Full Opinion

IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Hunter Warfield, Inc., Sep 30 2026, 9:17 am Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. Alexandra Mai, Appellee-Plaintiff September 30, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CT-48 Appeal from the Tippecanoe Circuit Court The Honorable Sean M. Persin, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79C01-1908-CT-114 Opinion by Judge Altice Judge DeBoer concurs. Judge Brown concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 1 of 45 Altice, Judge. Case Summary [1] Purdue University student Alexandra Hustedt-Mai (Tenant) signed a lease for an apartment at the conclusion of which the property management company, Granite Management, LLC (Granite), assessed Tenant around $110 in charges, which Tenant disputed that she owed. Granite eventually referred the account to Hunter Warfield, Inc. (HW), a national debt collection company. HW later reported the debt to two credit reporting agencies (CRAs), and Tenant continued to dispute it. [2] Tenant filed a complaint against HW in Tippecanoe Circuit Court (the trial court) that, as amended, alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The case was removed to district court but remanded to the trial court for lack of federal standing. The case proceeded to a jury trial, with the jury awarding Tenant $200,000 in actual damages and $1,750,000 in punitive damages. Additionally, the trial court ordered HW to pay Tenant $306,984 in attorney’s fees and $47,393 in costs. [3] HW raises six issues, which we restate: 1. Did the trial court err by denying HW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings that asserted Tenant lacked standing? 2. Did the trial court err by denying HW’s motion for summary judgment on Tenant’s FDCPA and FRCA claims? Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 2 of 45 3. Did the trial court err by denying HW’s motion for judgment on the evidence? 4. Did the trial court apply the wrong evidentiary standard to Tenant’s FRCA claim for punitive damages when it instructed the jury that Tenant needed to establish her claim by a greater weight of the evidence? 5. Did the trial court err in its costs award? 6. Did the trial court err when it denied HW’s motion to correct error and refused to reduce the punitive damages award? [4] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. Facts & Procedural History 1 [5] While a graduate student at Purdue, Tenant leased an apartment at a complex owned by a company called MSCI for the period of August 15, 2016 through July 31, 2017. During that tenancy, Tenant executed another one-year lease, in February 2017, for a different unit, Apartment 102, beginning August 1, 2017 through July 31, 2018 (the Lease). The Lease required Tenant and her roommate to return their unit in as good a condition as when they received it, ordinary wear and tear excepted. A couple months after Tenant signed the Lease, MSCI sold the complex to Tailwind West Lafayette, LLC, who in turn 1 We held oral argument on August 5, 2026, at the Indiana Court of Appeals courtroom in Indianapolis, Indiana. We thank counsel for their excellent written and oral advocacy. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 3 of 45 contracted with Granite to manage the property, including the handling of leases, move out inspections, and assessment of charges. [6] The prior tenant’s lease of Apartment 102 did not end until July 31, 2017 – the day before Tenant’s Lease was to begin. In June, Tenant electronically executed a Lease Addendum (As Is Addendum). It provided: Granite Management, LLC, in agreement with [Tenant and roommate], tenant(s) of . . . Apartment #102 shall deliver said premises in as-is condition without having any cleaning, painting or carpet cleaning done before move in per the request of [Tenant and roommate]. The move-in date shall be August 1, 2017. No walk thru checklist will be given, and the previous walk thru checklist will serve as the reference for this lease term also. Appendix Vol. 5 at 51. Granite did not perform a move-out inspection of Apartment 102 to assess its condition, or otherwise see it, before Tenant moved in. Tenant completed her own move-in checklist, which she electronically submitted to Granite via its portal. Tenant received a reply from Granite indicating receipt of the checklist. [7] Tenant moved out in May 2018, a few months before the end of the Lease, as she was graduating and moving out of state; her roommate remained in the apartment for the duration of the lease term. The day after the Lease ended, Granite inspected the apartment. On September 6, 2018, Granite issued an Itemization of Security Deposit Return, charging Tenant $140.91, consisting of cleaning and painting, carpet cleaning and flooring replacement, and maintenance labor and supplies. Tenant disputed the charges. Granite revisited Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 4 of 45 the assessment and, after considering Tenant’s move-in checklist that she had submitted, reduced the amount owed to $110.58. Tenant continued to maintain that she did not owe the charges, telling Granite that she was being charged for things that were listed on her move-in checklist as having been already damaged. Granite ultimately referred the outstanding $110.58 to HW for collection. 2 [8] In March 2019, HW sent a collection letter to Tenant, and, thereafter, Tenant and HW exchanged phone calls and letters, in which Tenant disputed the charges. Consistent with its collection practices for Granite, HW, in June 2019, began reporting the claimed obligation to two CRAs, Equifax and TransUnion. In July 2019, Tenant sent letters, by certified mail to the CRAs, disputing the reporting. To verify the debt, HW reached out to Granite, who on July 10, 2019, advised HW that Tenant owed the $110.58 balance and that the charges had been properly and timely itemized and sent to Tenant as required by Indiana law. After receiving Granite’s response, and after reviewing the Lease and the itemization of charges, 3 HW continued with reporting the debt to the CRAs until October 2020, when Granite withdrew the account from collections and wrote off the balance. 2 Under HW’s contract with Granite, HW would be paid forty percent of any charges successfully collected. 3 HW either did not have or did not consider the As Is Addendum at that time. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 5 of 45 [9] On June 2, 2021, Tenant filed a complaint in Tippecanoe County against HW alleging violation of the FDCPA, 4 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq., for HW’s conduct in attempting to collect the claimed debt. The complaint alleged that Tenant “was harmed by [HW]’s continued attempts to collect debt that she never owed” and that she was seeking actual and statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs for violations of the FDCPA. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 111. The complaint’s numerous factual allegations detailed HW’s alleged actions or failures in collecting a debt that Tenant maintained she did not owe, including sending letters and reporting a debt to CRAs that HW knew or should have known to be false to CRAs. The factual allegations alleged that, in response, Tenant had sent letters to HW, disputing the charges. Tenant also alleged damages: 58. HW’s action [sic] concerning [Tenant] have caused damages, including not by way of limitation: costs of sending one or more certified letters and [Tenant]’s time. 4 The FDCPA’s purpose is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged…” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The act regulates communications in connection with debt collection, including when and under what circumstances a debt collector can communicate with a consumer, and with whom, besides the consumer, a debt collector may communicate. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c. A debt collector “may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Violative conduct includes “[t]he false representation of [] the character, amount, or legal status of any debt[,]” “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken[,]” “[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false[,]” and “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt[.]” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), (5), (8) and (10). A debt collector “may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Violative conduct includes “[t]he collection of any amount . . . unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 6 of 45 59. HW’s communications with [Tenant] caused [her] anxiety and stress. Id. at 115. [10] On July 26, 2021, Tenant filed an amended complaint, which added a claim for violation of the FCRA, 5 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The amended complaint included additional factual allegations pertaining to HW, including that HW had failed to review all relevant information, furnished inaccurate information to CRAs, and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of her dispute. The two paragraphs specifically alleging damages caused by HW due to mailing costs, lost time, anxiety, and stress had been removed from the first amended complaint. The amended complaint added factual allegations pertaining to actions that Tenant had taken in response to the debt collection, namely, she 5 The FCRA’s purpose is “to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit … in a manner that is fair and equitable to the consumer…” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). Furnishers – entities that provide consumer credit information to CRAs – are prohibited from providing any information to a CRA if the furnisher knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a). If a furnisher determines that previously reported information is not complete or accurate, it must promptly notify the CRA of that determination, provide any necessary corrections, and refrain from thereafter furnishing the information that remains incomplete or inaccurate. Id. When a furnisher is notified by a CRA that a consumer has disputed the accuracy or completeness of information that the furnisher provided, the furnisher has a duty to conduct an investigation (sometimes referred to as a “reinvestigation”). 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). Courts have held that the investigation must be “reasonable.” See Woods v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 27 F.4th 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2022) (holding the investigation must be reasonable and “pro forma inquiries will not do”); Walton v. EOS CCA, 885 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Whether the furnisher’s investigation is reasonable is a factual inquiry.”). If a furnisher cannot verify the disputed information, it must delete it. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). A consumer who demonstrates that a furnisher was negligent in breaching Section -2(b) is entitled to actual damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. If the consumer can establish that a furnisher willfully violated one of its duties, the consumer may recover actual or statutory damages, as well as punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. Costs and reasonable attorney’s fees are authorized under both §§ 1681n and 1681o. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 7 of 45 “notified [] Equifax and TransUnion that she did not owe anything to HW or Granite” and “requested a reinvestigation[.]” Id. at 123. [11] On August 31, 2021, HW removed the action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. On October 12, 2021, Tenant filed (in federal court) a second amended complaint, which was, in large part, the same as the first amended complaint. 6 Tenant also moved to remand the case back to state court, arguing that she did not allege any injury in fact in her second amended complaint sufficient to support Article III standing. In opposing remand, HW argued that Tenant had alleged injury sufficient for standing and, further, had intentionally removed from her complaint the specific allegations of injury in an attempt to avoid federal standing. [12] On January 24, 2022, the district court granted Tenant’s motion for remand. In its order, the court observed the “topsy-turvy” nature of the situation, with Tenant “trying to convince [the court] she has no concrete injury, while [HW] insists [Tenant] has indeed been injured by its conduct.” Id. at 155. The court explained that standing in federal courts requires an “injury in fact” which is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” and that, here, Tenant had alleged only that HW reported allegedly inaccurate information to CRAs, “but nothing beyond that – not that 6 Several factual allegations pertaining to “[t]he CRA Defendants” that had been in the first amended complaint were not included in the second amended complaint, with HW explaining at a hearing that CRAs had never been named as defendants and the allegations had been inadvertently included in the first amended complaint that was filed. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 124; Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 8 at 224-232. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 8 of 45 those agencies had provided inaccurate credit reports or scores . . . to any third- parties, or that [Tenant] had otherwise been concretely and negatively impacted by HW’s sharing of erroneous information.” Id. at 156, 164. The district court concluded that HW failed to demonstrate how the operative complaint alleges a concrete injury in fact so as to establish [Tenant]’s standing to bring the action 7 and remanded the case to the trial court. 8 [13] On December 9, 2022, HW moved for judgment on the pleadings under Ind. Trial Rule 12(C), asserting that the second amended complaint did not allege any actual harm or injury and that Tenant lacked standing. The trial court held a hearing on January 24, 2023, taking the matter under advisement. While that was pending, our Supreme Court decided Hoosier Contrs., LLC v. Gardner, 212 N.E.3d 1234 (Ind. 2023), involving whether a homeowner, who had brought statutory claims against a contractor, had brought forth sufficient evidence of injury to establish standing to withstand the contractor’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court set HW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for an additional hearing to address the impact of Hoosier Contrs. 7 The court recognized that, unlike some circuits, “the Seventh Circuit has taken a very restrictive view on the standing requirement in FCRA and FDCPA cases, dismissing many cases over the past couple years on standing grounds.” Id. at 158. 8 Tenant’s action against HW was consolidated with a case that Tenant had filed against Granite and Tailwind in August 2019. On January 19, 2023, summary judgment was granted in favor of Granite and Tailwind on Tenant’s then-remaining claims, which were under Indiana’s Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (DCSA) and Indiana’s Crime Victim’s Relief Act (CVRA). See Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 3 at 148. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 9 of 45 [14] While HW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was pending, Tenant and HW each filed a motion for summary judgment. Tenant sought partial summary judgment under certain sections of the FDCPA on the basis that HW was seeking to collect money for damages that existed before she moved into the apartment and that she did not cause. HW’s motion asserted it was entitled to summary judgment on both the FCRA and the FDCPA claims, in part, because the As Is Addendum was enforceable and made the debt valid and owed, precluding Tenant’s statutory claims. HW also argued that, as required, it had contacted Granite to verify the debt and notified the CRAs that the account was being disputed. [15] Following a hearing, the trial court issued an Order on Dispositive Motions on July 31, 2023, which (1) denied HW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for lack of standing and (2) granted, in part, the parties’ motions for summary judgment. As to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court made several initial observations: Tenant had not suffered a denial of credit, a loss of credit previously extended, a lowering of credit limits or a requirement to pay a higher interest rate as a result of the reporting of the alleged debt to the CRAs; although Tenant’s postage costs were pecuniary losses, “these voluntary expenses are not the types of ‘actual damages’ contemplated by the FCRA or FDCPA”; and “procedural violations and statutory damages are insufficient to confer standing” and that Tenant “does not seek injunctive relief or a declaratory judgment.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 70. The court then determined: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 10 of 45 [T]he court finds that unless there is some binding authority holding that emotional damages alone are insufficient to confer standing in Indiana, then [Tenant] should not be denied her day in court. It is undisputed that the FCRA and FDCPA allow for actual damages, which can include emotional harm. [HW] cites no Indiana authority suggesting that emotional harm alone is insufficient to confer standing. Importantly, Hoosier Contrs. does not address emotional harm. The court is not concerned with lack of references to emotional harm in the Second Amended Complaint, which requests “damages” and “all other relief just and proper in the premises.” Indiana’s notice pleading requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and “a demand for relief to which the pleader deems entitled.” Ind. Trial Rule 8(A). A pleading need not adopt a specific legal theory of recovery or state all elements of a cause of action. A complaint’s allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues. Here, [Tenant] has consistently claimed emotional harm. Id. at 70-71 (internal citation omitted). [16] The court granted Tenant’s motion for summary judgment only to the extent that Tenant was a “consumer,” HW was a “debt collector,” and the obligation was a “consumer debt” under the relevant statutes. As to HW’s motion for summary judgment, the court determined, in part, that the As Is Addendum was “enforceable to the extent it applies to routine and regular cleaning, paint touch up, or carpet vacuuming or cleaning.” Id. at 73. The court denied HW’s motion in all other respects due to genuine issues of material fact. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 11 of 45 [17] On June 4-7, 2024, the case proceeded to jury trial on Tenant’s FCRA and FDCPA claims. Tenant testified that the apartment was in poor condition when she moved in, including broken locks, scuffs and holes in the walls, stained and fraying carpets, a broken stove, a stained toilet, a non-functional sink, and a front door that did not shut properly. There was also testimony that she and her then boyfriend (now husband) cleaned the apartment, he took pictures of its condition, and she left it in a better condition than she had received it. The move-in checklist from the prior tenant reflected some of the same unclean and damaged conditions that Tenant noted in her move-in checklist that she had submitted to Granite. Exhibits Vol. 2 at 82, 84 (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 9 and 10). Tenant testified that, as a result of HW’s reporting, she experienced increased anxiety, reputational embarrassment, intrusive thoughts, inability to focus, and emotional withdrawal and required an increase in anti-anxiety medication. She did not apply on her own for either an apartment or a car loan, anticipating denial. [18] In her case-in-chief, Tenant also presented the testimony of: an FRCA/credit- reporting industry expert; an attorney with Purdue legal services; chief executive officer of Granite; another expert who was formerly an Experian dispute agent and, later, its corporate representative; Tenant’s husband; and HW’s manager of operational strategies, who was HW’s corporate representative at trial. Tenant presented portions of video deposition testimony of four HW employees: two dispute agents, a manager who oversees dispute agents, and a compliance officer. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 12 of 45 [19] HW called Granite’s collection manager and HW’s corporate trial representative. Generally speaking, HW’s trial position was that, under the Lease and the As Is Addendum, Tenant owed the $110 in charges to Granite, that HW’s agents communicated with Granite and verified that the amount was owed, such that HW’s reporting of it to the CRAs was accurate as required by law, and that HW’s investigation of the dispute was reasonable and proper. [20] At the conclusion of Tenant’s evidence, HW moved for Ind. Trial Rule 50 judgment on the evidence, which the trial court denied. The parties briefed and presented argument pertaining to the appropriate burden of proof applicable to punitive damages, with HW maintaining it was a clear and convincing standard and Tenant maintaining that, pursuant to federal law, it was by a preponderance/greater weight of the evidence. Ultimately, the trial court instructed the jury with a greater weight of the evidence burden of proof. [21] The jury returned a verdict in favor of Tenant on all claims, determining that HW was liable under both the FCRA and FDCPA and that HW had willfully violated the FCRA, which allowed for recovery of punitive damages. The jury awarded Tenant $200,000 in actual damages and $1,750,000 in punitive damages. 9 Tenant moved for statutory attorney’s fees and costs, which HW 9 Following trial, the parties stipulated that Tenant was entitled to $1,000 in statutory damages under FDCPA with HW retaining the right to appeal the jury’s verdict. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 8 at 245. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 13 of 45 opposed in part. The trial court reduced the hourly rates sought by counsel but awarded the full amount of costs sought by Tenant, $47,393. [22] HW filed a combined renewed motion for judgment on the evidence and motion to correct error to reduce the jury award, arguing, in part, that the punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive and that the costs award exceeded statutory limits. The trial court denied the motion. HW now appeals. Discussion & Decision 1. Denial of HW’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [23] HW asserts that the trial court erred in denying its T.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, in which HW argued that Tenant’s operative complaint did not include any allegation of injury and thus she lacked standing. Like a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6), a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Trial Rule 12(C) tests the sufficiency of the complaint to state a redressable claim, not the facts to support it. A judgment on the pleadings is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the facts shown by the pleadings clearly entitle the moving party to judgment. A trial court should grant such a motion only when it is clear from the pleadings that the non-moving party cannot in any way succeed under the facts and allegations therein. In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for judgment on the pleadings this court conducts a de novo review. We look only to the pleadings in making this assessment. We will accept as true the well-pleaded material facts alleged. The moving party is deemed to have admitted well- Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 14 of 45 pleaded facts in favor of the nonmovant, and this court will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Lockerbie Glove Co. Town Home Owner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Indianapolis Historic Pres. Comm’n, 194 N.E.3d 1175, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal citations and quotations omitted). A trial court may grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings if the party bringing the action lacks standing to do so. Id. [24] Standing is a threshold issue: if it is lacking, the court cannot consider the merits of the claim. Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 215 (Ind. 2022). Standing is a “significant restraint on the ability of Indiana courts to act, as it denies the courts any jurisdiction absent an actual injured party participating in the case.” Hoosier Contrs, 212 N.E.3d at 1238. Standing is a legal question reviewed de novo. City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022). [25] To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. Red Lobster Restaurants LLC v. Fricke, 234 N.E.3d 159, 167 (Ind. 2024). “Indiana law is clear that standing requires an injury, which is met if the party shows it ‘ha[s] suffered or [is] in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct.’” Hoosier Contrs., 212 N.E.3d at 1238 (quoting Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 217) (internal citation omitted); McLinden v. Tangoe U.S., Inc., 263 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). HW maintains that Tenant, who removed from her complaint the specific damage allegations of stress, anxiety, and mailing costs, “intentionally pled her way out Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 15 of 45 of federal court. But in doing so, she also pled her way out of state court.” Appellant’s Brief at 26. After careful consideration, we disagree. [26] Our decision today is particularly informed by Hoosier Contrs., where our Supreme Court recognized that “[a]t the pleading stage, a claimant’s general factual allegations of injury arising from the defendant’s conduct may suffice to satisfy standing.” 212 N.E.3d at 1239. There, a homeowner, Gardner, contacted Hoosier Contractors (Hoosier) to inspect his roof and obtain an estimate for repairs, and Hoosier required Gardner to first sign a contract agreeing to hire Hoosier for any necessary repairs. Gardner ultimately hired another company to perform the work. [27] Hoosier sued Gardner for breach of contract, and Gardner counterclaimed on behalf of a class, alleging that Hoosier’s form contract violated the Home Improvement Contractors Act (HICA) and that the violations constituted deceptive acts under the DCSA. Hoosier moved for summary judgment on the basis that Gardner and the class lacked standing because they did not suffer actual injury, designating evidence that Garner hired another company to do the repairs for a cheaper price. Gardner and the class asserted that all those who signed the noncompliant-HICA contract had suffered statutory damages under the DCSA. The trial court denied Hoosier’s motion. [28] Our Supreme Court reversed, finding that the DCSA provides that a person who relies on a deceptive act may bring an action “for the damages actually suffered” as a result of relying on the deceptive act and that Gardner’s Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 16 of 45 documents submitted in response to summary judgment “showed [that] Hoosier’s deceptive acts did not harm him at all” given that he hired another company for the repairs at a lower cost. Id. at 1241. Because statutory violations “are insufficient by themselves to confer standing,” and Garder and the class did not set forth designated evidence to show that they suffered actual injury, the Court concluded that Hoosier was entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 1242. Of significance here, in reaching its decision, the Court recognized that, in his counterclaim, [Gardner] claimed that he and the other class members “relied upon [the] deceptive acts perpetrated by Hoosier” and “suffered damages as a result of the deceptive acts.” These injury allegations were sufficient to confer standing at the litigation’s pleading stage. . . . But the summary- judgment phase raises the threshold for proving an injury. Id. at 1241 (internal citation omitted) (emphases added). The Court’s observation that the bar for standing at the pleading stage is lower than that necessary to survive summary judgment is a recognition of Indiana’s liberal notice pleading requirements. [29] Ind. Trial Rule 8(A) sets forth our general rules of pleading and provides that to state a claim for relief, the complaint must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for relief to which the pleader deems entitled. “In practice, [our] liberal standard merely requires that a ‘complaint ... put the defendant on notice concerning why it is potentially liable and what it stands to lose.” NFI Interactive Logistics LLC v. Bruski, 239 N.E.3d 63, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (affirming trial Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 17 of 45 court’s denial of T.R. 12(B) motion for failure to state a claim, where complaint did not plead a specific theory of liability, noting that other means less drastic than dismissal can be used to clarify, such as discovery and pretrial conferences), trans. denied. A plaintiff need only plead the operative facts involved in the litigation. Id. [30] Here, the second amended complaint opened with the allegation that Tenant “was harmed by [HW]’s continued attempts to collect debt that she never owed.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 199. The complaint then set forth several pages of factual allegations, including what HW was claimed to have done or not done, in response to which Tenant sent letters to HW to dispute the debt and challenge HW’s reporting of it to CRAs, notified two CRAs that she did not owe Granite or HW, and requested a reinvestigation of the matter. Her efforts necessarily required her to expend time and effort and some mailing costs. [31] Just as the homeowner’s allegations that he relied upon deceptive acts perpetrated by the contractor and “suffered damages as a result” were sufficient to confer standing at the pleading stage in Hoosier Contrs., we find that the allegations of Tenant’s second amended complaint were adequate to confer standing and survive judgment on the pleadings. We thus affirm the trial court’s denial of HW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 18 of 45 2. Denial of HW’s Motion for Summary Judgment [32] HW asserts that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary judgment on Tenant’s FDCPA and FCRA claims. We review the denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of . . . the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is “material” if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is “genuine” if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences. The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue, at which point the burden shifts to the non- movant to come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (cleaned up). Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims. Id. at 1004. [33] In partially granting the motion, the trial court made several legal determinations regarding the As Is Addendum. In addition to finding that it was supported by consideration and was not ambiguous, the court determined that the As Is Addendum “is enforceable to the extent it applies to routine and regular cleaning, paint touch up, or carpet vacuuming or cleaning.” Appellant’s Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 | September 30, 2026 Page 19 of 45 Appendix Vol. 2 at 73. The trial court clarified that the As Is Addendum did not provide a “blank check” to Granite, as “it would be unconscionable for a landlord to ask a tenant to accept all property damage from a prior tenant, sight unseen.” Id. HW’s motion for summary judgment was denied in all other respects due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact. [34] HW’s position is that the trial court’s ruling that the As Is Addendum was legally enforceable necessarily established that Granite could charge Tenant for the items that it did – and therefore, the debt was accurate – making HW’s attempts to collect it and its reporting to the CRAs not violative of either the FDCPA or FCRA. This conclusory reasoning is flawed, however. While the trial court made the legal determination that the As Is Addendum was enforceable to a limited extent, that determination did not resolve the factual dispute as to whether the assessed charges represented damage or conditions for which Tenant was liable. [35] The Lease required Tenant to return the apartment in as good a condition as she received it, ordinary wear and tear excepted. In opposing summary judgment, Tenant maintained that she turned over the apartment without damage and in clean condition and that the As Is Addendum did not make her responsible for preexisting damage. Tenant designated evidence, including her move-in checklist that she had submitted to Granite and her supplemental affidavit, in which she averred that Granite’s itemization of security deposit return “contain[ed] charges for conditions in the apartment that pre-existed my tenancy.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 5 at 248. She also designated deposition Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-48 |