Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana In the Matter of J.P. and W.P., Minor Children Alleged to be Children in Need of Services; J.P. (Father), FILED Nov 04 2026, 8:55 am Appellant-Respondent CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner and Kids’ Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem November 4, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-JC-2086 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 1 of 42 The Honorable Geoffrey A. Gaither, Judge The Honorable Rosanne Tan Ang, Magistrate Trial Court Cause Nos. 49D09-2412-JC-11508 49D09-2412-JC-11509 Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judge Weissmann concurs in result with separate opinion. Judge Foley dissents with separate opinion. Tavitas, Chief Judge. Case Summary [1] J.P. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order finding that Father’s children are children in need of services (“CHINS”). We affirm. Issues [2] Father presents three issues for our review, which we reorder and restate as: I. Whether the trial court violated Father’s due process rights by failing to give him notice of the basis for the CHINS adjudication. II. Whether the trial court’s failure to hold the factfinding hearings within the time limits set forth in Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1 requires reversal. III. Whether the trial court clearly erred in determining that Father’s children were CHINS. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 2 of 42 Facts [3] Father and N.P. 1 (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of J.P., born in September 2019, and W.P., born in August 2022 (collectively, “Children”). On December 3, 2024, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) responded to a report of the death of Children’s five-month-old sibling, T.P. 2 DCS began its investigation into the circumstances of T.P.’s death by meeting with members of the local police department, interviewing Parents, and inspecting Parents’ home. DCS found the home to be cluttered, disorganized, infested with cockroaches, and lacking sufficient food for the family. Children were unbathed, smelled bad, and had visible rashes on their bodies. [4] DCS requested that Children be removed from the home due to the “hazardous home conditions,” Parents’ “possible untreated mental health” issues, and Parents’ delay in providing medical care to T.P. Tr. Vol. II p. 57. DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Natalie Shepler substantiated the neglect allegations “[b]ased on the deplorable home conditions and no evidence that there w[ere] any steps taken to improve that, coupled with the concerns for possible untreated mental health, and no plausible explanation for why the home conditions were like that.” Id. at 61. Children were removed from Parents and placed in foster care. 1 Mother does not participate in this appeal. 2 The record does not reveal a cause of death for T.P. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 3 of 42 [5] On December 4, 2024, DCS filed petitions alleging that Children were CHINS. As the basis for the CHINS allegations, the petitions listed the conditions of Parents’ home, T.P.’s death, and Father’s delayed arrival at home after T.P. died. The petitions did not allege facts concerning Children’s skin conditions, malnourishment, or Parents’ mental health. [6] During a January 10, 2025 pretrial conference, the trial court scheduled the factfinding hearing to take place within sixty days of the petition, setting hearings on January 24 and 31, 2025. At the end of the hearing on January 24, the trial court planned to resume the factfinding hearing the following week. In the interim, however, DCS moved to continue the January 31 hearing based upon its attorney’s sudden illness, which was documented by a physician’s note stating that counsel could not return to work until February 2, 2025. [7] Father’s attorney filed a motion “object[ing] to a waiver of the 60 day statutory requirement, to a continuance, and to a good-cause finding to go beyond the 60 day statutory requirement.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 114. Neither Mother’s counsel nor Children’s Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) objected to a continuance. The trial court granted DCS’s motion to continue on January 29, 2025, “mak[ing] a finding of good cause to go beyond the sixty (60) day deadline in this matter due [to] the unavailability of counsel for [] DCS.” Id. at 120. The trial court then rescheduled the factfinding hearing for February 7, 2025, four days beyond the sixty-day statutory deadline. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 4 of 42 [8] On February 5, 2025, Father filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice, arguing that, because the factfinding hearing had not been completed within sixty days of the filing of the petition, the trial court was required to dismiss the petition under the applicable version of Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1(d). 3 The trial court held a status conference on February 7 instead of the factfinding hearing as scheduled. On February 14, the trial court issued an order memorializing the events that occurred during the status conference, which provides in relevant part: “DCS requested a continuance of the trial set for 1/31/2025, because [DCS’s attorney] could not be present due to illness. The Court responded to that written request and granted the continuance, finding good cause to go outside of 60 [days].” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 133. The trial court then set additional factfinding hearings for March 20 and 28, 2025. [9] At the close of the March 20 hearing, the court set the matter for further factfinding hearings on March 28 and April 3, 2025. At the close of the March 28 hearing, DCS’s counsel informed the trial court that she anticipated seeking a finding of good cause to exceed the 120-day deadline found in Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1(b) because Father’s cross-examination of FCM Shepler remained outstanding due to that witness being on vacation. At the April 3 hearing, DCS’s counsel renewed this request and stated that she would follow up with a written motion. The GAL agreed that a continuance was reasonable, explaining that accommodating the remaining hearing days might not fit within 3 The trial court never issued a direct ruling on Father’s February 5 motion to dismiss, but the trial court implicitly overruled it by proceeding with the case. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 5 of 42 120 days and that witness-availability issues had made it difficult to complete the factfinding within that timeframe. [10] On April 8, 2025, DCS filed a written motion under Trial Rule 7(D) asking the court to find good cause to exceed the 120-day deadline, stating that DCS had one remaining witness to recall. Both Parents objected to the motion, but the GAL did not. The trial court granted the motion that same day, finding that “the parties have worked diligently to conclude the Fact Finding within 120 days, but factors, including medical leave and unavailability of essential witnesses, prevented that from occurring.” Id. at 153. The trial court continued the factfinding hearing to April 10, 2025. [11] At the April 10 factfinding hearing, nurse practitioner Hannah Renfrow testified at length regarding Children’s physical condition, including their skin conditions and malnourishment. Mother’s counsel cross-examined Renfrow about whether these conditions were alleged in the CHINS petition; DCS objected that the questioning was irrelevant, the GAL joined that objection, and the trial court sustained it and cut off that line of questioning. Father made no objection to NP Renfrow’s testimony. Social worker Dajour Crawford testified without objection that Parents left with Children during a supervised visitation and only returned after law enforcement indicated that they could avoid arrest by bringing Children back. FCM Shepler testified that Children were removed, at least in part, due to concerns regarding Parents’ mental health. Father objected to this testimony on the ground that FCM Shepler was not qualified to testify about Parents’ mental health, and the trial court overruled that objection. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 6 of 42 Mother’s counsel also argued that Parents’ mental health was not alleged in the petition, but Father’s counsel did not make any such argument or join in Mother’s argument. [12] It was at this April 10 hearing that the trial court noted some of the reasons for the delay in completing the factfinding hearings, which included the trial court’s use of an interpreter for Parents, who primarily speak Haitian Creole and have limited English proficiency. Specifically, the trial court explained that the proceedings had been delayed due to: the parties’ tardiness, an extended break necessitated by Mother’s emotional testimony, counsel’s scheduling conflicts, and the “slower pace” caused by using an interpreter. Tr. Vol. III p. 28. [13] At the conclusion of the April 10 hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement and requested that the parties file proposed findings of fact and conclusions thereon. On July 8, 2025, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions thereon, adjudicating Children to be CHINS. The trial court’s findings included that: Children’s odor indicated they had not recently bathed; Parents initially disbelieved that T.P. had died; and Children had skin conditions and were malnourished but improved after being removed from Parents’ care. On August 1, 2025, a dispositional hearing was held, and the trial court ordered Parents to participate in a “psychological evaluation, home- Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 7 of 42 based therapy, and follow the recommendations [of providers].” Id. at 73. Father now appeals. 4 Discussion and Decision I. Father’s due process rights were not violated. [14] Indiana Code Section 31-34-10-2(c) requires that a copy of the CHINS petition accompany the summons served on the child’s parent. And at the initial hearing on the petition, the trial court must inform the parties, including the parents, of “[t]he nature of the allegations in the petition” and “[t]he dispositional alternatives available to the court if the child is adjudicated a [CHINS].” Ind. Code § 31-34-10-4. [15] Father contends that the CHINS petition alleged certain facts—the conditions of Parents’ home, T.P.’s death, and Father’s delayed arrival after T.P.’s death— but the trial court’s CHINS order was based on facts not listed in the petition, such as Children’s rashes and malnutrition, and Parents’ mental health. Thus, Father claims that he had no notice of the basis of the CHINS adjudication and no opportunity to prepare a defense. 4 During the pendency of this appeal, the wardship was terminated, resulting in reunification of Parents and Children. See Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 2. Despite this, Father’s appeal is not moot, which DCS concedes. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 8 of 42 A. Father waived his due process claim by failing to present it to the trial court. [16] DCS argues that Father waived this claim by failing to present it to the trial court in the first instance. We agree. “‘[A]ppellate review presupposes that a litigant’s arguments have been raised and considered in the trial court.’” In re A.R., 271 N.E.3d 1161, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013)). “A party waives a claim of error, ‘including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.’” Id. (quoting In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016)). [17] Here, at the factfinding hearing, Mother’s counsel noted that the CHINS petition did not contain any allegations concerning Children’s development or their skin conditions. But neither Parent made any claim of a deprivation of due process based on a lack of notice of such allegations in the CHINS petition. 5 Indeed, as noted by DCS, the words “due process” do not appear in the transcript of the factfinding hearings; nor does the word “constitution.” By not presenting this argument to the trial court, Father cannot present it now for the first time on appeal. See S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the father waived his due-process argument because he never raised it to the trial court); Hite v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Fam. & Child., 845 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 5 In his reply brief, Father claims that this issue was preserved because Mother’s counsel objected when testimony concerning Parents’ mental health and Children’s skin condition was elicited. But Mother never presented a due process argument. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 9 of 42 father waived his due process argument because he never objected to the termination on grounds that he lacked notice of the CHINS proceeding). [18] Waiver notwithstanding, Father’s due process claim fails on its merits. Father did not object to testimony regarding Children’s malnourishment and skin conditions, Parents’ mental health, or the supervised-visit incident on the ground that these matters were outside the petition. Thus, those issues were tried by implied consent, and any due process claim based on a lack of notice fails. See In re K.W., 178 N.E.3d 1199, 1213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that father’s failure to object to evidence on an unpleaded issue established implied consent under Trial Rule 15(B) and defeated his due process claim). II. The trial court’s grant of continuances that exceeded the time limits set forth in Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1 does not mandate reversal. [19] Father next claims that the trial court violated his right to procedural due process to be heard in a meaningful time and manner by holding the fact- finding hearings outside the sixty-day and 120-day timeframes set forth in the applicable version of Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1 (“Section 1”). A. Father was not denied due process. [20] We first note that Father’s argument conflates the requirements of procedural due process with those of a statutory deadline. It is well settled that a violation of a state statute, by itself, does not establish a due process violation. Garwood v. State, 77 N.E.3d 204, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. granted, aff’d in relevant part, 84 N.E.3d 624 (Ind. 2017) (citing Charleston v. Bd. of Trs., 741 F.3d 769, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 10 of 42 773 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will be clear once more: a plaintiff does not have a federal constitutional right to state-mandated process.”); Ind. Land Co. v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n error of state law is not a violation of due process.”). [21] Procedural due process requires only notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to confront witnesses, In re Adoption of K.M., 31 N.E.3d 533, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), all of which Father received here. Father was represented by counsel throughout the factfinding hearings, and, as discussed above, he was on notice of the issues to be adjudicated. Accordingly, we reject Father’s claim to the extent that it is couched in terms of procedural due process. B. The trial court had inherent authority to continue the factfinding hearing based on good cause. [22] Father also claims that the trial court violated Section 1 by holding a hearing outside the sixty-day and 120-day deadlines set forth in that statute, which, at the time of the hearing in this case, provided: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), unless the allegations of a petition have been admitted, the juvenile court shall complete a factfinding hearing not more than sixty (60) days after a petition alleging that a child is a child in need of services is filed in accordance with IC 31-34-9. (b) The juvenile court may extend the time to complete a factfinding hearing, as described in subsection (a), for an additional sixty (60) days if all parties in the action consent to the additional time. ***** Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 11 of 42 (d) If the factfinding hearing is not held within the time set forth in subsection (a) or (b), upon a motion with the court, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice. I.C. § 31-34-11-1 (2012) (emphases added). [23] Father argues that the trial court violated Section 1(b) when, without his consent, it granted continuances of the factfinding hearing beyond sixty days from the date of the filing of the petition. The CHINS petition was filed on December 4, 2024, meaning that the factfinding hearing had to be completed by February 3, 2025, 6 unless the time for completion of the factfinding hearing was extended by agreement under Section 1(b). The factfinding hearing commenced on January 24 and was scheduled for completion on January 31, 2025. On January 29, 2025, DCS filed a motion to continue the factfinding hearing based upon DCS counsel’s illness. The trial court found good cause to grant the continuance over Father’s objection, and rescheduled the factfinding hearing for February 7, 2025, which was more than sixty days after the date of the filing of the petition. [24] Father argues that Section 1 does not contain a good-cause justification for exceeding the sixty-day statutory deadline. This is true. Our Supreme Court, however, recognized a good-cause exception to the statutory deadline in In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 284 (Ind. 2020). Specifically, the Court held: 6 The sixty-day deadline fell on February 2, 2025, which was a Sunday. See Ind. Trial Rule 6(A). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 12 of 42 Because our trial rules trump statutes on matters of procedure, [then current Trial] Rule 53.5 allows extension of the 120-day deadline in [Section 1(b)] provided a party can show “good cause.” Where, as here, the circumstances dictate good cause for a continuance, Trial Rule 53.5 controls and a trial court has discretion to grant a continuance without the risk of mandatory dismissal for failure to complete the factfinding hearing within 120 days. Id. Former Trial Rule 53.5 provided: “Upon motion, trial may be postponed or continued in the discretion of the court, and shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by affidavit or other evidence.” [25] Father notes that Trial Rule 53.5 was repealed effective January 1, 2025. Motions to continue are now governed by Trial Rule 7(D), which provides: (D) Written Motions for Continuance. (1) A party must file a motion for continuance as soon after the cause for continuance or delay is discovered by the party seeking the same. (2) Any written motion to continue a matter must be filed pursuant to subdivision (B) and must include: (a) A statement that the opposing party has no objection; (b) A statement that the opposing party objects; or (c) A statement that the opposing party’s position is unknown, and the date, time, and method by which the moving party filing the motion attempted to obtain agreement and the result, or why such outreach was not possible. (3) If a party did not comply with subdivision (D)(2), a court may grant a motion for continuance only if the moving party certifies Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 13 of 42 to the court, in writing, the efforts made to give notice and the reasons supporting the moving party’s claim that actual notice should not be required. (4) A party’s motion must include: (a) the approximate amount of time needed to elapse before the matter can be heard, and, (b) a good faith estimate of the time needed for the rescheduled hearing or trial. Notably, the “good cause” language of former Trial Rule 53.5 is not included in Trial Rule 7(D). Still, we have held that Trial Rule 7(D) “appears to leave continuances to the discretion of the trial court, so long as the procedural requirements of the rule are met.” In re C.J.B., 281 N.E.3d 615, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). [26] Trial Rule 7(D) merely contains procedural requirements with respect to the filing of motions to continue; it retains no explicit language governing under what circumstances a trial court should grant a motion to continue. Nor does it make any mention of oral motions to continue. Because Trial Rule 53.5 and Section 1(b) are no longer in conflict, Father claims that M.S. is no longer controlling and that trial courts lack authority to continue a CHINS factfinding hearing beyond the statutory deadlines set forth in Section 1(b). We disagree. [27] The source of a trial court’s authority to grant continuances is not located in Trial Rule 7(D), or the former Trial Rule 53.5, for that matter. The power to grant continuances is instead part of the inherent authority of a court to manage Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 14 of 42 its own docket. Our Supreme Court has long held that “courts have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within their jurisdiction.” Knox Cnty. Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 29 N.E.2d 405, 413 (Ind. 1940); see also Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Good, 919 N.E.2d 144, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that courts have recognized “the inherent power of a court to control the movement of cases on its docket[.]”) (quoting Persichini v. William Beaumont Hosp., 607 N.W.2d 100, 109 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)), trans. denied. Former Trial Rule 53.5 did two things: (1) it recognized that continuances rest “in the discretion of the court,” and (2) it separately required that a continuance “shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause.” This second clause guaranteed relief when good cause existed, but it was not the source of the court’s underlying discretionary authority. 7 [28] Our Supreme Court’s October 30, 2024 order repealing Trial Rule 53.5 describes the change as deleting an “obsolete rule on continuances of trial” as part of a broader project to reconcile the trial rules with common local-rule practice for “uniform statewide application.” Order Amending Rules of Tr. Proc. & Admin. Rules, No. 24S-MS-1 (Ind. Oct. 30, 2024). Nothing in this 7 Our conclusion is not inconsistent with In re W.H., No. 26A-JC-109, 2026 WL 2250472 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2026), also written by the author of the instant opinion. In W.H., no party moved for a continuance before the statutory deadline for holding dispositional hearings elapsed. We, therefore, held that the trial court could not retroactively use good cause to grant a continuance that was never requested. Id. at *4. W.H. did not consider the question of whether a trial court has authority to grant a continuance that has been properly requested. Here, DCS moved in writing for both continuances well before the applicable deadlines expired. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 15 of 42 Order suggests an intent to abolish the standard that had governed Indiana continuances for decades. [29] We also conclude that to interpret Section 1 and Trial Rule 7(D) as Father would have us do would produce an absurd result. Indiana courts construe rules and statutes to avoid absurd results. Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. 2003). Instead, when interpreting statutes, we consider the objects and purposes of the statute as well as the effects and repercussions of our interpretation. In re J.S., 130 N.E.3d 109, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). [30] In July 2025, the General Assembly amended Section 1(d) to excuse dismissal where the delay is “necessitated by unanticipated, emergent circumstances,” “the circumstances of the case,” or “the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.” I.C. § 31-34-11-1(d) (2025). Under Father’s interpretation, for the six months between the repeal of Trial Rule 53.5 and the July 1, 2025 statutory amendment, no continuance of any kind—regardless of fault, prejudice, or the parties’ consent—could save a CHINS factfinding from mandatory dismissal if the deadline has passed. We find this reading hard to reconcile. The amendment reads as continuous with, not a departure from, the good-cause practice our Supreme Court approved in M.S. [31] Father would have us treat the six months after the effective date of Trial Rule 7(D) and before the amendment to Section 1(d) as a “gap” in which even a brief delay caused by unavoidable and unforeseeable circumstances requires dismissal of a CHINS proceeding, regardless of the best interests of the child. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 16 of 42 This is untenable. We will not mechanistically interpret the Trial Rules and Section 1 to require such an absurd result. [32] Nor does recognizing a good-cause exception render the statutory deadlines in Section 1 a dead letter. To the contrary, the sixty and 120-day deadlines remain the general rule in CHINS cases. All we hold today is that these deadlines may be extended if a trial court makes an affirmative, case-specific finding that a party has shown a good and sufficient reason for delay. This is a common- sense limitation on the statutory deadlines. Our reading acknowledges that rigid application of the deadlines should yield in the narrow circumstances that justify a continuance.8 C. The trial court’s decision to grant continuances here was not an abuse of discretion. [33] Applying our interpretation of Trial Rule 7(D) and Section 1 to the facts of the present case, we have no hesitation in saying that the trial court’s decision to grant brief continuances in this matter was not an abuse of the court’s discretion. “We review for an abuse of discretion a juvenile court’s determination of whether good cause existed for a continuance,” and a trial court abuses its discretion only if the court’s decision is “clearly against the 8 Father also argues that DCS violated Trial Rule 7(D) because it discovered the need for a continuance on April 3 but did not file its motion until April 8. However, Father identifies no prejudice from this five-day delay. Indeed, the motion was granted the same day it was filed, and the continuance itself was brief and unavoidable. Moreover, any delay in DCS making its written request for a continuance did not deprive Father of notice or an opportunity to be heard on the timing of the continuance. At the April 3 hearing, DCS informed the trial court it intended to seek a continuance, and Father’s counsel confirmed she wanted the request in writing. The trial court and parties agreed on the record to reconvene on April 10. DCS’s April 8 motion simply formalized the timing of the continuance the parties had already worked out. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 17 of 42 logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” In re M.H., 244 N.E.3d 966, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citations omitted). Good cause for a continuance may be shown “where a party is ill, a party’s mental capacity needs to be assessed, a party’s attorney has a medical emergency such that the party is without counsel, a witness is unavailable to testify, or the parties represent to the court that a settlement is likely.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [34] Here, the trial court granted two brief continuances. The first continuance rested on DCS counsel’s medical inability to proceed due to an illness that was documented by a physician’s note. Father’s counsel objected, claiming that there was no good cause for a continuance and that another DCS attorney could cover the hearing. But Father’s objection made no claim of prejudice from the delay itself. Moreover, substituting counsel on such short notice is often a difficult task. Neither Mother’s counsel nor the GAL objected. The resulting delay was brief, consisting of merely one week, from January 31 to February 7, 2025. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision to grant a continuance based upon the good cause of counsel’s unforeseen illness was not an abuse of discretion. [35] The second continuance was similarly the result of unavoidable circumstances. As early as March 28, 2025, DCS informed the trial court that it anticipated needing additional time because Father’s own cross-examination of FCM Shepler remained outstanding. At the April 3 hearing, the GAL agreed that a continuance was reasonable. The trial court then entered a specific finding that Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 18 of 42 the parties had worked diligently but that witness unavailability still prevented timely completion of the factfinding hearing. And again, the resulting delay was brief—merely two days from April 8 to April 10. [36] In short, both continuances were brief in duration, based on specific and unavoidable causes, and supported by explicit findings. We, therefore, cannot say that the trial court’s decision to grant brief continuances based on these good causes was an abuse of discretion. D. The scheduling of the factfinding hearings did not deprive Father of due process. [37] Father also argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by conducting the factfinding hearing over five hearing dates that spanned seventy- seven days. Father asks this Court to establish, as a matter of first impression, “an upper bound to the number of hearings over which the State can conduct factfinding in a CHINS action.” Appellant’s Br. p. 23. We decline to do so. [38] We first conclude that Father’s challenge to the trial court’s scheduling is waived. Although Father objected to the continuance that produced the February 7 setting and he later moved to dismiss based on the sixty-day deadline, he did not object to the settings on April 3 or April 10. Having failed to object to the scheduling he now challenges, Father cannot raise a due process claim based on that scheduling for the first time on appeal. See N.G., 51 N.E.3d at 1173. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 19 of 42 [39] Regardless, there is no due process right to have a CHINS factfinding hearing completed within a set number of days or at a certain number of settings. As discussed above, a violation of a statutory timeframe, standing alone, does not establish a due process violation. Garwood, 77 N.E.3d at 220; Charleston, 741 F.3d at 773. Because the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents, trial courts are afforded considerable discretion in scheduling and in ruling on continuances. M.S., 140 N.E.3d at 284-85. Adopting a fixed cap on the number of hearings at which a trial court may conduct factfinding would remove the very discretion that allows trial courts to accommodate scheduling conflicts and witness availability. See In re L.S., 82 N.E.3d 333, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (rejecting due process challenge based on the length of the factfinding proceeding and the delay between the factfinding hearing and the trial court’s CHINS order), trans. denied. III. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Children were CHINS. [40] Lastly, Father claims that the trial court’s order contains findings not supported by the evidence and not relevant to a CHINS determination, and, that the court’s findings do not support a CHINS adjudication. We disagree. A. Standard of Review [41] CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, “‘the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.’” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)); see also Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. On Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 20 of 42 review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017)). Instead, we consider only the evidence that favors the juvenile court’s decision and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). [42] We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.; D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578. “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish parents.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without the coercive intervention of the court. Id. at 105. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child . . . . [T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.” Id. (citations omitted). “A CHINS finding should consider the family’s condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014). [43] Here, the trial court entered findings and conclusions thereon sua sponte. 9 As to the issues covered by such findings, we apply our familiar two-tiered standard of “whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 1287 (citations omitted). We review the 9 “Unlike CHINS dispositional decrees, no statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS factfinding order.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (citing Ind. Code § 31-34-19-10). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2086 | November 4, 2026 Page 21 of 42 remaining issues under the general judgment standard, under which a judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. 10 Id.