Posey County Council v. Kim Cross

FILED Aug 25 2026, 8:39 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Posey County Council, Appellant-Respondent v. Kim Cross, Appellee-Petitioner August 25, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-MI-2804 Appeal from the Posey Superior Court The Honorable Travis L. Clowers, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 65D01-2401-MI-6 Opinion by Judge Weissmann Chief Judge Tavitas concurs in result with a separate opinion. Judge Foley concurs. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 1 of 32  Weissmann, Judge. [1] This appeal arises from a dispute about the salary of Posey County’s prison matron (matron). Long after the Posey County Sheriff (Sheriff) ranked two positions on his staff—matron and jail commander—as equivalent, he repeatedly asked the Posey County Council (Council) to pay the matron the same salary as the jail commander as required by Indiana law. The Council continued to pay the matron less, prompting Kim Cross—the current matron— to bring this lawsuit. Cross sought the higher salary, including back pay, and the trial court entered summary judgment in her favor. [2] The Council appealed, contending that only the Council—not the Sheriff—had authority to rank the matron equal to the jail commander and that, in any event, Cross’s claim was barred by laches and waiver. Because Indiana law assigns the Sheriff—not the Council—the authority to determine the matron’s rank and requires the matron’s pay to be equal to that of identically ranked positions within the Sheriff’s Department, we affirm. Facts [3] The Posey County Sheriff’s Department employs both a jail commander and a matron. When the Sheriff took office in 2019, he identified confusion about the rankings and responsibilities of the Department’s various positions. In response, the Council requested he resolve that confusion by creating an organizational chart depicting the Department’s structure. The chart reflected that the matron was below the chief deputy sheriff in rank but that she headed one of the three Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 2 of 32  Department sections depicted on the chart. The chart listed no specific ranks, but the matron and the jail commander were side by side on the chart, although in different sections of the Department. [4] Later, in August 2020, the Sheriff appointed Kim Cross to replace the outgoing matron. Cross’s duties were those assigned to the prior matron: (1) receiving, searching, and caring for female prisoners and juvenile detainees under the age of 14, as statutorily required; (2) performing any additional duties the Sheriff assigned; (3) supervising the front office, jail kitchen, and jail laundry; (4) handling bonds received after business hours; (5) maintaining Inmate Trust Account and Inmate Commissary Account financial records; and (6) maintaining the sex offender registry. [5] From the time Cross was hired in 2020 through July 2023, the Council set her salary using a matrix system that did not reflect her as being equal in rank, grade, or position to the jail commander. At “Sheriff’s school” in December 2022, Cross learned from other matrons that matrons are statutorily entitled to the same pay as equally ranked Sheriff’s Department employees. App. Vol. II, p. 52. She informed the Sheriff, who then began notifying the Council of its statutory obligation. In exchanges that he described as “heated,” the Sheriff communicated on multiple occasions that Cross held the same rank, grade, and position as the jail commander and was required to be paid the same. Id. at 53. [6] The Council continued to pay Cross less than the jail commander. On July 11, 2023, the Council passed a salary ordinance setting the jail commander’s salary Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 3 of 32  at $60,743 plus longevity pay and setting the matron’s salary at $50,235 with no provision for longevity pay. [7] Cross filed a complaint for mandate against the Council in January 2024, and the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The Council claimed that unlike the matron, the jail commander is a certified law enforcement academy graduate with arrest powers and jailer certifications who supervises all jail staff and manages jail operations. The Council pointed out that Cross holds a high school diploma, has no law enforcement certification, and performs duties centered on female inmates and jail support functions. The Council designated no evidence rebutting Cross’s calculation of damages. [8] The trial court granted Cross’s motion for summary judgment but denied the Council’s. It found no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cross holds the same rank, grade, or position as the jail commander. It therefore determined that Cross is statutorily entitled to the same pay. The court entered judgment of $36,115.96 against the Council as of October 3, 2025, plus prejudgment interest, and ordered the Council thereafter to pay Cross the same salary, including longevity pay, as the jail commander. The Council appeals. Discussion and Decision [9] We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Aegean LLC v. Taggart Ins. Ctr., Inc., 263 N.E.3d 171, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidence establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 4 of 32  that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Indiana Trial Rule 56(C)). In conducting this review, we liberally construe all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. But the Council, as the party appealing the trial court’s summary judgment determination, bears the burden of persuading this Court that the ruling was erroneous. S.E. ex rel. Glaser v. City of Carmel, 198 N.E.3d 1209, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). [10] The Council raises two primary issues on appeal. First, it contends that only the county fiscal body may declare a matron to be of the same rank, grade, or position as the jail commander and that the two positions are not equivalent in any way. Second, the Council asserts that laches and waiver bar Cross’s claim. We conclude that the applicable statutes require that Cross receive pay equal to that of the similarly ranked jail commander and that neither laches nor waiver applies. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Cross Is Statutorily Entitled to Equal Pay [11] Cross contends she is entitled by statute to the same salary as the jail commander because the Sheriff equally ranked the two positions. The Council disagrees, arguing the positions differ too substantially in duties, training, and authority to be considered equivalent and that the Sheriff had no authority to make that determination in the first place. [12] Indiana Code § 36-8-10-5 (Matron Statute) frames this dispute. It provides: (a) Each sheriff shall appoint a prison matron for the county. The sheriff shall set the qualifications for that position. Except as Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 5 of 32  provided in subsection (b), the sheriff has complete hiring authority over the position of prison matron. (b) A prison matron who was a county police officer appointed under section 10(b) of this chapter immediately before being hired as prison matron is entitled to the discipline and removal procedures under section 11 of this chapter before: (1) being reduced in grade to a rank below the rank that the person held before being hired as prison matron; or (2) removal from the department. *** (e) The prison matron and assistant matrons: (1) are members of the department; (2) have the powers and duties of members of the department; and (3) are entitled to the same salary that other members of the department of the same rank, grade, or position are paid. Ind. Code § 36-8-10-5. [13] The dispute in this case is over the meaning of “complete hiring authority,” as used in the Matron Statute. “[S]tatutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.” Tidd v. Est. of Tidd, 257 N.E.3d 846, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “The first task when interpreting a statute is to give its words their plain meaning and consider the structure of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 851. “If no ambiguity in the language exists, delving into legislative intent is unnecessary.” Id. Instead, a clear and unambiguous statute must be applied as written. Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 6 of 32  A. “Complete Hiring Authority” Is Ambiguous [14] Both parties treat the Matron Statute as unambiguous, although they offer disparate interpretations of it. “[T]he parties’ disagreement about a [statutory] provision is not conclusive of ambiguity[] but is merely evidence that an ambiguity may exist.” S.W. Allen Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Fort Wayne, 142 N.E.3d 946, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis in original). This is because questions of law are beyond the power of agreement by the parties. Pond v. McNellis, 845 N.E.2d 1043, 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). [15] In determining whether statutory language is ambiguous, the court must first “determine whether the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question.” Young v. Hood’s Gardens, Inc., 24 N.E.3d 421, 424 (Ind. 2015). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court need not apply any rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. Id. at 424-25. “Only when a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation is it deemed ambiguous and open to judicial construction.” In re Adoption of J.E.H., 859 N.E.2d 388, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). [16] The Council maintains that “complete hiring authority” means the Sheriff can appoint but not rank the matron. Cross contends “complete hiring authority” necessarily includes ranking authority. [17] The legislature has not expressly defined “complete hiring authority.” That term also does not appear elsewhere in the Indiana Code. And our appellate Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 7 of 32  courts have used this phrase only in the context of the Matron Statute or related statutes without specifically defining it. See, e.g., Thompson v. Hays, 867 N.E.2d 654, 658 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Murray v. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 690 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Young v. Williamson, 497 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). When courts have used the shorter phrase “hiring authority” in contexts irrelevant to this appeal, they generally have used it to identify the official or entity vested with the power to hire, rather than as a description of the scope of powers that accompany hiring authority. See, e.g., McDermott v. Bicanic, 550 N.E.2d 93, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Such usage is of no help here. The question before us is not who may hire the matron, but rather what that authority entails as it relates to the power to fix rank, grade, or position. [18] “[W]hen a statutory term is undefined, the legislature directs us to interpret the term using its plain, or ordinary and usual, sense.” Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc. v. Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 174 (Ind. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Ind. Code § 1-1-4-1 (providing rules for statutory construction). The usual meaning of a statute’s non-technical wording is provided by the words’ ordinary and accepted dictionary definitions. Bd. of Dirs. of Bass Lake Conservancy Dist. v. Brewer, 839 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 2005). [19] “Complete” is defined as “having all necessary parts, elements, or steps” and “total, absolute” and “brought to an end.” Complete, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/complete (last visited July 27, 2026) [https://perma.cc/E2Z2-78G8]. The definition of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 8 of 32  “hiring” includes “to engage the personal services of for a set sum.” Hiring, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster .com/dictionary/hiring (last visited July 27, 2026) [https://perma.cc/3WZF- QKKL]. Finally, “authority” is defined as “power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior” or “persons in command.” Authority, Merriam- Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/authority (last visited July 27, 2026) [https://perma.cc/D296-BGQE]. [20] Taken together, these definitions reveal that the plain language of “complete hiring authority” yields two possible interpretations: (1) “complete hiring authority” means full control over the terms of employment, including rank of the matron because the Sheriff sets the “qualifications” for the matron, rank determines pay, and hiring is for a “set sum” (essentially, Cross’s position); and (2) “complete hiring authority” refers to only full power to control the hiring process of the matron but does not explicitly encompass broader employment powers over that position such as the ability to rank and to promote after hiring (essentially, the Council’s position). When the language of a statute is subject to two interpretations, it is ambiguous, requiring us to resort to the rules of statutory interpretation to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 9 of 32  B. The Sheriff Determines the Matron’s Rank [21] The Council claims the Matron Statute does not authorize the Sheriff to determine the matron’s rank for salary purposes. In its view, “complete hiring authority” under subsection (a) of the Matron Statute is limited to the power to appoint; that is, the Sheriff chooses the matron but does not determine the matron’s rank. The Council also argues that rank equivalency under subsection (e)(3) of the Matron Statute is based on objectively comparing the duties and qualifications of the two positions. Ind. Code § 36-8-10-5(e)(3). [22] In furthering this interpretation, the Council focuses on the language of Indiana Code § 36-8-10-10(a) (Approval Statute). That statute specifies: Except for the position of chief deputy, the position of prison matron, and in a county with a population of more than fifty thousand (50,000), temporary administrative ranks or positions established and appointed by the sheriff, the sheriff, with the approval of the [merit] board, shall establish a classification of ranks, grades, and positions for county police officers in the department. Ind. Code § 36-8-10-10(a). [23] The Council reads the Approval Statute as stripping the Sheriff of ranking authority over the chief deputy and matron. The Council further claims that its own general compensation authority over county employees, provided by Indiana Code § 36-2-5-3 (Compensation Statute), gives the Council the final word on the relative worth of each position within the Sheriff’s Department. The Compensation Statute provides in relevant part: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 10 of 32  The county fiscal body shall fix the compensation of officers, deputies, and other employees whose compensation is payable from the county general fund, county highway fund, county health fund, county park and recreation fund, aviation fund, or any other fund from which the county auditor issues warrants for compensation. This includes the power to: (1) fix the number of officers, deputies, and other employees; (2) describe and classify positions and services; (3) adopt schedules of compensation . . . . Ind. Code § 36-2-5-3(a). [24] The essence of the Council’s argument is that the Compensation Statute—a general statute—applies to the chief deputy and matron because the specific statutes—the Matron Statute and the Approval Statute—specifically exclude those positions from ranking by the Sheriff or the merit board. [25] In response, Cross argues that the Matron Statute authorizes the Sheriff to determine the matron’s rank. She contends the Approval Statute is consistent with that interpretation because the Approval Statute acknowledges that the chief deputy and matron ranks are not subject to the ranking provisions applicable to employees who fall within the merit board’s purview. Essentially, her view is that the legislature’s recognition in both the Matron Statute and the Approval Statute that the Sheriff has “complete hiring authority” over the matron and chief deputy shows the legislature’s intent to simply end the shared authority generally exercised by the Sheriff and merit board and leave to the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 11 of 32  Sheriff alone the hiring and ranking authority for the matron and chief deputy positions. [26] We agree with Cross. The Council’s reading of the applicable statutes fails because it is inconsistent with: (1) the prior versions of the relevant statutes and the context in which they evolved; and (2) the rule of statutory interpretation that requires that the Approval Statute and its neighboring statutes, including the Matron Statute, be construed consistently. 1. Prior Versions of Relevant Statutes and Their Context [27] In determining legislative intent underlying an ambiguous statute, “we examine the entire statute, prior versions, changes made, and the reasons for making them.” Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 446 N.E.2d 1337, 1339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). The prior versions of the Matron Statute and the Approval Statute are informative as to both the meaning of the phrase “complete hiring authority” and the matron exception that appear in both statutes. Ind. Code §§ 36-8-10-5(a), -10(a). [28] When the merit system for certain public employees first went into effect in 1961, members of the “county police force”—including the matron and chief deputy—were both hired and promoted through that system. Murray, 690 N.E.2d at 340. “For each rank, grade, and position . . . the sheriff, with the approval of the [merit] board, was required to set reasonable standards of qualifications, and fix the prerequisites of training, education, and experience.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 12 of 32  Id. (citing Acts 1961, ch. 285, § 5, which enacted the earliest version of the Approval Statute). [29] The sheriff, with the approval of the board, accomplished this task by “devis[ing] and administer[ing] examinations designed to test applicants as to the qualifications required for the respective ranks, grades, or positions.” Id. “Only those applicants who in the opinion of the sheriff and the board best met the prescribed standards and prerequisites could be appointed.” Id. In 1971, the General Assembly made merit boards for county police forces mandatory in all counties. Id. (citing P.L. 241-1971); see Ind. Code § 36-8-10-1 (providing “[t]his chapter applies to all counties”). [30] The merit system changed further after two federal appellate decisions in the early 1970s limited the use of political motivation as a ground for discharging public employees. First, in 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the First Amendment generally barred dismissals of non-policymaking civil service employees solely for their political beliefs or affiliations. Illinois State Emps. Union, Council 34, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973). But the Seventh Circuit recognized “the public executive’s right to use political philosophy or affiliation as one criterion in the selection of policy-making officials” and that “considerations of personal loyalty, or other factors besides determination of policy, may justify the employment of political associates in certain positions.” Id. at 574 (emphasis added). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 13 of 32 [31] Then, in January 1975, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s decision dismissing a claim by noncivil service employees of an Illinois sheriff, who allegedly dismissed or threatened to dismiss them on partisan grounds in alleged violation of the First Amendment. Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975) (hereinafter Burns I). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 6, 1975. Elrod v. Burns, 423 U.S. 821 (1975). [32] In its later decision in January 1976, the United States Supreme Court carved out an exception to the First Amendment’s general ban on politically motivated dismissals of noncivil service public employees. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 371-73 (1976) (hereinafter Burns II). “[T]o insure that policies which the electorate has sanctioned are effectively implemented,” the Court determined that partisan-based dismissals are limited to “policymaking positions.” Id. at 372. [33] In April 1975—after Lewis and Burns I recognized potentially broader authority by elected officeholders over staff in policymaking positions—the Indiana General Assembly amended several of the merit board statutes. “[A]t the request of the Indiana Sheriff’s Association, the [S]heriffs were first given ‘complete hiring authority’ over the positions of chief deputy and prison matron” through an amendment to the Approval Statute. Murray, 690 N.E.2d at 340 (citing P.L. 164-1975, § 1); Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1975) (a predecessor to the current Approval Statute). The pre-amendment version of the Approval Statute subjected the matron, the “first deputy” (now known as the chief deputy), and virtually all other “county police force” employees to the merit Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 14 of 32  system’s hiring and ranking requirements implemented by the Sheriff in conjunction with the merit board. Id. at 340-41; see Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1971). [34] After the 1975 amendments, the Approval Statute excluded the matron and the chief deputy from the merit board requirements by granting the Sheriff “complete hiring authority” over them. Id. at 340-41; Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1975) (“The sheriff shall, with the approval of the merit board, except for the positions of first deputy and matron over which the sheriff has complete hiring authority, establish a classification of ranks, grades and positions for county policemen in the department . . . .”) (emphasis added). Other than the addition of this “complete hiring authority” clause, the legislature left intact the existing language of the Approval Statute. P.L. 164-1975, § 1. [35] In conjunction with the amendment to the Approval Statute in 1975, the legislature also amended the statutes relating to the matron. The amended version of Indiana Code § 11-5-4-6 (1975)—with the new language italicized— specified: “The prison matron and her assistants shall be appointed by the sheriffs in the several counties as provided for in this chapter, and except for the matron position for which the sheriff sets the qualifications, the assistants shall meet the qualifications set forth in IC 1971, 17-3-14-6 [the prior Approval Statute].” P.L. 164- 1975, § 2. [36] The practical effect of this amendment was to allow the Sheriff to independently determine the minimum qualifications of the matron position. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 15 of 32  Previously, the Sheriff set the qualifications for the matron in conjunction with the merit board, and together, they were required to hire the person who best met those qualifications. Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1971); Ind. Code § 11-5-4-6 (1971). The joint Sheriff-merit board determination of qualification requirements in effect before 1975 still applied to the matron’s assistants, however. Ind. Code § 11-5-4-6 (1975). [37] In sum, as a result of these amendments, the Sheriff no longer hired the chief deputy and matron in conjunction with the merit board but, instead, independently determined the minimum qualifications for those positions and who should occupy them. Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1975); Ind. Code § 11-5-4-6 (1975). Cross essentially maintains the statutory language ultimately resulting from this legislative action, which largely removed the merit board’s authority over the matron and chief deputy, left intact the Sheriff’s existing authority to hire and rank those two positions. Intrinsically, as to those two positions, the Sheriff was left alone to do what the Sheriff previously did jointly with the merit board. The Matron Statute and the Approval Statute have not changed since those 1975 amendments in any manner significant to this analysis. [38] The Council, on the other hand, essentially treats the language resulting from these amendments as divesting both the Sheriff and the merit board of ranking authority over the matron and chief deputy but retaining the Sheriff’s hiring authority over those positions. The Council’s argument is inconsistent with the evolution of these statutes that we have just related and the context of these statutory changes. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 16 of 32 [39] The Indiana Sheriff’s Association requested the legislative changes shortly after the Seventh Circuit in Lewis effectively recognized that “public executives” had greater authority under the First Amendment over “policy-making positions.” 473 F.2d at 574. Although the United States Supreme Court made clear in Burns II that whether a position qualifies as “policymaking” is fact sensitive, 427 U.S. at 368, the chief deputy seems a particularly strong candidate for that description, and the matron might also qualify. [40] The chief deputy is the sheriff’s second in command, and the matron position appears to have always had responsibility for all female prisoners and juvenile detainees under the age of 14. See Ind. Code § 11-5-4-1(d) (1972); Ind. Code § 11-5-4-3 (1972) (The matron “shall be jailer in charge of the female department of the jail and other prisons and detention centers in the county where such prisoners are confined . . . .”). Thus, both are potentially policymaking positions over which elected officeholders have greater authority. See Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling that Sheriff’s deputies in small police departments who are closely connected to the Sheriff possess decision-making roles); Dimmig v. Wahl, 983 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1993) (ruling that Sheriff was entitled to fire deputies based on political considerations); but see Kolman v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling that Upton and Dimmig did not create per se rule that chief deputies necessarily inhabit a decision-making job to which First Amendment protections against partisan firing do not apply). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 17 of 32 [41] In this context, the timing of the amendments also suggests that the legislature was acting to increase, rather than limit, the Sheriff’s authority over the chief deputy and matron positions. By the time the General Assembly acted in 1975, the federal courts had already begun recognizing that public executives possess broader authority over politically sensitive, non-merit positions: the Seventh Circuit said as much in Lewis in 1972 and reaffirmed it in Burns I in January 1975. The amendments followed within months of Burns I, and their chronological proximity to those decisions supports inferring that the legislature legislated within that emerging backdrop. See Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 714 N.E.2d 135, 140 (Ind. 1999) (legislative intent may be gleaned from an amendment enacted shortly after a controlling decision). [42] What came afterward confirms that the legislature read the trend correctly. The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Burns II explained “the need for political loyalty of employees . . . to the end that representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of . . . policies . . . presumably sanctioned by the electorate.” 427 U.S. at 367. This is the same interest that seemingly distinguishes the chief deputy and matron from rank- and-file merit employees. See also Grossart v. Dinaso, 758 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1985). [43] And the Seventh Circuit later recognized in Upton that a state legislature “may choose to adjust state laws to protect some level of party affiliation or participation.” 930 F.2d at 1218. This is precisely what the 1975 amendments did. That the principle endured and was later described as one that legislatures Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 18 of 32  could implement does not supply the 1975 legislature's intent, but it confirms that reading the amendments as a deliberate expansion of the Sheriff's authority is consistent with the doctrine's settled trajectory. [44] The Council’s claim that the legislature removed the Sheriff’s ranking authority through the amendment of the Approval Statute in 1975 is inconsistent with this inferred legislative intent. Given the timing of the Indiana Sheriff’s Association’s request, the Association more likely sought more, not less, control over the chief deputy and matron as key policymaking positions distinguishable from the other positions within the statutory merit system. The courts had awarded Sheriffs greater authority over policymaking positions, so it is reasonable to infer that the Association asked the legislature to essentially follow the courts’ lead by leaving hiring and ranking decisions for the chief deputy and matron positions exclusively to the Sheriff. 2. The Council’s Reading Conflicts With the Rules of Statutory Construction [45] Even if the evolution of the relevant statutes and context of the 1975 amendments are insufficient to vitiate the Council’s argument, the rules of statutory construction do. “We ‘generally presume that all statutory language is used intentionally’ so that ‘[e]ach word should be given effect and meaning where possible’ . . . and not treated as ‘mere surplusage.’” In re Howell, 27 N.E.3d 723, 726 (Ind. 2015) (quoting both AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Ott, 785 N.E.2d 1068, 1079 (Ind. 2003) and Martin v. Martin, 495 N.E.2d 523, 524-25 (Ind. 1986)). We also are mindful of not only what the statute says, but “‘what it does Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 19 of 32  not say.’” ESPN v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016)). [46] Both the Matron Statute and the Approval Statute create exceptions to merit system requirements for the matron and chief deputy positions—merit system requirements long applicable to virtually all other positions within the Sheriff’s Department. “Statutes relating to the same general subject matter ‘are in pari materia [on the same subject] and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme.’” Klotz v. Hoyt, 900 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Sanders v. State, 466 N.E.2d 424, 428 (Ind. 1984)). “Harmonization requires a court to construe both statutes and examine the legislative intent closely.” Kibbey v. State, 733 N.E.2d 991, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). [47] The Approval Statute provided for rank, grade, and position classifications to be made by the Sheriff, with the approval of the board, until the Statute’s amendment in 1975. Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1971). Likewise, until 1975, the Matron Statute subjected both the chief deputy and the matron to merit system requirements. Id.; Ind. Code §§ 11-5-4-3, -6 (1972). After the 1975 amendments, the Matron Statute never expressly stripped the Sheriff’s pre-1975 ranking authority, and it never expressly transferred that authority to the Council. [48] Indiana courts recognize “a presumption that the legislature in enacting a particular piece of legislation has in mind existing statutes on the same subject.” E. Chicago Police Dep’t v. Bynum, 826 N.E.2d 22, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting County Council of Bartholomew Cnty. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 20 of 32  Bartholomew Cnty, 400 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)); see also Thompson v. Mossburg, 139 N.E. 307, 310 (Ind. 1923) (ruling that when the legislature amends a statute but retains existing language, the reenactment does not show a legislative intent to make any change in the law in the untouched language); accord Sutton v. State, 101 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ind. 1951) (“The unchanged portions of the statute are not to be considered as repealed and re- enacted . . . [but] are continued in force, with the same meaning and effect after the amendment that they had before.”). Thus, when the legislature largely removed the merit board’s ranking authority over the matron and chief deputy positions but did not expressly remove the Sheriff’s existing ranking authority over those positions, that silence may reasonably be construed as continuing the Sheriff’s authority to rank. Compare Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1971) and Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1975). [49] The Indiana Attorney General reached the same conclusion as we have when examining an analogous provision granting Sheriffs distinct hiring authority over special deputies: “determination of their rank, demotion and promotion, if any, would be controlled by the [S]heriff.” 1985 Ind. OAG No. 29, 1985 WL 69029, at *4. Although the Attorney General’s opinions “are without precedential effect and are not binding on this [C]ourt,” they occasionally are considered by this Court when conducting independent statutory analysis. Thompson, 867 N.E.2d at 659 n.9 (noting an Attorney General opinion but reaching different conclusion); see also Ind. State Personnel Bd. v. Martin, 338 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-MI-2804 | August 25, 2026 Page 21 of 32  N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (finding Attorney General’s opinions to be “persuasive” in light of limited precedent on issue). 3. The Council’s General Compensation Authority Does Not Grant It Ranking Authority [50] The Council claims it has ranking authority over the matron under the Compensation Statute and Indiana Code § 36-8-10-4(b) (Salary Statute). As previously explained, the Compensation Statute grants the Council the power to “describe and classify positions and services” and to “adopt schedules of compensation.” Ind. Code § 36-2-5-3(a). Similarly, the Salary Statute specifies that “[t]he [merit] board may recommend t