Michael Yonkman v. Argonaut Insurance Company

FILED Sep 16 2026, 9:02 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Michael Yonkman, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Argonaut Insurance Company, Appellee-Defendant September 16, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CT-422 Appeal from the Lake Superior Court The Honorable John M. Sedia, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 45D01-2502-CT-215 Opinion by Judge DeBoer Judges Mathias and Kenworthy concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 1 of 20  DeBoer, Judge. Case Summary [1] While investigating a suspected shoplifting, Highland Police Officer Michael Yonkman was injured when the suspect reversed his vehicle into Yonkman, pinning him against a parked car. Yonkman filed a complaint against the suspect and the police department’s uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM) provider, Argonaut Insurance Company (Argonaut), seeking damages for his injuries. Argonaut moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting it was filed outside the statutory limitations period, and, in any event, Yonkman was not entitled to UIM coverage because he was not occupying his police cruiser when he was injured. After the trial court converted Argonaut’s motion to one for summary judgment, Yonkman filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the timeliness of his complaint and his occupancy of a covered vehicle. The trial court ruled in Argonaut’s favor, and Yonkman appeals. [2] We hold that Yonkman filed his complaint within the two-year limitations period and that he maintained a sufficient relationship with his police cruiser during the investigation to be “occupying” it for purposes of UIM coverage. We thus reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions for the court to deny Argonaut’s motion and grant Yonkman’s cross-motion. Facts and Procedural History [3] On February 17, 2023, a loss prevention officer suspected Jomo Wilson of shoplifting from a Kohl’s department store in Highland. Yonkman was Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 2 of 20  dispatched to the store to investigate, and he drove his department-issued police cruiser to the store’s parking lot. When Yonkman arrived, Wilson had left the store and was pushing a shopping cart through the lot toward his Ford Escape. [4] Yonkman parked his cruiser near the Escape. Then he exited the cruiser, left the engine running, and started walking toward Wilson. Though Yonkman instructed Wilson to stop, Wilson started running and managed to climb into the driver’s seat of the Escape before Yonkman caught up to him. Yonkman opened the driver’s door to arrest Wilson, but Wilson accelerated the vehicle in reverse. The open driver’s door dragged Yonkman backwards and crushed him between it and another parked car, injuring him. 1 Only sixty seconds passed between Yonkman exiting his cruiser and Wilson reversing into him. [5] On February 18, 2025—two years and one day after the incident—Yonkman filed his complaint against Wilson and Argonaut, seeking in part to recover damages for his injuries under the police department’s UIM policy. Argonaut responded to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), asserting two arguments. First, it contended that Yonkman filed the complaint outside the two-year limitations period provided by Indiana law and the terms of the policy. Second, Argonaut asserted Yonkman was not an “insured” as defined by the policy because he was not “occupying” his cruiser at the time of the incident. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 29. 1 The nature and extent of Yonkman’s injuries are not clear from the record before us. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 3 of 20 [6] Argonaut attached several exhibits to its motion, including a copy of the policy, the charging information filed against Wilson for numerous offenses stemming from his encounter with Yonkman, the probable cause affidavit filed in Wilson’s criminal case, and Wilson’s May 16, 2025 plea agreement, in which he pled guilty to Level 3 felony aggravated battery against Yonkman. Before Yonkman responded to the motion to dismiss, the trial court converted it to a motion for summary judgment and enlarged Yonkman’s deadline to respond.2 [7] Yonkman’s response in opposition to Argonaut’s motion was timely, and he made a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the timeliness of his complaint and the applicability of UIM coverage. First, he argued his filing of the complaint was timely because Indiana Code section 1-1-9-1 defined the two- year anniversary of the incident, February 17, 2025, as a legal holiday commemorating George Washington’s Birthday. Thus, Trial Rule 6(A)(3) extended the limitations period through February 18, 2025. Second, Yonkman claimed that though he was outside his cruiser when Wilson injured him, he nonetheless occupied it under the four-factor test developed by this Court in Miller v. Loman, 518 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), reh’g denied. 2 This was necessary because Argonaut referenced matters outside the pleadings in its motion to dismiss. See Ind. Trial Rule 12(B) (“If, on a motion [under Rule 12(B)(6)], matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.”). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 4 of 20 [8] Among other exhibits, Yonkman designated his own affidavit, in which he recounted the February 17, 2023 incident. He also explained what he intended to do had Wilson not fled: If Wilson had complied with my verbal response to stop, I would have conducted a theft investigation, which would have required me to return to my police [cruiser] to run Wilson’s name/identity through [the] . . . software system located within my police issued laptop computer inside the police vehicle. Subsequent to the incident, I became aware that Wilson had an active warrant for impersonating a federal police officer. Accordingly, [the software] would have alerted me to the active warrant, and I would have arrested Wilson for the outstanding warrant. Further, I would have used the police vehicle to transport Wilson following the arrest. Appellant’s App. Vol. 4 at 93. Yonkman further alleged that “[h]ad Wilson not pinned [him] between his Ford Escape and another parked car, [he] would have returned to [his] police vehicle to initiate a pursuit on Wilson . . . .” Id. [9] In a combined reply and response to Yonkman’s arguments, Argonaut designated a memorandum issued by then-Governor Eric Holcomb informing Indiana state employees “of the 2025 state holidays and the dates on which they [would be] observed.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 7 at 11. As shown by that memorandum, Governor Holcomb had exercised his authority under Indiana Code section 1-1-9-2 to shift the observance of Washington’s Birthday to December 26, 2025. Thus, according to Argonaut, February 17, 2025, was not a legal holiday and Trial Rule 6(A)(3) did not apply. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 5 of 20 [10] On December 1, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment. There, the parties’ arguments largely tracked the contentions made in their written submissions. However, at the conclusion of the hearing, Yonkman’s attorney asked the court to take judicial notice of Lake County Ordinance 1502D (the Ordinance), which declared all county offices closed on February 17, 2025, in observance of Presidents Day. Because Lake County offices were closed on the two-year anniversary of the incident, Yonkman argued Trial Rule 6(A)(4) extended the limitations period by one day. The court took the motions under advisement, including Yonkman’s request for judicial notice of the Ordinance. [11] The day after the hearing, the trial court issued a five-page order granting Argonaut’s motion for summary judgment, denying Yonkman’s cross-motion, and certifying the order as a final appealable judgment. The court reasoned that because Governor Holcomb shifted the observance of “Washington’s Birthday . . . to December 26, 2025, . . . February 17, 2025 was not a legal holiday in Indiana and was not to be included in the computation of time . . . to determine when the statute of limitations expired.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 7 at 64. Thus, “Yonkman’s lawsuit [was] time-barred[,]” rendering moot the issue of whether “Yonkman was actually occupying the motor vehicle[.]” Id. at 65. The court did not rule on Yonkman’s request to take judicial notice of the Ordinance or what effect, if any, the county’s observance of Presidents Day had on the limitations period. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 6 of 20 [12] Yonkman filed a motion to correct error on December 23, 2025, to which he attached a copy of the Ordinance. The trial court summarily denied the motion to correct error on January 22, 2026, and this appeal ensued. Discussion and Decision [13] In an appeal following a motion to correct error, our review necessarily involves both the motion to correct error and the underlying order. Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). The denial of a motion to correct error is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. But when a motion to correct error involves questions of law, we review those questions de novo, giving no deference to the trial court’s judgment. Id. Here, the underlying order was a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment, which implicates questions of law subject to de novo review. Isgrig v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 256 N.E.3d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 2025). [14] Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(C), the party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to make “a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). If the moving party satisfies that burden, “the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. Our review is limited “to the materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied. We construe any doubts as to the facts or reasonable inferences in favor Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 7 of 20  of the non-moving party, and while the trial court’s reasoning “aid[s] our review, . . . [it does] not bind us.” Sandoval v. Willow Lake Ests. Home Owners Ass’n, 255 N.E.3d 1181, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). [15] When, as here, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, we “consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 260 N.E.3d 253, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Because Yonkman lost on the motions below, he “has the burden of persuading us that the trial court erred.” Kluger v. J.J.P. Enters., Inc., 159 N.E.3d 82, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 1. Statute of Limitations [16] Though Yonkman purports to raise three issues on appeal, each focuses on a common question. That is, whether the trial court erred by concluding Yonkman filed his complaint after the statute of limitations expired. [17] Our Supreme Court has held that “[s]tatute of limitations defenses are ‘particularly appropriate for summary judgment determination.’” City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., 169 N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Stickdorn v. Zook, 957 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). The party asserting the defense must establish three things: “(1) the nature of the plaintiff’s action, so that the relevant statute of limitations period may be identified; (2) the date the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued; and (3) the date the cause of action was brought, being beyond the relevant statutory period.” Id. (quoting McMahan v. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 8 of 20  Snap On Tool Corp., 478 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). If the movant makes this prima facie showing, “the burden shifts to the opponent ‘to establish facts in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense.’” Id. (quoting McMahan, 478 N.E.2d at 120). [18] Yonkman apparently concedes that Argonaut established items (1) and (2). On item (1), the parties agree that Yonkman seeks to recover for personal injuries, so his complaint was subject to the two-year limitations period defined by Ind. Code section 34-11-2-4. As for item (2), there is no dispute that Yonkman’s cause of action accrued (and thus the statute of limitations began to run) on February 17, 2023, the date Yonkman was injured. [19] Regarding item (3), the parties agree Yonkman filed his complaint two years and one day after his injury: February 18, 2025. But Yonkman and Argonaut dispute whether that date was beyond the statutory limitations period. To determine whether February 18, 2025, was outside the limitations period, we must apply Trial Rule 6(A), which provides, in part, as follows: In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included unless it is: .... (3) a legal holiday as defined by state statute[.] Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 9 of 20  .... In any event, the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, a legal holiday, or a day on which the office is closed. [20] According to Yonkman, his complaint was timely filed under Rule 6(A)(3) because February 17, 2025, was statutorily defined as a legal holiday commemorating Washington’s Birthday, thus extending the limitations period through February 18. See Ind. Code § 1-1-9-1(a) (2000). Argonaut disagrees and argues Governor Holcomb exercised his statutory authority to shift the observance of Washington’s Birthday to December 26, making February 17 not a legal holiday. See Ind. Code § 1-1-9-2 (1989). [21] Interpretation of statutes and trial rules are questions of law reviewed de novo. Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019). When interpreting a statute, we ascertain the legislature’s intent by giving an unambiguous statute “its clear and plain meaning.” Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016) (quoting State v. Evans, 810 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. 2004), reh'g denied). We resort to rules of statutory construction only “if a statute admits of more than one interpretation.” Id. And we must “examine the statute as a whole,” reading “sections of an act together so that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statue.” Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d on reh’g by 15 N.E.3d 72. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 10 of 20 [22] The phrase “legal holiday as defined by state statute” means just that: the enactments of our legislature govern the dates of legal holidays. The text of section 1-1-9-1 confirms this interpretation. There, the legislature defined “the third Monday in February” as a “legal holiday[] within the state of Indiana for all purposes.” I.C. § 1-1-9-1(a) (emphasis added). The phrase “for all purposes” leaves no ambiguity that the legislature intended the third Monday in February to be a “legal holiday as defined by state statute” when calculating filing deadlines under Trial Rule 6(A)(3). And here, since February 17, 2025 was the third Monday of that month, Trial Rule 6(A)(3) gave Yonkman until February 18 to file his complaint. [23] Section 1-1-9-2 does not alter our conclusion. There, the legislature provided: All legal holidays, except Sundays, shall be paid holidays for state employees. However, the governor may shift to another day the observance of a legal holiday, except that Martin Luther King, Jr.’s birthday shall be observed as a holiday on the third Monday in January. I.C. § 1-1-9-2. Argonaut contends the second sentence of section 1-1-9-2 empowers the governor to unilaterally change when legal holidays are observed for any purpose, including calculating deadlines under Trial Rule 6(A)(3). But the use of “however” to connect the second sentence to the first indicates the legislature intended to permit the governor to shift when state employees enjoy paid holidays, not give the executive carte blanche to redefine the state holiday schedule for other purposes. Thus, section 1-1-9-2 authorizes the governor to Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 11 of 20  shift only the observance of holidays by state employees, not the dates selected by the legislature to be actual legal holidays. [24] We therefore find no genuine issue of fact that Yonkman filed his complaint within the two-year limitations period on February 18, 2025. 3 2. Occupation of a Covered Vehicle [25] Because the trial court erroneously found that Yonkman’s complaint was filed outside the limitations period, it did not reach whether Yonkman was occupying the vehicle at the time of the incident as required by the UIM policy. Though Yonkman did not address that issue in his opening brief, Argonaut raised it in its brief. In reply, Yonkman asserted “[t]he issue of [UIM] coverage is not properly before this Court because the trial court . . . specifically declined to rule upon that portion of the motion.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 10. Contrary to Yonkman’s assertion, when we review the grant or denial of summary judgment, “we stand in the shoes of the trial court” and are not limited by the issues addressed by the appealed order. 4 Lane v. Menard, Inc., 242 N.E.3d 1060, 3 Because the state holiday schedule is dispositive, we do not comment on whether the trial court could have taken judicial notice of the Ordinance as evidence that county offices were closed on February 17, 2025. Nor do we fully address Argonaut’s argument that the UIM policy required Yonkman to file his complaint “within two years after the date of the ‘accident’” regardless of whether February 17, 2025, was a state or local holiday. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 11. UIM policies are statutorily required “to afford the same protection to a person injured by an uninsured motorist as they would have enjoyed if the offending motorist had themselves carried liability insurance.” Napier v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 179 N.E.3d 504, 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Ind. Code § 27-7-5-2 (2020) (amended 2026)). Thus, to the extent the Argonaut policy required Yonkman to file his lawsuit before the statute of limitations expired, that requirement contravenes public policy and is unenforceable. Id. 4 On August 3, 2026, Yonkman moved to strike Argonaut’s arguments regarding the applicability of the UIM policy. We denied that motion in an order issued August 19, 2026. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 12 of 20  1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Misner v. Dekalb Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)), trans. denied. [26] To resolve whether the present circumstances fall under the terms of the UIM policy, we start with the general rules of contract interpretation. Progressive Se. Ins. Co. v. Chastain, 153 N.E.3d 330, 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). We look to the language of the insurance agreement “to determine and implement the parties’ intent when they entered the contract.” In re Est. of Webster, 275 N.E.3d 928, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Wohlt v. Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d 611, 616 (Ind. 2024)). We give undefined terms, if unambiguous, their plain and ordinary meanings and generally “construe ambiguous terms against the policy drafter and in favor of the insured.” G&G Oil Co. of Ind., Inc. v. Cont'l W. Ins. Co., 165 N.E.3d 82, 87 (Ind. 2021). [27] The Argonaut policy provided coverage for “all sums [an] ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an ‘uninsured motor vehicle.’” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 8. The term “insured” was defined to included “[a]nyone ‘occupying’ a covered ‘auto’ . . . .” Id. at 9. And “occupying” meant “in, upon, getting in, on, out[,] or off.” Id. at 12. When construing similar policy language, this Court developed the following four-factor test: whether a person is “occupying” a vehicle for purposes of [UIM] coverage requires consideration of: (1) the distance between the accident and the covered vehicle; (2) the time separating the accident and the exit from the covered vehicle; (3) the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 13 of 20  individual's opportunity to reach a zone of safety; and (4) the individual's intentions in relation to the covered vehicle. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 844 N.E.2d 572, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Miller, 518 N.E.2d at 491), summarily aff’d in relevant part by 866 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ind. 2007). [28] This test was first expressed in Miller, where the panel held “a person has not ceased ‘occupying’ a vehicle until he has severed his connection with it—i.e., when he is on his own without any reference to it.” Lake States Ins. Co. v. Tech Tools, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 314, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Miller, 518 N.E.2d at 489). The Miller factors aid in determining whether the injured party maintained “a relationship between [himself] and the insured automobile” at the time of his injury. 518 N.E.2d at 491. Each factor carries “greater or lesser weight depending upon the circumstances of each individual case,” and “[t]here may be instances in which one of the factors may be determinative.” 5 Id. 5 A judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana opined that “[o]ne might wonder whether such a four-factor test can be applied as a matter of law. But the Indiana courts in Miller and the other cited cases decided the question as a matter of law.” Gutierrez, 844 N.E.2d at 581 n.4 (quoting Spencer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 811, 825 (S.D. Ind. 2005), reconsideration denied). The trial judge here expressed the same concern, reasoning that whether Yonkman occupied his cruiser “could potentially raise fact issues.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 7 at 65. We do not comment on whether applying the Miller factors might, under some circumstances, present a question of fact. Here, the relevant facts are undisputed. The only designated materials discussing the incident are Yonkman’s affidavit and the probable cause affidavit from Wilson’s criminal case, which do not conflict. Because the facts of the incident are not disputed, we can resolve whether Yonkman occupied his cruiser as a matter of law. See Erie Ins. Exch. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 265 N.E.3d 1011, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“When the facts are undisputed, ‘our task is to determine the law applicable to those facts, and whether the trial court properly applied it.’” (quoting Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Precedent Cos., LLC, 782 N.E.2d 470, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003))). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 14 of 20 [29] In Gutierrez, Gutierrez was riding in a pickup truck hauling a playhouse to the driver’s home. 844 N.E.2d at 576. When the playhouse became unsecured and fell onto the road, Gutierrez and another passenger got out of the vehicle to load the playhouse back onto the truck. Id. While Gutierrez stood next to the truck, the driver accelerated in reverse, causing the open passenger door to knock Gutierrez onto the ground. Id. Gutierrez sought coverage for his resulting injuries from the truck owner’s insurance carrier, which denied the claim on the basis that Gutierrez was not occupying the truck when he was injured. Id. at 577. Thereafter, Gutierrez sued the carrier for breach of contract and bad faith, and a jury ultimately found in his favor. Id. at 579. At trial, the carrier moved for judgment on the evidence with respect to Gutierrez’s occupancy of the truck, which the trial court denied. Id. [30] On appeal, the carrier argued the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment on the evidence because Gutierrez was not occupying the truck under the Miller test. Id. at 582. The panel rejected that argument, reasoning: Gutierrez was a passenger in the truck when he and another passenger got out to retrieve the playhouse that had fallen onto the roadway. Gutierrez was outside of the truck for less than one minute and was standing immediately next to the truck when he was struck by the open passenger-side door. Gutierrez had no plans to leave the truck and intended to exit only long enough to re-load the playhouse before he and the others continued on their journey. He had not had any opportunity nor any reason to reach a zone of safety. Gutierrez remained vehicle-oriented at all times. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 15 of 20  Id. at 583. [31] Here, Yonkman aptly compares the facts of his case to Gutierrez. Like Gutierrez, Yonkman did not intend to reach a zone of safety after exiting his cruiser. Instead, the sole purpose of Yonkman’s exit from the vehicle was to speak with Wilson before returning to the cruiser to look up Wilson in the police database. And once Wilson entered his Escape, Yonkman wanted to return to his cruiser to pursue Wilson but was prevented from doing so when Wilson reversed the Escape into him. Had Yonkman been able to successfully arrest Wilson, he would have transported Wilson in the cruiser. Moreover, Yonkman affirmed that he parked his cruiser near Wilson’s Escape and had been outside it for less than sixty seconds before being struck by Wilson’s vehicle. [32] Argonaut tries to distinguish Gutierrez by noting that Gutierrez was struck by the insured vehicle, while Yonkman’s cruiser was not involved in the collision at issue here. But this distinction is immaterial, as this Court has found UIM coverage under Miller when the covered vehicle was not involved in a collision. For example, in Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Jones, a police officer used her cruiser to block a lane of traffic to make room for a tow truck. 953 N.E.2d 608, 611-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. While she was directing traffic, the officer was struck and killed by a motorist. Id. at 612. Her estate brought an action against the police department’s UIM carrier seeking coverage under a provision of the policy applying to injuries arising out of the use of a covered vehicle. Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 16 of 20  The estate and the carrier filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court ruled in favor of coverage. Id. at 613. [33] On appeal, the panel affirmed the trial court’s coverage determination, reasoning: Argonaut designated no evidence that indicates [the officer’s] actions with relation to her patrol car were inconsistent with using the car for controlling traffic around the slide-off site or were anything other than central to that purpose. Rather, Argonaut focuses on [the officer’s] distance from the patrol car, the positioning of the car, the length of time [the officer] spent directing traffic away from the car, and [the motorist’s] contentions that she did not see the patrol car’s lights on or see a reason for a police car to be deployed at all. Whether [the officer] was 104 feet from her patrol car, as determined by [one trooper’s] measurements, or some shorter distance, per [conflicting] testimony, the question is not one of distance alone, but whether [the officer] was in some active relationship to the vehicle at the time of the collision. Nor is time the crucial inquiry. Whether [the officer] spent five minutes or fifteen minutes directing traffic is not dispositive, so long as she was still in some active relationship to the car. See Miller, 518 N.E.2d at 491 (rejecting a test focusing only on distance and time when considering whether an individual was “alighting” from a vehicle and noting that “other relevant criteria” may be considered). Jones, 953 N.E.2d at 619. [34] Though Jones applied Miller to different policy terms than the “occupying” language at issue here, courts have held that a physical connection to the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 17 of 20  covered vehicle does not control whether the injured party was “occupying” it for purposes of UIM coverage. See Lakes States Ins., 743 N.E.2d at 320 (the relationship described by Miller “seems to be something different than simply physical contact, but instead, seems to be some sort of metaphysical connection”). In applying Indiana law, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found that a semi-truck driver was occupying his vehicle though it was not involved in either of the two collisions at issue. Spencer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 811, 825 (S.D. Ind. 2005). After the first collision, the semi driver got out of his vehicle to render aid to an injured motorist, only to be injured himself when the injured motorist’s pickup truck was struck by another vehicle. Id. at 813-14. The district court found the driver was occupying the semi under Miller because he left it parked near the injured motorist, was injured seconds after he’d last exited it, did not have an opportunity to reach a zone of safety, and intended to continue on his journey after helping the injured motorist. Id. at 825. [35] Like the semi-truck driver in Spencer, Yonkman was struck by Wilson’s vehicle less than a minute after exiting his police cruiser, which was parked near Wilson’s car. Yonkman intended to use the cruiser during the investigation and, if necessary, transport Wilson to jail. The undisputed facts thus show that although the cruiser was not involved in the collision, Yonkman remained oriented to it under the Miller test. [36] Despite the factual similarities between Gutierrez, Jones, Spencer, and Yonkman’s case, Argonaut directs us to Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Herring-Jenkins, 830 F. Supp. 2d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 18 of 20  566, 577 (N.D. Ind. 2011). There, a construction crew was working to fill potholes on I-80. Id. at 569. The crew was transported in a dump truck to stretches of roadway in need of repairs and would exit the truck to complete their work. Id. After working on a certain stretch of roadway for about an hour-and-a-half, one worker was struck and killed by a passing motorist. Id. [37] After the worker’s estate filed a claim with the dump truck’s insurance carrier, the carrier filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana seeking a declaration that the worker was not “using” or “occupying” the truck at the time of the accident. Id. at 568. The district court ultimately ruled in the carrier’s favor, reasoning in part that [a]lthough [the worker] anticipated becoming a passenger, this was not to occur until the end of his shift. In the meantime, he was undertaking tasks that had no relation to being an operator or passenger of the truck . . . . In fact, [the worker] had been performing these independent tasks for an hour and one-half before his death. Id. at 575. [38] Herring-Jenkins is readily distinguishable from the present circumstances. As noted above, Yonkman’s investigation and potential arrest of Wilson were not independent of his police cruiser, which was a crucial part of Yonkman’s police work. Nor had Yonkman been performing tasks independent of his cruiser for a significant time after exiting it, as Wilson’s vehicle struck Yonkman just sixty seconds after he parked the cruiser. Yonkman’s case is therefore closer to the facts of Gutierrez, Jones, and Spencer than Herring-Jenkins. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 19 of 20 [39] In sum, Yonkman showed there was no genuine issue of fact that he occupied his police cruiser under the Miller test, so he is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law regarding his occupancy of a covered vehicle. Conclusion [40] For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions for the court to deny Argonaut’s motion for summary judgment and grant Yonkman’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the timeliness of Yonkman’s complaint and Yonkman’s occupancy of his police cruiser at the time of the incident. [41] Reversed and remanded. Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT David S. Gladish Mark J. Schocke Gladish Law Group Highland, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Dennis F. Cantrell Zachary J. Reichle Stoll Keenon Ogden, PLLC Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-422| September 16, 2026 Page 20 of 20