Full Opinion

FILED Sep 29 2026, 8:47 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana In the Matter of the Paternity of O.S.C., Minor Child, Brenden Carrell, Appellant-Petitioner v. Katherine Schurman, Appellee-Respondent September 29, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-JP-212 Appeal from the Hancock Circuit Court The Honorable Cody B. Coombs, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 30C01-2112-JP-419 Opinion by Judge Foley Judges Vaidik and Altice concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 1 of 17 Foley, Judge. [1] Brenden Carrell (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order granting the request of Katherine Shockley (“Mother”) 1 to relocate with the parties’ minor son (“Child”) to Pennsylvania. The order also awarded Mother primary physical custody and reduced Father’s parenting time. Father raises four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the following three issues: I. Whether remand is required because the trial court did not enter the findings and conclusions that Indiana Code section 31-14-13-7.5 (“the Special Findings Statute”) requires to support a modification of child custody; II. Whether remand is also required because the trial court placed the burden of proof for Mother’s relocation request on Father, the nonrelocating parent; and III. Whether the magistrate should be disqualified from hearing the matter on remand. [2] We remand. The trial court did not enter the findings and conclusions the Special Findings Statute requires. It also misallocated the burden of proof on relocation. On remand, the trial court must (1) enter an amended written order containing the required custody findings and conclusions, and (2) reconsider the relocation request under the correct statutory standard, entering more specific 1 Mother’s previous surname was Schurman, which appears in the record. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 2 of 17 findings and conclusions indicating that the trial court applied the correct burden of proof on the issue. We deny Father’s request for disqualification. Facts and Procedural History [3] Father and Mother are the parents of Child, born in July 2021. Father filed this paternity action in the Hancock Circuit Court in December 2021. The same magistrate has presided over the hearings and issued the substantive orders in the case. In January 2023, the trial court approved the parties’ Agreed Entry on Parenting Time, Custody, and Child Support (“the Agreed Entry”). The parties agreed “to equally share joint legal and physical custody” of Child. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 18. They agreed to alternate parenting time weekly, beginning on Mondays. Mother described the arrangement as a “week on, week off basis,” with exchanges at Child’s daycare. Tr. Vol. II p. 15. [4] In May 2024, Mother filed a petition to relocate. The trial court denied it, directing Mother to “the statutory requirements for notices of intent to relocate” and granting leave to correct and refile. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 23. In August 2025, Mother filed the Verified Notice of Relocation and Motion to Modify Custody and Parenting Time (“the Motion to Modify”). She sought to relocate with Child to Pennsylvania and alleged a substantial change in circumstances. Mother had remarried. Her husband (“Stepfather”) worked as the training coordinator for a nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. The couple now had a child to whom Child was bonded. Mother said she had “no desire to sever the relationship” between Child and Father. Id. at 29. She offered to Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 3 of 17 modify parenting time so that Father would have “the majority of all breaks from school and the summer.” Id. [5] Father filed a Verified Objection to Relocation of Mother and Child (“the Objection”). He noted that the parties had shared a “week to week” arrangement since the Agreed Entry, with Mother in Hancock County and Father in Madison County. Id. at 24. He stated that Mother had recently “stopped bringing the child to daycare” and had “requested copies of [Child’s] records from the daycare.” Id. Father asserted that he was a dedicated parent. He did not want Mother “to cut him off from his child by her unilateral choice to relocate.” Id. at 25. [6] A hearing set for September 2025 was continued, on Father’s motion, to December 2025. In the meantime, Mother relocated to Pennsylvania in October 2025. Mother would later testify that she took Child with her during her parenting weeks and returned him to Indiana for Father’s parenting time. She explained, “I relocated. I did not relocate my son. I was taking him to Pennsylvania to visit and then bringing him back to Indiana so . . . Father can exercise his parenting time . . . .” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Father notified the court and objected to the change to Child’s living arrangements. The trial court issued an order on November 14, 2025, requiring Mother to return Child to Indiana and enjoined her from removing Child from the State. The court later denied Mother’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside that order. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 4 of 17 [7] The trial court heard the Motion to Modify and the Objection on December 11, 2025. At the outset, the trial court addressed the order of proof and the burden of proof. Father’s counsel stated that “Mother has an affirmative obligation to prove the justification for the relocation.” Id. at 5. Counsel added that the Objection “would go first” in the presentation of evidence, but that Mother “would still be the moving party.” Id. The trial court disagreed, stating: The law talks about, um, whether the Court needs to restrain the child from leaving the State, um, which is language that falls on Father, not on Mother, because that wouldn’t be restraining Mother from, um, removing the child from the State. That would be re-- I mean, Mother wouldn’t be arguing for that. Father would be arguing for that. That’s why I think the burden actually falls on Father. Id. [8] Mother testified that she met Stepfather in 2023 while visiting her sister in Pennsylvania. Stepfather moved to Indiana in 2024, shortly before the couple’s child was born. His job required frequent travel throughout the country. He was later recruited for a position at a nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, where he had previously applied. Mother and Stepfather married in April 2025. About a month later, Stepfather returned to Pennsylvania to take the position. It involved a substantial pay increase and a traditional work schedule. Mother remained in Indiana until October 2025, when she began traveling back and forth with Child. The plan was for Mother to stay at home to care for Child and his younger half-sibling. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 5 of 17 [9] Father testified about his weekday work schedule, which was compatible with Child’s daycare hours. He also presented evidence about Mother’s handling of parenting time and the sharing of information. Text messages indicated that when Mother held Child’s first birthday party, she invited Father but said his family could not come. She said they could celebrate during his parenting time, but Father said his family was not available. Mother acknowledged that she had not provided the Court with her Pennsylvania address until testifying at the hearing and that she only disclosed the address to Father “after the fact,” in “the first week of November.” Id. at 9. She had also stopped taking Child to the Indiana daycare. [10] The trial court ruled from the bench and granted Mother’s request to relocate and modify custody. It later reduced the decision to a written order. In its oral ruling, the court noted that the parties had “week on, week off” parenting time, were “taking equal time” with Child, and were both “good parents.” Id. at 98. It also explained that “there is not a way to do an equal parenting time split based on the distance between the parties.” Id. at 99. Looking at “all the factors . . . that the Court is supposed to review in the relocation statute and motions to modify, et cetera,” the court called it “a close and difficult call.” Id. The court then announced, “I am going to modify custody. Mother will be primary physical custodian of the child. The parties will share joint legal custody of the child.” Id. Turning to parenting time, the court set exchanges in Dayton, Ohio. It described this as “an unequal travel arrangement because Mother is the one that left Indiana.” Id. at 100. It gave Father video contact Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 6 of 17 with Child “at least every other day.” Id. at 102. Addressing the birthday text messages, the court remarked that Mother’s approach to the special event “does not fit within the spirit of the parenting time guidelines,” and told her to make better efforts. Id. at 101. [11] After the court announced its decision, Father’s counsel asked the court to enter findings and conclusions. The court responded that “there wasn’t a request for Findings of Fact before I made my decision, and the Court didn’t sua sponte . . . request Findings of Fact.” Id. at 103. The court invited counsel to submit a proposed order consistent with its oral decision, but concluded that “[t]he request for Findings of Fact . . . has been waived.” Id. at 105. It also asked Mother’s counsel to prepare a proposed order. Within a week, Father filed a Verified Written Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law under Trial Rule 52(A). The court denied the request “as [it] was not made until after the Court issued its verbal decision.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 14. [12] The trial court entered its written order (“the Order”) on December 29, 2025. The parties would continue to have joint legal custody. The court modified physical custody to give Mother primary physical custody, finding that “[s]aid modification is in the child’s best interest.” Id. at 17. The court found that “[s]ince the last entry of this Court, Mother has remarried and has had another child,” that “Mother’s husband has relocated to Pennsylvania for employment which has enabled [M]other to stay at home with the children,” and that, “[a]s such, Mother’s request to relocate is granted.” Id. at 16. Father would have “one weekend a month,” along with “66% of winter break, all of fall and spring Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 7 of 17 break, and most of the summer unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.” Id. at 17. The Order provided for video calls “no less than every other day,” and set parenting-time exchanges in Dayton, Ohio. Id. Father now appeals. Discussion and Decision I. Special Findings Statute [13] Father argues that the Special Findings Statute required the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the modification of physical custody. He contends the court erred in two ways. It did not enter the required findings and conclusions. And it wrongly concluded that he waived the issue. [14] We review the scope and meaning of a statute de novo. Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1094 (Ind. 2018). If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its words and phrases “in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense.” Id. (quoting KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 898–99 (Ind. 2017)). [15] The Special Findings Statute directs that a trial court “shall include the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the custody order is based.” Ind. Code §§ 31-14-13-7.5(b)(1) (paternity cases), 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1) (dissolution cases). A “custody order” includes a final order modifying custody. I.C. §§ 31- 14-13-7.5(a), 31-17-2-8.2(a). The statute means what it says. It requires a trial court to include the court’s findings and conclusions in support of a custody order. Holstein v. Holstein, 283 N.E.3d 233, 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (referencing the same statutory language in a different context). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 8 of 17 [16] Next, the findings and conclusions must be set forth in the trial court’s written order. See Ind. Trial Rule 58(A) (providing that, “upon a decision of the court, the court shall promptly prepare and sign the judgment”); T.R. 54(A) (defining “judgment” to “include[] a decree and any order from which an appeal lies”); I.C. §§ 31-14-13-7.5(b)(1), 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1) (directing that the findings and conclusions “shall be included in a custody order” (emphasis added)). The findings must identify the basis for the custody decision. I.C. §§ 31-14-13- 7.5(b)(1), 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1); see also Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 1999) (“The principal purpose of findings of fact ‘is to have the record show the basis of the trial court’s decision so that on review the appellate court may more readily understand the former’s view of the controversy.’” (quoting Love v. State, 272 N.E.2d 456, 458 (Ind. 1971))). [17] Mother acknowledges that Father “raises a legitimate concern regarding the absence of detail[ed] findings” under the Special Findings Statute. Appellee’s Br. p. 8. But she claims the “issue does not warrant reversal” because Father waived the argument. Id. She argues he waived the argument by not requesting findings under Trial Rule 52(A), which ordinarily requires a written request before evidence is admitted. But that rule also provides that the court “shall make special findings of fact without request . . . in any . . . case provided by these rules or by statute.” T.R. 52(A) (emphasis added). The Special Findings Statute is such a statute. The obligation to enter findings and conclusions therefore applies without a request, and Father did not waive the argument. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 9 of 17 [18] The Order fails to satisfy the requirement of the Special Findings Statute. The Order states that “[s]ince the last entry of this Court, Mother has remarried and has had another child,” that “Mother’s husband has relocated to Pennsylvania for employment which has enabled [M]other to stay at home with the children,” and that, “[a]s such, Mother’s request to relocate is granted.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 16. Indiana Code section 31-14-13-6 governs the modification of child custody and provides that “[t]he court may not modify a child custody order unless: (1) modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider under section 2 and, if applicable, section 2.5 of th[at] chapter.” The court modified custody, but its only reference to these statutory requirements came later in the Order, where the trial court stated that “Said modification is in the child’s best interest.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 17. The trial court’s conclusory statement fails to identify the facts and statutory factors the trial court relied upon to make its best-interests determination. Further, the Order provides us no basis to review the modification. We must remand for findings and conclusions supporting the custody decision. Holstein, 283 N.E.3d at 237 (recognizing that remand for adequate findings, not reversal, is the remedy for insufficient findings); cf. In re G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (remanding, in the CHINS context, for entry of proper findings). [19] Father asks for more than a remand. He asks us to reverse the Order, remand for a new evidentiary hearing, “reassign” the case to a different judge, and restore equal parenting time in the interim. See Appellant’s Br. pp. 35–36. We Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 10 of 17 decline. Where inadequate findings in a trial court’s order leave us unable to determine the theory on which a case was decided, the remedy is to remand the case for the entry of adequate findings, not to reverse. Holstein, 283 N.E.3d at 237. We therefore remand for the trial court to enter the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which its custody modification is based, as the Special Findings Statute requires. In Part III, we separately address the request for a different judge, which we regard as a request to disqualify the magistrate. II. Burden of Proof [20] Father next argues that the trial court misapplied the relocation statute. He contends the court placed the burden of proof on him rather than on Mother, as the relocating parent. The allocation of a statutory burden of proof is a question of law that we review de novo. See Garner, 93 N.E.3d at 1094. In conducting appellate review, we begin with a presumption that the trial court followed the law and applied the correct burden of proof. Moran v. State, 622 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1993). That presumption is not conclusive. See id. It is overcome when the trial court’s own remarks disclose use of an erroneous standard “with clarity and certainty.” Id. It is also overcome when the trial court’s findings collectively present an unjustifiable risk that the court did not follow the law. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 863 N.E.2d 1232, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). [21] In Justice v. State, the trial court announced that the criminal defendant had not “met the burden” for self-defense. 237 N.E.3d 1154, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. The remark indicated that the trial court incorrectly placed the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 11 of 17 burden on the defendant, when the law placed it on the State, so this court held the presumption be overcome. Id. A neutral description of the court’s task is different. In Browell v. Bagby, a relocation case, the court’s statement that it must now determine whether the move is in the best interest of the children did not overcome the presumption that the court correctly applied the law, because it said nothing about who bore the burden. 875 N.E.2d 410, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In contrast, in Ramsey, the trial court entered findings regarding grandparent visitation but did not refer to the presumption that a fit parent acts in a child’s best interests. 863 N.E.2d at 1239. When read as a whole, the order gave “cause to worry” that the court had not applied the presumption, creating an unjustifiable risk that it did not follow the law. Id. [22] Indiana Code chapter 31-17-2.2 governs relocations. See I.C. § 31-14-13-10.5. Section 1 generally requires a relocating parent to file a notice of intent to relocate. Within twenty days, the nonrelocating parent must respond. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(a). Section 5 (“the Relocation Statute”) governs responses. If a nonrelocating parent objects to the relocation of the child, the response must include “[a] motion requesting: (i) a temporary or permanent order to prevent the relocation of the child; and (ii) the modification of a custody, parenting time, grandparent visitation, or child support order as a result of the relocation.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(a)(3)(B). It must also include a request for a hearing “on the motion” filed. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(a)(3)(C). When a party has requested a hearing, “the court shall hold a full evidentiary hearing to allow or restrain the relocation of the child and to review and modify, if appropriate, a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 12 of 17 custody order, parenting time order, grandparent visitation order, or child support order.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(d). [23] The Relocation Statute allocates the burden of proof in two steps. Subsection (e) sets forth the initial burden: “The relocating individual has the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is made in good faith and for a legitimate reason.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(e). “If the relocating individual meets the burden of proof under subsection (e), the burden shifts to the nonrelocating parent to show that the proposed relocation is not in the best interest of the child.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(f). The relocating parent thus bears the initial burden. This court has applied the burden-shifting framework in that order. See Pilkington v. Pilkington, 227 N.E.3d 885, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024); see also id. at 896 n.9 (addressing burden shifting). [24] The trial court’s comments indicate a departure from the burden-shifting framework required by the Relocation Statute. Before hearing evidence, the trial court addressed the order of proof and the burden of proof. Father’s counsel stated that “Mother has an affirmative obligation to prove the justification for the relocation.” Tr. Vol. II p. 5. He added that Father, as the nonrelocating parent, “would go first” in the presentation of evidence, but that Mother “would still be the moving party.” Id. The trial court disagreed with counsel, stating: The law talks about, um, whether the Court needs to restrain the child from leaving the State, um, which is language that falls on Father, not on Mother, because that wouldn’t be restraining Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 13 of 17 Mother from, um, removing the child from the State. That would be re-- I mean, Mother wouldn’t be arguing for that. Father would be arguing for that. That’s why I think the burden actually falls on Father. Tr. Vol. II p. 5. [25] Mother reads the record differently, attributing counsel’s statement to the trial court. She asserts: “The record reflects that the trial court and both parties’ counsel acknowledged this burden-shifting framework. The court stated, ‘Mother has an affirmative obligation to prove the justification for the relocation . . . I believe they would still be the moving party.’” Appellee’s Br. pp. 13–14 (quoting Tr. Vol. II p. 23). But that was Father’s counsel’s statement, not the court’s ruling. The court’s response was to place the burden on Father. The court appears to have conflated the order of proof with the burden of proof. The statute assigns to Mother the initial burden to prove a good faith and a legitimate reason for the relocation. The trial court instead placed the initial burden on Father. That was error. [26] Mother argues in the alternative that any error was harmless. She asserts that the court “heard evidence from both sides” and that “[t]here is no indication that the trial court misapplied or misunderstood the burden of proof.” Id. at 14. She points to the trial court’s oral remarks, noting that “[t]he court explicitly stated it was ‘looking at all the factors, uh, that the Court is supposed to review in the [R]elocation [S]tatute and motions to modify, et cetera, it is a close and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 14 of 17 difficult call.’” Id. at 15 (quoting Tr. Vol. II p. 99). Mother argues that these remarks “demonstrate[] compliance with statutory requirements.” Id. [27] We disagree. The court’s own statement, quoted above, gives us “cause to worry” that it misapplied the applicable burden. Ramsey, 863 N.E.2d at 1239. Nothing in the written order identifies the correct standard or indicates that the court applied it, creating an unjustifiable risk that the trial court did not follow the law. As in Part I, Father asks for a new hearing before a different judge. Again, we decline. This kind of error is curable. It is not a basis for reversing the relocation decision. Id. at 1240 (remanding for the entry of “more specific findings and conclusions” to indicate that the trial court applied the correct legal standard). We therefore remand for the trial court to apply the burden of proof as the statute allocates it and to enter more specific findings and conclusions confirming that it applied the correct legal standard. 2 III. Disqualification [28] Father asks that we “reassign” the matter to a different judge on remand. This Court has authority to grant appropriate relief on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(C)(10) (authorizing this Court to “grant any other appropriate relief”). 2 Because the missing findings and the burden-of-proof error each independently require remand, we do not reach Father’s remaining challenge to the trial court’s consideration of the statutory relocation factors, including whether Mother thwarted Father’s contact with Child. See Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-1(c)(4). The trial court should address the statutory factors when it reconsiders the relocation request on remand. Father also raises a constitutional challenge to the burden-shifting framework where, as here, the parties shared physical custody. He did not present that argument to the trial court. A party generally may not raise the constitutionality of a statute for the first time on appeal. Monschein v. LaLonde, 701 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). The constitutional argument is therefore waived. See id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 15 of 17 Father’s request, however, is contained in a single sentence, offered without cogent argument or citation to authority, and it is therefore waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring citation to supporting authority and cogent reasoning); Topp v. Leffers, 838 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (identifying appellate waiver for noncompliance with our appellate rules), trans. denied. Waiver aside, the request for reassignment, which we interpret as a request for disqualification, fails on the merits. [29] Trial Rule 76(C)(4) governs requests for disqualification and requires a verified petition setting forth the grounds. Moreover, this court does not allocate cases among trial court judges and magistrates. Rather, Trial Rule 79 governs the appointment of a special judge, with “the provisions of th[e] rule constitut[ing] the exclusive manner for the selection of special judges in circuit, superior, and probate courts in all civil and juvenile proceedings.” Ind. Trial Rule 79(A). [30] In requesting disqualification, Father did not comply with Trial Rule 76(C)(4). Furthermore, “[t]he law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced.” L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 (Ind. 2018). “To overcome that presumption, the party seeking disqualification must identify facts reflecting the judge’s actual bias or prejudice.” State ex rel. Allen v. Carroll Cir. Ct., 226 N.E.3d 206, 217 (Ind. 2024). This presumption is not overcome by the mere existence of adverse or even erroneous rulings. Id.; Newville v. State, 566 N.E.2d 567, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 16 of 17 [31] Even looking past the procedural impediments, the two errors we have identified are legal ones, and neither the record nor the challenged order discloses any basis to conclude that the magistrate cannot fairly consider the matter on remand. We therefore deny Father’s request for disqualification. Conclusion [32] The trial court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its custody decision as required by the Special Findings Statute. The court also misallocated the burden of proof required by the Relocation Statute. We therefore remand for the trial court to (1) enter an amended written order containing the required child custody findings and (2) revisit its relocation decision, confirming use of the correct legal standard on the issue through the entry of more specific findings and conclusions. We deny Father’s request for disqualification of the magistrate. [33] Remanded. Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Nathan K. Vining Vining Legal Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Dorothy Ferguson Law Office of Dorothy Ferguson Anderson, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JP-212 | September 29, 2026 Page 17 of 17