Hoagland Family Limited v. Town Of Clear Lake

FILED Jun 22 2026, 8:44 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Hoagland Family Limited Partnership, Appellant-Defendant v. Town of Clear Lake, Appellee-Plaintiff June 22, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-1361 25A-PL-3170 Appeal from the Steuben Circuit Court The Honorable William R. Walz IV, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 76C01-1006-PL-000425 Opinion by Judge Felix Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 1 of 58  Judges May and Mathias concur. Felix, Judge. Statement of the Case [1] In this installment of the Hoagland Family Limited Partnership’s (“Hoagland”) fight over connecting to the Town of Clear Lake’s (the “Town”) public sewer system (the “Sewer”), Hoagland challenges five of the trial court’s more recent orders: (1) the December 2024 order denying Hoagland’s motion for leave to amend its answer; (2) the March 2025 order holding Hoagland liable for $512,623.52; (3) the April 2025 order holding Hoagland liable for $60,076.49 in attorneys’ fees, (4) the October 2025 order holding Hoagland liable for $15,066.00 in appellate attorneys’ fees, and (5) the October 2025 nunc pro tunc order clarifying that Hoagland is liable for $19,920.00 pursuant to a contempt finding. Specifically, Hoagland presents the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Hoagland leave to amend its answer; 2. Whether the trial court erred by entering the $512,623.52 judgment in favor of the Town; 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the Town $60,076.49 in attorneys’ fees; 4. Whether the trial court erred by awarding the Town appellate attorneys’ fees; and 5. Whether the trial court erred by entering the nunc pro tunc order. [2] We affirm. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 2 of 58  Facts and Procedural History Background [3] Hoagland’s unwillingness to connect to the Sewer has generated a rather effluent stream of litigation, producing at least five prior decisions from this court and one decision from the Indiana Supreme Court: (1) Town of Clear Lake v. Hoagland Fam. Ltd. P’ship, 75 N.E.3d 1081 (Ind. Ct. App.) [hereinafter Hoagland I], trans. denied, 94 N.E.3d 298 (Ind. 2017); (2) Hoagland Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clear Lake, 131 N.E.3d 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) [hereinafter Hoagland II], trans. denied, 141 N.E.3d 26 (Ind. 2020); (3) Hoagland Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clear Lake, No. 21A-PL- 2566 (Ind. Ct. App.) [hereinafter Hoagland III]; (4) Hoagland Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clear Lake, 207 N.E.3d 1220, No. 22A-PL-631 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2023) (mem.) [hereinafter Hoagland IV], trans. denied, 217 N.E.3d 1243 (Ind. 2023); (5) Hoagland Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clear Lake, 257 N.E.3d 830 (Ind. Ct. App.) [hereinafter Hoagland V], trans. denied, 265 N.E.3d 1005 (Ind. 2025); and (6) Hoagland Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clear Lake, 253 N.E.3d 1109 (Ind. 2025) (per curiam) [hereinafter Hoagland VI]. In our latest effort to “plunge this dispute from the judicial pipeline,” Hoagland II, 131 N.E.3d at 732, we add another decision to this list: (7) Hoagland Fam. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 3 of 58  Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clear Lake, -- N.E.3d --, No. 25A-PL-1361, No. 25A-PL- 3170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) [hereinafter Hoagland VII]. 1 [4] Hoagland has two general partners—Daniel and Karen Hoagland—and owns three parcels of real estate in the Town. Hoagland V, 257 N.E.3d at 835. In 2002, the Town enacted an ordinance (the “2002 Ordinance”) that required Hoagland to connect to the Sewer, and once the Sewer was complete in 2005, Hoagland refused to connect. Id. In January 2010, the Town sent notice to Hoagland that it would initiate legal proceedings within 90 days if Hoagland did not connect to the Sewer. Id. True to its word, in Cause 76D01-1006-PL- 425 (the “2010 Cause”), the Town sued Hoagland, alleging it had not connected to the Sewer and should be fined for not doing so. Id. [5] In 2016, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hoagland, which this court reversed. Hoagland I, 75 N.E.3d at 1087. In 2017, while Hoagland I was pending, the Town enacted a new ordinance governing connection to the Sewer, and Hoagland refused to comply with the new requirements. Hoagland II, 131 N.E.3d at 735–36. The trial court ordered Hoagland to comply with the 2017 ordinance, id. at 736, and this court reversed that decision but reminded Hoagland that it still needed to connect to the Sewer pursuant to the 2002 Ordinance, id. at 739. 1 This decision disposes of two separate appeals: Case 25A-PL-1361 (“Appeal 1361”) and Case 25A-PL-3170 (“Appeal 3170”). To avoid confusion, we include “1361” and “3170” as appropriate in our citations to the Record and the parties’ briefs. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 4 of 58 [6] In October 2021, upon the Town’s motion, the trial court ordered Hoagland to connect to the Sewer by 5:00 p.m. on November 17, 2021 (the “Connection Order”). Hoagland V, 257 N.E.3d at 836–37. This court dismissed Hoagland’s subsequent appeal. Order, Hoagland III, No. 21A-PL-2566 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2022) (dismissing appeal); Order, Hoagland III, No. 21A-PL-2566 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2022) (denying reh’g pet.). While Hoagland III was pending, Hoagland refused to comply with the Connection Order and was held in contempt (the “First Contempt Order”). Hoagland IV, 207 N.E.3d 1220, No. 22A-PL-631, slip op. at ¶¶ 10–11. Hoagland appealed the First Contempt Order and several other related orders, including the Connection Order. Id. at ¶ 12 n.1. This court limited Hoagland’s appeal to only the First Contempt Order, id., and affirmed the trial court’s decision to hold Hoagland in contempt for willfully disobeying the Connection Order, id. at ¶ 22. [7] In October 2023, after Hoagland IV was decided, Hoagland admitted during a telephonic conference with the trial court that it still had not connected to the Sewer, so the Town requested Hoagland once again be held in contempt. Hoagland V, 257 N.E.3d at 838. At the ensuing contempt hearing, Daniel admitted that Hoagland’s properties still were not connected to the Sewer and provided explanations for this. Id. at 839. In December 2023, the trial court found Hoagland in contempt for a second time (the “Second Contempt Order”). Id. at 839–40. Hoagland appealed, arguing in relevant part that the Connection Order was void. Id. at 835, 844. In April 2025, this court affirmed the Second Contempt Order and awarded the Town appellate attorneys’ fees Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 5 of 58  because Hoagland V was not only the third time Hoagland challenged the Connection Order, but it was also “the most meritless and frivolous attempt to prolong this case.” Id. at 846. [8] While these proceedings were ongoing in the 2010 Cause, Hoagland initiated Cause 76D01-2305-PL-237 (the “2023 Cause”), in which it sued “the Town and several of its governing bodies, elected officials, employees, and contractors.” Hoagland VI, 253 N.E.3d at 1110. Hoagland’s claims in the 2023 Cause “derived from the facts and circumstances litigated in” the 2010 Cause. Id. The 2023 Cause was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(8). Id. Hoagland appealed the dismissal, arguing it should have been without prejudice. Id. In October 2024, this court affirmed the trial court’s decision, Hoagland Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clear Lake, 246 N.E.3d 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), and Hoagland petitioned for transfer. 2 In March 2025, the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer; vacated this court’s opinion; and issued Hoagland VI, agreeing that the dismissal should be without prejudice and remanding. 253 N.E.3d at 1110–11. 2 In recounting the procedural history leading to Hoagland VI, Hoagland states this court’s decision can be found at “246 N.E.3d 1081.” Appellant’s Am. 1361 Br. at 4, 48; see also Appellant’s 1361 Reply Br. at 4. That reporter information leads to Kaplan v. Hammond, 246 N.E.3d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024) (beginning on page 1072, ending on page 1089). The correct reporter information, as reflected above, is 246 N.E.3d 284. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 6 of 58  Proceedings Giving Rise to Appeals 1361 and 3170 [9] Answer Amendment. On November 27, 2024, while Hoagland VI was pending, Hoagland filed a motion in the 2010 Cause to amend its answer by adding a counterclaim. On December 2, the trial court denied that motion, and it struck the motion and attached counterclaim from the record. On April 15, 2025, based on Hoagland VI, Hoagland filed a motion to correct error regarding the denial of its amendment motion. On May 2, the trial court denied this motion. [10] $512,623.52 Judgment. “At various times in 2024[, Hoagland] ultimately connected its three properties to the Town’s sewer system . . . .” Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. II at 107. On September 12, 2024, the Town requested a hearing to determine Hoagland’s “financial obligations to the Town related to Hoagland’s connection to” the Sewer. Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. V at 227. In particular, the Town alleged Hoagland was liable for (1) the Town’s attorneys’ fees pursuant to Clear Lake Code section 51.51 and Indiana Code section 36-9- 23-30(d); (2) the Town’s expenses related to the design and construction of building the sewer lines serving Hoagland’s properties pursuant to Clear Lake Code section 51.52(A)(3); and (3) the delinquencies Hoagland owed pursuant to Clear Lake Code section 51.51(B)(3). [11] On December 17, the trial court held a hearing on the financial obligations motion (the “Financial Obligations Hearing”). On March 16, 2025, the trial court issued its order (the “Financial Obligations Order”) awarding the Town $512,623.52—$369,382.26 in attorneys’ fees related to enforcing sewer Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 7 of 58  connection requirements, $72,108.48 in installation costs, and $72,198.78 in unpaid sewer charges. 3 The trial court also “direct[ed] the Town’s attorneys to submit any supplemental petitions for attorney[s’] fees in connection with this matter” within 15 days of the order. Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. II at 114. [12] Supplemental Attorneys’ Fees. On March 26, in accordance with the Financial Obligations Order, the Town filed a supplemental petition requesting an additional $60,076.49 in attorneys’ fees. On April 16, over Hoagland’s written objection, the trial court awarded the Town the additional $60,076.49. Hoagland then initiated Appeal 1361. [13] Appellate Attorneys’ Fees & Nunc Pro Tunc Order. Meanwhile, on September 5, 2025, the Town filed a motion requesting (1) appellate attorneys’ fees pursuant to this court’s opinion in Hoagland V, 257 N.E.3d at 845–46; and (2) that the trial court “correct” the First Contempt Order because the Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”) did not reflect the $19,920.00 fine imposed, Appellant’s 3170 App. Vol. IX at 48. On October 7, over Hoagland’s written objection, the trial court awarded the Town $15,066.00 in appellate attorneys’ fees, and it issued a nunc pro tunc order (the “Nunc Pro Tunc 3 Adding together the attorneys’ fees, installation costs, and unpaid sewer charges results in a total award of $513,689.52. However, the trial court ordered Hoagland to pay the Town “the sum of Five Hundred Twelve Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Three and 52/100 Dollars ($512,623.52).” Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. II at 115. Neither party challenges the $1,066.00 discrepancy. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 8 of 58  Order”) regarding the First Contempt Order. Hoagland then initiated Appeal 3170. [14] We address the issues raised by Appeals 1361 and 3170 in this single decision. Additional facts will be provided below as necessary. Discussion and Decision 1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Hoagland Leave to File a Counterclaim [15] Hoagland argues the trial court erred by denying its motion for leave to amend its answer and subsequent motion to correct error. Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 15(A), once a case is past the pleading stage, “a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be given when justice so requires.” An amendment can essentially “restart[] a lawsuit,” and this rule “encourage[s] early amendment” to avoid such starts and stops. Brooks v. USA Track & Field, Inc., 272 N.E.3d 490, 496 (Ind. 2025), reh’g denied (Feb. 13, 2026). Trial Rule 15(A) also “ensure[s] both litigants (who often encounter new, critical information during discovery) and the court have some flexibility.” Id. [16] Trial courts have broad discretion in ruling on motions to amend pleadings, and we review such rulings for an abuse of discretion. Stone v. Wright, 133 N.E.3d 210, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing MAPCO Coal Inc. v. Godwin, 786 N.E.2d 769, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision “was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 9 of 58  it, Willow Haven on 106th St., LLC v. Nagireddy, 252 N.E.3d 418, 422 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Wisner v. Laney, 984 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ind. 2012)), or if it misinterpreted the law, id. (citing Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Haw., Alaska, Ind., Ky., Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957, 964 (Ind. 2023), reh’g denied). In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in ruling on a Trial Rule 15(A) motion, we look to a number of factors, including (1) “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive” on the movant’s part; (2) “repeated failure to cure deficiency by amendment previously allowed”; (3) “undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the amendment”; and (4) “futility of the amendment.” Stone, 133 N.E.3d at 220 (citing Godwin, 786 N.E.2d at 777). [17] Hoagland specifically contends that the Indiana Supreme Court in Hoagland VI “concluded that [Hoagland] has a right to pursue its claims in this case,” so the trial court erred by denying Hoagland’s amendment motion. Appellant’s Am. 1361 Br. at 49. The Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Hoagland VI was not as broad as Hoagland now reads it. On the narrow issue of whether Hoagland’s complaint in the 2023 Cause should be dismissed with or without prejudice, the Hoagland VI court held that the dismissal with prejudice “essentially denied Hoagland an opportunity to litigate its claims.” Hoagland VI, 253 N.E.3d at 1110 (emphasis added). The Hoagland VI court stated that Hoagland could “certainly attempt” to litigate its claims in the 2010 Cause, id. at 1110 (emphasis added), and it also expressly refused to “address the merits of Hoagland’s claims,” id. at 1110–11. None of this language gives Hoagland the right to amend its answer Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 10 of 58  in the 2010 Cause; instead, it only informs Hoagland that its claims in the 2023 Cause could possibly be litigated in the 2010 Cause. See id. That is, the Indiana Supreme Court did not limit the trial court’s Trial Rule 15(A) discretion in the 2010 Cause. [18] Furthermore, Hoagland does not contend that at the time it filed its motion, justice required the trial court to grant it. Hoagland does not try to explain why it should be allowed to amend its answer after more than 14 years, whether the Town would be unduly prejudiced by the amendment, whether the amendment would be futile, and any other relevant considerations under Trial Rule 15(A). [19] Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for leave to amend and subsequent motion to correct error. 2. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Ordering Hoagland to Pay the Town $512,623.52 [20] Hoagland challenges the Financial Obligations Order on multiple fronts. The trial court entered findings and conclusions in that order, so we review for clear error, see Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)), unless otherwise noted. In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the evidence supports the court’s findings and whether those findings support the court’s judgment.” Id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 11 of 58  600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court’s decision, In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). For issues not covered by the findings, we apply our general judgment standard, meaning we “should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” State ex rel. Dep’t Nat. Res. v. Leonard, 226 N.E.3d 198, 202 (Ind. 2024) (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123–24; Ind. Trial Rule 52(D)). [21] Hoagland argues the trial court erred by (a) taking judicial notice of certain documents and facts, (b) failing to enforce the parties’ alleged settlement agreement, (c) awarding the Town the costs it incurred in connecting Hoagland’s properties to the Sewer, (d) awarding the Town the monthly sewer charges Hoagland had not yet paid, and (e) awarding the Town attorneys’ fees related to enforcing the Connection Order. We address each argument in turn. a. Judicial Notice [22] Hoagland claims the trial court erred by (i) taking judicial notice of certain documents and facts, and (ii) not holding a hearing on whether to take judicial notice thereof. We address each claim in turn. i. Judicial Notice [23] At the Town’s request, the trial court took judicial notice of the following: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 12 of 58  1. “all the Town’s codified ordinances which were in place when the Town filed its lawsuit in June 2010,” Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. II at 109; 2. Steuben County Local Rule LR76-AR00-12; 3. a letter Hoagland “sent to the Town and Midwest Utilities dated April 15, 2002, . . . which stated, in part: ‘we are not participating in the Clear Lake Sewer System at this time and we will not be paying any sewer bills,’” id. at 110; 4. its order dated August 27, 2015, in which it required Hoagland’s properties “‘to be connected’ as referenced in [Clear Lake Code section] 51.51(B)(3),” id.; 5. three verified pleadings in Cause 76D01-0504-PL-0191, signed by Daniel, regarding the receipt of Sewer-related bills from the Town; 6. a September 14, 2024, email from Hoagland to the Town’s Billing Clerk; 7. the lack of a record in the Town’s Clerk-Treasurer’s office of “any payment received . . . from Hoagland for charges imposed by the Rate Ordinances,” Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. VIII at 4; see Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. II at 92; 8. a spreadsheet of the monthly sewer charges Hoagland owed between March 1, 2003, and October 15, 2024; 9. billing records related to installing Hoagland’s Sewer connections; and 10. the December 10, 2024, affidavits of Patricia Koesters Short and Jennifer Smith-Sattison, attesting “to the mailing of annual payment books for monthly sewer charges,” Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. II at 111. [24] Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201, a trial court may judicially notice a fact that “is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Ind. Evidence Rule 201(a)(1). A trial court may also judicially notice “published regulations of governmental agencies,” id. 201(a)(2)(A), (b)(3); “ordinances of municipalities,” id. 201(a)(2)(B), (b)(4); “rules of court,” id. 201(b)(2); and “records of a court of this state,” id. 201(a)(2)(C), (b)(5). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 13 of 58 [25] “[W]e review a trial court’s decision to take judicial notice . . . , like other evidentiary decisions, for abuse of discretion.” Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016) (citing Storey v. Leonas, 904 N.E.2d 229, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied; McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 536 (Ind. 2001)). “[W]e may affirm the trial court’s decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind.) (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 424 (2024). [26] Hoagland specifically argues that the trial court “took judicial notice of substantive facts in lieu of live testimony subject to cross-examination.” Appellant’s Am. 1361 Br. at 51 (emphasis in original). Hoagland points to “copies maintained in Town Clerk’s office, an Affidavit of Nathan Striker, Clerk- Treasurer, billing records of a third party, a statement that no record existed, a letter, and an email” as “example[s]” of improperly judicially noticed documents and facts. Id. (emphases in original) (citing Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. II at 92). However, Hoagland does not explain why the trial court could not take judicial notice of any of this evidence under Evidence Rule 201. See id. at 51–52; Appellant’s 1361 Reply Br. at 25–27. “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 14 of 58  172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Hoagland’s failure to present cogent argument on this issue, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration” thereof such that we cannot address its merits, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)). 4 Because Hoagland has waived this claim for our review, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of certain documents and facts. ii. Opportunity to Be Heard [27] Evidence Rule 201(e) provides that “[o]n timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard.” 4 In the last sentence of its two-paragraph argument regarding the judicially noticed evidence, Hoagland references “our Constitution and confrontation clause.” Appellant’s Am. 1361 Br. at 52. Hoagland does not develop this argument further, so it is waived for our review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring cogent reasoning); Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (holding that an appellate claim may be waived for significant noncompliance with the Indiana Appellate Rules). Additionally, in its Appeal 1361 reply brief, Hoagland argues that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice after the Financial Obligations Hearing. Hoagland did not make this argument in its Appeal 1361 opening brief, so Hoagland has waived it for our review. See Steele v. Steuben Lakes Reg’l Waste Dist., 168 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1180–81 (Ind. 2016)) (“[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal in a reply brief.”). Waiver notwithstanding, Evidence Rule 201 plainly allows a trial court to “take judicial notice at any stage of a proceeding.” Ind. Evidence Rule 201(d) (emphasis added); see also In re Paternity of P.R., 940 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (recognizing same). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 15 of 58 [28] In its Appeal 1361 opening brief, Hoagland asserts without citation, “The Trial Court refused to allow a hearing under Rule 201(e) . . . .” Appellant’s Am. 1361 Br. at 52–53. This is the only argument Hoagland provides on the issue in its opening brief. See id. It is not until its reply brief that Hoagland supports this argument with a citation to the Record on Appeal, namely, its response to the Town’s December 21, 2024, motion to take judicial notice. Appellant’s 1361 Reply Br. at 27–28 (citing Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. X at 153). In that response, Hoagland stated, Even if the Court did allow the Town to present additional evidence, after it rested, fundamental fairness and Rule 201(e) would dictate that [Hoagland] be given the opportunity to respond. There is a lot of context and history to [Cause 76D01- 0504-PL-0191] that [Hoagland] would have presented had the Town properly raised the 20[-]year[-]old complaint at the hearing on December 17, 2024. Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. X at 153. [29] Assuming arguendo that this statement constitutes a request under Evidence Rule 201(e), Hoagland does not explain how it was prejudiced by the lack of a hearing on the Town’s motion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (error is harmless if “its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties”); cf. Care Grp. Heart Hosp., LLC v. Sawyer, 93 N.E.3d 745, 758 (Ind. 2018) (holding failure to hold hearing on T.R. 37(A)(4) award was harmless where parties litigated the issue in writing and hearing would not have revealed anything the written record did Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 16 of 58  not supply). We therefore must conclude that any error caused by the trial court not holding a hearing on the Town’s motion to take judicial notice was harmless. b. Settlement Agreement [30] Hoagland contends the trial court erred by failing to enforce a settlement agreement the parties allegedly entered into in April 2021. On October 13, 2021, Hoagland filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, representing that on April 12, 2021, Hoagland and the Town “met and agreed upon the process” by which Hoagland would connect to the Sewer. Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. III at 91. The Town filed a written objection, and on October 18, the trial court denied Hoagland’s motion. Four years later at the Financial Obligations Hearing, Hoagland attempted to question Daniel about the alleged settlement agreement. The Town objected, and the trial court sustained that objection. Hoagland then made an offer of proof regarding the alleged settlement agreement. In the Financial Obligations Order, the trial court rejected Hoagland’s argument that the parties had reached a settlement, finding instead that Hoagland connected to the Sewer only after extensive litigation, including two contempt findings. [31] On appeal, Hoagland maintains that the alleged settlement agreement was enforceable and the Town breached it. The Town argues that Hoagland has waived any challenge regarding the enforceability of the alleged settlement agreement because Hoagland does not first challenge the exclusion of the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 17 of 58  settlement agreement evidence. That is, the Town contends we cannot consider the offer of proof in reviewing the Financial Obligations Order. [32] “An offer of proof allows the trial and appellate courts to determine the admissibility of the testimony, as well as the potential for prejudice if it is excluded.” Heckard v. State, 118 N.E.3d 823, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Dylak v. State, 850 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied), trans. denied. “The offer of proof is part of the record only insofar as the [party] chooses to challenge the trial court’s exclusion.” Bradford v. State, 675 N.E.2d 296, 302 (Ind. 1996). We typically “may not consider evidence outside the record presented to the trial court in resolving an appeal.” Banks v. Banks, 980 N.E.2d 423, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing In re D.Q., 745 N.E.2d 904, 906 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). Consequently, when a party makes an offer of proof at the trial level but does not challenge the propriety of the trial court’s exclusion of that evidence on appeal, we will not consider the proffered evidence in ruling on any other issue. Bradford, 675 N.E.2d at 302. [33] Hoagland does not claim that the trial court erred by excluding evidence concerning the alleged settlement agreement. In fact, Hoagland expressly states that it “is not arguing that the Trial Court erred in excluding testimony during” the Financial Obligations Hearing. Appellant’s 1361 Reply Br. at 12. Hoagland instead frames its claim as a challenge to the original denial of the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. However, Hoagland’s argument overlooks its own attempt to obtain a new ruling using new evidence at the Financial Obligations Hearing on the enforceability of the alleged settlement Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 18 of 58  agreement. The trial court’s exclusion of the settlement agreement evidence and rejection of Hoagland’s settlement agreement argument is the operative ruling from which Hoagland now appeals. Cf. In re A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (determining no relief available for parents who challenged child’s removal based on first removal order when dispositional order had been issued). Hoagland’s failure to challenge the exclusion of the settlement agreement evidence is therefore fatal to its appellate claim. See Bradford, 675 N.E.2d at 302. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred by not enforcing the alleged settlement agreement. 5 c. Sewer Connection Costs [34] Hoagland asserts the trial court erred by awarding the Town $72,108.48 for the costs of connecting Hoagland’s properties to the Sewer (the “Connection Costs”). In the Financial Obligations Order, the trial court found and concluded in relevant part as follows: 23. Dan Hoagland testified in . . . Cause No. 76C01-1006-PL- 425, on March 16, 2018, as contained in the transcript thereof: []Question. []And what amount do you believe that you were supposed to pay? 5 Hoagland also argues that it was denied due process because the trial court did not hold a hearing on its October 2021 motion to enforce the alleged settlement agreement, but Hoagland fails to analyze the applicable due process law. Hoagland has thus waived this claim for our review. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a); Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1267. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 19 of 58  Ans. $200 per property. Question. Okay, and did that include the Town provide the grinder pump? Ans. Yes it does. Question. And again, once the grinder pump is installed by the Town, would it then be your responsibility to connect your home to the grinder pump? Ans. As-assuming the grinder pump’s is, is installed and functioning, yes. This testimony would be consistent with the requirements of [Clear Lake Code] § 51.52(A)(3) and [Clear Lake Code] § 51.62(B)(1). 24. Dan Hoagland’s testimony on December 17, 2024, was contrary to his testimony on March 16, 2018 . . . . 25. [Hoagland] is responsible for the . . . expenses incurred by the Town for the extension of house lateral sewers to Hoagland’s properties. *** 29. [Hoagland] owes the Town, pursuant to [Clear Lake Code] § 51.52(A)(3), the sum of $72,108.48 which consists of costs of installation of the building sewer[] lines for [Hoagland]’s three (3) properties to connect to the Town-owned grinder pump station, including engineering expenses, directional drilling expenses, survey expenses, and landscape restoration. Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. II at 112–14 (emphases in original). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 20 of 58 [35] Hoagland specifically argues that the trial court erred by (i) awarding the Connection Costs pursuant to Clear Lake Code section 51.52(A)(3), and (ii) determining the Town provided grinder pumps at no cost to Hoagland. We address each argument in turn. i. Reliance on Clear Lake Code Section 51.52(A)(3) [36] In Hoagland II, this court determined that the Clear Lake ordinances in place when the Town initiated the 2010 Cause are the applicable ordinances for determining the Sewer connection expenses Hoagland owes. 131 N.E.3d at 737–38. [37] First, Hoagland seems to contend that the trial court could not rely on the version of Clear Lake Code section 51.52(A)(3) in effect in 2010 because “the only ordinances introduced into evidence [at the Financial Obligations Hearing] were Ordinance 275, Ordinance 2007-01, and Ordinance 2022-02.” Appellant’s Am. 1361 Br. at 40. However, in the Financial Obligations Order, the trial court stated that it “took judicial notice of all the Town’s codified ordinances which were in place when the Town filed its lawsuit in June 2010, including those upon which the Town relied in its claims against [Hoagland].” Appellant’s 1361 App. Vol. II at 109. [38] Although not included in Hoagland’s Appeal 1361 Appendix or Supplemental Appendix, the version of Chapter 51 of the Clear Lake Code in effect when the Town initiated the 2010 Cause is in the Record. On March 12, 2021, the Town filed an affidavit from the Town’s Clerk-Treasurer Jessica Swander with the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1361, 25A-PL-3170 | June 22, 2026 Page 21 of 58  relevant version of Chapter 51 attached thereto. Appellee’s 1361 Addend. at 3– 5, 16–35. 6 The version of Section 51.52(A)(3) in effect in 2010 was originally