Full Opinion

Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Oct 29 2026, 9:00 am Terry W. Curella, CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Appellant-Petitioner Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. Gina A. Behny, Appellee-Respondent October 29, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-1700 Appeal from the Howard Superior Court The Honorable Hans J. Pate, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 34D04-2204-PL-940 Opinion by Judge May Judge Altice and Judge Foley concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 1 of 14 May, Judge. [1] Terry Curella (“Terry”) acquired an undivided one-half interest in a Kokomo home (the “House”) from his brother (“Gregg”) in 2021 and petitioned to partition the House by sale fifteen months later. Gregg lived in the House from 2001 to 2004, but he had not made any mortgage payments. Gina Behny (“Gina”) – whom Gregg had been dating during his three years in the House – still lived in the House when Terry petitioned for sale, had lived in the House since 1999, and had made all the mortgage payments and necessary improvements on the House. Gina opposed a sale. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the entire property to Gina, ordered Terry to convey his interest to her, and entered a $4,307.95 judgment against Terry. [2] Terry appeals to challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion to add the parties’ proposed findings to the Clerk’s Record, its equitable adjustment of the values of their cotenant shares, and its inclusion of a lost homestead deduction and an expired judgment lien in the money judgment. Although the trial court erred by not making the proposed findings and conclusions part of the official record, any error therein was harmless under the specific facts of this case. Terry has not demonstrated error in the trial court’s determination that equity required him to sign over his interest in the House to Gina, he waived his argument regarding the homestead deduction, and the trial court’s order that Terry pay Gina for the money judgment was not error. We accordingly affirm the trial court’s judgment. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 2 of 14 Facts and Procedural History [3] In 1999, Gina purchased the House in Kokomo. She borrowed $10,000 from her grandparents for the downpayment and financed the remaining $42,000 with a mortgage. Her boyfriend at the time, Gregg Curella (“Gregg”), moved into the home with her. [4] About two years later, Gina needed money to pay an attorney in a child- custody matter and to make repairs to the House. For Gina to obtain the necessary funds by refinancing her mortgage, Gregg agreed to co-sign for the mortgage, which increased from approximately $42,000 to $57,580. Gina executed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to herself and Gregg as “joint tenants with right of survivorship[.]” (Ex. Vol. at 8) (emphasis removed). Gregg moved out in the fall of 2004, but his name was never removed from the title. [5] Gina has lived in the House since 1999 and was joined there around 2010 by her husband, Peter, and later his disabled adult son. Gina made all mortgage payments on the Kokomo house, even when Gregg lived there. Real estate taxes and homeowner’s insurance were escrowed and paid as part of the monthly mortgage payment. Gina also paid the utilities and paid for repairs and maintenance, including a new roof, furnace, and water-heater, along with bathroom repairs and a $1,000 insurance deductible for water damage. Her total contribution toward the House over the years has been $275,462.25. (Ex. Vol. at 45.) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 3 of 14 [6] On January 22, 2021, Gregg executed a quitclaim deed transferring his interest to his brother, Terry. When the deed to Terry was recorded on January 29, 2021, Gina lost her homestead deduction, and her monthly mortgage payment increased by roughly $100 for two years. After the transfer, Terry made one mortgage payment of $657.19 and one real-estate-tax payment of $456.64, which duplicated a payment already made through Gina’s escrow. Terry made no other payments, invested no money in the property, and has never lived in the House. [7] Terry petitioned to partition the House by sale on April 27, 2022. As an exhibit to his petition, Terry filed a title report showing that a personal judgment entered against him on January 6, 2015, in an unrelated case – for $2,396.33 plus interest and costs – had become a lien on the property. Terry also filed an appraisal of the House, which indicated its value was $98,000. (App. Vol. II at 29.) [8] The day before trial, Gina moved for special findings of fact and conclusions of law under Trial Rule 52. At the start of trial, Terry’s counsel stated that he did not object and indicated he was prepared to file his own request as well. The trial court granted both motions. At the close of the evidence, the court asked whether the parties wished to present oral argument or rely on the legal arguments from their summary judgment motions. Both parties declined the opportunity to make oral arguments and elected instead to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court ordered the parties to file their submissions within five weeks. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 4 of 14 [9] The parties filed their proposed orders to the trial court through the E-Filing System, which served the documents on the opposing party. (App. Vol. II at 120-21 & 141-42.) The “Filing Details” of each notification indicates the “Filing Type” is a “Proposed Order Filed” (id. at 120 & 141); the “Filing Description” is “Findings of Fact and Conclusions or Law” (id. at 120) or “Proposed Order of Judgment” (id. at 141); and whom the proposed order was “Filed By[.]” (Id. at 120 & 141.) The trial court clerk forwarded the documents to the trial court judge but did not place the filings on the Chronological Case Summary or in the Clerk’s Record. [10] On April 7, 2025, the trial court entered judgment, adopting Gina’s proposed order verbatim. The order granted Terry’s petition for partition but awarded the entire property to Gina, ordered Terry to transfer his interest to her within thirty days, and entered a money judgment against Terry for $4,307.95. The court calculated the money judgment as the $2,396.33 judgment lien, along with $511.45 in interest at eight percent from January 6, 2015, and $154.00 in court costs on the judgment; plus $2,400.00 for Gina’s loss of the homestead deduction; minus $1,153.83 for Terry’s two payments. [11] Terry filed a motion to correct error in which he pointed out that the judgment lien had expired between trial and the trial court’s entry of judgment. The court denied the motion. (App. Vol. II at 19.) Terry also moved the trial court to order the clerk to file the parties’ proposed orders on the Clerk’s Record and chronological case summary (“CCS”), and the trial court denied this motion as well. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 5 of 14 Discussion and Decision 1. Motion to Add Proposed Orders to the Record [12] Terry first argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to add the parties’ proposed orders to the Clerk’s Record. He contends the proposed orders are necessary for his appeal so that we may see that the trial court adopted Gina’s proposal verbatim – which, as Terry notes, impacts our scrutiny of a case on appeal. (See Br. of Appellant at 11-12) (quoting Dallas v. Cessna, 968 N.E.2d 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). In Dallas, our court explained: We note that in this case, the trial court adopted Cessna’s proposed findings and conclusions verbatim. Although wholesale adoption is not prohibited, we do not encourage trial courts to engage in this practice. We have recognized that “this practice weakens our confidence as an appellate court that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court.” Although we do not apply an altered standard of review when a trial court adopts a party’s findings verbatim, “near verbatim reproductions may appropriately justify cautious appellate scrutiny.” 968 N.E.2d at 296 (internal citations omitted). [13] The trial court twice denied Terry’s motion – presumably for the reasons asserted by Gina in her responses to Terry’s motions. Gina asserted the proposed orders could not properly be made part of the Record on Appeal 1 1 “The Record on Appeal shall consist of the Clerk’s Record and all proceedings before the trial court or Administrative Agency, whether or not transcribed or transmitted to the Court on Appeal.” App. R. 2(L). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 6 of 14 because they were not part of the Clerk’s Record, which consists of “the Chronological Case Summary (CCS) and all papers, pleadings, documents, orders, judgments, and other materials filed in the trial court . . . or listed in the CCS.” Ind. Appellate Rule 2(E) (emphasis added). A document that a party does not file with the trial court does not become part of the trial court’s record, and thus a party may not supplement the record on appeal with matters not filed below. Thomas v. N. Cent. Roofing, Inc., 795 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“We cannot allow North Central to file with us what it apparently failed to file with the trial court.”). Gina is correct that the chronological case summary does not indicate the proposed orders were filed in the trial court, which suggests they could not be made part of the Record on Appeal. See id. at 1072 (“there is nothing in the CCS to indicate that the designated materials were actually filed”). [14] We nevertheless hold the trial court erred by denying Terry’s motion. The parties’ proposed orders were submitted to the trial court through the E-Filing System and served on the opposing party. (App. Vol. II at 120-21 & 141-42.)2 The “Filing Details” of each notification indicates the “Filing Type” is a “Proposed Order Filed” (id. at 120 & 141); the “Filing Description” is “Findings of Fact and Conclusions or Law” (id. at 120) or “Proposed Order of Judgment” (id. at 141); and whom the proposed order was “Filed By[.]” (Id. at 2 Terry attached the parties’ proposed orders as exhibits to his motion asking the trial court to order the clerk to add the documents to the CCS, such that we in fact have access to the proposed orders in the Record on Appeal. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 7 of 14 120 & 141.) Despite being “filed” by the parties and forwarded to the trial court judge, the trial court clerk did not place the filings on the Chronological Case Summary or in the Clerk’s Record. Because the trial court’s verbatim adoption of one party’s proposed order impacts the scrutiny that we give to a trial court’s final order, proposed findings of fact filed by parties must be available in the Record on Appeal as a matter of course. The trial court should have ordered the clerk to correct the error when Terry filed his request, and the trial court’s failure to do so was error. [15] Nevertheless, the trial court’s denial of Terry’s motion has not prejudiced Terry during this appeal. Terry sought their inclusion to demonstrate that the trial court adopted Gina’s proposed findings verbatim, and Gina does not dispute that the trial court did so. Moreover, Terry’s attachment of the proposal orders to his motion to add the filings to the Clerk’s Record placed the documents in the Record on Appeal. Accordingly, with our confidence “that the findings reflect the considered judgment of the trial court” eroded, Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 709 (Ind. 2001) (noting adoption of one party’s proposed findings erodes appellate court confidence in the judgment’s validity), we turn to Terry’s arguments on the merits. 2. Award of House to Gina [16] Terry next challenges the trial court’s equitable adjustment of the parties’ interests in the House, which resulted in the award of the House to Gina. When a court enters findings and conclusions at a party’s request, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: we first determine whether the evidence supports Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 8 of 14 the findings, and then whether the findings support the judgment. Koonce v. Finney, 68 N.E.3d 1086, 1089-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo, and we will disturb the judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 1090. [17] The trial court’s order indicated: 5. In this case, the court finds that Terry’s petition for partition should be granted, but the court finds that the equities require that Gina be permitted to maintain ownership of the home and the property. Gina has made all of the contributions to the home for more than 25 years, while there was no evidence that Terry (or Gregg, for that matter) made any equitable contributions. In fact, the judgment lien on the property against Terry exceeds the two small, superfluous payments Terry made for a tax payment and a mortgage payment. Gina has lived in the home for over 25 years and continues to live there with her husband and disabled child. She has made all payments on the mortgage, paid all property taxes, paid for the insurance on the home, and paid all utilities and repairs on the house. Gina has contributed $275,462.25 toward maintaining the equity in the property. There was no evidence that either Gregg or Terry paid anything for over 25 years other than the two small payments made by Terry, which the court finds to be superfluous since the payments simply duplicated payments already made by Gina. 6. The court finds it would be grossly unfair to require a sale of the property under these circumstances. For these reasons, and utilizing the court’s great flexibility in fashioning relief in such cases, to effect the partition requested by Terry, Terry is hereby ordered to sign a quitclaim deed transferring his interest in the property to Gina within thirty (30) days of this Order. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 16.) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 9 of 14 [18] According to Terry, the trial court erred3 by “giving full credit” to Gina for all $275,462.25 of the contributions she claimed in her Defendant’s Exhibit A – without offsetting a rental payment against the mortgage payment, without deleting the cost of the utilities that did not benefit the House,4 without deducting half the cost of the insurance and taxes that Gina needed to pay for her half of the House, and by crediting Gina for the cost of her improvements rather than for the increased value in the property produced by those improvements.5 Terry has not, however, demonstrated clear error in the trial court’s decision because the judgment did not require the trial court to give Gina “full credit” for any of those items. According to Terry’s Exhibit 6, the House has a value of “$92,800[,]” (Ex. Vol. 3 at 21), and thus Terry’s half would have a value of $46,400. If the trial court gave Gina zero credit for her estimated $90,000 in utilities and only half credit for the remaining $185,462.25 3 Terry also claims the trial court erred by giving Gina “credit for payment of personal expenses[,]” (Br. of Appellant at 19), because the mortgage payments included monies spent for attorney fees in a child custody matter. However, Terry failed to suggest to us, or to demonstrate that he suggested to the trial court during trial, the impact this should have on the court’s calculation of the amount of Gina’s contributions to the House. Neither we nor the trial court is obliged to pull such numbers from the ether. 4 Terry also asserts the trial court should not have considered Gina’s utility costs because she “admitted [they] were only guesstimates of what she had spent for utilities.” (Br. of Appellant at 16.) However, Terry did not object at trial to her testimony or her exhibit listing those figures based on the estimates being speculative. (See Tr. Vol. II at 32) (“To the fact of what her testimony would be no [objection] your honor.”). Nor when she testified on cross-examination that she was guessing did Terry ask the court to strike her testimony or exhibit as speculative. Because Terry failed to lodge any objection to this evidence at trial, he cannot argue on appeal that the trial court should not have considered it. See, e.g., Golden Corral Corp. v. Lenart, 127 N.E.3d 1205, 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (objection to challenged evidence is waived if not asserted “at trial contemporaneously with the introduction of such evidence”), trans. denied. 5 We again note that Terry did not object to the relevance of Gina’s evidence about the cost of the repairs and improvements that she made to the property. Nor did he offer evidence to demonstrate the increased value, or lack thereof, attributable to Gina’s improvements. When a party fails to offer the type of evidence it believes is required, we will not find error in the trial court’s use of the only evidence it was given. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 10 of 14 in expenses on her list – to eliminate any monies Gina had needed to pay for her half of the house – Gina still was due a credit of $92,731.12 – which is nearly twice the value of Terry’s half of the house. Regardless precisely how the trial court determined equity required Gina to receive the full value of the house, Terry has not demonstrated any error occurred.6 We accordingly affirm the award of the House to Gina. 3. Money Judgment [19] Finally, Terry challenges the trial court’s order that he pay a $4,307.95 money judgment to Gina. To arrive at that sum, the trial court added together $3,061.78 (due for judgment lien, interest, and court costs thereon) and $2,400.00 (for two-year loss of homestead deduction), and then the court subtracted $1,153.83 (for the two duplicative payments Terry made toward the mortgage and taxes on the House). Terry argues the trial court should not have ordered him to pay either the lost homestead deduction or the judgment lien. [20] Regarding the lost homestead deduction, Terry contends he should not be penalized for Gina’s loss of the homestead deduction after title transferred to him because Gina lost her legal eligibility for the homestead deduction in 2001, when she conveyed the House to herself and Gregg as joint tenants. (Br. of 6 Our refusal to find error herein, because equity tipped so far in Gina’s favor, should not be read as permission for trial courts to adopt inadequate findings submitted by a party. Trial Rule 52 requires trial courts to enter reasoned findings and conclusions that explain the basis of the judgment, and if a trial court receives wholly inadequate suggestions from all litigants, then the trial court needs to draft its own order. We recognize the time constraints weighing on trial courts but note that inadequate findings cause confusion for litigants and complications on appeal. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 11 of 14 Appellant) (citing Kellam v. Fountain Cnty. Assessor, 999 N.E.2d 120, 123 (Ind. T.C. 2013) (“Only an individual or married couple can obtain a homestead deduction on the individual’s or married couple’s property.”), rev. denied). Nevertheless, Terry did not assert this legal argument at trial, after Gina testified to the increase in her mortgage payments due to the loss of the deduction. (See Tr. Vol. 2 at 31-40.) We accordingly hold this argument waived for appeal. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Blue Sky Innovation Group, 230 N.E.3d 898, 907 (Ind. 2024) (“This issue was not presented before the trial court and is thus waived.”), reh’g denied. [21] Terry’s final argument is that the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay the judgment lien because the lien expired before the court entered its final judgment.7 A judgment constitutes a lien on real estate “until the expiration of ten (10) years after the rendition of the judgment[,]” exclusive only of “any time during which the party was restrained from proceeding on the lien by an appeal, an injunction, the death of the defendant, or the agreement of the parties entered of record.” Ind. Code § 34-55-9-2. While it is true that the underlying judgment lien attached to the property on January 6, 2015, (App. Vol. II at 23), and thus the lien it created reached the end of its ten-year term on January 6, 2025, the record before us does not reflect whether any of the four statutory 7 Terry did not raise the issue of the expiration of the judgment lien at trial. Instead, he raised it for the first time in his motion to correct errors. While normally new issues cannot be raised in a motion to correct errors, see Sanders Kennels, Inc. v. Lane, 153 N.E.3d 262, 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), we decline to apply that rule to this judgment lien, which was still enforceable at the time of the August 28, 2024, trial but expired on January 6, 2025, before the trial court entered its final judgment on April 7, 2025. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 12 of 14 exceptions to the ten-year limitations periods is applicable. Nor is the judgment creditor a party to this lawsuit to assert its rights. Given that the trial court was left to determine whether Terry or Gina should bear the risk that the lien was still enforceable, we cannot say the trial court erred when it chose to place that risk on Terry, who was the judgment debtor responsible for the lien’s existence. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order that Terry pay a $4,307.95 money judgment to Gina. Conclusion [22] The trial court erred when it denied Terry’s motion to add the parties’ proposed orders to the Clerk’s Record after the parties filed those documents with the clerk and served them on opposing counsel, but the error was harmless. None of Terry’s arguments regarding financial contributions by Gina demonstrate the trial court clearly erred when it determined equity required him to sign his interest in the House over to her. Terry forfeited his homestead-deduction argument by failing to raise it at trial, and the trial court did not err when it ordered Terry to pay the judgment lien. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. [23] Affirmed. Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 13 of 14 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT David W. Stone IV Stone Law Office & Legal Research Anderson, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Alan D. Wilson Kokomo, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1700 | October 29, 2026 Page 14 of 14