Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Oct 29 2026, 9:12 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Portage Township of St. Joseph County, Indiana, and 350 Columbia Street, LLC, Appellants-Intervenor Defendants v. City of South Bend, Appellee-Plaintiff October 29, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-PL-711 Appeal from the Marshall Circuit Court The Honorable Janette E. Surrisi, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 50C01-2501-PL-4 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-711 | October 29, 2026 Page 1 of 8 Opinion by Judge Vaidik Judge May concurs. Chief Judge Tavitas concurs in result with separate opinion. Vaidik, Judge. Case Summary [1] Indiana law grants units of local government—counties, municipalities, and townships—broad eminent-domain power. Indiana Code section 36-7-14-20 addresses the use of this power in “redevelopment project areas.” Specifically, the statute provides that if a unit’s legislative body (e.g., a city council) considers it necessary to use eminent domain to acquire real property in a redevelopment project area, it must adopt a resolution setting forth that determination and directing its attorney to file suit. The issue we must decide in this appeal is whether this statute gives a unit’s legislative body exclusive authority to exercise the power of eminent domain in a redevelopment project area, thereby precluding other unit officials from doing so. We hold that it does. Here, the trial court allowed a city to bring an eminent-domain action for property in a redevelopment project area without authorization from the city’s legislative body, so we reverse. Facts and Procedural History [2] In October 2024, the City of South Bend, acting at the direction of its mayor, filed a Complaint for Condemnation as to real property owned by Argos 316, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-711 | October 29, 2026 Page 2 of 8 LLC. The property is in a redevelopment project area established by the South Bend Redevelopment Commission. Portage Township of St. Joseph County had previously contracted to buy the property and completed the purchase shortly after the City filed its complaint. The Township, along with 350 Columbia Street, LLC, which held easements on the property, intervened in the case and filed objections to the condemnation. As relevant here, Portage Township and 350 Columbia Street (“Objectors”) objected under Indiana Code section 36-7-14-20(a), which provides: If the legislative body of the unit that established the department of redevelopment considers it necessary to acquire real property in a redevelopment project area by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the legislative body shall adopt a resolution setting out its determination to exercise that power and directing its attorney to file a petition in the name of the unit on behalf of the department of redevelopment, in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the property is situated. Objectors claimed that the City’s condemnation action is illegal because it was not authorized by the South Bend Common Council—the City’s legislative body—as contemplated by this statute. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court overruled this objection and the others. The court concluded that Common Council authorization under Section 36-7-14-20 is just one way, not the only way, for the City to use eminent domain to acquire real property in a redevelopment project area. [3] Objectors now appeal. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-711 | October 29, 2026 Page 3 of 8 Discussion and Decision [4] Objectors contend that the trial court erred by overruling their objection under Section 36-7-14-20. 1 The trial court’s decision turned on the interpretation of that statute, which is a pure question of law, so our review is de novo. See Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind. 2015). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary; we simply “apply the words and phrases in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense.” Id. But when a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous and thus open to judicial construction. Id. In construing an ambiguous statute, our goal is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the Legislature. Id. [5] Objectors argue that only the legislative body of a unit of local government can exercise the power of eminent domain in a redevelopment project area. They do not dispute that units have broad eminent-domain power or that this power can generally be exercised by officials other than the unit’s legislative body. See Ind. Code § 36-1-4-5(a) (“A unit may acquire by eminent domain or other means, and own interests in real and personal property.”). But they assert that Section 36-7-14-20(a) unambiguously limits the use of eminent domain in the context of redevelopment project areas. As noted above, the statute provides that “[i]f the legislative body of the unit that established the department of redevelopment considers it necessary to acquire real property in a redevelopment project area 1 Objectors also challenge the overruling of their other objections. Because we reverse based on Section 36-7- 14-20, we need not address those arguments. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-711 | October 29, 2026 Page 4 of 8 by the exercise of the power of eminent domain,” it must adopt a resolution setting forth that determination and directing its attorney to file suit. According to Objectors, the clear implication of the statute’s language—establishing a procedure for a unit’s legislative body to exercise the power of eminent domain in a redevelopment project area, but not establishing a procedure for other unit officials to exercise that power—is that other officials do not have the power. [6] The City also argues that Section 36-7-14-20(a) is unambiguous, but in a much different way. The City contends that the statute does nothing to limit who can exercise a unit’s power of eminent domain in a redevelopment project area; it simply establishes the procedure to be employed “if” it is the unit’s legislative body that wants to exercise that power. According to the City, because the statute doesn’t expressly state that only a unit’s legislative body can exercise the power of eminent domain in a redevelopment project area, or that other unit officials cannot exercise such power, the statute has no impact on the broad eminent-domain powers of other officials under Indiana Code section 36-1-4- 5(a). In sum, the City maintains that Section 36-7-14-20(a) is merely a procedural statute applicable to a unit’s legislative body, not a substantive statute establishing who does or does not have the power of eminent domain in a redevelopment project area. [7] When the statute is read in isolation, both interpretations are reasonable. Therefore, the statute is ambiguous, and we must look beyond its plain text to discern its meaning. See Anderson, 42 N.E.3d at 85. Having done so, we conclude that Objectors offer the correct interpretation. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-711 | October 29, 2026 Page 5 of 8 [8] Section 36-7-14-20 is part of Indiana Code chapter 36-7-14, which establishes a comprehensive scheme for units of local government (except townships) to (1) create redevelopment project areas and (2) acquire real property in such areas. A unit may establish a department of redevelopment, to be controlled by a redevelopment commission. I.C. § 36-7-14-3. In turn, a redevelopment commission can establish a redevelopment project area for an “area needing redevelopment” (with the approval of the unit’s plan commission and legislative body). I.C. §§ 36-7-14-15, -16, -17. Once a redevelopment commission establishes such an area, it must identify the real property that needs to be acquired for the redevelopment project and then attempt to negotiate the purchase of that property. I.C. § 36-7-14-19; see also I.C. § 36-7-14-19.5. [9] Of course, a redevelopment commission won’t always be able to negotiate an amicable purchase of property. And that is when eminent domain becomes necessary and Section 36-7-14-20 comes into play. The statute sets forth how the power of eminent domain can be exercised in a redevelopment project area—through a vote of the unit’s legislative body. While other unit officials generally have broad eminent-domain power, and Section 36-7-14-20 doesn’t expressly bar them from exercising that power in a redevelopment project area, the redevelopment statutory scheme as a whole makes clear that the power lies with the unit’s legislative body. Since the property at issue here is in a redevelopment project area, and the City’s legislative body didn’t authorize the condemnation action, the trial court erred by overruling the objection. [10] Reversed. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-711 | October 29, 2026 Page 6 of 8 May, J., concurs. Tavitas, C.J., concurs in result with separate opinion. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS James A. Masters Nemeth, Feeney, Masters & Campiti, P.C. South Bend, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jenny R. Buchheit Andrew J. Miroff John D. French Abby V. DeMare Ice Miller LLP Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-711 | October 29, 2026 Page 7 of 8 Tavitas, Chief Judge, concurring in result. [11] I concur in result. The majority concludes that Indiana Code Section 36-7-14- 20(a) is ambiguous, but it nevertheless concludes that the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain in a redevelopment project area lies with the unit’s legislative body. [12] Neither party argues that the statute is ambiguous. I am, therefore, hesitant to conclude that the statute is ambiguous sua sponte. But because the City’s legislative body did not authorize the condemnation action, I agree that the trial court erred by overruling the objection. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-711 | October 29, 2026 Page 8 of 8