Gregory Brandon v. Caregan Transport, Inc.

IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Gregory Brandon, Jul 29 2026, 9:24 am CLERK Appellant-Plaintiff Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. Caregan Transport Inc., Appellee-Defendant July 29, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-2294 Appeal from the Wayne Superior Court The Honorable Gregory Horn, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 89D02-2107-PL-37 Opinion by Judge DeBoer Judges Mathias and Kenworthy concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 1 of 31  DeBoer, Judge. Case Summary [1] Gregory Brandon worked as a truck driver for Caregan Transport Inc. (Caregan) from January 2020 until he voluntarily terminated his employment in May of that same year. In July 2021, Brandon sued Caregan to recover unpaid wages under Indiana Code chapter 22-2-5, which is commonly referred to as the Wage Payment Statute. When Brandon later moved for summary judgment, the trial court not only denied his motion but sua sponte ruled it “no longer ha[d] jurisdiction” to reach the merits of his wage payment claim. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 14. Brandon appeals, arguing the court erred in several respects. [2] We first hold that the trial court erred in concluding it no longer had jurisdiction. Second, we find the court should have stricken the materials submitted by Caregan in opposition to summary judgment because they were not timely filed by the response deadline. Furthermore, we conclude that Brandon is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law for $5,535.06 in actual unpaid wages. However, the court did not err insofar as it denied summary judgment on Brandon’s request for liquidated damages, as he did not meet his burden on summary judgment to negate Caregan’s claim that it acted in good faith. We thus affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 2 of 31  Facts and Procedural History [3] Caregan operates a trucking company based out of Richmond. In January 2020, it hired Brandon as a driver and agreed to pay him forty cents per mile driven. Caregan also agreed to pay $175.00 per night if Brandon had any out- of-state layovers. Brandon was paid weekly, though his pay varied from pay period to pay period depending on how many miles he drove each week. And if Brandon elected to take the week off from driving for Caregan, he would not receive a paycheck for that pay period. Brandon voluntarily terminated his employment with Caregan on May 11, 2020. After that, Caregan failed to pay him for miles driven during the weeks of April 19, April 26, May 3, and May 10. [4] On July 14, 2021, Brandon sued Caregan under the Wage Payment Statute. He alleged Caregan failed to pay his last four paychecks, did not compensate him for layovers he had during his employment, and had “illegally deducted monies from [his] wages . . . .” Id. at 27. In its answer, Caregan admitted that Brandon was a former employee, and it had agreed to pay him pursuant to the terms outlined above. It also admitted it “failed to pay [Brandon] multiple paychecks during and following his separation of employment[,]” blaming Brandon for “fail[ing] to tender Bills of Lading to [Caregan] subsequent to delivering cargo . . . .” Id. at 27, 30. However, Caregan denied that it had not compensated Brandon for layovers, made unauthorized deductions from his wages, or failed to pay him his correct wages before he terminated his employment. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 3 of 31 [5] Brandon moved for summary judgment on June 13, 2024. In support of that motion, he designated his complaint, Caregan’s answer, an excerpt of Caregan’s interrogatory answers, his own affidavit, and an affidavit from his attorney. In his summary judgment memorandum, Brandon raised three main contentions. First, he claimed that Caregan had made various unauthorized deductions from his paychecks. To support this claim, Brandon relied on payroll information attached as exhibits to his affidavit, as well as his own declaration that he “did not sign a document permitting Caregan to take money out of [his] wages for advances, fines, or fees.” Id. at 137. [6] Second, Brandon contended that Caregan had failed to pay $5,535.06 in wages earned. To calculate this number, he relied on assertions in his affidavit that Caregan owed him compensation for eleven nights spent on out-of-state layovers, totaling $1,925.00 in unpaid layover pay. 1 To calculate his unpaid mileage, Brandon cited his attorney’s affidavit, attached to which was a document Brandon’s attorney claimed to have personally created “to calculate the miles driven by” Brandon. Id. at 147. Based on that document, Brandon asserted Caregan owed him $2,279.72 in unpaid mileage. That, together with the unpaid layover pay, $1,055.34 in certain bonuses and other credits Brandon 1 Brandon’s affidavit recounted that he “had ten (10) out-of-state layovers while working for Caregan.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 139. However, assertions made earlier in the affidavit recount eleven dates he was on layover: January 14-15, 21; February 6, 12, 26-27; and March 3-4, 12, 19, 2020. See id. at 138-39. Brandon’s summary judgment memorandum relied on these eleven dates to calculate $1,925.00 in unpaid layover pay (i.e., 11 * $175.00). See id. at 44. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 4 of 31  claimed he earned but never received, and $275.00 in unauthorized deductions,2 equaled $5,535.06 in unpaid wages. [7] Third, Brandon claimed that under the Wage Payment Statute, he was entitled to recover his unpaid wages, costs, attorney’s fees, and liquidated damages equal to twice his actual unpaid wages. 3 In total, Brandon asserted that, as a matter of law, he was entitled to judgment against Caregan “in the amount of $5,535.06 in actual wages, $11,070.12 in liquidated damages, pre-judgment interest of $1,846.42 plus $1.21 per day from June 13, 2024 to the date Judgment is entered, [and] $13,058.66 in statutory attorney fees and costs[.]” Id. at 50. [8] On June 26, 2024, the trial court issued a summary judgment briefing schedule which gave Caregan until July 13 to respond. Before that deadline expired, Caregan requested an extension of time, which the trial court granted in an order extending the response deadline to July 19. On July 19, Caregan attempted to electronically file materials in opposition to summary judgment, but they were rejected by the Indiana Electronic Filing System (IEFS) because 2 Brandon provided no explanation for the significant discrepancy between this value and his earlier assertion that Caregan made $2,281.00 in unauthorized deductions. 3 The Wage Payment Statute provides that if an employee brings a successful wage payment claim, [t]he court shall order as costs in the case a reasonable fee for the plaintiff’s attorney and court costs. In addition, if the court in any such suit determines that the person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or association that failed to pay the employee . . . was not acting in good faith, the court shall order, as liquidated damages for the failure to pay wages, that the employee be paid an amount equal to two (2) times the amount of wages due the employee. Ind. Code § 22-2-5-2 (2015). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 5 of 31 one of Caregan’s exhibits “contain[ed] formatting that . . . prevent[ed] the system from submitting [the] envelope.” Id. at 158. As Caregan’s attorney would later recount, 4. On July 19, 2024, at 11:08 a.m., [Caregan] electronically filed [several documents opposing summary judgment.] .... 5. For reasons imperceptible to [Caregan’s] counsel, [IEFS] issued a “submission failure” reflecting that [one of Caregan’s exhibits] received an “[u]nrecoverable system error[.]” 6. As a result of the above system error, [IEFS] indicated that the issue “will prevent the system from submitting your envelope.” 7. Counsel left his office shortly after the above-referenced materials were electronically filed to begin a vacation. 8. On Sunday, July 21, 2024, while Counsel was on vacation, he learned of the filing error, and reached out to his assistant to inquire. 9. Counsel’s assistant did not see the email from [IEFS] prior to leaving the office for the weekend on July 19, 2024. 10. [Counsel’s] assistant called [the county clerk’s office] on Monday, July 22, 2024 to seek information about the filing error, and learned that due to a technical issue, [an exhibit] was rejected; and as a result, the entirety of [Caregan’s summary judgment] filings were not received into the system. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 6 of 31  Id. at 69-70 (sixth alteration in original). Accordingly, Caregan did not successfully file its summary judgment response until July 22. [9] In that response, Caregan moved to strike the mileage calculation prepared by Brandon’s attorney, arguing the exhibit would be inadmissible at trial and thus “should not be considered by the Court when determining whether summary judgment is appropriate . . . .” Id. at 62. Moreover, Caregan claimed that without the mileage calculation, “the Court ha[d] no evidence to support any claim relative to Brandon’s allegations of miles driven for which he wasn’t paid.” Id. Caregan also argued that while it did owe Brandon unpaid wages, there was a factual dispute regarding the exact amount owed because “its records do not comport with the records that Brandon’s counsel created.” Id. at 60. According to Caregan, it owed Brandon just $1,863.43 in unpaid mileage, $416.29 less than the $2,279.72 Brandon said he was owed. Additionally, it asserted that Brandon was not entitled to liquidated damages because Caregan had acted in good faith. Specifically, “Brandon had an obligation to [report] miles driven, which produced his pay[,]” and “it was difficult to calculate Brandon’s pay due to his routine failures in this regard.” Id. at 59. Caregan also claimed to have attempted to forward a check to Brandon through the Illinois Department of Labor to settle the wage claim, but that check had been returned “[f]or reasons unknown to Caregan[.]” 4 Id. at 60. To support these 4 Brandon is an Illinois resident. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 7 of 31  assertions, Caregan designated, among other exhibits, payroll and mileage records, its written policy requiring drivers to report completed shipments (and thus miles driven) by submitting bills of lading, and an affidavit by Caregan’s president. 5 [10] On the afternoon of the 22nd, Brandon moved to strike Caregan’s summary judgment response, relying on the “well[-]established” rule that a party cannot respond to a motion for summary judgment after the deadline to do so has passed. Id. at 67. In opposition to that motion, Caregan conceded that its summary judgment response was “not timely . . . filed due to a technical error associated with” IEFS but argued that this failure aside, its response was “submitted prior to the deadline . . . .” Id. at 72. On September 3, the trial court denied Brandon’s motion to strike, reasoning as follows: It is well settled that the Court may not consider summary judgment filings after the due date established by the court. See Borsuk v. Town of St. John, 820 N.E.2d 118 (lnd. 2005). Indeed, this is a bright line rule that must be followed. Here, however, [Caregan] did attempt to file its Response to [Brandon’s] Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support, and Designation of Evidence with Exhibits prior to the deadline 5 Brandon did not include copies of Caregan’s designated evidence in his appendix, and Caregan did not file an appendix of its own. Still, those documents are part of the record on appeal, and we’ve accessed them using our Odyssey Case Management System. See Ind. Appellate Rule 27 (“The Record on Appeal shall consist of the Clerk’s Record and all proceedings before the trial court . . . , whether or not transcribed or transmitted to the Court on Appeal.”) (emphasis added). We note that the failure of Brandon’s attorney to include Caregan’s designated evidence in the appendix is particularly disappointing, as he was previously scolded by this Court and found to have engaged in procedural bad faith for “including a woefully incomplete appendix” in addition to committing other Appellate Rule violations in a prior appeal. See Gallo v. Sunshine Car Care, LLC, 185 N.E.3d 392, 399, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 8 of 31  established by the Court. They were submitted to the Indiana Court’s Odyssey Case Management System prior to the deadline established by the Court . . . . This court simply cannot find that [Caregan] failed to timely file its responsive materials prior to the deadline established by the Court. Counsel for [Caregan] prepared all of its responsive materials and submitted them to the State’s filing system prior to the deadline. Indeed, they went through the electronic system, although resulting in a “system error.” The “error” from this Court’s viewpoint was a “technical” error not associated with [Caregan] or [Caregan’s] counsel but, rather, with the Indiana Court’s Odyssey Case Management system. The submission and the “System Failure” response both occurred prior to the Court’s established filing deadline. It seems to this Court that to rule in [Brandon’s] favor on this matter would be to put form over substance and is not at all in the true spirit or meaning of Trial Rule 56 or Borsuk . . . . Id. at 24-25. [11] Brandon asked the court to reconsider its decision, arguing that denial of his motion to strike did not comply with Trial Rule 87(J), which applies when e- filing is prevented by an IEFS failure or other circumstances not caused by the filer. According to Brandon, [Caregan’s] summary judgment response was not filed due to an IEFS failure, but the failure of counsel for [Caregan] to follow the instructions to correct an incompatible PDF file and re-submit. Moreover, [Caregan’s] Summary Judgment was not filed timely because of counsel for [Caregan’s] failure to follow Trial Rule 87(J) and conventionally file the pleading if correcting the PDF Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 9 of 31  would not have worked. Finally, this Court cannot sua sponte grant[] [Caregan] relief pursuant to Trial Rule 87(J) because [Caregan] failed to request it and the summary judgment deadline is a deadline that by law cannot be extended. Id. at 79. Caregan opposed the motion to reconsider and asked the court to retroactively grant relief under Trial Rule 87. In Caregan’s view, the submission error resulted from an IEFS failure, and it was therefore entitled to a one-day extension of the summary judgment response deadline. The court agreed with Caregan and retroactively extended the summary judgment filing deadline by one day. [12] On December 9, 2024, the court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment and took the matter under advisement. On January 3, 2025, the court issued an order requesting that the parties “submit additional briefing as to [Brandon’s] position that several deductions made from [his] pay . . . , such as fees, fines, and advances [were] contrary to Indiana law and [were] impermissible[.]” Id. at 90. Brandon filed his supplemental brief on January 24, in which he argued the deductions did not comply with statutory wage assignment requirements. In Caregan’s supplemental brief, filed February 13, it acknowledged its non-compliance with those requirements but asserted the deductions were made “at Brandon’s express direction.” Id. at 105. Moreover, Caregan argued for the first time that Brandon’s wage payment claim must fail in its entirety because he had not earned a “wage”: Caregan does not view the monies paid to Brandon as “wages”. As previously affirmed by the company president, drivers are Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 10 of 31  paid forty cents ($.40) per mile. Drivers are not required to report to work at any specific time, or at all. It is entirely up to drivers whether they attempt to earn a living through the delivery of freight. If a driver desires to work, he secures a freight load and then must deliver the same to the receiving location. Next, the driver must turn in a bill of lading so that Caregan may appropriately calculate his mileage driven. Brandon did not earn an hourly rate. He did not clock in at a specified time each morning and then clock out at a different specified time. Payments to Brandon for employment services rendered were not regular and consistent like a normal “nine to five” employee. Further, even if this matter is dealing with “wages”, the “ten-day” requirement . . . was frustrated by Brandon due to him not complying with the bill of lading requirements.[ 6] In any event, . . . monies [were] not earned unless Brandon “completed delivered sales”. Thus, payments were not necessarily paid on a regular basis. . . . Brandon’s payments could vary greatly, and even include periods of time where no payments are made. As such, this Court . . . should conclude that these factors support the determination that, as a matter of law, the payments made to Brandon do not constitute “wages” under the Wage Payment Statute. Id. at 106-07. [13] On February 16, Brandon moved to strike Caregan’s supplemental brief. According to Brandon, Caregan’s assertion that he expressly authorized the deductions from his paychecks found no support in the designated evidence. 6 Indiana Code section 22-2-5-1(b) requires that “[p]ayment shall be made for all wages earned to a date not more than ten (10) business days prior to the date of payment.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 11 of 31  Moreover, Brandon alleged Caregan exceeded the scope of the court’s order requesting supplemental briefing by raising for the first time that his compensation did not constitute a “wage” under the Wage Payment Statute. At a hearing on that motion to strike on February 27, Caregan’s attorney acknowledged that while Brandon’s payroll records indicate that Caregan had issued advances that were later deducted from his pay, it had not designated any evidence that those advances were issued at Brandon’s request. He also said, “[I]f the Court determines the advances need to be given back, I will concede that point.” Transcript at 36. However, counsel for Caregan claimed the court did not have to reach that issue once it made “a determination as to whether the wage payment statute applies at all.” Id. at 37. [14] After that hearing, on June 2, 2025, the trial court issued two orders on the pending motions. As to Brandon’s motion to strike, the court found that Caregan had not designated any evidence “that Brandon expressly requested advances[,]” and ruled that any references to factual assertions not supported by the designated evidence should be stricken. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 21. The court also agreed with Brandon that Caregan had raised issues outside the scope of the order for supplemental briefing but ruled it would not strike “case law, proper application of case law, or legal application . . . .” Id. The court further declined to strike “any inferences that can be made from properly designated evidence” or “Caregan’s argument as to the inapplicability of Indiana’s Wage Payment [S]tatute as to mileage, etc.” Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 12 of 31 [15] As for Brandon’s motion for summary judgment, the court agreed with Caregan that “Brandon’s mileage pay does not qualify as ‘wages’ in order to implicate the Wage Payment Statute.” Id. at 17. The court based that determination on Bragg v. Kittle’s Home Furnishings, Inc., 52 N.E.3d 908, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied, trans. denied, which the court cited for the proposition that whether an employee’s compensation constitutes a “wage” depends on “factors which affect and impact the practicality of handling [the compensation] or arriving at an amount due within the ten (10) required days.” Id. at 18. Under that standard, the court determined Brandon’s pay for miles driven did not qualify as wages because a driver may make three (3) runs this week and none (0) the following three (3) weeks. Payment is contingent upon completing a task and not based solely on time. Moreover, . . . payment is also dependent upon submitting proof of completion of that task by way of submitting Bills of Lading. Id. Because Caregan had not paid Brandon a “wage,” the court ruled that “his Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied and, further, under Indiana case law the Court does not have jurisdiction to proceed further, and the matter must go to the Department of Labor” (DOL). Id. at 18-19. The court applied the same logic to Brandon’s arguments about unauthorized deductions, attorney’s fees, and liquidated damages because “[s]uch request[s] hinge[] upon whether or not [he] was properly paid for ‘wages’ under Indiana’s Wage Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 13 of 31  Payment Statute.”7 Id. at 19. Accordingly, the court concluded that “Brandon’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied in all particulars.” Id. at 20. [16] Brandon filed a motion to correct errors on July 2, which the court summarily denied on August 19. Brandon now appeals. Discussion and Decision [17] Brandon raises several issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as: 1) Whether the trial court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his wage payment claim; 2) Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike Caregan’s summary judgment response; and 3) Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment. We address these issues in turn. 1. The Trial Court’s Jurisdiction [18] As a threshold issue, Brandon challenges the trial court’s determination that “it ha[d] no jurisdiction to proceed further and Brandon should proceed before 7 The court did not address Brandon’s claim for unpaid layover pay, performance bonuses and other credits, or Caregan’s motion to strike Brandon’s attorney’s affidavit. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 14 of 31  the” DOL. Id. at 19. The court provided little explanation for why it believed it lacked jurisdiction or how it lost jurisdiction it once had. The court’s order provides that its jurisdictional holding was supported by “Indiana case law . . . ,” but it cited no such authority. Id. at 18. Nor is it entirely clear what the court meant by “jurisdiction,” though presumably it was referring to subject matter jurisdiction. See K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind. 2006) (explaining “Indiana trial courts possess two kinds of ‘jurisdiction’’’: subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction). [19] “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and decide the general class of actions to which a particular case belongs.” Parkview Hosp., Inc. v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 977 N.E.2d 369, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Indiana courts obtain that power through the state constitution or a statute, id. at 372, and issues of subject matter jurisdiction are “resolved by determining whether a claim falls within the [court’s] general scope of statutory authority[,]” Terry v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc., 17 N.E.3d 389, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 710 (Ind. 2018). [20] Here, the trial court was authorized by statute to hear wage payment claims. The Wage Payment Statute permits “current employees and those who have voluntarily left employment[,]” Gallo v. Sunshine Car Care, LLC, 185 N.E.3d 392, 401 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh’g denied, trans. denied, to bring a claim for unpaid wages “in any court having jurisdiction of a suit to recover the amount Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 15 of 31  due to the employee[,]” 8 Ind. Code § 22-2-5-2 (2015). And as a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court here has “original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases . . . .” Ind. Code § 33-29-1-1.5(1) (2019); see Lakes & Rivers Trans., a Div. of Jack Gray v. Rudolph Robinson Steel Co., 736 N.E.2d 285, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have subject matter jurisdiction.”). [21] The court’s reasoning that it “ha[d] no jurisdiction to proceed further” in light of its conclusion that “Brandon’s earnings do not qualify as ‘wages’ under the Wage Payment Statute” is evocative of the defunct concept of jurisdiction over the case. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 19. Indiana’s appellate courts used to describe “[j]urisdiction of the particular case” as “the power of the court to hear a specific case within the class of cases over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Cox v. Town of Rome City, 764 N.E.2d 242, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). But the Court abolished the concept in K.S., explaining, [W]hile we might casually say, “Judge Flywheel assumed jurisdiction,” or “the court had jurisdiction to impose a ten-year sentence,” such statements do not have anything to do with the law of jurisdiction, either personal or subject matter. Real jurisdictional problems would be, say, a juvenile delinquency 8 This contrasts with the Wage Claims Statute, Indiana Code chapter 22-2-9, a closely related series of statutes which apply “to employees who have been involuntarily separated from work by their employer[.]” Gallo, 185 N.E.3d at 401 n.3. Unlike the Wage Payment Statute, claims under the Wage Claims Statute “must be submitted to the DOL for administrative enforcement and exhaustion of the administrative remedy is required before filing a lawsuit.” Id. at 400. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 16 of 31  adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a judgment rendered without any service of process. 849 N.E.2d at 541-42; see also Wike v. Grandview Solar Project, LLC, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2026 WL 1834349, at *8 (Ind. June 24, 2026) (“[O]ur Court has stopped talking about jurisdiction over the case.”) . Accordingly, whether Brandon can succeed on the merits of his wage payment claim is not relevant to the trial court’s statutory authority to adjudicate it. The court erred in concluding otherwise, and we therefore reverse its determination that it lacks jurisdiction over this matter. 2. Motion to Strike Caregan’s Summary Judgment Response [22] Next, Brandon contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the materials filed by Caregan in opposition to summary judgment. Generally, “a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on motions to strike in the summary judgment context.” Arnett v. Est. of Beavins, 184 N.E.3d 679, 683-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). However, Brandon contends (and we agree) that the trial court had no such discretion here because “late responses to summary judgment motions cannot be considered.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. In support of that contention, Brandon relies on the well-established rule that [w]hen a nonmoving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment within 30 days by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under Trial Rule 56(I), or filing an affidavit under Trial Rule 56(F), the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to the 30-day period. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 17 of 31  Mitchell v. 10th and The Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 972 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Borsuk, 820 N.E.2d at 123 n.5) (footnotes omitted). [23] This bright-line rule was first clearly expressed in Desai v. Croy, where, against a backdrop of inconsistent precedent, this Court held that “a trial court may exercise discretion and alter time limits under 56(I) only if the nonmoving party has responded or sought an extension within thirty days from the date the moving party filed for summary judgment.” 805 N.E.2d 844, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, cited favorably by Borsuk, 820 N.E.2d at 123 n.5. As another panel of this Court later clarified, not only must a nonmovant file a response or request for a continuance during the initial thirty-day period, but the nonmovant “must also file a response, file an affidavit pursuant to T.R. 56(F), or show cause for alteration of time pursuant to T.R. 56(I) during any additional period granted by the trial court.” Miller v. Yedlowski, 916 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Thayer v. Gohil, 740 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied), trans. denied. Said differently, “where a nonmovant timely seeks and obtains an extension of time to respond, the bright-line rule continues to apply to the new filing deadline.” Andry v. Thorbecke, 218 N.E.3d 600, 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. [24] Here, it is undisputed that Caregan failed to timely file its summary judgment materials by the July 19, 2024 deadline. Rather, Caregan contends its unsuccessful electronic filing attempt was precipitated by “an IEFS failure” and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 18 of 31  it is therefore entitled to relief under Indiana Trial Rule 87. Appellee’s Br. at 19. Rule 87 governs electronic filing and provides, in relevant part: (J) Inability to E-File. (1) Indiana E-Filing System Failures. (a) The rights of the parties shall not be affected by an IEFS failure. .... (c) With the exception of deadlines that by law cannot be extended, when E-Filing is prevented by an IEFS failure, the time allowed for the filing of any document otherwise due at the time of the IEFS failure is extended by one day for each day on which such failure occurs, unless otherwise ordered by the court. (d) Upon motion and showing of an IEFS failure the court must enter an order permitting the document to be considered timely filed and modify responsive deadlines accordingly. Ind. Trial Rule 87(J)(1). While no appellate court has construed Trial Rule 87(J), it’s clear that it does not provide an avenue for relief under these circumstances. [25] We first note that “[i]nterpretation of our trial rules is a question of law that we review de novo.” Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019). “When construing a trial rule, we employ . . . standard tools of statutory Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 19 of 31  interpretation[,]” Noble County v. Rogers, 745 N.E.2d 194, 197 n.3 (Ind. 2001), meaning we must give an unambiguous trial rule “its clear and plain meaning[,]” Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016) (quoting State v. Evans, 810 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. 2004), reh’g denied). The clear and plain meaning of the phrase “IEFS failure” refers to situations when the electronic filing system is not able “to perform a normal function” or has experienced “an abrupt cessation of normal functioning[.]” See Failure, MERRIAM- WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/failure [https://perma.cc/MW46-QJZR]. [26] When Caregan tried to submit a document with certain formatting that IEFS could not process, IEFS operated as intended. It rejected the envelope and sent a “Submission Failure” email to Caregan’s attorney one minute after he submitted it with instructions to “try re-saving or re-creating the document[] as a PDF or printing and scanning the document[] as a PDF, and re-file the envelope with the recreated document[].” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 158. The E-Filing User Guide instructs e-filers to “monitor [their] [p]ending filings” and “[p]ay special attention to messages with [certain] subject lines after [they’ve] submitted a filing . . . ,” including the subject line: “Submission Failed for Envelope Number[.]” 9 Caregan’s attorney didn’t follow those instructions, and he can’t 9 E-Filing User Guide at 14 (updated May 15, 2026), available at https://www.in.gov/courts/help/efiling/ [https://perma.cc/LA7B-BUS7]. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 20 of 31  escape the consequences of his failure to do so by blaming it on an electronic filing system that was operational. [27] We are sympathetic to the trial court’s concern that striking Caregan’s summary judgment materials would be harsh under the circumstances. But the bright- line rule is just that, and it leaves us with no option but to hold that the trial court should have stricken Caregan’s untimely response. That said, “a trial court is not required to grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment.” Murphy v. Curtis, 930 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Trial Rule 56(C) provides that “[s]ummary judgment shall not be granted as of course because the opposing party fails to offer opposing affidavits or evidence, but the court shall make its determination from the evidentiary matter designated to the court.” (emphasis added). Thus, confining our analysis to the evidentiary materials designated by Brandon, we turn to whether he is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law on the merits of his summary judgment motion. See Quirk v. Delaware Cnty., 91 N.E.3d 1008, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“[S]ummary judgment is awarded on the merits of the motion, not on technicalities.”). 3. Brandon’s Motion for Summary Judgment [28] We review a decision to grant or deny summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as the trial court. Isgrig v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 256 N.E.3d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 2025). Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(C), the initial burden is on the moving party to make a “prima facie showing that there are no genuine Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2294 | July 29, 2026 Page 21 of 31  issues of material fact and that it is en