rational factfinder could find that the defendant knew they were stopped for an infraction or ordinance violation. “[K]nowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence and inferred from the circumstances and facts of each case.” Heavrin v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ind. 1996). And “when determining whether a material element exists, the jury may rely on its collective common sense and knowledge acquired through everyday experiences.” Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind. 2005). [17] As he did at trial, Fleming contends he never knew his presence in the park after 10:00 p.m. was an ordinance violation. He stresses that the park’s hours were not posted on the premises and that Officer Roby never expressly tied his request for identification to the Curfew Ordinance. But the evidence most favorable to the judgment supports a reasonable inference that Fleming had the requisite knowledge when he refused to provide his identification to Officer Roby. [18] Fleming and a female companion were hanging out in the back seat of a parked car in a dark American Legion Park just before 11:00 p.m. When Officer Roby approached the car and shined his flashlight through Fleming’s open window, Fleming raised his hands in the air. Officer Roby then told Fleming: “[P]arks close at ten o’ clock” and “you can’t just be chilling out here.” Exh. 9 at 0:44- 0:53. Fleming responded understandingly to each statement: “Okay” and “Alright.” Id. And when Officer Roby asked Fleming for identification, Fleming responded: “Am I getting trespassed?” Id. at 1:06. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 11 of 25 [19] Fleming then went on to argue, with both Officer Roby and the second police officer, that he was not required to provide identification absent probable cause. He was adamant with the second officer that he “kn[e]w the law.” Id. at 4:40- 4:43. And when the second officer explained to Fleming that he was wrong because he was “in a city park,” “past closing,” which was “[a]gainst a city ordinance,” Fleming responded with “Yeah?” and “Okay?” Id. at 4:54-5:02. Given his tone and demeanor—which were captured on video—the jury could have reasonably interpreted Fleming’s response as suggesting he already knew those facts and they did not change his stance on the matter. Indeed, Fleming reiterated his probable cause stance moments later, before telling the second officer he had “d[one] a whole lot of research.” Id. at 5:40-5:46. [20] From all this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could infer that Fleming was aware of a high probability that his presence in American Legion Park after 10:00 p.m. was an infraction or ordinance violation and the reason for Officer Roby’s stop. Although Fleming told Officer Roby that he “didn’t know that it was a city ordinance,” id. at 7:34-7:39, the jury was not required to believe him. The jury heard the evidence, watched the encounter unfold on video, and was correctly instructed on the knowledge element. It was their prerogative—not ours—to weigh the evidence and decide whether Fleming knew he was stopped for an infraction or ordinance violation. The jury resolved that question against him, and the evidence supports its verdict. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 12 of 25 [21] Admittedly, this is a close case. But Fleming’s arguments are an invitation to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the jury’s, which we will not do. See Farral, 263 N.E.3d at 797. We affirm. Altice, J., concurs. Baker, Sr.J., dissents with a separate opinion. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Michael Frischkorn Brand & Morelock Greenfield, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Eva V. Schmitt Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 13 of 25 Baker, Senior Judge, dissenting. [22] At trial, before a witness is permitted to testify, an oath is administered. The contours of that oath are codified. “Before testifying, every witness shall be sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” Ind. Code § 34-45-1-2 (1998). In the majority opinion, my colleagues have told a story. But I do not believe they have told the whole story. Thus, I respectfully dissent. [23] To clarify my point of contention with the majority’s decision, I will begin by addressing those things upon which I agree. I agree that Decatur had and has a continuing legitimate interest in protecting its citizens (including Fleming and his passenger) from criminal activity in the American Legion Park after hours. I agree that the municipal ordinance establishing hours during which it is permissible to be present in the park serves a valid purpose for both Decatur’s citizens and for law enforcement officers. And I agree that Officer Roby had a good faith belief that Fleming had committed an ordinance violation when he parked his cruiser behind Fleming’s car, thus detaining him, and approached the car at 10:52 p.m. in a park that, by municipal ordinance, closed at 10:00 p.m. [24] I disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that it was sufficient to sustain Fleming’s conviction if the jury could conclude from the evidence or inferences from the evidence that Fleming knew he was detained and that this was not a consensual encounter when the officer blocked Fleming’s car. I believe the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 14 of 25 statutory framework selected by our General Assembly requires that a person, such as Fleming, receive notice of the alleged ordinance or infraction violation by the officer before being required to provide identification. Again, the majority says that “The Good Faith Statute is therefore inapplicable to Fleming’s claim.” Slip op. at 10. I disagree, as do I disagree with the majority’s proclamation that “Although the statute contemplates a law enforcement officer informing a stopped person of their alleged “infraction” or “ordinance violation,” we do not read it as requiring the officer to have specifically used those words. . . .” Id. [25] Giving due respect to our legislature’s choice of statutory requirements, notification to the person of the allegation during the detention triggers the person’s duty to provide identification information or face being charged with a Class C misdemeanor. Officer Roby need not state the ordinance section or recite the language of the ordinance. But he needed to express or articulate that a violation of the law has occurred. Language such as “the park is closed” and “you can’t be chillin’ here” does not meet the standard. While those are statements of fact, they do not articulate an alleged violation of the law. This point is made clear by the interaction between Fleming and Officer Roby in which Fleming asks the officer to articulate the violation (e.g., “are you trespassing me?”). And once the second officer complied with the notification statute and told Fleming that his presence in the park after closing constituted an ordinance violation, Fleming immediately offered to provide his identification information. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 15 of 25 [26] Our General Assembly has declared that “[w]henever a law enforcement officer believes in good faith that a person has committed an infraction or ordinance violation, the law enforcement officer may detain that person for a time sufficient to: (1) inform the person of the allegation; (2) obtain the person’s: (A) name, address, and date of birth; or (B) driver’s license, if in the person’s possession; and (3) allow the person to execute a notice to appear.” Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3(a) (2014) (emphasis added). “A person who knowingly or intentionally refuses to provide either the person’s: (1) name, address, and date of birth; or (2) driver’s license, if in the person’s possession; to a law enforcement officer who has stopped the person for an infraction or ordinance violation commits a Class C misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3.5 (1998). [27] Again, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Fleming was detained. However, I disagree with the majority’s disregard of the statutory obligations placed upon an officer when a person is detained for an ordinance or infraction violation. I do not believe that we can disrespect the legislature’s command to enforce what a law enforcement officer is required to do before a person can be found to knowingly or intentionally refuse to provide identification information. [28] The majority opines that Officer Roby’s statement, “Okay, the park’s closed at ten o’clock[,]” Tr. Vol. III, p. 5 (State’s Ex. 9 at 0:44-0:45), and “you guys can’t just be chillin’ out here, alright?” Id. at 0:51-0:53, is enough to: (1) satisfy Indiana Code section 34-28-5-3’s notice of violation requirement, informing Fleming that he had violated an ordinance or had committed an infraction; and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 16 of 25 (2) trigger Indiana Code section 34-28-5-3.5’s requirement that Fleming produce his identification information or be arrested for knowingly or intentionally refusing to provide identification information as a Class C misdemeanor. I disagree. [29] The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Fleming knowingly or intentionally refused to provide his driver’s license to a law enforcement officer who has stopped him for an infraction or ordinance violation. See I.C. § 34-28-5-3.5. That statute, however, is read in tandem with Indiana Code section 34-28-5-3, which requires the officer to inform the person of the infraction or ordinance violation allegation. I.C. § 34-28-5-3. As opposed to grafting a new element into Indiana Code section 34-28-5-3.5, satisfaction of Indiana Code section 34-28-5-3 is the condition precedent to establishing Indiana Code section 34-28-5-3.5’s element that the refusal is done knowingly or intentionally. In other words, the defendant, here Fleming, must be informed of the alleged ordinance or infraction violation before he can be said to have refused to provide his identification information knowingly or intentionally to a law enforcement officer who has stopped or detained him for the alleged ordinance or infraction violation. To hold otherwise, would require detained persons to read the officer’s mind to guess what alleged infraction or ordinance violation they are alleged to have committed. This is not the same as the presumption that one knows the law. And without notification of the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 17 of 25 alleged infraction or ordinance violation, persons detained under this statute are 1 presented with a modern-day authoritarian command to show one’s papers. [30] This Court first explained the need to consider the statutes together in Starr v. State, 928 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. In Starr, the driver of a vehicle, in which Starr was a passenger, committed a traffic infraction and was stopped by a law enforcement officer for making an illegal turn. After obtaining the driver’s information, the officer asked Starr for his identification information. To be sure, Starr behaved poorly, denying having identification on him, claiming to be someone he was not, and indicating that he could not remember his social security number. And he claimed that photographic identification found in the vehicle depicted his identical cousin. Nevertheless, Starr was charged with and convicted of Class C misdemeanor refusal to provide identification information. [31] In his appeal, Starr argued that the statute should be interpreted to criminalize the driver’s refusal to identify oneself. 928 N.E.2d at 878 (emphasis added). Although we rejected that argument, we acknowledged that there must be notice given to a person of the alleged infraction or ordinance violation, in that 1 See, e.g., Com. v. Alvarez, 692 N.E2d 106, 109 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (“The statute does not authorize the more searching inquiry that a random request for identification papers constitutes—the sort of request uncomfortably associated with authoritarian societies and most commonly made of persons belonging to a racial or ethnic minority.”). There is no evidence in the record that Fleming is a member of a racial or an ethnic minority. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 18 of 25 2 case, driver or passenger. When analyzing the issue, we noted that “[p]enal statutes are to be strictly construed against the State and should be held to prohibit only that conduct which is clearly within the spirit and letter of the statutory language.” Id. We further noted that “[s]tatutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme.” Id. [32] We said that the Good Faith Belief Act “provides for detention of a person who, in the ‘good faith’ belief of the officer, ‘has committed an infraction or ordinance violation.’” Id. at 880 (quoting I.C. 34-28-5-3). We further noted that “[t]he Refusal to Identify Self statute then criminalizes the refusal to comply with an officer’s lawful request under the statute authorizing detention.” Id. In Starr’s situation, although he was stopped when the vehicle in which he was a passenger was stopped, there was no showing that Starr was stopped as a consequence of his conduct. “There was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an infraction or ordinance violation, giving rise to an obligation to identify himself upon threat of criminal prosecution.” Id. Thus, we established in Starr that the two statutes must be read together when determining the sufficiency of the evidence. Starr’s conviction was reversed. 2 For example, each occupant of a motor vehicle equipped with a safety belt “shall have a safety belt properly fastened about the occupant’s body at all times when the vehicle is in forward motion.” Ind. Code § 9-19-10- 2 (2007). The failure of a person, who is at least sixteen years of age to have a safety belt properly fastened when the vehicle is in forward motion commits a Class D infraction. Ind. Code § 9-19-10-8 (1998). Consequently, a passenger could be in violation of an infraction such that he would be required to provide identification to the officer. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 19 of 25 [33] Next, in Miller v. State, 51 N.E.3d 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), we examined probable cause for Miller’s arrest for resisting law enforcement in the context of an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence. Miller was alleged to have caused a disturbance in a convenience store. When law enforcement officers arrived, an employee of the store exited the store and pointed at Miller. She jaywalked across the street and headed toward an apartment. The officers turned on their emergency lights and drove toward her as she approached the door of an apartment. After an officer exited his vehicle and said that he needed to talk to her, she turned, looked at the officer, ignored him, and entered the apartment. When she eventually came to the door to speak with the officers, she said she did not initially stop to speak with them because she did not know what they wanted to talk to her about. Miller was arrested for resisting law enforcement. After Miller’s arrest, the officers returned to the convenience store where they learned the specific allegation that Miller had damaged the store’s EBT card reader and had argued with the clerk over the price of a soda. [34] While discussing the potential lawful bases for Miller’s arrest, we observed that her arrest could not be legitimized by her jaywalking. Even though an ordinance required pedestrians to cross streets at intersections, the Good Faith Belief Act “permits officers to detain violators of municipal codes in order to identify the person and inform her of the allegation; and that those who refuse to provide information to an officer who has stopped them for an ordinance violation commit a class C misdemeanor.” 51 N.E.3d at 315 (emphasis added). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 20 of 25 In rejecting that basis for Miller’s arrest, we stated, “[t]he undisputed evidence shows that the officer asked Miller why she did not stop, she answered, and then she was immediately placed under arrest.” Id. We echoed the Supreme Court’s rationale in Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249, 1254 (Ind. 2014) that “a person’s freedom to walk away is rendered illusory if she is subjected to criminal penalty for exercising that freedom.” Id. at 316. [35] Then in Weaver v. State, 53 N.E.3d 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. granted, we considered the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Weaver’s conviction for refusing to provide identification information. Weaver’s vehicle was stopped by a law enforcement officer because the license plate light on the vehicle was inoperable. The officer approached the vehicle and asked Weaver if he was 3 aware that his license plate light was inoperable. After Weaver replied that he did not know that, the officer asked for Weaver’s driver’s license and registration. The majority of this Court determined that there was insufficient evidence that Weaver had refused to provide his identification information. The majority said, We may reasonably conclude that the General Assembly intended that a person would identify him or herself promptly 3 This fact is represented in the light most favorable to the verdict. The officer testified that he first asked Weaver for his identification. Tr. Vol. I, p. 11 (“I approached him. He was the only one in the vehicle. Uh, I asked him if he had a driver’s license and registration.”). The interaction between the officer and Weaver as recorded by the bodycam was read into evidence at trial. The officer asked, “Is this your car, bud?” and then, “Did you know that the plate light doesn’t work on it?” Id. at 51-52 But the issue in Weaver was the delay in providing the identification information and at what point during that delay do the defendant’s delay tactics amount to a refusal in violation of the statute. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 21 of 25 when a law enforcement officer requests such identification. Failing to require a person to promptly provide the statutorily required identification information would contravene public policy. If a person could indefinitely delay giving identification information to the requesting officer, it would make the officer’s job needlessly difficult, and possibly endanger officers and drivers involved in roadside traffic stops. However, after reviewing the conversation between Weaver and Deputy Chandler, it is evident that Weaver did not refuse to give his address when asked. Instead of replying that he would not provide his address, or evading Deputy Chandler on the issue, Weaver asked a question: “Uh, am I being charged with something?” Tr. p. 56. Weaver’s question was a normal and legitimate question; it was certainly not an express denial of information. Weaver then asked why he was required to identify himself if he was not being charged with a crime. Deputy Chandler explained that Weaver was required to provide the information by law, but Deputy Chandler did not return to the topic of Weaver’s address at any other time during the traffic stop. Weaver’s general behavior during the stop was ridiculous. Deputy Chandler properly ended Weaver’s evasiveness eight minutes into the stop, ordering him out of the vehicle, and handcuffing him until he could identify him. See Tr. pp. 23; Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 1. Even then, Weaver’s evasiveness did not abate. It took Deputy Chandler another eight minutes before he had Weaver’s date of birth. Importantly, with those two (and one-half) pieces (Weaver having stated that he lived in Indianapolis) of the three pieces of information called for by the statute, Deputy Chandler was able to ascertain that Weaver was driving while suspended (a Class A Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-715 | September 30, 2026 Page 22 of 25 misdemeanor), had