Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Nov 16 2026, 8:57 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Steuben County, Indiana Plan Commission, Appellants-Respondents Todd and Sara Barile, Husband and Wife; Brian and Terri Richards, Husband and Wife; Jared and Michelle Widenhoefer, Husband and Wife; Kameron and Abby Meyer, Husband and Wife; Jeffrey and Lori Wagner, Husband and Wife; Ronald and Paula Laurent, Husband and Wife; Dorick Rudolph and Cynthia Baker, as Joint Tenants with Rights of Survivorship; Brian W. Strahm Revocable Living Trust, Dated August 7, 2020; and Christopher A. and Nancy E. Graham, Husband and Wife, Appellants-Intervening-Respondents v. 3rd Basin, LLC, Appellee-Petitioner Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 1 of 21 November 16, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-PL-490 Appeal from the Steuben Circuit Court The Honorable Jeremy T. Musser, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 76C01-2505-PL-265 Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judges Bradford and Felix concur. Tavitas, Chief Judge. Case Summary [1] The Steuben County Plan Commission (“Plan Commission”) and a group of intervening neighboring property owners (“Intervenors”) appeal the trial court’s grant of a petition for judicial review filed by 3rd Basin, LLC (“3rd Basin”). This litigation concerns the Plan Commission’s conditional grant of 3rd Basin’s application for primary approval of a subdivision plat. 3rd Basin argued that the Plan Commission erred by imposing a condition on the grant of the application and filed a petition for judicial review. We conclude that the trial court erred by granting 3rd Basin’s petition for judicial review. Accordingly, we reverse. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 2 of 21 Issue [2] The Plan Commission and Intervenors raise two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred by granting 3rd Basin’s petition for judicial review. Facts [3] This litigation involves the Plan Commission’s conditional approval for 3rd Basin’s proposed subdivision primary plat on the shores of Crooked Lake in Steuben County. As the matter turns on the interpretation of relevant statutes and ordinances, we begin by setting out the relevant Steuben County Ordinances. A. Relevant Steuben County Ordinances 1. Steuben County Subdivision Control Ordinance [4] The Steuben County Subdivision Control Ordinance (“Subdivision Control Ordinance”) provides that the Plan Commission has “all the powers and duties with respect to primary and secondary plats of subdivisions[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 107 (Preamble and Enacting Clause). The Subdivision Control Ordinance “shall be held to be the minimum requirements for the protection of the public health, safety, and general welfare . . . .” Id. at 107 (Preamble and Enacting Clause) (emphasis added); see also id. at 125 (Section 8.1(a)). In addition to the requirements established in the Subdivision Control Ordinance, “all subdivision plats shall comply with” all applicable state and local statutory provisions and “[t]he County Zoning Ordinance[.]” Id. at 109 (Section Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 3 of 21 3.1(a)(2)). Where any provision of the Subdivision Control Ordinance “imposes restrictions [different] from those imposed by any other provision of this Ordinance, any other ordinance, rule or regulation, or other provision of Law, whichever provisions are more restrictive or impose higher standards, shall control.” Id. at 125 (Section 8.1(b)(1)) (emphasis added). Section 3.1(b) of the Subdivision Control Ordinance provides: “Plat approval may be withheld if a subdivision is not in conformity with the above guides and requirements, or with the policies and purposes of these Regulations.” Id. at 109. [5] In general, the approval process for a major subdivision, which is at issue here, requires several steps. First, an application for primary approval of a preliminary plat is submitted, and public hearings are held. The Subdivision Control Ordinance provides that the Plan Commission shall “grant primary approval, primary approval with conditions, disapprove the plat, or table the plat for more information.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 61. If the Plan Commission approves the primary plat, construction plans are submitted, and the Plan Director “shall immediately refer these plans to the appropriate agencies of the participating jurisdictions for review.” Id. If the construction plans are approved by the appropriate agencies, an application for secondary approval of the plat is submitted and considered by the Plan Commission. The secondary approval request must “[t]otally comply with the Ordinance and terms and conditions of primary approval.” Id. at 62. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 4 of 21 2. Steuben County Zoning Ordinance [6] 3rd Basin’s property at issue here is zoned Lake Residential. The Steuben County Zoning Ordinance (“Zoning Ordinance”) establishes the following regarding this zoning district: The LR, Lake Residence District, is established to include residential neighborhoods in the proximity of bodies of water. These areas are characterized by environmental sensitivity and are subject to heavy recreational use. Uses in the LR District are limited to residential and certain water-related and recreational- related uses compatible with both the nearby development and the local, environmentally sensitive land. The regulations of this district are intended to ensure infill development is consistent with the character of established lakefront neighborhoods, is compatible with the size, scale, setback, and architectural character of surrounding homes, does not overbuild small lots and minimizes impacts to views. Id. at 70. [7] In the Lake Residential district, common use lake access lots require “Special Exception approval” from the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”). Id. at 70-71. Section 17.01 of the Zoning Ordinance provides: “A use listed in a zoning district as a special exception use may only be established or expanded with the approval of the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) following the procedures and requirements of this chapter.” Id. at 74. Section 9.10(b) concerns common use lake access lots and provides: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 5 of 21 Common Use Riparian/Lake Access Lots (1) The intent of this provision is to minimize the impacts of Back lot Development on the Shoreline. Further, it is the intent of this provision to: a. discourage the funneling of lake access for multiple residences through narrow access points, b. establish a balanced and orderly relationship between development and the amount of Shoreline available for use by residents, and c. assure responsible “lake access” for Lakefront Development. (2) This section shall apply to lakefront or back lot development, including, lake front access points, lake front recreational areas, beaches, parks, [and] playgrounds that have been designated as a common area or access point, in all zoning districts. This section shall apply to common areas lakefront or back lot developments created as part of a residential subdivision . . . . (3) Where a parcel of land contiguous to a natural body of water is proposed for residential development, a commonly owned area bordering on the body of water may be dedicated for recreational purposes. ***** Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 6 of 21 (4) Common use waterfront lots shall not be used for public marinas, public beaches or commercial recreational use operated for profit. (5) The design, operation and use of the common waterfront lot shall not impair the natural appearance of the land, overcrowd the lake surface or produce unreasonable noise or annoyance to surrounding properties. ***** Id. at 72. B. 3rd Basin’s Proposed Plat Application [8] 3rd Basin owns 23.63 acres in Steuben County near Crooked Lake (“Property”), and the Property is zoned Lake Residential. 3rd Basin desires to subdivide the Property into a thirty-two-lot major subdivision entitled Shores of Crooked Lake. The lots would share access to the lake through a single access point, designated as “Common Area A,” together with a large, proposed pier. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 33. Only two of the lots would have direct lake access. Id. The proposed plat presents a “funneling” configuration in which lake access for the non-waterfront lots is concentrated to one common access point. [9] On March 6, 2025, 3rd Basin filed an application with the Plan Commission for primary approval of a preliminary subdivision plat. A hearing was held before the Plan Commission on April 2, 2025. Funneling was a concern raised by remonstrators. During the hearing, 3rd Basin’s counsel stated: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 7 of 21 We were advised today that there would be needed a special exception for the common use dock. We understand that. That was the first we had heard of it. But that is the part of the ordinance where all of your anti-funneling provisions are in, and so those are the criteria upon which that special exception is to be reviewed. This was never flagged before really earlier as an extra step, but we’re willing to go through with that. Id. at 133. Ultimately, at the hearing, the Plan Commission approved the primary plat on the condition that 3rd Basin obtain a special exception as required by the Zoning Ordinance. The Plan Commission later issued the following written findings: 5. The Plat submitted by 3rd Basin, LLC, complies with the improvement standards of the Steuben County Subdivision Control Ordinance and there has been no evidence presented that they are not in compliance. 6. The Petitioners, 3rd Basin, LLC, have consented to a special exception for a common-use dock. The Steuben County Plan Commission gives primary plat approval conditioned upon 3rd Basin, LLC, obtaining a special exception for a common-use dock. Id. at 186-88. [10] In May 2025, 3rd Basin filed its petition for judicial review, challenging the condition imposed by the Plan Commission. 3rd Basin argued that Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-702 did not allow the Plan Commission to impose the special exception condition on the primary plat and that it was prejudiced by Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 8 of 21 the Plan Commission’s decision. Intervenors filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court granted. Additionally, the trial court took judicial notice of the Zoning Ordinance and the Subdivision Control Ordinance in existence as of March 6, 2025. [11] After briefing and a hearing on 3rd Basin’s petition for judicial review, the trial court granted the petition. The trial court found: 40. As noted above, the Plan Commission stated in its findings that 3rd Basin complied with the plat procedures for primary approval. The Plan Commission further found that the submitted plat complied with the improvement standards of the Subdivision Control Ordinance, and that no evidence was presented that 3rd Basin was not in compliance. 41. The Court agrees with 3rd Basin that the plain reading of IC § 36-7-4-702(d) indicates the General Assembly intended to limit the conditions that may be placed upon a primary plat approval to the enumerated subsections. “May specify” is construed to mean that the imposition of a condition is discretionary, but if the commission chooses to impose a condition, it must fall within subjections [sic] (1) – (5). The Court finds that the Respondents’ interpretation of the statute is not reasonable. 42. If the General Assembly intended to allow the commission to impose any condition not specifically enumerated or found in other ordinances, it would have used a phrase such as “reasonable conditions.” As noted by 3rd Basin, the General Assembly has employed similar language in other statutes. (See IC § 36-7-4-918.2, IC § 36-7-4-918.4, IC § 36-7-4-1405, and IC § 36-7-4-1512). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 9 of 21 43. While 3rd Basin may be required to obtain such a special exception for a common-use dock from the BZA, it is not authorized at the primary plat approval stage under the specific provisions of IC § 36-7-4-702(d). 44. In making a finding of 3rd Basin’s compliance, but then imposing the condition at the primary plat approval stage, the Plan Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in excess of its statutory authority. 45. The Plan Commission had a ministerial duty to review, and once it found that the plat complied, it had a mandatory duty to approve. 46. Because the Plan Commission imposed an unauthorized condition, 3rd Basin’s plat was not granted the primary approval required for it to proceed to secondary plat approval. As such, 3rd Basin has been prejudiced. Appellants’ App. Vol. III pp. 198-99 (emphasis in original). The trial court also found that 3rd Basin did not consent to the special exception requirement. The trial court remanded with instructions that the Plan Commission “remove from its findings any reference to: (1) conditioning approval on obtaining a special exception for the common-use dock; and (2) 3rd Basin’s purported consent to that condition.” Id. at 202. The Plan Commission and Intervenors now appeal. Discussion and Decision I. Standard of Review [12] The Plan Commission and Intervenors bring this appeal from the trial court’s grant of judicial review of the Plan Commission’s decision. Indiana Code Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 10 of 21 Section 36-7-4-715(a) provides that the “[p]rimary approval or disapproval of a plat” and the “[i]mposition of a condition on primary approval of a plat” are “final decisions of the plan commission that may be reviewed as provided by” Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-1016. Such final decisions of a plan commission under the subdivision control statutes are subject to judicial review “in the same manner as that provided for the appeal of a final decision of the board of zoning appeals[.]” Ind. Code § 36-7-4-1016. [13] The appeal of a decision of a board of zoning appeals is subject to Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-1614(d), which provides: The court shall grant relief under section 1615 of this chapter only if the court determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been prejudiced by a zoning decision that is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial evidence. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 11 of 21 3rd Basin had the “burden of demonstrating the invalidity of [the Plan Commission] decision[.]” Ind. Code § 36-7-4-1614(a). [14] The trial court and this Court both review the Plan Commission’s decision with the same standard of review. St. Charles Tower, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Evansville-Vanderburgh Cnty., 873 N.E.2d 598, 600 (Ind. 2007). “For questions of fact, we uphold agency findings that are supported by substantial evidence.” Noblesville, Indiana Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. FMG Indianapolis, LLC, 217 N.E.3d 510, 513 (Ind. 2023). “For mixed questions of law and fact, we review agency conclusions for their reasonableness.” Id. “And for questions of law, we decide independently whether the agency action is contrary to law, including whether the agency ‘stayed within its jurisdiction and conformed to the statutory standards and legal principles involved in producing its decision, ruling, or order.’” Id. (quoting Ind. Off. of Util. Consumer Couns. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 200 N.E.3d 915, 918 (Ind. 2023)). [15] The issues presented here require this Court to interpret the relevant statutes and ordinances. “[W]e do not defer to agency decisions on legal questions,” and we review the relevant statutes and ordinances de novo. Id. at 514. We use the same methodology to interpret ordinances as we do to interpret statutes. Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind. 2011). “The first step in statutory interpretation is determining if the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question.” Id. “‘When those words are clear and unambiguous, we simply apply their plain meaning, without resorting to other canons of statutory construction.’” Willow Haven on 106th St., Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 12 of 21 LLC v. Nagireddy, 252 N.E.3d 418, 425 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Ind. Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales, 217 N.E.3d 517, 524 (Ind. 2023)). “If possible, every word must be given effect and meaning, and no part should be held to be meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the ordinance [or statute].” Siwinski, 949 N.E.2d at 828. “[I]f a statute contains ambiguity that allows for more than one interpretation, it opens itself up to judicial construction to effect the legislative intent.” Id. II. The trial court erred by granting 3rd Basin’s petition for judicial review. A. The Plan Commission’s Order implicates the common use lake access provisions of the Zoning Ordinance. [16] Before addressing the parties’ arguments, we must address a point of contention in the parties’ briefing. The Plan Commission gave “primary plat approval conditioned upon 3rd Basin, LLC, obtaining a special exception for a common- use dock.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 188 (emphasis added). The Zoning Ordinance, however, requires special exception approval of “common use riparian/lake access lots” in Lake Residential Zoning Districts and does not specifically mention common use docks. Appellants’ App. Vol. III pp. 70-72. 3rd Basin argues that only the Department of Natural Resources can regulate a common use dock and contends that the anti-funneling provision is inapplicable here because the common use lake access lot provision was not mentioned in the Plan Commission’s order. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 13 of 21 [17] The Plan Commission argues that 3rd Basin’s argument is “simply form over substance,” and we agree. Appellants’ Reply Br. p. 30. The intent of the special exception requirement and Section 9.10(b) of the Zoning Ordinance is to “discourage the funneling of lake access for multiple residences through narrow access points[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 72. The provision applies to lakefront developments, including lakefront access points, lakefront recreational areas, beaches, parks, and playgrounds, that have been designated as a common area or access point. During the hearing before the Plan Commission, concerns about funneling, lake access, and the common use dock were specifically raised. The entire disagreement regarding the proposed subdivision focused on Common Area A funneling the lake access for multiple residences through one access point. [18] 3rd Basin’s primary plat shows Common Area A as providing the only lakefront access to almost all of the lots in the proposed subdivision with a single common dock attached to Common Area A serving the lots. Although the order refers to a special exception for a common use dock, the parties were well aware that the anti-funneling provision of the Zoning Ordinance was at the heart of the issue. Accordingly, we focus our attention on the common use lake access provision of Section 9.10(b) of the Zoning Ordinance. B. Consideration of the special exception is required under Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-702. [19] The dispute here centers on the timing of BZA approval of a special exception. The Plan Commission granted 3rd Basin’s primary plat on the condition that it Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 14 of 21 obtain a special exception from the BZA regarding the common use lake access provision of Section 9.10(b) of the Zoning Ordinance. 3rd Basin concedes that “[t]he anti-funneling provisions and the special exception they require come into play later on in the process, not as a condition of primary approval.” Appellee’s Br. p. 23. Accordingly, 3rd Basin concedes that the special exception requirement is applicable later in the process; 3rd Basin merely argues that the special exception was not required for the primary plat approval. We disagree. [20] Under Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-701, the Plan Commission “has exclusive control” over the approval of plats within its jurisdiction. The parties’ arguments here focus on Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-702, which governs the Plan Commission’s consideration of primary approval of plats and provides: (a) In determining whether to grant primary approval of a plat, the plan commission (or plat committee acting on the commission’s behalf) shall determine if the plat or subdivision qualifies for primary approval under the standards prescribed by the subdivision control ordinance. (b) The subdivision control ordinance must specify the standards for determining whether a plat qualifies for primary approval. The ordinance must include standards for: (1) minimum width, depth, and area of lots in the subdivision; Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 15 of 21 (2) public way widths, grades, curves, and the coordination of subdivision public ways with current and planned public ways; and (3) the extension of water, sewer, and other municipal services. The ordinance may also include standards for the allocation of areas to be used as public ways, parks, schools, public and semipublic buildings, homes, businesses, and utilities, and any other standards related to the purposes of this chapter. (c) The standards fixed in the subdivision control ordinance under subsection (b) may be waived at the discretion of the plan commission (or plat committee acting on the commission’s behalf); however, to be approved, the plat must still meet all applicable standards prescribed in the zoning ordinance (other than standards modified by variance in accordance with the 900 series of this chapter). As a condition of granting a waiver under this subsection, the commission or committee may allow or require a commitment to be made under section 1015 of this chapter. (d) As a condition of primary approval of a plat, the commission or committee may specify: (1) the manner in which public ways shall be laid out, graded, and improved; (2) a provision for water, sewage, and other utility services; (3) a provision for lot size, number, and location; Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 16 of 21 (4) a provision for drainage design; and (5) a provision for other services as specified in the subdivision control ordinance. [21] The parties focus their arguments exclusively on Indiana Code Section 36-7-4- 702(d). 3rd Basin argues that the special exception is not an allowable condition under Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-702(d), while the Plan Commission argues that the language of Subsection (d) does not limit conditions to the list in Subsection (d)(1)-(5). Inexplicably, however, the parties do not mention Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-702(c) (“Subsection (c)”), which we conclude resolves the issue here. Accordingly, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-702(d). [22] Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-702 specifically applies to the primary plat approval process. Subsection (a) of the statute requires the Plan Commission to determine if the plat “qualifies for primary approval under the standards prescribed by the subdivision control ordinance.” Subsection (b) specifies the standards that the subdivision control ordinance must include and also notes other standards that may be included. Subsection (c) then addresses the waiver of standards from the subdivision control ordinance and provides: The standards fixed in the subdivision control ordinance under subsection (b) may be waived at the discretion of the plan commission (or plat committee acting on the commission’s behalf); however, to be approved, the plat must still meet all applicable standards prescribed in the zoning ordinance (other than standards modified by variance in accordance with the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 17 of 21 900 series of this chapter). As a condition of granting a waiver under this subsection, the commission or committee may allow or require a commitment to be made under section 1015 of this chapter. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Plan Commission may waive subdivision control ordinance standards, but the Plan Commission may not waive zoning standards, other than standards already modified by variance. The statute, thus, unambiguously presupposes that the zoning standards have already been met when the primary plat approval is submitted. [23] Consistent with Subsection (c), the Subdivision Control Ordinance at issue here provides that “all subdivision plats shall comply with” all applicable state and local statutory provisions and “[t]he County Zoning Ordinance.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 109 (emphasis added). The Zoning Ordinance required a special exception for common use lake access lots, like Common Area A at issue here. Accordingly, 3rd Basin was required to have a special exception to meet the Zoning Ordinance standards prior to primary approval of its plat. See, e.g., LBL Dev., LLC v. St. John Plan Comm’n, Town of St. John, 224 N.E.3d 947, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (noting in a case involving primary approval that the plan commission is “responsible for determining whether proposed subdivision plats comply with the technical requirements of that zoning”), trans. denied. [24] Although the Plan Commission would have been within its authority to simply deny or table 3rd Basin’s primary plat application due to the failure to have a special exception, the Plan Commission instead conditioned its approval on 3rd Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 18 of 21 Basin obtaining the special exception. The Plan Commission merely required 3rd Basin to perform a step that 3rd Basin was already required to do. Given the requirements of Subsection (c), we conclude that the Plan Commission’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious, in excess of its statutory authority, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The trial court, accordingly, erred by granting 3rd Basin’s petition for judicial review. C. 3rd Basin was not prejudiced by the Plan Commission’s decision. [25] Alternatively, even if Subsection (c) did not require 3rd Basin to satisfy the special exception prior to requesting primary plat approval, we conclude that 3rd Basin cannot show that it was prejudiced by the Plan Commission’s decision. Indiana Code Section 36-7-4-1614(d) required 3rd Basin to demonstrate that it was “prejudiced” by the Plan Commission’s decision. [26] The Subdivision Control Ordinance required that the secondary plat approval request must “[t]otally comply with the Ordinance and terms and conditions of primary approval.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 62. Compliance with the Subdivision Control Ordinance requires compliance with the Zoning Ordinance, including the common use lake access provision and the need for a special exception. It is clear that secondary approval of the plat could not be granted until 3rd Basin obtained the special exception. The Plan Commission’s conditional approval merely imposed a condition that 3rd Basin was already required to meet. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 19 of 21 [27] 3rd Basin argues that it was prejudiced because the special exception condition “discounts the possibility that 3rd Basin may proceed with its approval without a common-use dock.” Appellee’s Br. p. 40. 3rd Basin, thus, contends that it could remove the dock, eliminate the need for the special exception, and proceed with secondary plat approval. We do not find support for 3rd Basin’s argument in the Zoning Ordinance. As we have noted, the concern with the common dock related to Section 9.10(b), which addresses funneling concerns and required a special exception for common use lake access lots. Section 9.10(b) applies to lakefront development areas, including lakefront access points, like Common Area A. Even if 3rd Basin removed the dock, Common Area A remains and would require a special exception. [28] Under these circumstances, we cannot ascertain how 3rd Basin was prejudiced by the conditional approval of its primary plat. Regardless of the timing, 3rd Basin was required to obtain a special exception before requesting secondary approval of its plat. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it determined that 3rd Basin was prejudiced and erred by granting 3rd Basin’s petition for judicial review. Conclusion [29] The trial court erred by granting 3rd Basin’s petition for judicial review. Accordingly, we reverse. [30] Reversed. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 20 of 21 Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS Robert W. Eherenman Hannah L. Alderks HallerColvin PC Fort Wayne, Indiana Donald J. Stuckey Auburn, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Patrick R. Hess Brian C. Heck Caleb R. Patterson Beckman Lawson, LLP Fort Wayne, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-490 | November 16, 2026 Page 21 of 21